{ "id": 4289157, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL A. MAYNARD, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Maynard", "decision_date": "2009-08-06", "docket_number": "No. 4-08-0934", "first_page": "605", "last_page": "608", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 605" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 1283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448453 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 1208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5287173 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2883288 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696", "parenthetical": "\"notice of appeal was given at a time when there was not in existence a judgment order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2518729 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749", "parenthetical": "\"notice of appeal was given at a time when there was not in existence a judgment order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 N.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "\"mere announcement of an order in court does not constitute the entry of that order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2865222 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248", "parenthetical": "\"mere announcement of an order in court does not constitute the entry of that order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838", "parenthetical": "\"notice of appeal filed by the State prior to the entry of the written order of suppression would be premature\"" }, { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3333097 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "\"notice of appeal filed by the State prior to the entry of the written order of suppression would be premature\"" }, { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147041 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" }, { "page": "275" }, { "page": "280-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 N.E.2d 1386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2493586 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0204-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 410, "char_count": 6612, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1441572462332746 }, "sha256": "c3bd34d48227f497031714d9f6a39b34c92675da806cfe825958ab8361bbdf60", "simhash": "1:62133c96ed6e0f64", "word_count": 1112 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:16:56.365944+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL A. MAYNARD, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn May 2008, the State charged defendant, Michael Maynard, by information with one count of criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13(a)(1), 12\u2014 16(d) (West 2006)). The State appeals the trial court\u2019s order suppressing defendant\u2019s statements made to Danville police department investigators. The State contends that the court\u2019s order suppressing the statements because defendant \u201casserted his right to counsel upon his arrest and that no interrogation should have taken place at that time\u201d was error as a matter of law.\nDefendant was arrested at his home on May 7, 2008, and transported to the Danville public safety building. Investigators Scott Damilano and Troy Hogren of the Danville police department interviewed defendant. During this interview, defendant made certain inculpatory statements.\nDefendant filed a motion to suppress these statements, arguing (1) he was interrogated after his arrest despite his request for counsel, (2) his attorney was denied an opportunity to speak to defendant, (3) his statements were induced by the promise he would not be charged, and (4) the statements were therefore involuntary.\nThe trial court conducted a hearing on November 14, 2008. Thereafter, the parties submitted written arguments. In a letter decision dated December 4, 2008, the court (1) granted the motion and suppressed the statements, and (2) directed defense counsel to prepare a written order \u201cin conformance with this letter decision and submit it to me for signature.\u201d The State filed a notice of appeal on the same day, December 4, 2008.\nDefense counsel prepared an order granting the motion and suppressing the statements. The trial court entered the order on December 10, 2008. The State did not file a notice of appeal after December 10, 2008.\nDefendant argues the notice of appeal filed December 4, 2008, was premature and did not confer jurisdiction on the appellate court. Supreme Court Rule 606(b) provides that \u201cthe notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 606(b). \u201cFailure to file the notice of appeal is jurisdictional.\u201d People v. Men-nenga, 195 Ill. App. 3d 204, 206, 551 N.E.2d 1386, 1388 (1990).\nSupreme Court Rule 271 states: \u201cWhen the court rules upon a motion other than in the course of trial, the attorney for the prevailing party shall prepare and present to the court the order or judgment to be entered, unless the court directs otherwise.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 271. Although this rule appears among the civil appeals rules, it has been held applicable in criminal cases as well. See People v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268, 276, 472 N.E.2d 455, 458 (1984).\nA ruling by a court on a motion to suppress is not a final judgment but a ruling on a motion other than in the course of trial. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d at 275, 472 N.E.2d at 458. Therefore, Rule 271 applies, and pursuant to that rule it was incumbent upon defense counsel to prepare and present to the court the order to be entered unless the court directed otherwise. Critically, the letter decision made clear that a signed order suppressing the evidence was contemplated: \u201cAttorney Olmstead is to prepare a written [ojrder in conformance with this letter decision and submit it to me for signature.\u201d Although the ruling on the motion to suppress was made on December 4, 2008, no written order on this ruling was entered until December 10, 2008. The judge\u2019s written pronouncement on December 4, 2008, was not an order from which an appeal could be taken. See People v. Eddington, 64 Ill. App. 3d 650, 654, 381 N.E.2d 835, 838 (1978) (\u201cnotice of appeal filed by the State prior to the entry of the written order of suppression would be premature\u201d); People v. Boston, 27 Ill. App. 3d 246, 248, 327 N.E.2d 40, 42 (1975) (\u201cmere announcement of an order in court does not constitute the entry of that order\u201d); People v. Deaton, 16 Ill. App. 3d 748, 749, 306 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1974) (\u201cnotice of appeal was given at a time when there was not in existence a judgment order\u201d).\nContrary to the State\u2019s assertion, the statements in Jones were not dicta. In Jones, the supreme court examined delay occasioned by defendants\u2019 motion to suppress in computing speedy-trial time. For example, the court held that defendants failed to establish that delay between an oral pronouncement and entry of a written order was delay caused by the prosecution, and such delay was not to be counted in calculating speedy trial. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d at 280-81, 472 N.E.2d at 461. The statements in Jones were essential to the court\u2019s ruling on the speedy-trial issue. We note the Second District has found the statements in Jones persuasive and applied them in People v. Dylak, 258 Ill. App. 3d 141, 630 N.E.2d 164 (1994), and People v. Rymut, 216 Ill. App. 3d 920, 576 N.E.2d 1208 (1991).\nFurther, the case of People v. Allen, 71 Ill. 2d 378, 375 N.E.2d 1283 (1978), is inapplicable to the present case since Allen is limited to the issue of whether the pronouncement of sentence, rather than the entry of judgment order, is the judicial act comprising the judgment of the court for purposes of appeal. See Eddington, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 654, 381 N.E.2d at 838. The State also attempts to distinguish the instant case, arguing that Rule 271 applies \u201conly where there is an oral pronouncement of judgment.\u201d The mere fact that the trial court took the instant case under advisement and did not rule orally from the bench does not indicate that Rule 271 does not apply. Rule 271 does not distinguish between oral and written rulings.\nThe State next argues that \u201cRule 272, not Rule 271, controls where, as here, the substantive effect of the trial court\u2019s decision is to dismiss the charge.\u201d Nothing in the record indicates a charge has been dismissed.\nPursuant to Supreme Court Rule 271, the State\u2019s appeal was premature, and we dismiss this cause.\nFor the reasons stated, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\nDismissed.\nKNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randall Brinegar, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Charles F. Mansfield (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Brett N. Olmstead (argued) and Lindsay B. Kearns, both of Beckett & Webber, PC., of Urbana, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL A. MAYNARD, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 08\u20140934\nOpinion filed August 6, 2009.\nRandall Brinegar, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Charles F. Mansfield (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nBrett N. Olmstead (argued) and Lindsay B. Kearns, both of Beckett & Webber, PC., of Urbana, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0605-01", "first_page_order": 621, "last_page_order": 624 }