{
  "id": 4289354,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD G. WEBB, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Webb",
  "decision_date": "2009-07-27",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-07-0551",
  "first_page": "478",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:16:56.365944+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD G. WEBB, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPursuant to a fully negotiated plea, Richard G. Webb, the defendant, pled guilty to aggravated battery. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(8) (West 2006). The defendant filed the instant petition for postconviction relief (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2006)), which the trial court denied. The defendant appeals, arguing that the court\u2019s requirement that he return to the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS) after his release from the Department of Corrections (DOC) is void because it is not an authorized disposition for an aggravated battery conviction. We affirm.\nFACTS\nOn October 2, 2006, the State charged the defendant with aggravated battery. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(8) (West 2006). The charge arose from an incident where the defendant struck a DHS employee who had transported him to court for a hearing. The record shows that at the time of the instant offense, the defendant was \u201ca detainee in the [Sexually Violent Persons] (SVP) program\u201d and was \u201cin [DHS] custody.\u201d\nThe court held a plea hearing on January 5, 2007. The defendant entered a fully negotiated plea to a reduced charge of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(8) (West 2006)) in exchange for a recommended term of imprisonment of two years, followed by a one-year term of mandatory supervised release. Further, regarding the proceedings in the defendant\u2019s SVP case, the State\u2019s Attorney disclosed that \u201cthere [had] not been a commitment [to the DHS] yet.\u201d However, the State\u2019s Attorney requested that \u201cthe order \u2014 the mittimus reflect\u2014 *** that [the defendant] be released only to the custody of the Illinois [DHS] upon release [from the DOC].\u201d The court entered the agreed sentence, and \u201crecommended\u201d that the defendant be released to the custody of the DHS upon completion of his term of incarceration.\nOn January 19, 2007, the court held a hearing to amend the mit-timus. Specifically, the State\u2019s Attorney requested that the court \u201corder\u201d that the defendant be released only to the custody of the DHS upon his release from the DOC. The court entered an amended judgment, where it \u201cordered that [the defendant] shall be released to the custody of the Illinois [DHS] upon release from the [DOC].\u201d\nThe defendant did not file a direct appeal. On April 23, 2007, the defendant wrote a letter to the court requesting that the court strike the language regarding his transfer to the DHS following his term of imprisonment because he was not admonished at his guilty plea hearing that he would be returned to DHS custody. However, after a hearing, the court declined to strike this language because defense counsel admitted that the defendant had been informed of the transfer at the plea hearing prior to entering his guilty plea.\nThereafter, on June 11, 2007, the defendant filed the instant pro se postconviction petition. The defendant alleged that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction regarding the civil SVP proceedings. The defendant also alleged that he was not informed of the transfer back to the DHS. Thus, the defendant contended that he did not receive the benefit of his plea bargain. Because of these alleged flaws, the defendant argued that \u201cthe order directing D.O.C. to return [him] to the custody of [the] D.H.S. upon his release from [the] D.O.C. be deemed invalid [and] void.\u201d On June 15, 2007, the court dismissed the defendant\u2019s postconviction petition. The defendant appeals.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that the court\u2019s requirement that he return to DHS custody after his release from the DOC is void because it is not an authorized disposition for an aggravated battery conviction.\nAccording to the supreme court, a void judgment is one that was entered by a court that lacked jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or by a court that lacked the inherent power to make or enter the particular order. People v. Ama, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 658 N.E.2d 445 (1995). A sentence that is not statutorily authorized is void. People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 805 N.E.2d 1200 (2004). A void judgment can be attacked at any time, including during a collateral proceeding such as postconviction review. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 805 N.E.2d 1200.\nPursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act), if, after the filing of the requisite petition and the holding of a hearing, the court determines that there is probable cause to believe the named person is sexually violent, \u201cthe court shall order that the person be taken into custody.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 207/30(c) (West 2006). After a trial (725 ILCS 207/35 (West 2006)), if the court or jury finds that the named person is sexually violent, \u201cthe court shall order the person to be committed to the custody of the [DHS] for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent person.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 207/40 (West 2006). Thus, the Act differentiates between custody, which arises after a probable cause hearing (725 ILCS 207/30 (West 2006)), and commitment (725 ILCS 207/40 (West 2006)), which occurs after a trial.\nIn his brief, the defendant argues that the trial court civilly committed him to the DHS following his release from the DOC, and the court did so without following the procedure articulated in the Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2006)). We disagree. According to the language of the sentencing order, the court \u201creleased [the defendant] to the custody of the [DHS] upon release from [the DOC].\u201d (Emphasis added.) Contrary to the defendant\u2019s assertion, this language did not civilly commit the defendant to the DHS. See 725 ILCS 207/40 (West 2006). Rather, the court\u2019s order merely returned the defendant to DHS custody, as he was in custody of the DHS at the time he committed the instant offense. See 725 ILCS 207/30 (West 2006).\nWe further find that the court did not err when it ordered the return of the defendant to DHS custody. Defendant admits that he was in the custody of the DHS when the instant offense occurred. At the plea hearing, the State\u2019s Attorney stated in the defendant\u2019s presence that the mittimus should reflect that the defendant shall be returned to DHS custody following the completion of his prison term. The record furnished to this court by the defendant does not show that the defendant was released from DHS custody at any time during the instant proceedings, nor that any sort of disposition was entered on the SVP petition. Thus, we find no error with the court\u2019s order that the defendant return to DHS custody when he is released from the DOC.\nAdditionally, when a person commits a criminal offense at a time when he is in the custody of the DHS and the subject of a pending SVR the better policy is that the person be immediately returned to the custody of the DHS upon completion of his term of imprisonment, rather than be released to society with the hope that he will voluntarily return to DHS custody to face the possibility of an indeterminate commitment as an SVE It hardly makes sense to allow one to defeat DHS custody by assaulting a DHS employee. Such a policy would, in effect, declare an \u201copen season\u201d on DHS employees or anyone else within the reach of one in DHS custody and facing the possibility of indeterminate commitment. Defendant\u2019s arguments to the contrary are without merit.\nIn conclusion, we find that no part of the sentencing order is void. The court had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the parties. We agree that sentencing one to the custody of DHS is not an authorized disposition for aggravated battery. The trial court did not \u201csentence\u201d defendant to DHS. However, the trial court did not err by ordering the return of the defendant to the custody of the DHS upon completion of his term of imprisonment with the DOC, given that the defendant was in the custody of the DHS prior to the instant offense. The trial court\u2019s order simply preserved the status quo. Had the trial court dismissed the aggravated battery charges or found defendant not guilty, would it have ordered defendant released? Of course not. Defendant would have been remanded to the custody of DHS. Therefore, the court properly dismissed the defendant\u2019s petition for postconviction relief.\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019BRIEN, EJ., and McDADE, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Santiago A. Durango, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "James Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Terry A. Mertel and Dawn D. Duffy, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD G. WEBB, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 07\u20140551\nOpinion filed July 27, 2009.\nSantiago A. Durango, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJames Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Terry A. Mertel and Dawn D. Duffy, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0478-01",
  "first_page_order": 494,
  "last_page_order": 497
}