{ "id": 4288313, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS LIGON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ligon", "decision_date": "2009-06-24", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201407\u20141991", "first_page": "988", "last_page": "1000", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "392 Ill. App. 3d 988" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "417 U.S. 600", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1519804 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" }, { "page": "353-54" }, { "page": "2246" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "353-54" }, { "page": "2446" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 U.S. 353", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765282 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "814" }, { "page": "816" }, { "page": "814" }, { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 N.W.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "462 Mich. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1251309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/462/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 U.S. 605", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8209670 ], "weight": 32, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616-17" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "2590" }, { "page": "616-17" }, { "page": "2590" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "560" }, { "page": "2587" }, { "page": "610" }, { "page": "560" }, { "page": "2586-87" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "2592" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "2592" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "2592" }, { "page": "619, 624" }, { "page": "565, 568" }, { "page": "2592, 2594" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "2593" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "2593-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/545/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3606913 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 U.S. 551", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6218288 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555", "parenthetical": "\"the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further\"" }, { "page": "545", "parenthetical": "\"the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further\"" }, { "page": "1993", "parenthetical": "\"the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/481/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604764 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302617 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725341 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451151 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148-49" }, { "page": "148-49" }, { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034168 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" }, { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8449055 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223616 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549473 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263480 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0109-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1145, "char_count": 34334, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.666970501906556e-08, "percentile": 0.2926948636773804 }, "sha256": "965ff4e8fd54d37850a5eea4b81e103c78152cd00628e837f30236c2a3e6b9bb", "simhash": "1:9be61d9e7422f5fb", "word_count": 5629 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:50.333780+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS LIGON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Dennis Lig\u00f3n, was found guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 4(a)(3) (West 2004)) and sentenced to natural life in prison as an habitual offender. On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence but declined to rule on two of his claims regarding ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, finding that those issues could be more appropriately addressed in a proceeding for postconviction relief. People v. Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d 109 (2006). The defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, but did not raise the two issues that this court declined to adjudicate. The circuit court summarily dismissed defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition, and this appeal followed. On appeal, defendant contends that the due process and equal protection clauses of the constitution required that defendant have legal counsel appointed to assist him in preparing his postconviction petition. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nDefendant\u2019s trial on a charge of aggravated vehicular hijacking was held on April 2 and 3, 2003. The defendant was represented by assistant public defenders (APD) Anthony Thomas and Camille Cala-brese. On April 2, 2003, before opening statements, APD Thomas informed the court that he intended to call defendant\u2019s son, Dennis Compton, as a witness, stating that he had interviewed Compton for the first time the previous day. The prosecutor did not object, stating that she also had the opportunity to speak with Compton the day before.\nIn her opening statement, APD Calabrese told the jury that this would be a \u201ctext book case of misidentification,\u201d stating that the jury would hear that defendant\u2019s son, Dennis Compton, is almost his father\u2019s look-alike and that the jury would learn that \u201cthe actual story behind this case is of a father who is protecting his son.\u201d APD Cala-brese told the jury \u201cwe believe we are going to be able to produce Dennis Compton for you\u201d and expressed confidence that, after hearing Compton\u2019s testimony, the jury would have a reasonable doubt as to defendant\u2019s guilt. Defense counsel said that defendant \u201cmay be guilty of protecting his son[,] but that doesn\u2019t mean that he\u2019s guilty of having [taken] this automobile.\u201d\nThe State presented several witnesses at trial. Ana Diaz testified that on December 16, 2000, at 1:15 p.m., she drove her red Ford pickup truck into the Sears parking lot at 6153 South Western Avenue in Chicago. Diaz parked and was getting out of her truck when defendant approached from behind, blocked her into her truck, and told her to leave the keys in the ignition and get out. Diaz felt defendant push something into her ribs. Then she heard a click, looked down and saw a gun in defendant\u2019s hand. Diaz screamed, handed defendant her keys and moved away from the truck. Defendant got in the truck and drove away. On January 3, 2001, Diaz went to the police station to view a lineup. She identified defendant as the man who stole her truck and made an in-court identification of defendant at trial\nHumberto Perez testified that on December 16, 2000, at 1:15 p.m., he was walking to his car in the Sears parking lot. When Perez got into his car, he heard a scream coming from the direction of a red truck. Perez drove over to Diaz, who told him that her truck had been stolen. Perez followed the red truck for several blocks but lost it when it ran a red light. Perez was not able to identify defendant as the man in the truck but testified that the offender was an African-American man with a light complexion and 5 feet 9 inches or 6 feet tall.\nGeorgio Dawson, a 13-year-old boy, testified that he knew defendant through his mother. On January 2, 2001, at 8 p.m., defendant was babysitting Dawson while his mother was at work. Defendant and Dawson went for a ride in defendant\u2019s red Ford truck. Dawson had also ridden in the truck a few weeks earlier when defendant drove Dawson and his mother to the grocery store. Defendant and Dawson picked up a man Dawson described as \u201cdark\u201d and \u201cbald\u201d and then stopped while defendant talked to a woman named Tenita. Defendant told Tenita that he would pick her up later that evening. Defendant and Dawson then dropped off the dark, bald man and picked up defendant\u2019s son, Dennis Compton. Dawson testified that Compton looked like his father but was smaller in height and stature. After dropping Compton off, defendant and Dawson picked up Tenita. Defendant then dropped Dawson off at defendant\u2019s girlfriend\u2019s house and told Dawson he would be back in 40 minutes to pick him up. Several hours later, Dawson heard a horn honking, looked out of the window and saw the red truck. Dawson got into the truck and saw that Tenita was in the truck, but defendant was not. Shortly afterwards, a police car approached, and the police officer told Dawson and Tenita to get out of the truck. The officer searched the truck and found a BB gun. Dawson identified the BB gun at trial. Dawson told the officer that the driver of the truck was named Dennis and went with the police to look for defendant, who was found near an elevated train station. Dawson testified that, at all times, defendant was driving the truck and that he never saw Compton driving the truck.\nTenita Barber testified that, though she had seen defendant driving a red truck several times at the end of December 2000, she first spoke with defendant on December 31, 2000. Barber next saw defendant driving the red truck on January 2, 2001, at 9 p.m. Defendant was with Dawson and a man whom Barber also described as \u201cdark\u201d and \u201cbald.\u201d Defendant told Barber that he would come back to pick her up at 10:45 p.m. Tenita testified that when defendant returned to pick her up at about 11 p.m., only defendant and Dawson, whom defendant introduced as his stepson, were in the truck. Defendant and Tenita dropped Dawson off and then drove around, drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. Defendant told Tenita that he had just bought the truck. A few hours later, defendant and Tenita drove back to pick up Dawson. Defendant honked the horn but got out of the truck when Dawson did not come out of the apartment. After defendant had walked away from the truck, Dawson came out and got into the truck. Shortly afterwards, the police arrived and asked Dawson and Barber to get out of the truck. As they were searching the truck, Barber heard the police officers say that they found a BB gun. Barber was arrested and charged with criminal trespass to a vehicle.\nOfficer Eric Helson testified that on January 3, 2001, at 5:10 a.m., he and his partner were on duty when they noticed another patrol car stopped near a red Ford truck. After talking to the officer who had arrived on the scene earlier and Dawson and Barber, Officer Helson and his partner took Dawson to look for defendant. Defendant was found standing near the entrance to an elevated train station about a block and a half from the red truck. Officer Helson stated that the defendant identified himself as \u201cDennis,\u201d and he was placed under arrest.\nDuring its case, the defense did not call defendant\u2019s son, Dennis Compton, to testify or otherwise display his likeness to the jury. In his closing argument, APD Thomas stated \u201cMs. Calabrese told you in the beginning that this was a classic case of misidentification. That is what this case is about. *** According to Tanita [sic] Barber she says that Compton is 5, 8. Well that\u2019s pretty close to the Dennis she\u2019s describing, but not to Dennis Lig\u00f3n. When you saw him just now, you could see that he is closer to 6, 1 not 5, 9 or 5, 8 like Dennis Compton. There was a Dennis there, but it wasn\u2019t Dennis Lig\u00f3n.\u201d\nIn its closing statement, the State told the jurors that \u201cwhat you heard at the start of this trial by Defense Counsel was that you were going to hear about a classical case of misidentification. *** A classical case of misidentification? Where is the evidence of that?\u201d\nAfter deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking. Defendant filed a pro se motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that he was charged with an unconstitutionally vague statute, that the police knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence, and that he had not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also requested a hearing on whether defense counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss defendant\u2019s indictment, quash defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress suggestive identification evidence, for not challenging the destruction of exculpatory evidence, not calling witnesses to testify to the misidenti-fication of defendant and not consulting defendant before making statements during opening arguments that defendant contended admitted his guilt.\nThe public defender also filed a motion alleging that a new trial was warranted because the State made prejudicial comments during closing argument, defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and no evidence was presented at trial that the BB gun was used as a bludgeon, as averred in defendant\u2019s indictment. The trial court subsequently allowed the public defender\u2019s office to withdraw and appointed Steven Decker as defendant\u2019s counsel.\nDecker filed a supplemental motion for a new trial, which incorporated defendant\u2019s pro se motion and the public defender\u2019s motion. Decker\u2019s motion also alleged, in part, that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call Compton as a witness after indicating that they would do so during opening statements and for failing to explain his nonappearance.\nOn April 13, 2004, at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, APD Thomas testified that prior to defendant\u2019s trial, he developed a trial strategy of misidentification because the witnesses\u2019 descriptions of the perpetrator of the vehicular hijacking more closely resembled Dennis Compton than the defendant. Thomas testified that he interviewed Compton on the day before the trial started and on the first day of the trial. Thomas testified that during their conversations, Compton contradicted himself several times and made statements that led Thomas to believe that he would be suborning perjury if he put Compton on the witness stand. Another factor in his decision not to present Compton to the jury was the fact that on the day Compton was to testify, he was arrested on a charge of intimidating the prosecution\u2019s teenage witness, Georgio Dawson, and Thomas was concerned that the arrest would come out at trial and hurt defendant\u2019s case. The day before the trial started, Thomas told defendant that he believed Compton would not be a good witness in his case because of Compton\u2019s inconsistent version of events, his inappropriate manner of dressing and speaking, and his tattoos, but that he would call Compton to testify if defendant so requested. Defendant agreed that Thomas should not call Compton to testify.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. At sentencing, the State presented certified copies of two of defendant\u2019s prior convictions, and he was sentenced to life in prison as an habitual offender.\nDefendant appealed his conviction to this court, contending that: (1) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) there was a fatal variance between his indictment and the proof submitted at trial; (3) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorneys said in opening statements that they would produce defendant\u2019s look-alike son, Dennis Compton, at trial and would show that Compton lived near where the truck was recovered but failed to do so; (4) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate the case prior to trial when he did not interview Compton until after the trial had begun; (5) defense counsel was ineffective because he did not have a reasonable basis to believe that Compton would testify when he made his opening remarks; (6) defendant was denied a fair trial because of comments made by the State in its closing argument; and (7) section 33B \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1 (West 2002)), pursuant to which defendant was sentenced to natural life, deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury and to due process.\nOn March 30, 2006, this court issued an opinion affirming defendant\u2019s conviction. People v. Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d 109 (2006). This court rejected defendant\u2019s contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorneys stated during opening statements that they would produce Compton and then failed to do so, finding that trial counsel\u2019s decision was a matter of sound trial strategy. Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 121. However, the court declined to adjudicate defendant\u2019s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate the case prior to trial when he did not interview Compton until after trial had begun. Noting that \u201c[t]his issue was not specifically raised in defendant\u2019s posttrial motion and no evidence pertaining to this particular contention was elicited during the hearing on the motion,\u201d this court stated that the issue was more appropriate for consideration in a proceeding for postconviction relief. Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 122. The court also declined to adjudicate \u201cthe very closely related contention that defense counsel was ineffective because he did not have a reasonable basis to believe that Compton would testify when he made his opening remarks to the jury.\u201d Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 122. The court stated \u201c[a]s with defendant\u2019s last contention, we refuse to address this contention because we find that it could more appropriately be addressed in a proceeding for post-conviction relief.\u201d Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 122.\nOn March 8, 2007, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging that the statute used in his sentencing was unconstitutional and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the unconstitutionality of the sentencing statute on appeal. Defendant did not raise the two issues regarding ineffectiveness of trial counsel that this court stated would be appropriate in a post-conviction proceeding. The petition was summarily dismissed. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nDefendant raises only one issue on appeal: whether after this court decided not to adjudicate two of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims finding that they would be more appropriately decided in a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the equal protection and due process clauses of the constitution required that counsel be appointed to help defendant prepare his postconviction petition. Before addressing that issue, however, we must first determine whether, as the State contends, defendant forfeited his ineffective assistance of counsel claims by failing to set them forth in his postconviction petition.\nA. Waiver of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a mechanism by which those under criminal sentences in this state can assert that their convictions were the result of substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution or both. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2006). Proceedings under the Act are commenced by the filing of a petition in the circuit court in which the original proceeding took place. Section 122 \u2014 2 of the Act provides that \u201c[t]he petition shall *** clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner\u2019s constitutional rights were violated.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2 (West 2006). A pro se litigant need only present the gist of a constitutional claim to survive the summary dismissal stage of section 122 \u2014 2.1. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (1988). This threshold is a low one \u2014 defendant need only present a modest amount of detail and need not make legal arguments or cite to legal authority. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996).\nSection 122 \u2014 3 of the Act provides that \u201c[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or amended petition is waived.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 3 (West 2006). Our supreme court has held that although it has the power to excuse an appellate waiver resulting from a failure to include an issue in a postconviction petition, the appellate courts do not. People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 505 (2004). The court expressly stated in Jones, \u201cour appellate court[s] [are] not free, as this court is under its supervisory authority, to excuse, in the context of postconviction proceedings, an appellate waiver caused by the failure of a defendant to include issues in his or her postconviction petition.\u201d People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 508 (2004). As a result, this court may not address the issues defendant failed to raise in his postconviction petition.\nWe reached a similar conclusion based on similar facts in People v. Burns, 332 Ill. App. 3d 189 (2001). In Bums, defendant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted robbery. On appeal, defendant argued that his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to present evidence that one of his accomplices may have been in jail at the time of the crime and that because this information would have discredited his own inculpatory statement, he was prejudiced and should receive a new trial. The appellate court held that defendant\u2019s contention would be more appropriately addressed in a postconviction proceeding, because its disposition required consideration of matters beyond the record on direct appeal. Defendant filed a postconviction petition but failed to raise the ineffectiveness claim. The trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. On defendant\u2019s appeal from that dismissal, this court held that because the defendant failed to raise the ineffective assistance claim in his petition, it was waived pursuant to section 122 \u2014 3 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 3 (West 2006)). Burns, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 191. This court also rejected defendant\u2019s argument that his failure to raise the issue in his postconviction petition was due to his scant educational background, because the record showed that defendant was fully competent to stand trial, that competency was never raised as an issue, and his postconviction petition exhibited a full understanding of his case and his legal rights. Burns, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 92.\nSimilarly, in this case this court explicitly stated in its March 30, 2006, opinion that defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel arguments \u201ccould more appropriately be addressed in a proceeding for postconviction relief.\u201d Lig\u00f3n, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 122. By failing to raise those claims in his pro se postconviction petition, the defendant has waived them, and this court does not have authority to excuse that waiver.\nDefendant is not without recourse, however. \u201cA defendant who fails to include an issue in his original or amended postconviction petition, although precluded from raising the issue on appeal from the petition\u2019s dismissal, may raise the issue in a successive petition if he can meet the strictures of the \u2018cause and prejudice\u2019 test.\u2019 \u201d People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 148-49 (2004). \u201cUnder this test, the defendant must demonstrate \u2018cause\u2019 for failing to raise the error in prior proceedings and actual \u2018prejudice\u2019 resulting from the claimed error.\u201d Jones, 211 Ill. 2d at 149 citing People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 449 (2001). \u201c \u2018[T]he cause-and-prejudice test is the analytical tool that is to be used to determine whether fundamental fairness requires that an exception be made to section 122 \u2014 3 so that a claim raised in a successive petition may be considered on its merits.\u2019 \u201d Jones, 211 Ill. 2d at 148-49, quoting, People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002).\nB. Defendant\u2019s Right to Appointed Counsel\nThe sole issue raised by defendant in this appeal is whether the equal protection and due process clauses of the constitution required that counsel be appointed to represent him in his postconviction proceeding. In noncapital criminal cases, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2006)) establishes a three-step procedure for a defendant to challenge a conviction based on a substantial denial of constitutional rights. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 471 (2006). If the circuit court determines that a pro se petition states the gist of a constitutional claim, the petition moves to the second stage, where counsel may be appointed if the petitioner so requests and is indigent. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(b), 122 \u2014 4 (West 2006); People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). At the second stage, if a substantial showing of a constitutional violation is made, a third-stage evidentiary hearing is ordered. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 6 (West 2006).\nDefendant concedes that the general rule, as well established by our supreme court and the United States Supreme Court, is that neither fundamental fairness nor due process considerations require that an attorney be appointed for postconviction petitioners. People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 148 (2004); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539, 545, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987) (\u201cthe right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further\u201d). Regarding the appointment of counsel our supreme court has stated:\n\u201cThere is no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in postconviction proceedings; the right to counsel is wholly statutory [citation] and petitioners are only entitled to the level of assistance provided for by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) [citations]. The Act provides for a reasonable level of assistance. [Citation.] To ensure that postconviction petitioners receive this level of assistance, Rule 651(c) imposes specific duties on postconviction counsel.\u201d People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007).\nDefendant contends, however, that in light of the United States Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 162 L. Ed. 2d 552, 125 S. Ct. 2582 (2005), and the \u201cunique circumstances\u201d of his case, the due process and equal protection clauses of the constitution required the appointment of counsel to assist him in preparing his postconviction petition.\nIn Halbert, the Court addressed whether indigent criminal defendants who seek first-tier review in the Michigan Court of Appeals after pleading guilty or nolo contendere have a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Michigan has a two-tier appellate system, consisting of the Michigan Supreme Court, which hears appeals by leave of court, and the Court of Appeals. Prior to 1994, the Court of Appeals adjudicated appeals as of right from all criminal convictions. To reduce the workload of that court, a voter-approved 1994 amendment to the state constitution provided that an appeal by a defendant convicted on a guilty or nolo contendere plea would be heard only by leave of the court.\nThe defendant in Halbert pleaded nolo contendere to two counts of second degree criminal sexual assault. During defendant\u2019s plea colloquy, the trial court advised him of certain instances in which it \u201cmust\u201d or \u201cmay\u201d appoint counsel, but failed to tell him that it could not appoint counsel in other circumstances, including in defendant\u2019s own case should he appeal. Defendant\u2019s counsel requested that defendant\u2019s sentences run concurrently, but the trial court set the sentences to run consecutively. The day after sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion, stating that defendant\u2019s proper remedy was to appeal to the state court of appeals.\nTwice thereafter, the defendant asked the trial court to appoint counsel to help him prepare an application for leave to appeal. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion, citing People v. Bulger, 462 Mich. 495, 506, 614 N.W.2d 103, 108 (2000), in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment\u2019s equal protection and due process clauses do not secure a right to appointed counsel to pursue a discretionary appeal. The defendant then filed a pro se application for leave to appeal and sought, inter alia, remand for appointment of appellate counsel. The court of appeals denied defendant\u2019s application for \u201clack of merit in the grounds presented.\u201d Bulger, 462 Mich, at 121 n.13, 614 N.W.2d at 536 n.13. The Michigan Supreme Court declined review.\nThe United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals and held that the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who seek access to first-tier review in the Michigan Court of Appeals. Hal-bert, 545 U.S. at 616-17, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 564, 125 S. Ct. at 2590. The Court noted that defendant\u2019s case was framed by two prior Supreme Court decisions concerning state-funded appellate counsel, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963), and Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974). In Douglas, the Court held that a state must appoint counsel for an indigent defendant\u2019s first-tier appeal as of right {Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 814, 83 S. Ct. at 816), while in Ross, the Court held that a state need not appoint counsel to aid an indigent person in discretionary appeals to the state\u2019s highest court, or in petitioning for review in the Supreme Court {Ross, 417 U.S. at 615, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 353-54, 94 S. Ct. at 2246).\nMichigan contended that because appeals to its Court of Appeals required leave of court they were discretionary, and pursuant to Ross, counsel need not be appointed. The Court disagreed and found that \u201cDouglas provide[d] the controlling instruction\u201d (Halbert, 545 U.S. at 616-17, 162 L. Ed. at 564, 125 S. Ct. at 2590) because Halbert sought first-tier review on the \u201cmerits\u201d of his conviction and, unlike subsequent appellate stages, his claims had not yet \u201c \u2018been presented by [appellate counsel] and passed upon by an appellate court\u2019 \u201d (Halbert, 545 U.S. at 611, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 560, 125 S. Ct. at 2587, quoting Douglas, 417 U.S. at 356, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 814, 83 S. Ct. at 816). The Court held that such indigent criminal defendants are entitled to appointed counsel pursuant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the constitution. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 610, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 560, 125 S. Ct. at 2586-87.\nDefendant contends that in light of the holding in Halbert, counsel should have been appointed to assist him in preparing his postconviction petition. Defendant argues that by deciding not to consider his claims on direct appeal and relegating them to a postconviction proceeding, this court effectively created a discretionary review process, requiring him to make a preliminary showing of merit before he could secure his first direct review of those claims. Defendant contends that pursuant to Halbert, this procedure can pass constitutional muster only if counsel is appointed to prepare the petition seeking discretionary review. We disagree.\nIn Halbert, the defendant requested that an attorney be appointed to assist in his initial appellate review, and in deciding that counsel should be appointed, the Court contrasted the very different procedural positions of a pro se defendant seeking first-tier review and a pro se defendant seeking second-tier review. The Court stated that a defendant seeking second-tier review will have had the assistance of appellate counsel at his first-tier review and that counsel \u201cwill have reviewed the trial record, researched the legal issues, and prepared a brief reflecting that review and research.\u201d Halbert, 545 U.S. at 619, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 565, 125 S. Ct. at 2592, citing Ross, 417 U.S. at 615, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 353-54, 94 S. Ct. at 2446. That defendant \u201cmay also be armed with an opinion of the intermediate appellate court addressing the issues counsel raised.\u201d Halbert, 545 U.S. at 619, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 565, 125 S. Ct. at 2592. Conversely, \u201ca first-tier review applicant, forced to act pro se, will face a record unreviewed by appellate counsel, and will be equipped with no attorney\u2019s brief prepared for, or reasoned opinion by, a court of review.\u201d Halbert, 545 U.S. at 619, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 565, 125 S. Ct. at 2592. Such a defendant would not have meaningful access to the appellate court system. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 619, 624, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 565, 568, 125 S. Ct. at 2592, 2594.\nThe defendant in this case, unlike the defendant in Halbert, had a direct appeal of his conviction to this court, with the assistance of appointed counsel. Therefore, when preparing his pro se petition, defendant had copies of the petition for leave to appeal drafted by his appellate lawyer, which included 4\u00bd pages on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel and copies of his appellate counsel\u2019s opening and reply briefs. Defendant also had the benefit of the petition for rehearing in which his appellate lawyer argued that defendant\u2019s trial counsel was ineffective. Lastly, defendant had this court\u2019s published opinion, which set forth the two ineffectiveness claims and expressly stated that they could \u201cmore appropriately be addressed in a proceeding for postconviction relief.\u201d Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 122. As a result, defendant had significantly more guidance than the defendant in Halbert, who was seeking first-tier review without the assistance of appellate counsel.\nFurthermore, the defendant in Halbert faced far more daunting legal hurdles than the defendant in the present case. Under Michigan law, the defendant in Halbert was required to state in his application for leave to appeal (1) a concise recitation of his allegations of error and the relief sought; and (2) a concise argument in support of his position on each issue. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 622, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 567, 125 S. Ct. at 2593. The application form provided by the state of Michigan instructed the person seeking appellate review to \u201c 1 \u201cstate the law that supports your position and explain how the law applies to the facts of your case.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Halbert, 545 U.S. at 622, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 567, 125 S. Ct. at 2593-94. Conversely, in this case, although a petition for postconviction relief in Illinois must state the respects in which the petitioner\u2019s constitutional rights were violated (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2 (West 2006)) to survive dismissal at this stage, \u201ca petition need only present the gist of a constitutional claim.\u201d People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996), citing People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 74 (1988). \u201cThis is a low threshold and a defendant need only present a limited amount of detail in the petition. At this stage, a defendant need not make legal arguments or cite to legal authority.\u201d Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418, citing Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 74.\nFor the foregoing reasons, defendant\u2019s position in filing his pro se postconviction petition seeking collateral and second-tier review of his claims was not analogous to the defendant in Halbert, who was seeking first-tier review of his conviction. Defendant had the benefit of court-appointed counsel during his first-tier appeal, and there is no support for his argument that the constitution mandates appointment of counsel for a defendant seeking second-tier, discretionary review. Therefore, we find that the due process and equal protection clauses of the constitution did not require that counsel be appointed to assist defendant in preparing his postconviction petition.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons set forth above, we find that defendant may not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time in this appeal and accordingly affirm the order of the circuit court dismissing defendant\u2019s postconviction petition. We also find, pursuant to People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007), that defendant did not have a constitutional right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel in preparing that petition.\nAffirmed.\nMURPHY, P.J., and COLEMAN, J., concur.\nWe note that when this court issued its opinion in People v. Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d 109 (2006), it mistakenly believed that defense counsel had not interviewed Compton prior to trial. On direct appeal, in its opening brief, the appellate defender stated that defendant\u2019s trial lawyer did not interview Compton until after opening statements. The People\u2019s brief pointed out that defendant had misinterpreted the sequence of events regarding defense attorney\u2019s interview of Compton and in its reply brief, the appellate defender correctly stated that the record established that defendant\u2019s lawyer had actually interviewed Compton one day prior to opening statements. In its Rule 23 order issued on February 2, 2006 (and subsequently withdrawn), this court stated, \u201cWe decline to adjudicate defendant\u2019s *** contention that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate the case prior to trial when he did not interview Compton until after trial had begun.\u201d On March 23, 2006, defendant\u2019s counsel filed a petition for rehearing but did not bring this error to the court\u2019s attention and instead stated, \u201cAs this court acknowledged, defense counsel did not interview Compton until after trial had begun.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Defendant also stated that \u201cthe fact that counsel failed to interview Dennis Compton before the promise [to the jury] was made belies this court\u2019s finding that counsel was effective.\u201d After denying defendant\u2019s petition for rehearing, this court issued its opinion declining to adjudicate two of defendant\u2019s ineffectiveness of counsel claims and incorrectly stating that the record did not contain evidence \u201cthat Compton was, in fact, available to be interviewed prior to commencement of trial.\u201d Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 122.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE QUINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, and Patrick F. Cassidy, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Mary P. Needham, and Owen D. Kalt, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS LIGON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20141991\nOpinion filed June 24, 2009.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, and Patrick F. Cassidy, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Mary P. Needham, and Owen D. Kalt, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0988-01", "first_page_order": 1004, "last_page_order": 1016 }