{ "id": 4290243, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. JOHN RAMEY, Petitioner-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ramey", "decision_date": "2009-08-10", "docket_number": "No. 1-07-2217", "first_page": "661", "last_page": "671", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 661" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "896 N.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4279994 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "866 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[wjhere the Supreme Court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous action\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 931", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269111 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "934", "parenthetical": "\"[wjhere the Supreme Court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous action\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0931-01" ] }, { "cite": "864 N.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "claim that consecutive sentence is void raised for the first time on appeal from the dismissal of a successive petition nonetheless considered" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 1000", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268235 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1007", "parenthetical": "claim that consecutive sentence is void raised for the first time on appeal from the dismissal of a successive petition nonetheless considered" }, { "page": "1007", "parenthetical": "noting our \"independent duty to vacate void orders\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/1000-01" ] }, { "cite": "843 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735959 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "169-70" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Thomas, C.J., and Karmeier, J." }, { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "805 N.E.2d 1200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461527 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1078", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738560 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276-77" }, { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 N.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4821172 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 N.E.2d 173", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592370 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 1096", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243927 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "26" }, { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by Heiple, J." }, { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by Heiple, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777558 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "861 N.E.2d 999", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604764 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "862 N.E.2d 977", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3606913 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "888 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277968 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "824 N.E.2d 1071", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3750348 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "424-25" }, { "page": "424-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "897 N.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "386 Ill. App. 3d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4281228 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230-31" }, { "page": "230-31" }, { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/386/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302617 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "462" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "463" }, { "page": "462" }, { "page": "462" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "872 N.E.2d 1036", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5137824 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/240/0456-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1006, "char_count": 27526, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.7189078829503834e-08, "percentile": 0.35879794536283777 }, "sha256": "9e09c215f05472b852b3b823d076cce067dfb154c77befada4f0b8f7bbaf1775", "simhash": "1:3a1eb99ef3da96ff", "word_count": 4380 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:16:56.365944+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. JOHN RAMEY, Petitioner-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from the second-stage dismissal of defendant John Ramey\u2019s successive petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2002)). Following a jury trial presided over by Judge Robert J. Collins, the defendant was convicted of the murder, residential burglary, and robbery of Sylvia Wilson. He was sentenced to natural life in prison for murder, with a consecutive sentence for residential burglary to be served concurrently with a sentence for robbery. We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal (People v. Ramey, 240 Ill. App. 3d 456, 608 N.E.2d 512 (1992)) and affirmed the second-stage dismissal of his 1994 postconviction petition (People v. Ramey, No. 1 \u2014 96\u20143098 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)).\nThe defendant filed the instant postconviction petition in October 2003. Judge Rickey Jones granted the State\u2019s motion to dismiss the 2003 petition on res judicata grounds at the second stage of the post-conviction proceeding. The defendant appeals, contending errors of constitutional magnitude by trial counsel were overlooked by postcon-viction counsel in 1994, errors which he now raises in the petition dismissed by Judge Jones. In particular, he claims the sentence he was ordered to serve consecutive to his life term is void. The defendant contends these record-based issues were not forfeited, despite his failure to raise them in his 1994 petition, because he can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test to allow his successive petition to proceed. The defendant asserts that postconviction counsel\u2019s failure to raise these issues in his first petition constitutes the required showing of \u201ccause.\u201d\nBecause we reject the defendant\u2019s assertion as to \u201ccause,\u201d we affirm Judge Jones\u2019s ruling that the claims are barred by res judicata, except for the claim concerning the sentence consecutive to natural life. Case law holds that such a sentence is void, subject to attack at any time, including in a successive postconviction petition. See People v. Waldron, 375 Ill. App. 3d 159, 160, 872 N.E.2d 1036 (2007). We modify the sentencing order to reflect that the consecutive sentence for residential burglary is to be served concurrently with the natural life sentence; we affirm the dismissal of the defendant\u2019s successive postconviction petition in all other respects as barred by res judicata.\nBACKGROUND\nMotion to Suppress Statements\nPrior to trial the defendant moved to suppress statements he made to police after his arrest, arguing that his statements were coerced. At a hearing on the motion, the State introduced police testimony that officers arrived at 1660 South Drake in Chicago to arrest the defendant on January 14, 1986. When the defendant saw the officers, he jumped out of a second-story window and ran 10 to 15 feet before he was detained. When the officers transported the defendant to Area 4 for questioning, he walked with a slight limp. The defendant said his foot hurt but only while walking. According to the officers, the defendant declined offers to go to the hospital. The officers testified that the defendant was never told that he would only receive medical treatment if he made a statement.\nThe defendant testified that he fell out of the window as an officer holding a gun in one hand reached for the defendant with his other hand. The defendant testified that \u201cboth of my bones was sticking out of both of my knees\u201d and he had to be helped into the police station because he could not walk. Once inside, officers said he would only be taken to the hospital if he made a statement. Police took him to Mount Sinai hospital 75 minutes after he made an inculpatory statement.\nBecause he was still in pain the following morning, the defendant asked to go to \u201csick call.\u201d The defendant testified that he was taken to Cermak Clinic the next day, where doctors scheduled knee surgery. He did not know exactly when the surgery took place but testified that it was probably four or five months after his arrest. Defense counsel did not introduce the defendant\u2019s medical records or clarify the date of the defendant\u2019s purported surgery.\nThe trial court found the defendant\u2019s testimony that officers linked medical treatment to giving an inculpatory statement was not credible and denied his motion to suppress.\nTrial\nThe defendant was tried with codefendants Robert Jernigan and Lorenzo White before separate juries. Because the issues raised in the instant postconviction petition are not based on the evidence introduced at trial, we only present a brief summary.\nThe defendant\u2019s statement to the police was read into evidence. In it, the defendant stated that on January 5, 1986, Jernigan suggested that White and the defendant help him rob Sylvia Wilson. While Jerni-gan entered Ms. Wilson\u2019s apartment, the defendant waited in the lobby of her apartment building and White waited in a car on the street. Jernigan returned to the lobby 15 minutes later and asked the defendant to help carry bags from the apartment. When the defendant entered Ms. Wilson\u2019s apartment, she was tied up on the bed. After reentering the apartment, Jernigan hit her on the head, placed a rag into her mouth, and tied the rag in place. Jernigan and the defendant rejoined White in the car, left the scene and split the $45 proceeds of the robbery. The evidence demonstrated that Ms. Wilson died from strangulation.\nThree witnesses saw the defendant in the lobby of Ms. Wilson\u2019s apartment building on the date of the crime. The defendant\u2019s wife also testified that a few days after Ms. Wilson\u2019s death, she overheard Jerni-gan say he tied up someone. When she asked the defendant if he was with Jernigan at the time, the defendant admitted that \u201che was around.\u201d\nThe jury found the defendant guilty of murder, residential burglary, and robbery.\nSentencing\nAt the sentencing hearing, defense attorney did not present any evidence in mitigation, although he informed Judge Collins that several of the defendant\u2019s family members were present in court. Judge Collins sentenced the defendant to natural life for the murder based on a finding that it was committed in a brutal and heinous manner. Judge Collins sentenced the defendant to a consecutive 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for residential burglary, to be served concurrently with a 7-year sentence for robbery.\nDirect Appeal\nOn direct appeal, the defendant raised three issues: (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statement; (2) the evidence did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) his sentence was excessive. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Ramey, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 456.\n1994 Postconviction Petition\nIn 1994, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition contending in part that police officers coerced his inculpatory statement by withholding medical treatment. The trial court determined that the petition stated a gist of a constitutional claim and appointed counsel for the defendant. The State thereafter moved to dismiss the 1994 petition, claiming the issues raised were barred by res judicata-, the trial court granted the motion. This court affirmed the dismissal on appeal. Ramey, No. 1 \u2014 96\u20143098 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nThe Present Postconviction Petition\nIn October 2003, the defendant filed this second pro se postconviction petition. In December 2003, the defendant filed what he titled a \u201csupplement petition.\u201d Judge Jones dismissed the \u201csupplement petition\u201d as patently without merit. The defendant appealed from the dismissal of his \u201csupplement petition,\u201d with counsel appointed to represent him in that appeal. Appointed counsel moved to dismiss the appeal, contending the dismissal order was not a final and appealable order because any issue raised in the December 2003 supplemental petition could be added to any amended petition to be filed based on the October 2003 petition, which passed to the second stage when Judge Jones did not dismiss it within 90 days of its filing. See 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1 (West 2002). The December 2003 postconviction appeal was dismissed; appellate counsel was appointed to represent the defendant in the second-stage proceedings before Judge Jones on the October 2003 petition.\nIn August 2006, appointed counsel filed a \u201csupplemental petition,\u201d arguing in part that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to (1) clarify the timing of the defendant\u2019s knee surgery; (2) seek an inquiry with the defendant\u2019s jury after discovering that the defendant\u2019s jurors were concerned because they saw codefendant Jernigan looking at their juror cards; or (3) call any mitigation witnesses at the sentencing hearing. The supplemental petition also contended that the defendant\u2019s 30-year sentence for residential burglary is void because it is consecutive to his natural life sentence.\nIn a motion to dismiss the second-stage proceedings before Judge Jones, the State argued that the defendant forfeited all of his contentions because he could not demonstrate an objective \u201ccause\u201d for his failure to raise those contentions in his 1994 petition, citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459, 793 N.E.2d 609 (2002), as authority. After a hearing on the motion, Judge Jones agreed with the State and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nUnder the Act, a defendant\u2019s conviction is subject to collateral attack based upon a denial of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 (West 2002). Where the death penalty is not at issue, post-conviction petitions are adjudicated in three stages. People v. Hobson, 386 Ill. App. 3d 221, 230-31, 897 N.E.2d 421 (2008). If a petition is not summarily dismissed by the trial court, it advances to the second stage where an indigent defendant is provided assistance by counsel. Hob-son, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 230-31. At the second stage, the petition under consideration must make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation or be subject to a motion to dismiss. See People v. Vasquez, 356 Ill. App. 3d 420, 422, 824 N.E.2d 1071 (2005); 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 5 (West 2006). If the State\u2019s motion to dismiss is denied or no such motion is filed, the State must file a timely answer to the postconviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 5 (West 2006). If upon consideration of the petition, with any accompanying documentation and in light of the State\u2019s answer, the trial court determines that the requisite showing of a constitutional violation has been made, a third-stage evidentiary hearing must follow. Hobson, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 231. Our review of a dismissal of a postconviction petition short of an evidentiary hearing is de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 389, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998).\nThe Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459, 793 N.E.2d 609 (2002). Normally, where a successive postconviction petition is filed, unless a claim of actual innocence is made in a nondeath case, a defendant must make a \u201ccause-and-prejudice\u201d showing to avoid forfeiture. Pit-sonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459. The supreme court reiterated \u201cthat \u2018cause\u2019 *** refers to any objective factor, external to the defense, which impeded the petitioner\u2019s ability to raise a specific claim in the initial post-conviction proceeding. Thus, when \u2018cause\u2019 is based on a fundamental deficiency in the first post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must show that the deficiency directly affected his ability to raise the specific claim now asserted.\u201d Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 462. To show \u201cprejudice\u201d under the test, a defendant must show that the claimed error \u201cso infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violates due process.\u201d Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464. \u201c[A] petitioner must establish cause and prejudice as to each individual claim asserted in a successive petition, even if he demonstrates that his initial post-conviction [petition] was deficient in some fundamental way.\u201d Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 463.\nIn the instant postconviction petition, the defendant claims that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to clarify the timing of the defendant\u2019s surgery, inquire about the defendant\u2019s jurors\u2019 concern over Jernigan\u2019s view of their information cards, or call any mitigation witnesses at sentencing, and that his 30-year sentence for residential burglary is void because it is consecutive to his life sentence. The defendant contends that forfeiture does not apply to these claims because the unreasonable assistance of his appointed counsel in the 1994 postconviction proceeding was the objective \u201ccause\u201d of his failure to raise these claims previously. The defendant argues that his 1994 postconviction counsel was unreasonable when she failed to properly examine the trial record and amend his 1994 petition to include these claims.\nCounsel is provided in the second-stage postconviction proceeding \u201c \u2018to ensure that the complaints of a prisoner are adequately presented.\u2019 \u201d People v. Richardson, 382 Ill. App. 3d 248, 254, 888 N.E.2d 553 (2008), quoting People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 46, 862 N.E.2d 977 (2007). The duties imposed by Rule 651(c) frame appointed counsel\u2019s obligations \u201c \u2018 \u201cto investigate and properly present the petitioner\u2019s claims.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Richardson, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 254, quoting People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 476, 861 N.E.2d 999 (2006), quoting People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 164, 619 N.E.2d 750 (1993). While postconviction counsel \u201c \u2018may raise additional issues if he or she so chooses, there is no obligation to do so.\u2019 \u201d Richardson, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 254, quoting Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 476.\n\u201cCause\u201d in This Case\nThe defendant provides no authority for the proposition that the failure of appointed counsel to amend the defendant\u2019s first post-conviction petition to include issues the defendant himself did not raise satisfies the \u201ccause\u201d prong of the cause-and-prejudice test. Nor does he explain how counsel in the defendant\u2019s first postconviction proceeding may constitute an \u201cobjective factor, external to the defense, which impeded the petitioner\u2019s ability to raise a specific claim in the initial post-conviction proceeding.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 462. As our supreme court made clear, objective cause concerns an impediment to raising a specific claim in an earlier petition. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 462. We are unpersuaded that post-conviction counsel did, or could have done, anything to impede the defendant from raising the claims he urges before us in the pro se petition he filed in 1994, before counsel was appointed to assist him. Nor does he contend that a liberal reading of the allegations in his 1994 pro se petition gave rise to the claims in the present petition.\nCase law is clear: the \u201c \u2018reasonable level of assistance\u2019 \u201d a defendant is entitled to in a postconviction proceeding is limited to counsel presenting the petitioner\u2019s claims. Richardson, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 252, quoting Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 42. \"[P]ostconviction counsel is required to reshape the claims contained in pro se petitions to put them into appropriate legal form; *** postconviction counsel is [not] required to formulate new claims.\u201d Vasquez, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 424-25.\nThe defendant seeks to challenge once again the performance of his trial counsel based on a contention that postconviction counsel in the 1994 proceeding should have raised the claims the defendant raises in the instant petition. He contends first postconviction counsel\u2019s unreasonable assistance may constitute \u201ccause\u201d to permit the filing of a successive petition. In other words, the defendant contends that because postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance, res judicata should not flow from his 1994 postconviction proceeding to bar the petition before us. The defendant\u2019s novel argument, we conclude, is foreclosed by the supreme court\u2019s decision in People v. Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d 19, 42, 708 N.E.2d 1096 (1998).\nIn Szabo, the supreme court addressed an appeal from the denial of a second postconviction petition challenging the sentencing hearing in a death penalty case. The supreme court had earlier affirmed the denial of postconviction relief stemming from the defendant\u2019s first postconviction petition. See People v. Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d 525, 582 N.E.2d 173 (1991). Affirming the denial of his first postconviction proceeding \u201cwould normally be sufficient to negate any suggestion that the defendant is now entitled to a second opportunity to establish a constitutional defect in the sentencing proceedings.\u201d Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d at 24. To avoid this expected result, the defendant claimed that the decision in People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 609 N.E.2d 304 (1993), decided after his appeal from his first postconviction petition, opened the door for \u201ca reexamination of the holding in the appeal from the first postconviction petition [citation] that postconviction counsel sufficiently complied with Rule 651(c)\u2019s requirements.\u201d Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d at 25. The \u201creexamination\u201d by way of a second postconviction petition, so the defendant urged, should not be subject to the res judicata bar. The supreme court rejected the argument. \u201cWe see no reason to excuse this repetitive filing, even on the ground that the holding in Johnson required postconviction counsel to do more than what was done in that earlier proceeding.\u201d Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d at 25. The supreme court made clear that a challenge to postconviction counsel\u2019s conduct in an earlier postconviction proceeding rarely may form the basis to find an earlier postconviction proceeding deficient: \u201cthe post-conviction process does not provide a forum by which a defendant may challenge the conduct of counsel at an earlier postconviction proceeding.\u201d Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d at 26, citing People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 276-77, 606 N.E.2d 1078 (1992).\nThis holding in Justice Miller\u2019s majority opinion in Szabo was reemphasized by Chief Justice Freeman in his special concurrence. \u201cTo hold otherwise would allow the fundamental-deficiency exception to res judicata to swallow the general proscription against the use of successive petitions to assail the conduct of post-conviction counsel.\u201d Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d at 42 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by Heiple, J.). In other words, allegations that amount to nothing more than a claim that first postconviction counsel inadequately amended the defendant\u2019s first postconviction petition cannot \u201cestablish \u2018cause\u2019 for a finding of a fundamental deficiency in the prior proceeding as contemplated in Flores\u201d to allow a successive petition to go forward. Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d at 44 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by Heiple, J.).\nNeither the defendant\u2019s sentencing claim nor his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were raised in his 1994 postconviction petition, although each was fully contained within the trial record. As we noted above, no Illinois authority requires postconviction counsel to \u201cformulate new claims.\u201d Vasquez, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 424-25. Nor does the defendant provide a basis to assert that postconviction counsel, regarding the 1994 petition, provided less than a reasonable level of assistance. See Richardson, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 254, citing Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 476. Given that postconviction counsel is under no obligation to raise issues in addition to those raised by a defendant in his pro se petition, we are unpersuaded that the failure of postconviction counsel to raise additional issues may satisfy the \u201ccause\u201d prong to warrant consideration of a successive petition. Where no showing has been made that postconviction counsel\u2019s conduct fell below reasonable assistance, there is no authority to hold that post-conviction counsel\u2019s conduct constitutes \u201ccause\u201d under the cause-and-prejudice test. The defendant\u2019s inability to demonstrate an objective \u201ccause\u201d for his failure to raise the instant claims in his 1994 petition results in forfeiture. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 458-S9.\nVoid Sentence\nIn anticipation of our holding, the defendant argues that his consecutive 30-year sentence is void, subject to attack at any time, even if he cannot demonstrate \u201ccause\u201d for his failure to raise the issue in the 1994 petition. See People v. Waldron, 375 Ill. App. 3d 159, 160, 872 N.E.2d 1036 (2007), citing People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 27, 805 N.E.2d 1200 (2004).\nIn People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148, 843 N.E.2d 292 (2006), our supreme court discussed the irrationality of consecutive life sentences. Our supreme court noted that serving consecutive life sentences is impossible \u201caccording to natural law and within the plain meaning of *** \u2018consecutive.\u2019 \u201d Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 164. To make the sentences consistent with the laws of nature, the court modified the defendant\u2019s life sentences to be served concurrently rather than consecutively. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 169-70.\nAs this court has repeatedly held, the reasoning of Palmer renders a term of years consecutive to a life sentence void; void sentences can be attacked at any time, even when raised for the first time in a successive postconviction petition without demonstrating an objective \u201ccause\u201d for his failure to raise the issue earlier. Waldron, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 160-61; see also People v. Spears, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1007, 864 N.E.2d 758 (2007) (claim that consecutive sentence is void raised for the first time on appeal from the dismissal of a successive petition nonetheless considered). Just as consecutive life sentences \u201cwould add not one minute or one day to [a] defendant\u2019s punishment\u201d (Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 169), a term of years consecutive to a natural life sentence does not add another minute to the time the defendant will spend in prison. Nor is such a sentence subject to forfeiture because \u201c \u2018a sentencing judge cannot impose a penalty not otherwise allowed by the sentencing statute in question.\u2019 \u201d Waldron, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 160-61, quoting Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 154; see also Spears, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 1007 (noting our \u201cindependent duty to vacate void orders\u201d).\nThe State argues that we should adopt the position taken by Justice Garman in dissent in Palmer that in the face of legislation mandating sentences be consecutive, courts do not \u201cpossess [ ] the discretion to breach *** statutory parameters requiring consecutive sentencing.\u201d Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 172 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Thomas, C.J., and Karmeier, J.). In presenting such an argument, the State ascribes more authority to this court than we possess. See Kelley v. Sheriff\u2019s Merit Comm\u2019n, 372 Ill. App. 3d 931, 934, 866 N.E.2d 702 (2007) (\u201c[wjhere the Supreme Court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous action\u201d). According to our supreme court, sentences consecutive to a life sentence violate natural law and must be modified to be served concurrently. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 170. We are bound by that holding.\nWe note that in a case in which our supreme court granted leave to appeal, the Third District acknowledged that a term of years consecutive to a life sentence contravenes natural law, but found that such a sentence is not void. Based on its conclusion that such a sentence is merely voidable, the Third District held that a successive postconviction petition raising such a claim cannot go forward without a showing of \u201ccause.\u201d See People v. Petrenko, 385 Ill. App. 3d 479, 484-85, 896 N.E.2d 873 (2008), appeal allowed, 231 Ill. 2d 646 (2009). We decline to follow Petrenko. Until our supreme court rules otherwise, we rely on the weight of recent authority finding orders in violation of natural law to be void, not voidable. See Waldron, 375 Ill. App. 3d 159, 872 N.E.2d 1036; Spears, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 864 N.E.2d 758.\nBecause the defendant\u2019s sentence is void, he can attack it for the first time in a successive postconviction petition, despite his failure to raise this claim in his 1994 petition and in the absence of \u201ccause\u201d for his failure to do so. We therefore modify the defendant\u2019s 30-year sentence to run concurrently with his life sentence. See 134 Ill. 2d R 615(b)(4).\nCONCLUSION\nBecause the assistance of the defendant\u2019s appointed counsel in his 1994 postconviction proceeding cannot satisfy \u201ccause\u201d in the cause- and-prejudice test to allow the defendant to proceed on the successive postconviction petition before us, res judicata bars consideration of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that could have been raised in that petition; those claims are forfeited. However, the defendant\u2019s claim that the 30-year sentence he was ordered to serve consecutive to his life sentence is void makes a substantial showing of a constitutional violation; that claim is not forfeited. As a void sentence, the claim is properly before us; we modify the consecutive sentence to a concurrent sentence.\nWe affirm Judge Jones\u2019s dismissal of the defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, but modify the sentencing order to reflect that the 30-year sentence for residential burglary be served concurrently with his natural life sentence.\nAffirmed; sentence modified.\nRE. GORDON, EJ., and WOLFSON, J., concur.\nThe parties dispute whether the second-stage proceedings contemplated both the October 2003 petition and the December 2003 \u201csupplement petition.\u201d The dispute is a nonissue in this appeal because the only postconviction claims before us are those raised in the amended petition filed in August 2006.\nThe State initially argued that Jernigan only viewed his own jury\u2019s information cards and not that of the defendant\u2019s. We granted the State\u2019s request for leave to file a surreply in which it noted that the defendant\u2019s jury did express concern that Jernigan had, inexplicably, looked at their information cards.\nThe cause-and-prejudice test, first recognized by Illinois courts in People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 278-79, 606 N.E.2d 1078 (1992), and made mandatory in Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459, is now part of the Act itself. In 2004, the legislature passed an amendment requiring a defendant to seek leave to file a successive postconviction petition conditioned upon meeting the cause- and-prejudice test. See Pub. Act 93 \u2014 493, eff. January 1, 2004 (amending 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 (West 2002)). While the statutory amendment does not apply to the petition the defendant filed in 2003, the same cause-and-prejudice analysis applies under the common law rule. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459.\nWe note that to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice involving a defendant that makes a sufficient showing of actual innocence, his failure to raise a claim in an earlier petition will be excused even where he fails to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459. However, this is not such a case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia Unsinn and Rebecca I. Levy, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Amy Watroba Kern, and Haley Peck, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. JOHN RAMEY, Petitioner-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 07\u20142217\nOpinion filed August 10, 2009.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied September 3, 2009.\nPatricia Unsinn and Rebecca I. Levy, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Amy Watroba Kern, and Haley Peck, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0661-01", "first_page_order": 677, "last_page_order": 687 }