{ "id": 4288499, "name": "JAMES R. SBARBORO, Independent Adm'r of the Estate of John L. Sbarboro, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RAGHU VOLLALA et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Sbarboro v. Vollala", "decision_date": "2009-06-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201407\u20143236", "first_page": "1040", "last_page": "1058", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "392 Ill. App. 3d 1040" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260345 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880", "parenthetical": "\"it is the function of the jury to weigh contradictory evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and draw ultimate conclusions as to the facts of a case\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429856 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29951 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2832497 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" }, { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909172 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5253393 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2879654 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" }, { "page": "557" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 Ill. App. 3d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4278559 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90-91" }, { "page": "91" }, { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/384/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4270573 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Jones I" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/373/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596242 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4279252 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill App. 3d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272026 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84", "parenthetical": "to the extent any prejudice occurred it was cured by the circuit court's instruction to the jury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910231 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274736 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2598772 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5435843 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3142403 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229700 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" }, { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292317 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602061 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429143 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283602 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/388/0450-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1425, "char_count": 46747, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.60167783687625e-08, "percentile": 0.28860138177940103 }, "sha256": "ec1459561bfd9df856ac85eab8d13f01e6fb0bee2b7aaf5b081c918526508623", "simhash": "1:06be03f07e5b11d3", "word_count": 7687 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:50.333780+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JAMES R. SBARBORO, Independent Adm\u2019r of the Estate of John L. Sbarboro, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RAGHU VOLLALA et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, surviving brother of John Sbarboro and independent administrator of the estate of John Sbarboro, filed a lawsuit alleging medical negligence against defendants, Dr. Raghu Vollala, Dr. Alan B. Spacone, Dr. Alan B. Spacone, Ltd., a Corporation, VHS of Illinois, Inc., d/b/a MacNeal Health Network, MacNeal Hospital, MacNeal Home Care, and MacNeal Hospice (MacNeal Hospital), claiming that Dr. Vollala failed to diagnose and treat the decedent\u2019s aortic dissection. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants and against plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a posttrial motion requesting a new trial, which the circuit court denied. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his posttrial motion for a new trial where: (1) the circuit court allowed evidence of Dr. Vollala\u2019s discharge summary pertaining to the decedent to be presented to the jury despite the fact that the document was not produced to plaintiff until at trial; (2) plaintiff was not allowed to introduce evidence that Dr. Vollala had failed his board-certification examination; and (3) the substantial errors in this case were not harmless because it was a close case on the facts. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn April 21, 2001, John Sbarboro (the decedent) began experiencing chest pain sometime between 9 p.m. and 11 p.m. On April 22, 2001, at about 4:30 a.m., John took a taxi from his home to the emergency room at MacNeal Hospital in Berwyn, Illinois. Dr. Alan Spacone treated John in the emergency room. Defendant Dr. Vollala was the attending physician on call to accept patients who did not have a primary care physician and needed to be admitted to the hospital.\nAt about 10:10 a.m., after several hours in the emergency room, Dr. Vollala admitted John to MacNeal Hospital. At 10:55 a.m., Dr. Vol-lala had John transferred to the telemetry unit for heart monitoring. John continued to experience chest pain and two successive tests for cardiac enzymes were ordered to rule out a myocardial infarction (MI). Both tests came back negative. At about noon, the telemetry nurse telephoned Dr. Vollala and Dr. Vollala examined John at about 1 p.m. At 1:30 p.m., Dr. Kelly Choi, an intensive care unit (ICU) fellow, evaluated John and ordered a third test for cardiac enzymes. At 3:56 p.m., John died at MacNeal Hospital from an aortic dissection, which is a tear in the lining of the aorta.\nAt trial, plaintiff called Dr. Vollala as an adverse witness. Dr. Vol-lala testified that at about 10:10 a.m., on April 22, 2001, he spoke on the telephone with Dr. Spacone from the emergency room. Dr. Spacone informed Dr. Vollala that John was complaining of chest pain, but all of his tests were negative. Dr. Spacone advised Dr. Vollala that he was going to admit John to rule out an MI and have a cardiac fellow see him. At about noon, Dr. Vollala testified that he gave telephone orders to Nurse Karen Manyak on the telemetry floor to give John an injection of 50 milligrams of Demerol every six hours or as needed for back pain. At about 1 p.m., Dr. Vollala saw John, took a history, then transferred John to the ICU and ordered a nitroglycerin drip. Dr. Vol-lala noted in John\u2019s history that he had experienced chest pain for more than five hours prior to admission and complained of retroster-nal pain that sometimes radiated into his left back.\nDr. Vollala testified that the policy at MacNeal Hospital at that time required that when a patient was transferred to the ICU, that patient would be examined by an ICU fellow. Pursuant to this policy, after John was transferred to the ICU, Dr. Kelly Choi was called for a consult. At about 2 p.m., Dr. Choi called Dr. Vollala and told him that an MI had been ruled out and that she had countermanded the ICU transfer order and suggested that John remain in the telemetry unit. Dr. Vollala testified that he agreed that John should be monitored in the telemetry unit and that another set of tests for cardiac enzymes had been ordered by the ICU team.\nDr. Vollala testified that he took John\u2019s history and physical examination but did not chart them at the time. Dr. Vollala agreed that aortic dissection is a potentially life-threatening disease that should be ruled out, but Dr. Vollala testified that he had no reason to suspect that John was suffering from that ailment. Dr. Vollala did not consider ordering a CT or CAT scan which, depending on when it is taken, would have shown evidence of an aortic dissection. The decedent also had an allergy to iodine, which is used during a CAT scan. Dr. Vollala testified that MacNeal Hospital had a policy that required an attending physician to place a discharge summary in the patient\u2019s chart within 24 hours, but he did not remember if he prepared a discharge summary for John. Plaintiffs counsel asked Dr. Vollala, \u201cNowhere in this record is there a discharge summary prepared by you, correct?\u201d Dr. Vollala answered that he could not remember.\nFollowing Dr. Vollala\u2019s adverse examination by plaintiff, counsel for defendant MacNeal Hospital asked for a recess and, outside the presence of the jury, advised the parties and the circuit court to the existence of a discharge summary that was dictated and transcribed in July 2001. Plaintiffs counsel stated that this was the first time that he was shown the discharge summary despite defendant\u2019s counsel receiving notice to produce a complete set of John\u2019s hospital chart. Counsel for defendant MacNeal Hospital indicated that the discharge summary had come to her with the file when her law firm had substituted in as counsel and she had assumed that the discharge summary had been previously produced through discovery. Plaintiffs counsel then requested that the circuit court bar evidence of the discharge summary. At the suggestion of Dr. Vollala\u2019s counsel, the circuit court provisionally barred the use of the discharge summary and decided to revisit the matter the following day after the parties had more time to consider the matter.\nDuring cross-examination by his own attorney, Dr. Vollala testified that he did not see any indication that John had an aortic dissection and the emergency room records did not show any description of pain that was suggestive of an aortic dissection. Dr. Vollala testified that the emergency room records also did not show a history of hypertension or tachycardia. Dr. Vollala testified that a complaint of back pain is not necessarily consistent with an aortic dissection. Dr. Vollala testified that the protocol to rule out an MI is to monitor the patient\u2019s vitals, give the patient a nitroglycerin drip and provide the patient with morphine for pain and beta blockers for a fast heartbeat. A set of cardiac enzymes is performed to rule out myocardiac damage at timed intervals, a second set after six hours, and a third set after nine hours, and two EKGs are then done to rule out damage to the heart.\nDr. Vollala testified that when he saw John, his blood pressure was normal, there was no tachycardia, hemodynamic instability or neurological symptoms and his heart had no murmur. Dr. Vollala testified that John had retrosternal pain, which is a symptom of unstable angina, heart attack or coronary insufficiency, not aortic dissection. Dr. Vollala testified that John\u2019s back pain also responded to Demerol, which is inconsistent with an aortic dissection. Dr. Vollala testified that an aortic dissection is associated with \u201ca very sudden onset [of] sustained and a sheering [sic] ripping pain\u201d that is not usually controlled by pain medication. Dr. Vollala also noted that John\u2019s family had a history of coronary heart disease, which is important because John could have also inherited the same disease. Dr. Vollala testified that he had no disagreement with Dr. Choi over the transfer of John to the telemetry unit or any other order regarding cardiac enzymes.\nThe following day, prior to resuming testimony, Dr. Vollala\u2019s counsel requested a curative instruction. Plaintiff stood on his motion to bar the discharge summary for any use \u201cgiving rise to new opinions or a new basis for any old opinion\u201d by the parties\u2019 experts. Plaintiff also requested a limiting instruction and the opportunity to conduct further adverse examination of Dr. Vollala. Plaintiff made the following statement:\n\u201cI stand on my motion to bar this discharge summary for any use in this trial after today, and why I say that is because this was never given to any of my experts. They never had it in any of my examination of any of the defendants or any of the witnesses throughout discovery including defense expert witnesses.\n***\nIf the Court is inclined to give some type of limiting instruction or explanatory instruction to the jury that the discharge summary does exist, my position would be that the jury also needs to know that this was not produced by the hospital until after Dr. Vollala\u2019s testimony in this courtroom, otherwise the logical inference is that I was trying to confuse or accuse Dr. Vollala of doing something that he didn\u2019t do, and it would draw a negative inference on me; and I think that would be highly prejudicial in the case.\nHowever, now that the discharge summary has been produced and as I read it, I would like to question Dr. Vollala about the discharge summary and some of the matters within the discharge summary. This was his document. For all I know he may have had a copy of this document. And I\u2019ll just say this in passing. In every situation involving the hospital care that I\u2019ve ever been aware of, hospitals routinely send to the attending physician copies of all things that doctors dictate like discharge summaries, history and physicals, as well as reports of laboratories, et cetera. These are commonly \u2014 these documents are usually like three paper copies where one copy goes to medical records, one copy goes somewhere else, and one copy goes to the doctor.\nSo he may have very well had this summary. It\u2019s his document. He dictated it. He should have known that he dictated a discharge summary. We now have it, and it contains material that I was not provided with during discovery that I would have used to question Dr. Vollala; and there\u2019s material in there that I would have used on my adverse examination of Dr. Vollala, and I would like to do that.\u201d\nThe circuit court agreed to give a limiting instruction and granted plaintiff s request to reopen his adverse examination of Dr. Vollala. The court ordered that this examination be conducted in the afternoon in order to provide the parties additional time to prepare. Prior to resuming Dr. Vollala\u2019s adverse examination, the circuit court instructed the jury as follows:\n\u201cAt the close of plaintiffs direct examination of Dr. Vollala counsel for MacNeal Hospital became aware for the first time the hospital had not produced a two page typed written discharge summary, which neither plaintiffs counsel nor counsel for Dr. Vollala had in their possession. *** Hospital counsel immediately brought this to the attention of the Court and all the parties. ***.\nDoes everybody understand that? So based on that then I\u2019m going to allow [plaintiffs counsel] now to ask additional questions of Dr. Vollala because it was turned over last night. So I\u2019m going to allow [plaintiffs counsel] to again question Dr. Vollala based on solely the discharge summary.\u201d\nDr. Vollala testified that a discharge summary is prepared when a patient is going home to explain why the patient came in, what tests were performed, what happened and what instructions the patient was given. Dr. Vollala explained that a discharge summary is only a guideline of what happened to a patient and does not include every detail regarding the patient. Dr. Vollala testified that John\u2019s discharge summary was not signed by him, but that his signature was stamped on it. Dr. Vollala explained that sometimes a summary was prepared by a resident or another doctor familiar with the case and that he usually would review it before his signature was stamped. Dr. Vollala testified that he may have made a mistake when he testified that a summary had to be prepared within 24 hours of discharge and acknowledged that John\u2019s summary was dictated and transcribed on July 25, 2001, three months after John\u2019s death. Dr. Vollala testified that the discharge summary contained errors and that he had not read and corrected it.\nFollowing Dr. Vollala\u2019s testimony, both defendants moved for a mistrial. Plaintiff did not move for a mistrial. Instead, plaintiff stated that he was properly allowed to \u201ctest the credibility\u201d of Dr. Vollala by \u201cfully questioning]\u201d Dr. Vollala regarding the hospital\u2019s policy to prepare discharge summaries. The circuit court denied defendants\u2019 motions for a mistrial.\nDr. Barry Ramo, plaintiffs expert, testified that he is a practicing physician, board certified in both internal medicine and cardiovascular disease. Dr. Ramo testified that he reviewed John\u2019s medical records, as well as the deposition testimony of Drs. Vollala and Choi, and the defense experts. Dr. Ramo opined that when John\u2019s cardiac enzyme tests came back normal, in conjunction with the chest and back pain, an aortic dissection should have become part of Dr. Vollala\u2019s differential diagnosis. Dr. Ramo testified that the record indicated that there was never any consideration given to anything other than John having a coronary problem. Dr. Ramo testified that under the applicable standard of care, at 11:40 a.m. and 1 p.m. on the date of John\u2019s death, Dr. Vollala was obligated to order diagnostic testing to rule out an aortic dissection.\nDr. Ramo also testified that despite John\u2019s reported iodine allergy, by asking John about his allergy and medication, an adverse reaction to the iodine required for a CAT scan could have been prevented. Dr. Ramo testified that the standard of care required Dr. Vollala to discuss a CAT scan with John or consider another diagnostic measure to rule out an aortic dissection. Dr. Ramo testified that under the standard of care, if Dr. Vollala had ordered a CAT scan, the aortic dissection would have been found and treated by a cardiovascular surgeon. Dr. Ramo opined that these deviations from the standard of care caused and contributed to John\u2019s death.\nDr. Samuel Sadow, plaintiffs expert, testified that he was a practicing cardiothoracic surgeon. Dr. Sadow testified that throughout his career, he managed over 125 cases of aortic dissections. Dr. Sadow testified that John had a Type III aortic dissection, which includes signs and symptoms of hypertension, pulse deficits, hypotension, chest pain, paraplegia, paralysis, and tachycardia. Dr. Sadow testified that patients with Type III aortic dissection may complain of back pain that may wax and wane. Dr. Sadow testified that John\u2019s sudden onset of pain was consistent with an aortic dissection, but John also presented signs and symptoms consistent with a myocardial infarction.\nDr. Sadow testified that there are three types of diagnostic tests that can reveal an aortic dissection, which include a CAT scan of the chest, an MRI, and a transesophageal echocardiograph (TEE). An aortic dissection can be treated pharmacologically with beta blockers and fast-acting hypertensive medications given intravenously. Dr. Sa-dow opined that if after an MI had been ruled out, a cardiothoracic surgeon had been called at either noon or 1:30 p.m., then the surgeon could have ordered one of the diagnostic tests and treated John\u2019s aortic dissection, thereby preventing John\u2019s death.\nDuring cross-examination, Dr. Sadow testified that a Type III aortic dissection is an uncommon medical complication in an individual such as John, who was 48 years old and had no long-standing history of hypertension. In 30 years of practice, the only other time that Dr. Sadow recalled seeing a 48-year-old patient with an aortic dissection was a few weeks prior to trial. Dr. Sadow testified that typically the peak incidence of aortic dissection is in the age group of 60 years old. Dr. Sadow testified that a cardiothoracic surgeon, like himself, is usually not consulted until there is a diagnosis or a high index of suspicion when the patient is evaluated. Dr. Sadow testified that John had three documented episodes of high blood pressure over IIV2 hours at Mac-Neal Hospital, but otherwise his blood pressure was within normal limits. Dr. Sadow testified that blood pressure within normal limits would be an uncommon finding in a patient with a Type III aortic dissection. Dr. Sadow testified that John also had a normal heart rate except for a few isolated episodes of a slow rate over IIV2 hours, which one would not expect to see in a younger patient with an aortic dissection. John\u2019s chest X-rays also did not show a widening of the mediastinum, which is one of the signs of an aortic dissection. Dr. Sadow also testified that a patient with an iodine allergy, such as John, can be treated with drugs before undergoing a CT scan, but it is a lengthy process. Dr. Sadow testified that a dissection can rupture, such as in John\u2019s case, even with a diagnosis of aortic dissection and treatment. Dr. Sadow testified that he had never saved the life of a patient whose dissection had ruptured.\nDr. Vollala presented expert testimony from Dr. Gregory Lewis, who was board certified in internal medicine, cardiovascular disease, and cardiac electrophysiology. Dr. Lewis testified that Dr. Vollala complied with the standard of care as it related to John\u2019s treatment and Dr. Vollala\u2019s treatment did not cause or contribute to John\u2019s death. Dr. Lewis explained that a propagating aortic dissection is a tear in the innermost lining of the aorta, so that blood seeps into the wall and causes a longer tear. Dr. Lewis testified that an aortic dissection is uncommon for a 48-year-old patient, such as John. Dr. Lewis testified that John showed no evidence of an aortic dissection on April 22, 2001. John did not exhibit symptoms, where his chest X-ray did not show an enlarged mediastinum, his heart sounds lacked a \u201cwhoosing\u201d sound in other vascular vessels, and he was not hypertensive. John also did not have risk factors associated with an aortic dissection, but John did have risk factors for coronary artery disease.\nDr. Lewis testified that the emergency room plan to admit John to the telemetry floor and treat him for pain was reasonable and it was also reasonable for Dr. Vollala to rely on Dr. Spacone without performing a differential diagnosis at that time. Dr. Lewis testified that nothing in the signs or symptoms raised an issue as to an aortic dissection when John was admitted to the telemetry unit at 11:40 a.m., and an MI had not been ruled out since cardiac enzyme testing was still ongoing. Dr. Lewis testified that the standard of care did not require a CAT scan or cardiothoracic consult and it was appropriate to order the MI protocol.\nDr. Lewis also testified that when John was examined by Dr. Choi in the ICU, an acute coronary syndrome was not ruled out and the plan to continue with cardiac enzyme tests and check for pancreatitis was reasonable. Dr. Lewis further testified that Dr. Vollala conformed with the standard of care when he examined John at 1 p.m. Since John did not exhibit any of the findings that one would expect to see for a propagating aortic dissection, the standard of care did not require Dr. Vollala to consider an aortic dissection and order a CAT scan or cardiothoracic consult. Dr. Lewis testified that John\u2019s dissection ruptured at 3:35 p.m., and he did not show any signs of dissection prior to that time. Dr. Lewis opined that John\u2019s death was caused by the ruptured aorta and no medical treatment could have prevented it.\nDr. Vollala also presented expert testimony from Dr. Robert Breyer, who testified that he was a cardiothoracic surgeon and board-certified thoracic surgeon. Dr. Breyer testified that an aortic dissection is uncommon in this case, where John was 48 years old and had normal blood pressure with no history of hypertension. Dr. Breyer testified that Dr. Vollala met the standard of care in his treatment of John and did not cause or contribute to John\u2019s death. Prior to 3:35 p.m. when the dissection ruptured, John did not present the signs and symptoms of an aortic dissection, such as knife-like, tearing pain, long-standing high blood pressure, a widening of the mediastinum, neurological symptoms, or a loss of pulse in an arm or leg.\nDr. Breyer testified that at noon, it was appropriate for Dr. Vollala to order Demerol for John\u2019s complaints of back spasms. Dr. Breyer testified that a complaint of retrosternal pain sometimes radiating into the left back would not bring an aortic dissection to mind because the pain can be caused by a number of things, including, most commonly in males near the age of 50, a cardiac condition. Dr. Breyer\u2019s opinion was that the standard of care did not require Dr. Vollala to order a CAT scan, TEE, or surgical consult at 11:40 a.m. or 1 p.m. Dr. Breyer explained that nothing that Dr. Choi documented would lead a reasonably well-qualified physician to include an aortic dissection in a differential diagnosis. Dr. Breyer testified that it was reasonable to include pancreatitis in John\u2019s differential diagnosis, which was a more likely explanation for his signs and symptoms.\nDr. Breyer also testified that if a CAT scan had been ordered at noon, John\u2019s death could not have been avoided. Dr. Breyer explained that it would have taken approximately 13 hours for pretreatment of John\u2019s iodine allergy with steroids and antihistamines for an elective CAT scan. Dr. Breyer testified that a TEE would not have changed the outcome because it would not have resulted in any different treatment. Dr. Breyer explained that because John was in the target range for controlling blood pressure and he had a low heart rate, John would have been kept under observation and he was not a candidate for surgery.\nDr. Michael Frank testified as an expert for MacNeal Hospital. Dr. Frank testified that he was a board-certified cardiothoracic surgeon. Dr. Frank testified that Dr. Choi complied with the standard of care and that her care did not cause or contribute to John\u2019s death from the rupture of an aortic dissection. Dr. Frank testified that Dr. Choi\u2019s differential diagnosis of pancreatitis was appropriate and her recommendation that John remain in the telemetry unit was within the standard of care. Dr. Frank testified that Dr. Choi did not have any reason to consider an aortic dissection in her differential diagnosis because John did not present any symptoms of aortic dissection, such as a severe, sharp pain different from that described by John. Dr. Frank testified that Dr. Choi\u2019s recommendation for another set of enzymes and an EKG complied with the standard of care because John still needed to be evaluated for possible acute coronary syndrome.\nDr. Frank testified that the standard of care did not require Dr. Choi to consider a CAT scan when acute coronary syndrome or an MI had not been ruled out and John had no signs of an aortic dissection. Dr. Frank testified that John was atypically young for an aortic dissection. Dr. Frank testified that even if Dr. Choi had considered an aortic dissection after she completed her evaluation at 2 p.m., there would not have been enough time to diagnose and treat the condition before the dissection ruptured at 3:55 p.m. Dr. Frank testified that the treatment for an aortic dissection is to control the pain, heart rate and blood pressure with beta blockers, but the majority of patients with an aortic dissection diagnosis do not survive. Dr. Frank testified that the mortality rate is 40% for even those patients who survive the acute phase.\nDuring closing arguments, plaintiff introduced the discharge summary into evidence and used an enlargement of the document to present arguments before the jury. Plaintiff made the following arguments:\n\u201cWas I confusing to anyone when I had Dr. Vollala on that witness stand? I had to impeach him at least six times with inconsistent statements he made at a deposition, and he now changes his testimony in this courtroom. Was that confusing?\nLet me take the confusion out of that. A person says one thing one day, a person says something completely the opposite the next day. Is that evidence of confusion or is that an absolute lack of credibility? I say it is an absolute lack of credibility.\nDr. Vollala\u2019s version of the events had to be pieced together by others, including his experts, to defend him because his recollection and what he said about what happened here doesn\u2019t make any sense.\n* * *\nWas I confusing when Dr. Vollala is in this witness box and on Monday he tells you all that the hospital has a requirement that a discharge summary be prepared within 24 hours of a patient\u2019s discharge or in this case the death of a patient.\nOn Tuesday he told you when he was confronted with the discharge summary and he was shown that this discharge summary was dictated on July 25th of 2001, some three months later, that, \u2018Oh, well, I was mistaken. There really isn\u2019t a policy. You can dictate these things anytime you want.\u2019 I had to establish through him what is the purpose of a discharge summary. You know, they\u2019re telling you not that, oh, I\u2019m creating all these non-issues in the case. I\u2019m drawing attention to all the non-issues. Well, ladies and gentlemen, a discharge summary is supposed to he just that, a summary of what happened to your patient, what the presenting problems were, what you did for the patient and what was the ultimate response to the treatment. This is to be a permanent record in a patient\u2019s medical chart. If the patient had lived, there may be others down the road, other hospitalizations. Other doctors may need these records and rely upon these records. These are records that have an importance because it is the summary of the total of what transpired during the admission. This was dictated three months after the fact. Was I confusing when I showed this to Dr. Vollala and I say to him, \u2018Well, here now is your discharge summary,\u2019 and he first tells me, \u2018That\u2019s not my summary. All right. Whose summary is it? Oh, some resident dictated this. Who? I don\u2019t know. Well, that\u2019s your signature on the bottom. No, that\u2019s not my signature. That\u2019s my stamp. Well, you reviewed this before you put your stamp on it? No, I never reviewed it.\u2019\nWe\u2019re talking about credibility of witnesses in this case and who\u2019s to be believed and not. *** I think this was Dr Vollala\u2019s summary that he now is not willing to take credit for, and maybe the reason being is three months after the fact when a summary is being dictated about events that ended up in a bad result at the hospital.\u201d\nFollowing deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in the defendants\u2019 favor and the circuit court entered judgment on that verdict. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial alleging, inter alia, that he was entitled to a new trial due to the late disclosure of the discharge summary and where he was not allowed to introduce evidence that Dr. Vollala had failed his board-certification examination.\nIn a 19-page written order, the circuit court denied plaintiffs motion for a new trial. In doing so, the circuit court stated that it was \u201cpuzzled by plaintiffs claim of prejudice where plaintiffs counsel was granted all the relief he requested\u201d with respect to the discharge summary. The circuit court found that plaintiff failed to show that the late disclosure of the discharge summary or any of the other alleged discovery violations caused the jury to base its verdict on passion or prejudice and not on the evidence. The circuit court also determined that the fact that Dr. Vollala failed his board-certification examination was irrelevant since Dr. Vollala did not provide standard of care testimony or any other opinions as an expert. Plaintiff now appeals.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. The Discharge Summary\nPlaintiff first contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial where plaintiff was prejudiced by Dr. Vollala\u2019s testimony regarding the discharge summary that was produced at trial.\nThe standard which we must apply regarding the trial court\u2019s decision to deny plaintiffs motion for a new trial, is abuse of discretion. Bosco v. Janowitz, 388 Ill. App. 3d 450, 461 (2009). A new trial is granted only \u201c \u2018if the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\u2019 \u201d Bosco, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 461, quoting Mizowek v. De Franco, 64 Ill. 2d 303, 310 (1976). A verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence \u201cwhen the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or when the jury\u2019s findings prove to be unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence.\u201d York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke\u2019s Medical Center, 222 Ill. 2d 147, 179 (2006). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must consider \u201c \u2018whether the jury\u2019s verdict was supported by the evidence and whether the losing party was denied a fair trial.\u2019 \u201d Bosco, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 461, quoting Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 455-56 (1992).\nHere, defendants argue that plaintiff forfeited this issue where plaintiff requested and consented to the circuit court\u2019s ruling regarding the discharge summary document.\n\u201c \u2018It is fundamental to our adversarial process that a party waives his right to complain of an error where to do so is inconsistent with the position taken by the party in an earlier court proceeding.\u2019 \u201d McMath v. Katholi, 191 Ill. 2d 251, 255 (2000), quoting Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 537, 543 (1984). A party cannot complain of error which he induced the court to make or to which he consented. McMath, 191 Ill. 2d at 255. \u201c \u2018The rationale of this rule is obvious. It would be manifestly unfair to allow one party a second trial upon the basis of error which he injected into the proceedings.\u2019 \u201d Auton, 105 Ill. 2d at 543, quoting Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 65 Ill. 2d 140, 144 (1976).\nAs is clearly set forth above, after counsel for MacNeal Hospital informed the circuit court that there was a discharge summary in existence, arguments were had outside the presence of the jury. After an extensive discussion among the parties about the best way to handle the question of the discharge summary, the circuit court requested that the parties review the newly disclosed discharge summary over the evening and in the morning present arguments regarding the document. The next morning, plaintiff requested that the circuit court allow additional adverse examination of Dr. Vollala about the discharge summary and that any curative instruction inform the jury that the discharge summary was only provided after Dr. Vollala\u2019s testimony in court. While plaintiff stated \u201cI stand on my motion to bar this discharge summary for any use in this trial after today,\u201d plaintiffs motion only related to barring the use of the discharge summary after plaintiff\u2019s additional examination of Dr. Vollala on that date. (Emphasis added.) The circuit court therefore granted all of the relief plaintiff requested. The record shows that plaintiff was permitted the opportunity to extensively examine Dr. Vollala regarding the disclosure summary and the circuit court, over the objection of defendant Dr. Vollala, provided a curative instruction to the jury. In addition, plaintiff introduced the discharge summary into evidence as a plaintiffs exhibit and presented closing arguments regarding the discharge summary and Dr. Vollala\u2019s credibility. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot now complain of error which he requested the circuit court to make. We further note that counsel for the plaintiff acknowledges that the discharge summary was attached to MacNeal Hospital\u2019s motion for summary judgment as part of the decedent\u2019s hospital records. As a result of acknowledging receipt of the discharge summary some five months before trial, plaintiff has withdrawn his assertion that the document had been intentionally withheld.\nHowever, plaintiff, nonetheless, argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by the circuit court\u2019s decision to allow the discharge summary to be introduced where MacNeal Hospital failed to disclose the document through discovery. Plaintiff maintains that he had little opportunity to explore questions regarding the document\u2019s preparation and to prepare for the adverse examination of Dr. Vollala about the document.\nAdmission at trial of evidence which should have been disclosed through discovery is not reversible error absent proof that it resulted in prejudice. Leggett v. Kumar, 212 Ill. App. 3d 255, 276 (1991). As the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery rules lies within the trial court\u2019s discretion, this court will not reverse the trial court\u2019s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Cyclonaire Corp. v. ISG Riverdale, Inc., 378 Ill. App. 3d 554, 562 (2007).\nIn support of his argument that evidence of the discharge summary was highly prejudicial and warranted a new trial, plaintiff relies on Ashpole v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 297 Ill. App. 3d 725 (1998). In Ashpole, a bowler who was injured after falling sued the owner and operator of the bowling alley. This court determined that the operator of the bowling alley acted in bad faith where it failed to identify as a witness one of its employees who was the only defense witness who saw the plaintiff fall. As a result, this court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing the undisclosed employee to testify as a witness and remanded the case for a new trial. Ashpole, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 728-30. Ashpole is distinguishable from the present case, which involves a discharge summary document rather than the failure to disclose a defendant\u2019s sole witness. Furthermore, unlike Ashpole, it is now undisputed that the failure to disclose the discharge summary was not purposeful.\nContrary to plaintiffs argument, we find that he has failed to show any substantial prejudice from the introduction of evidence relating to the discharge summary. The record shows that plaintiff was allowed to question Dr. Vollala regarding the creation of the discharge summary during the additional adverse examination. Plaintiff questioned Dr. Vollala\u2019s credibility where Dr. Vollala had previously testified that he did not recall creating a discharge summary in this case. This additional examination also allowed plaintiff to argue extensively during closing argument that Dr. Vollala\u2019s testimony could not be believed based on the answers that he gave to plaintiffs counsel. We note that it was plaintiff himself that used an enlargement of the discharge summary during closing arguments and introduced the document into evidence. Thus, the jury had the opportunity to consider the discharge summary as well as the testimony of Dr. Vollala regarding his lack of recollection in reviewing the discharge summaiy. Furthermore, the jury also had the opportunity to consider the discharge summary in light of the curative instruction that the circuit court gave immediately preceding plaintiff\u2019s adverse examination of Dr. Vollala regarding the discharge summary. See, e.g., Crumpton v. Walgreen Co., 375 Ill App. 3d 73, 84 (2007) (to the extent any prejudice occurred it was cured by the circuit court\u2019s instruction to the jury). Plaintiff has therefore failed to show how he was harmed by the late disclosure of the discharge summary.\nMoreover, plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the discharge summary contained any information that was not also contained in the medical records that plaintiff already had in his possession. While plaintiff asserted during oral arguments before this court that the discharge summary omitted relevant information concerning the decedent\u2019s care, plaintiff was permitted the opportunity to question Dr. Vollala regarding any inconsistencies and raise these issues during closing arguments. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court\u2019s decision to allow evidence of the discharge summary.\nB. Board-Certification Examination\nPlaintiff next contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting Dr. Vollala\u2019s motion in limine to bar plaintiff from introducing evidence that Dr. Vollala failed to obtain board certification in internal medicine where Dr. Vollala became an expert in his own case.\nA trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion in limine addressing the admission of evidence will not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse of discretion. Ahmed v. Pickwick Place Owners\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 385 Ill. App. 3d 874, 891 (2008). An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or when no reasonable person would take the same view. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991).\nPlaintiff argues that the circuit court incorrectly applied this court\u2019s decision in Jones v. Rallos, 373 Ill. App. 3d 439 (2006) (Jones I), vacated & circuit court judgment affirmed upon reconsideration, Jones v. Rallos, 384 Ill. App. 3d 73 (2008) {Jones II), to bar plaintiff from inquiring about Dr. Vollala\u2019s board certification and that a new trial is required.\nIn Jones I, this court held that evidence of a doctor\u2019s failure of his board examinations is not relevant unless that doctor testifies as an expert as to the medical standard of care. Jones I, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 447. This court found that the defendant testified as to her treatment of the plaintiff, but not as an expert at trial. Therefore, this court determined that it was reversible error to permit references to the defendant\u2019s board-certification status and remanded for a new trial. Jones I, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 447. The plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appeal. While our supreme court denied the petition for leave to appeal, the court entered an order directing this court to vacate its opinion and to \u201creconsider its judgment, with additional analysis of whether any error in the trial court\u2019s decision to permit plaintiffappellee to elicit evidence of defendant-appellant\u2019s failure to pass board-certification examinations constitutes no more than harmless, nonreversible error.\u201d Jones v. Rallos, 225 Ill. 2d 636 (2007).\nPursuant to our supreme court\u2019s supervisory order, this court vacated its previous judgment and reconsidered the matter in Jones II, 384 Ill. App. 3d 73. In Jones II, this court reiterated its view that the defendant physician\u2019s testimony was similar to that provided by the defendant in Rockwood v. Singh, 258 Ill. App. 3d 555 (1993).\nIn Rockwood, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in barring her from making any reference to the defendant physician\u2019s failure to become a board-certified neurosurgeon. Rockwood, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 557. This court held:\n\u201cGenerally, when a physician sued for malpractice testifies as an expert, evidence as to his age, practice, and like matters relating to his qualifications as an expert is admissible. [McCray v. Shams, 224 Ill. App. 3d 999 (1992).] In such cases, the failure to pass board certification examinations is relevant and admissible.\u201d Rockwood, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 557.\nIn Rockwood, this court determined that the defendant physician\u2019s testimony \u201cwas not used to show the standards of medical care *** but, rather, was used to relate to the jury what occurred before, during, and after the surgery. For these reasons, the circuit court correctly barred reference to defendant\u2019s board-certification status.\u201d Rockwood, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 558.\nIn Jones II, this court noted that the defendant provided testimony that was similar to the defendant physician in Rockwood. However, this court concluded that it could not say that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the defendant\u2019s motion in limine to bar questions regarding defendant\u2019s failure to pass the board-certification examination. Jones II, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 90-91. In accordance with our supreme court\u2019s supervisory order, this court also concluded that even if the circuit court had erred in allowing the evidence regarding the defendant physician\u2019s failure to pass her board-certification examination, such error did not constitute reversible error. Jones II, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 91.\nIn Jones II, this court applied the well-settled principle that a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion in limine addressing the admission of evidence will not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse of discretion. Jones II, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 90, citing Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 521 (1996). Nothing in Jones II changed the law as set forth in Rockwood that when a physician sued for malpractice testifies as an expert, evidence including the failure to pass a board-certification examination is relevant and admissible. Rockwood, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 557.\nHere, the record shows that Dr. Vollala\u2019s testimony was not used to show the standard of medical care associated with the treatment of aortic dissection but, rather, was used to relate to the jury what occurred prior to John\u2019s death. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Vollala provided expert testimony where he testified about the decedent\u2019s symptoms of retrosternal pain, unstable angina, chest pain, and the use of beta blockers, Demerol, and nitroglycerin. Contrary to plaintiff s assertion, we find that this testimony was provided within the context of the treatment decisions and medications that Dr. Vollala provided to the decedent. While Dr. Vollala provided general explanations of these various medical conditions of the heart, at no time did Dr. Vollala give opinions as to the standard of care or any other opinions as an expert. The record also shows that the circuit court carefully considered the parties\u2019 arguments and the applicable case law in granting Dr. Volla-la\u2019s motion in limine and subsequently denying plaintiffs motion for a new trial. We therefore cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Dr. Vollala\u2019s motion in limine to bar evidence regarding his failure to pass the board-certification examination.\nC. Plaintiffs Claim of Substantial Error and Closeness of the Evidence\nPlaintiff lastly contends that the circuit court erred in refusing to consider that where the facts of this case were close, any substantial error required a new trial.\nPlaintiff correctly notes that \u201cwhere the case is a close one on the facts, and the jury might have decided either way, any substantial error which might have tipped the scales in favor of the successful party calls for reversal.\u201d Both v. Nelson, 31 Ill. 2d 511, 514 (1964). However, not every alleged error requires a reversal. \u201c 1 \u201cWhere it appears that an error did not affect the outcome below, or where the court can see from the entire record that no injury has been done, the judgment or decree will not be disturbed.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 566-67 (2002), quoting Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 64 Ill. 2d 543, 559 (1976), quoting Both v. Nelson, 31 Ill. 2d 511, 514 (1964). Plaintiff argues that substantial error occurred in the present case from the admission of the discharge summary and the circuit court\u2019s decision to bar evidence of Dr. Vollala\u2019s failure to pass the board-certification examination. However, as previously discussed, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the admission of the discharge summary where he was granted all the relief requested and admitted the document into evidence as a plaintiffs exhibit. In addition, plaintiff failed to show that the circuit court abused its discretion in barring the evidence regarding Dr. Vollala\u2019s board-certification examination where Dr. Vollala did not present expert testimony in this case. Since we conclude that no error was demonstrated in this case, we find no basis to disturb the jury\u2019s verdict.\nMoreover, we cannot say that the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of defendants was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unsupported by evidence such that a new trial is required. See York, 222 Ill. 2d at 179. As outlined above, defendants presented evidence including the testimony of several experts regarding the proper standard of care by which Drs. Vollala and Choi should be judged. The jury heard evidence that defendants did not breach the standard of care in treating the decedent and, as a result, did not proximately contribute to or cause his death. Specifically, the medical witnesses agreed that an aortic dissection was a rare condition for a person of decedent\u2019s age and background and that the decedent exhibited no typical signs or symptoms relating to the condition. The jury also heard evidence that even if the rare condition had been diagnosed, there was no medical treatment that could have been rendered in time to have saved the decedent\u2019s life. While the jury also heard plaintiff\u2019s theories and plaintiff\u2019s experts\u2019 testimony that defendants breached the standard of care, the jury was free to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses presented. Moore v. Anchor Organization for Health Maintenance, 284 Ill. App. 3d 874, 880 (1996) (\u201cit is the function of the jury to weigh contradictory evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and draw ultimate conclusions as to the facts of a case\u201d). It was within the province of the jury, as finder of fact, to listen to the competing expert testimony, weigh the evidence presented, determine the credibility of all the witnesses, and determine whose testimony to accept or reject. Bosco, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 461. We therefore find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for a new trial where the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of defendants was supported by the evidence. As previously discussed, plaintiff was not denied a fair trial based on his allegations of error and, thus, plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial.\nFor the above reasons, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nMURPHY, P.J., and COLEMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE QUINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Shefsky & Froelich, Ltd. (J. Timothy Eaton and Patricia S. Spratt, of counsel), and Clifford Law Offices (Robert A. Strelecky and Robert P. Sheridan, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bollinger, Ruberry & Garvey (Krista R. Frick and Martin P. Head, of counsel), Hall, Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC (Hugh C. Griffin, of counsel), and SmithAmundsen, LLC (Carmel Cosgrave, Michael Resis, and Jennifer Stuart, of counsel), all of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES R. SBARBORO, Independent Adm\u2019r of the Estate of John L. Sbarboro, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RAGHU VOLLALA et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20143236\nOpinion filed June 30, 2009.\nShefsky & Froelich, Ltd. (J. Timothy Eaton and Patricia S. Spratt, of counsel), and Clifford Law Offices (Robert A. Strelecky and Robert P. Sheridan, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellant.\nBollinger, Ruberry & Garvey (Krista R. Frick and Martin P. Head, of counsel), Hall, Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC (Hugh C. Griffin, of counsel), and SmithAmundsen, LLC (Carmel Cosgrave, Michael Resis, and Jennifer Stuart, of counsel), all of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "1040-01", "first_page_order": 1056, "last_page_order": 1074 }