{ "id": 4289805, "name": "MICHAEL SUDZUS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Sudzus v. Department of Employment Security", "decision_date": "2009-07-24", "docket_number": "No. 1-08-2255", "first_page": "814", "last_page": "828", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 814" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 1109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821396 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" }, { "page": "312-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 1249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5534772 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221519 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2576555 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 N.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" }, { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186527 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" }, { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "782 N.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599253 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "873 N.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4271305 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 1028", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030" }, { "page": "1030" }, { "page": "1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5288680 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "807 N.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461434 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" }, { "page": "642", "parenthetical": "holding a nonprofit did not perform acts which constituted the unauthorized practice of law when an employee prepared and filed legal documents which were solely for the benefit of the association" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5585152 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. Reg. 7380", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "920 A.2d 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8321960, 3014753, 3015194, 8321911 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" }, { "page": "168-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/920/0162-02", "/pa/591/0542-01", "/pa/591/0543-01", "/a2d/920/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 Pa. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 3015194 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" }, { "page": "553-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/591/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 1266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1268", "parenthetical": "Illinois reviewing courts, having determined that the Pennsylvania unemployment statute is similar to the Illinois entitlement, have relied upon Pennsylvania jurisprudence in adjudicating \"voluntary leaving\" under this section of the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3499334 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "Illinois reviewing courts, having determined that the Pennsylvania unemployment statute is similar to the Illinois entitlement, have relied upon Pennsylvania jurisprudence in adjudicating \"voluntary leaving\" under this section of the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "587-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ohio St. 3d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1821091 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "216-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-3d/22/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 N.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238-39" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "240" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291525 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493-94" }, { "page": "494-95" }, { "page": "495" }, { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 N.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" }, { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2879703 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" }, { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 N.E. 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5258885 ], "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/344/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477863 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 N.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "404 Ill. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5307956 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/404/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 N.E. 646", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1899, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5549001 ], "year": 1899, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/181/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 N.E.2d 941", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "945" }, { "page": "944" }, { "page": "944-45" }, { "page": "946" }, { "page": "947" }, { "page": "947" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 Ill. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2579644 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "351-52" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/366/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 746", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157998 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/333/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "763 N.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29956 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3750410 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106, 825" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477051 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 980", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4282163 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" }, { "page": "177" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0168-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1404, "char_count": 36088, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2742343130386335e-07, "percentile": 0.6154883933387623 }, "sha256": "03ab0a4ceac1adabe22838958cf260ff037e4e10acf550f4056e330407b82072", "simhash": "1:19d011182fa3b7a5", "word_count": 5800 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:16:56.365944+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MICHAEL SUDZUS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TOOMIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this appeal, we confront the question of whether a nonattor-ney\u2019s representation of an employer at an unemployment benefits hearing constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Plaintiff, Michael A. Sudzus, appeals from the circuit court\u2019s judgment affirming the decision of the Board of Review of the Illinois Department of Employment Security, which denied Sudzus\u2019 claim for unemployment compensation benefits. On appeal, Sudzus asserts that (1) his former employer, Butterfield Electric, Inc. (Butterfield), engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by participating in the referee\u2019s hearing; (2) the hearing did not provide Sudzus with a full and fair opportunity to present his case; and (3) the Board erred in its determination that Sudzus committed disqualifying statutory misconduct. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nBACKGROUND\nSudzus was employed as an apprentice electrician at Butterfield, from December 2005 through September 2007. His termination stemmed from the dismantling and theft of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) units on the roof of Butterfield\u2019s customer, Industrial Kinetics. On September 24, Sudzus returned from a week-long vacation and received a voice message from Butterfield\u2019s owner, Larry Austin, stating that Sudzus should not return to work but should instead contact him.\nOn September 30, 2007, Sudzus filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Illinois Department of Employment Security (IDES) wherein he stated the reason for separation was lack of work. In response to Butterfield\u2019s protest, the claims adjudicator determined that Sudzus was discharged because of misconduct relating to the air conditioning units and was therefore not eligible for benefits. In turn, Sudzus sought further review by the IDES appeals division.\nOn December 3, 2007, a telephonic hearing was conducted by a hearing officer who received testimony and relevant exhibits. At the hearing, the referee took statements from Larry Austin, Bob Manley, the superintendent of Five Star Mechanical, Tony Crocilla, Sudzus\u2019 supervisor, and Sudzus.\nLarry Austin testified that his company was hired by Industrial Kinetics to disconnect the electrical service from 11 rooftop HVAC units. Although those units were to be removed entirely, two additional units were to remain intact to continue servicing offices. Because a separate contractor, Five Star Mechanical, was hired to physically remove the units, there was no reason for Butterfield electricians to be on the roof. Nevertheless, according to Austin, Bob Manley confronted Sudzus dismantling HVAC units on the roof. Once dismantled, copper parts from the units could be sold.\nAustin acknowledged that he had not contacted the police and was not aware of anyone at Industrial Kinetics doing so. Efforts were made to resolve this issue with the customer and it was Austin\u2019s understanding that Butterfield would be paying for the damage done to the \u201ctotally dismantled\u201d units. At the time of the hearing, Butter-field had not paid for any repairs but \u201cthe customer ball parked it around $8,000.\u201d At the conclusion of Austin\u2019s testimony, Sudzus declined the opportunity to ask questions.\nBob Manley confirmed that he discovered Sudzus dismantling a rooftop HVAC unit. Manley testified that his company, Five Star Mechanical, had been hired to remove the rooftop units and dispose of them. Manley told Sudzus that two of the units were to remain intact, but that the remaining ones could be dismantled. Although Manley did not see Sudzus specifically remove parts from the two units which were to remain intact, he later discovered that they were entirely dismantled. Again, Sudzus had no questions at the end of Manley\u2019s testimony.\nSudzus\u2019 supervisor, Tony Crocilla, testified that there was no reason for a Butterfield electrician to be on the roof at the time Sudzus was found there or, for that matter, at any time. At the end of Crocilla\u2019s testimony, Sudzus attempted to question him but was unable to form a coherent question. The referee then asked Crocilla a clarifying question, but Austin interjected, testifying that on an earlier project Butterfield electricians had worked on the rooftop but that job did not involve any dismantling. Sudzus offered that this was not an answer to his question and then began his own testimony.\nSudzus confirmed that he did indeed dismantle and remove parts from some of the rooftop HVAC units. However, Sudzus testified that Crocilla informed him that all of the units were garbage and that parts could be removed. Sudzus also testified that others participated in removing parts from the units. Although he reiterated that he \u201cwas told everything on the roof was junk,\u201d he nonetheless acknowledged that Manley had approached him about not dismantling two of the units. While Sudzus was unsure which two units were to remain intact, he made no effort to ask Manley their identity. Sudzus clarified that all the units were dismantled but denied seeing anybody else on the roof. Although Sudzus again admitted removing parts from two or three of the units, he was unable to identify the particular units.\nIn response to the referee\u2019s inquiry of whether he had anything further to state, Sudzus noted that he had never been informed of when he was actually fired. Sudzus then referenced materials he purportedly had faxed to the referee that morning. Because Sudzus sent them to the wrong number the referee had not received them and asked Sudzus to explain the content of those documents. Following Sudzus\u2019 testimony concerning the time line of his firing, the referee allowed Austin to question him.\nIn turn, the referee put additional questions to Austin, Crocilla, and Sudzus, and also allowed them to ask questions of each other. Austin and Crocilla again stated that Butterfield electricians were not to touch any of the rooftop units because their only assignment was to disconnect the units from inside the building. Sudzus repeated that Crocilla informed him it was permissible to dismantle units and take parts home. Sudzus reiterated that numerous other people, including Crocilla, removed parts from HVAC units. Crocilla denied that he had removed parts from the units but conceded that part of the earlier job was to disconnect and remove the pipes and wires attached to the units.\nThe referee\u2019s decision affirming the claim adjudicator\u2019s rejection of benefits was mailed the next day. Among her findings of fact, the referee observed:\n\u201cClaimant was aware that eleven of the units were to be junked. However, two of the units were supposed to remain intact because the client planned to use them again. Claimant went to the roof during time when [he] was supposed to be working inside with his crew. He took copper and other parts from some or all of the units. In so doing, he disabled the two units the client planned to keep. His employer had to take financial responsibility for that damage.\u201d\nThe referee found Crocilla\u2019s explanation of Sudzus\u2019 actual duties on the jobsite and Manley\u2019s account of finding Sudzus on the roof dismantling units to be credible. She therefore determined that \u201cthe evidence supports a conclusion that it was in fact claimant [Sudzus] who took the parts, apparently to be sold for their value as scrap\u201d and that he was discharged for misconduct. Accordingly, Sudzus was disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits.\nSudzus appealed the referee\u2019s decision to the Board, which in turn affirmed the findings and conclusions of the referee. In so doing, the Board stated, the \u201cactions of the claimant placed the employer at risk of a lawsuit from the client.\u201d The Board rejected Sudzus\u2019 claims that at the telephonic hearing: (1) Butterfield Electric engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; (2) Sudzus did not have the full opportunity to present his case; (3) all of the employer\u2019s testimony was hearsay; and (4) \u201cthe decision was incorrect as a matter of the evidence and law.\u201d The Board thus concluded that Sudzus was discharged for misconduct connected with work and was subject to disqualification of benefits under section 602(A) of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (820 ILCS 405/602(A) (West 2006)). In turn, Sudzus sought judicial review of the Board\u2019s decision under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2006)). The circuit court affirmed the decision of the Board and Sudzus now appeals.\nANALYSIS\nIt is well settled that in an appeal from a decision denying unemployment compensation benefits, it is the duty of this court to review the decision of the Board rather than the circuit court. Czajka v. Department of Employment Security, 387 Ill. App. 3d 168, 172, 901 N.E.2d 436, 442 (2008); Richardson Brothers v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. App. 3d 422, 428-29, 555 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (1990). The scope of judicial review of an administrative agency\u2019s decision extends to all questions of law and fact presented in the record. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2006).\nThe standard of review applicable to the agency\u2019s decision depends on whether the question presented is one of fact, law, or a mixed question of law and fact. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204-05, 692 N.E.2d 295, 302 (1998). In reviewing the administrative agency\u2019s factual findings, a court does not weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Ahrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1117 (1992); City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 204, 692 N.E.2d at 302. The factual findings of an administrative agency are deemed prima facia true and correct; the reviewing court will determine if those findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Jackson v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor, 105 Ill. 2d 501, 513, 475 N.E.2d 879, 885 (1985). Factual determinations are only against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88, 606 N.E.2d at 1117. Alternatively, reviewing courts owe less deference to the administrative agency\u2019s conclusions of law, which are reviewed de novo. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148 v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 215 Ill. 2d 37, 62, 828 N.E.2d 1104, Ill. (2005); Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254, 659 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1995). As such, an agency\u2019s decision on a question of law is not binding on a reviewing court. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205, 691 N.E.2d at 302.\nA third intermediate standard of review applies to an agency\u2019s determination involving mixed questions of law and fact.\n\u201c[A] mixed question is one in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.\u201d Moss v. Department of Employment Security, 357 Ill. App. 3d 980, 984, 830 N.E.2d 663, 667-68 (2005).\nMixed questions implicate the \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d standard, which is less deferential to the agency than the manifest weight of the evidence standard because the agency is deciding the legal application of a factual determination. Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 369, 776 N.E.2d 166, 177 (2002). We are mindful that, under such circumstances, our decision is based on fact-finding that is inseparable from the application of law to fact. Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill. App. 3d 101, 106, 825, N.E.2d 315, 320 (2005). An agency\u2019s decision will be deemed clearly erroneous only if, based on the entirety of the record, the reviewing court is left with the \u201c \u2018definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u2019 \u201d AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 393, 763 N.E.2d 272, 280-82 (2001), quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 (1948).\nWe first address the claim that Butterfield, through its representative Larry Austin, participated in the unauthorized practice of law at the administrative hearing. We view this as a mixed question of law and fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. Our inquiry of necessity begins with a recognition that the legislature has authorized lay representation of participants in proceedings before the Department. Thus, section 806 of the Act provides that \u201c[a]ny individual or entity in any proceeding before the Director or his representative, or the Referee or the Board of Review, may be represented by a union or any duly authorized agent.\u201d 820 ILCS 405/ 806 (West 2006).\nNotwithstanding this legislative grant of authority, our precedent makes clear that only licensed attorneys are entitled to practice law. 705 ILCS 205/1 (West 2006). \u201cThe General Assembly has no authority to grant a layman the right to practice law.\u201d People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass\u2019n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 352, 8 N.E.2d 941, 945 (1937), citing In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 84, 54 N.E. 646, 648 (1899). Only the supreme court has the authority to \u201cregulate and define the practice of law.\u201d Goodman, 366 Ill. at 349, 8 N.E.2d at 944.\nRunning through both contentions is an awareness that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law. People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 50-51, 87 N.E.2d 773, 776 (1949). Hence, definition of the term \u201cpractice of law\u201d defies mechanistic formulation. In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 523, 645 N.E.2d 906, 910 (1994). The touchstone for judging whether designated acts amounted to the practice of law was earlier expressed in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Peoples Stock. Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 475, 176 N.E. 901, 907 (1931):\n\u201c \u2018Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law *** is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.\u2019 \u201d\nIn Goodman, as in the case sub judice, the court\u2019s focus was upon representation of participants in administrative proceedings. Although respondent was not an attorney, he extensively engaged in the business of handling workmen\u2019s compensation claims. Respondent\u2019s activities routinely involved the solicitation of clients, providing advice concerning potential recoveries, negotiating settlements with insurance carriers, maintaining actions before the Industrial Commission and securing orders approving settlements. Goodman, 366 Ill. at 351-52, 8 N.E.2d at 944-45. Based upon these activities, our supreme court determined that respondent was indeed engaged in the practice of law. Goodman, 366 Ill. at 357, 8 N.E.2d at 944-45:\n\u201cIt is immaterial whether the acts which constitute the practice of law are done in an office, before a court or before an administrative body. The character of the act done, and not the place where it is committed, is the factor which is decisive of whether it constitutes the practice of law.\u201d\nThe Goodman court\u2019s rationale was rooted in the recognition that the legal ramifications of workmen\u2019s compensation practice were pervasive. As the court noted, practitioners should be able to weigh evidence and coordinate the testimony and its application to the statute. Moreover, the practice required a trained legal mind to intelligently grasp \u201cthe substantive provisions of (1) the Workmen\u2019s Compensation act, (2) the Federal Employer\u2019s Liability act and (3) the common law, as related to liability for damages for traumatic injuries.\u201d Goodman, 366 Ill. at 356, 8 N.E.2d at 946.\nConversely, in Chicago Bar Ass\u2019n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771 (1966), our supreme court held that an individual who merely provides simple fact-based answers, which do not require legal skill or knowledge, has not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The Quinlan court determined that real estate brokers could fill in blanks on customary contract-of-sale forms or offers to purchase without engaging in the practice of law because these documents \u201crequire no more than ordinary business intelligence and do not require the skill peculiar to one trained and experienced in the law.\u201d Quinlan, 34 Ill. 2d at 121, 214 N.E.2d at 774. However, the line was drawn by the court\u2019s understanding that upon execution of such contracts the broker has fully performed his obligation and could not fill in the blanks on deeds or mortgages and other legal instruments because those documents require the peculiar skill of a lawyer and constitute the practice of law. Quinlan, 34 Ill. 2d at 122, 214 N.E.2d at 774.\nIn Perto v. Board of Review, 274 Ill. App. 3d 485, 654 N.E.2d 232 (1995), as in the case sub judice, we were called upon to determine whether representation by a nonattorney before the Department of Employment Security constituted the practice of law. In Perto, the employer allowed its authorized agent to complete a protest form, which included a statement of facts detailing the claimant\u2019s discharge, and send a letter requesting a hearing before the Department. Perto, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 493-94, 654 N.E.2d at 238-39. No legal advice was provided. Because the mere submission of information did not require legal knowledge or skill, we concluded the acts of the nonattorney did not constitute the practice of law. Perto, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 494-95, 654 N.E.2d at 239.\nIn Perto, as distinguished from the case at bar, the employer\u2019s representative did not appear or participate in the administrative hearing. Significantly, however, the court relied in part on a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Henize v. Giles, 22 Ohio St. 3d 213, 218, 490 N.E.2d 585, 589 (1986), holding that the representation of an employer by an actuarial firm, through a nonattorney at a benefits hearing, did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. While the nonattorney in Henize presented evidence for the employer, questioned witnesses, and performed the closing statement, the Ohio Supreme Court emphasized the relative simplicity and informality of the proceedings and the absence of any necessity for formal presentation of legal arguments. Perto, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 495, 654 N.E.2d at 240, citing Henize, 22 Ohio St. 3d at 216-17, 490 N.E.2d at 587-88.\nNeither Perto nor any other Illinois precedent we have found provides insight into the scope of our enactment allowing nonattor-neys\u2019 participation in hearings before the Department. However, we have previously looked for guidance from the Pennsylvania unemployment benefits statute, recognizing its similarity to our own. See Popoff v. Department of Labor, 144 Ill. App. 3d 575, 578, 494 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (1986) (Illinois reviewing courts, having determined that the Pennsylvania unemployment statute is similar to the Illinois entitlement, have relied upon Pennsylvania jurisprudence in adjudicating \u201cvoluntary leaving\u201d under this section of the Act). Accordingly, we find instructive Harkness v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 591 Pa. 543, 554, 920 A.2d 162, 169 (2007), which held that a nonattorney representing an employer at an unemployment hearing did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. In Harkness, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned:\n\u201c[T]he character of the activities performed by representatives at unemployment hearings coupled with the informal nature of these proceedings, the minimal amounts at issue, and the long history of participation by non-lawyer representatives suggest that the public does not need the protection that serves as the basis for classifying certain activities to constitute the practice of law.\u201d Harkness, 591 Pa. at 553-54, 920 A.2d at 168-69.\nIn the case sub judice, we likewise find that Larry Austin did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by participating in the administrative hearing involving Butterfield, the employing unit. The Act establishes an informal hearing in which all parties, including the claimant and the employer, can participate without legal representation. 820 ILCS 405/806 (West 2006). We recognize that the provision affording parties the opportunity to be represented by a nonattorney is not unique to proceedings before the Department. As the assistant Attorney General offered at oral argument, the right to be represented by a party\u2019s lay representative or spokesman is also expressly authorized in administrative hearings before the Illinois Labor Relations Board (80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71200.70, amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 7380, eff. May 1, 2003), the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71100.60), as well as the State Universities Retirement System (80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71600.500(c)(5)).\nHere, the regulations expressly required that Butterfield notify the Department of Sudzus\u2019 theft of parts from HVAC units while employed at the Industrial Kinetics jobsite. 56 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a72720.132 (1997). Moreover, the claims adjudicator\u2019s subsequent investigation of Sudzus\u2019 eligibility required information gathering from Butterfield. 820 ILCS 405/702 (West 2006); 56 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a72720.135 (1997).\nFrom our review of the record, we discern that Austin was simply acting on behalf of Butterfield in a manner that would benefit the corporation; the character of the actions did not require legal knowledge or skill; and he supplied simple, fact-based answers. Johnson v. Pistakee Highlands, 72 Ill. App. 3d 402, 404, 390 N.E.2d 640, 642 (1979); Goodman, 366 Ill. at 357, 8 N.E.2d at 947; Perto, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 495, 654 N.E.2d at 239. Austin\u2019s participation in the hearing benefitted Butterfield because he was able to provide insight into the duties of electricians on the Industrial Kinetics jobsite, the effects of dismantling and removing parts from an HVAC unit, and the approximate resulting damage. He also asked clarifying questions at the request of the referee. Johnson, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 404, 390 N.E.2d at 642 (holding a nonprofit did not perform acts which constituted the unauthorized practice of law when an employee prepared and filed legal documents which were solely for the benefit of the association). Moreover, Austin\u2019s actions are in stark contrast to those of the nonat-torney in Goodman because Austin did not provide legal opinions or advice nor did his answers or questions within the hearing require any legal knowledge or skill. Goodman, 366 Ill. at 357, 8 N.E.2d at 947. From the totality of the circumstances, we are unable to discern that Austin\u2019s limited representation of Butterfield constituted the unauthorized practice of law.\nWe next address Sudzus\u2019 claim that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to be heard in conformance with the fundamental requirements of due process of the law. As we perceive this issue to present a question of law, our review is under the de novo standard. Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 271, 807 N.E.2d 423, 430 (2004). \u201c[A]n administrative proceeding is governed by the fundamental principles and requirements of due process of law. However, due process is a flexible concept and requires only such procedural protections as fundamental principles of justice and the particular situation demand.\u201d Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 92, 606 N.E.2d at 1119.\nIt is well-settled that a fair hearing before an administrative agency includes the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and impartiality in ruling upon the evidence. Abra-hamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 95, 606 N.E.2d at 1120. In Abrahamson, the applicant\u2019s due process claim stemmed, in part, from remarks made by an Illinois Medical Licensing Board member and the Board\u2019s attorney during the administrative hearing that challenged the applicant\u2019s veracity. Although the court agreed that the remarks were irrelevant, it concluded the hearing nonetheless afforded the applicant due process. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 95, 606 N.E.2d at 1120. Moreover, as the court reasoned, absent a \u201c \u2018showing to the contrary, State administrators \u201care assumed to be men of conscience *** capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.\u201d [Citations.]\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 95, 606 N.E.2d at 1120.\nThe regulations governing IDES\u2019 administrative hearings allow the referees oversight provided it does not infringe on due process rights. Pursuant to the regulations, \u201cThe Referee will control the hearing which will be confined to the factual and/or legal issues on appeal and ensure that the parties have a full opportunity to present all evidence and testimony regarding such issue[s].\u201d 56 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a72720.245(a) (1997). Additionally, the regulations stipulate that, the Referee shall continue in a hearing even if introduced or referenced documents were not received as long as the reasons admitting or not admitting documents are stated in the record. 56 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a72720.215(c) (1997). The IDES interpretation of these regulations and the resultant practices are entitled to deference by the reviewing court. See Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 98, 606 N.E.2d at 1121.\nWe further discern that a claim of a due process violation will be sustained only upon a showing of prejudice in the proceeding. Booker v. Department of Employment Security, 216 Ill. App. 3d 320, 322, 576 N.E.2d 1028, 1030 (1991). In Booker, the plaintiff argued that he was denied due process because the transcript of the administrative hearing contained inaudible portions and \u201csome documents submitted to the hearing examiner [were] not contained in the record.\u201d Booker, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 322, 576 N.E.2d at 1030. However, without a showing of prejudice, the court found no basis for the plaintiffs claim of a denial of due process. Booker, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 322, 576 N.E.2d at 1030.\nIn the case at hand, we likewise find Sudzus has not made a sufficient showing of a due process denial by the conduct of his hearing. During the hearing, Sudzus was afforded a full opportunity to present testimony as to his understanding that the HVAC units at Industrial Kinetics could be dismantled, that he and other individuals dismantled HVAC units, and that he had never been properly informed of being fired from Butterfield. Although Sudzus\u2019 testimony was not consistent on all of these matters, the hearing nonetheless provided him with an opportunity to be heard in compliance with due process. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 95, 606 N.E.2d at 1120. Additionally, the referee provided Sudzus with the opportunity to question other witnesses. Sudzus put no questions to Austin or Manley, but did indeed question Crocilla. Due process was not denied merely because Sudzus did not fully exercise his right to cross-examination. See Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 95, 606 N.E.2d at 1120. Additionally, Sudzus makes no claim that the referee made a biased determination on the evidence in violation of due process. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 95, 606 N.E.2d at 1120. Finally, Sudzus\u2019 contention that not allowing closing arguments constituted a denial of due process has no support in the law or regulations.\nIn the instant proceedings, the referee had the discretion to control the hearing in the best manner for the circumstances. 56 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a72720.245(a) (1997). Notably, during the hearing, the referee allowed the parties to make clarifying statements while other witnesses testified and continued the hearing although she had not received Sudzus\u2019 time line. 56 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a72720.215(c), 2720.245(a) (1997). Overall, we perceive that Sudzus received an administrative hearing in compliance with due process where he had the opportunity to be heard through his testimony, had the right to cross-examine Austin, Manley, and Crocilla, and obtained impartial rulings on the evidence. The referee exercised appropriate control as regards the form of witness testimony and questions, and the treatment of Sudzus\u2019 time line, the referenced documents. 56 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a72720.215(c), 2720.245(a) (1997). We therefore conclude that the administrative hearing met the due process requirements and provided Sudzus with a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 92, 606 N.E.2d at 1119.\nLastly, we consider whether the Board erred in its determination that Sudzus committed statutory misconduct. If an individual is discharged for misconduct, he is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits under the Act. Livingston v. Department of Employment Security, 375 Ill. App. 3d 710, 716, 873 N.E.2d 444, 457 (2007). The question of whether an employee was properly terminated for misconduct in connection with his work involves a mixed question of law and fact, to which we likewise apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. Oleszczuk v. Department of Employment Security, 336 Ill. App. 3d 46, 50, 782 N.E.2d 808, 811 (2002). To establish statutory misconduct, the Board must determine whether: (1) there was a deliberate and willful violation of a rule or policy; (2) the rule or policy of the employing unit was reasonable; and (3) the violation either had harmed the employer or was repeated by the employee despite previous warnings. See 820 ILCS 405/602(A) (West 2006).\nAddressing the first criterion, the focus is on whether Sudzus deliberately and willfully violated a rule. \u201cAn employee\u2019s act of misconduct is willful if he is aware of a company rule and then disregards that rule.\u201d Caterpillar, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 313 Ill. App. 3d 645, 653, 730 N.E.2d 497, 504 (2000). In the administrative hearing, the Board determined that Sudzus admitted dismantling of HVAC units from the rooftop at the Industrial Kinetics jobsite. Manley, the superintendent of Five Star Mechanical, testified that he told Sudzus that two of the HVAC units could not be dismantled. Consequently, the Board did not err in finding that Sudzus willfully and deliberately violated a rule by dismantling and removing parts from the units notwithstanding a warning that two units were to remain intact.\nThe second element of misconduct under the Act requires a showing that the rule or policy of the employing unit was reasonable. A reasonable rule concerns \u201c \u2018standards of behavior which an employer has a right to expect\u2019 \u201d from an employee. Livingston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 716, 873 N.E.2d at 457, quoting Bandemer v. Department of Employment Security, 204 Ill. App. 3d 192, 195, 562 N.E.2d 6, 7 (1990). However, a rule or policy need not be written down or otherwise formalized. Czajka, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 177, 901 N.E.2d at 445; Caterpillar, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 654, 730 N.E.2d at 505. Even without direct evidence, the reviewing court may make a \u201ccommonsense realization that certain conduct intentionally and substantially disregards an employer\u2019s interest.\u201d Greenlaw v. Department of Employment Security, 299 Ill. App. 3d 446, 448, 701 N.E.2d 175, 178 (1998).\nNevertheless, in order for a rule to be reasonable, the rule must appropriately relate to the workplace. 820 ILCS 405/602(A) (West 2006); Livingston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 719, 873 N.E.2d at 453; Czajka, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 176, 901 N.E.2d at 447. In Livingston, we found that a nursing home\u2019s policy prohibiting employees from slapping or touching the faces of the residents was a reasonable rule as it pertained to the workplace and was part of the employee\u2019s job performance. Livingston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 719, 873 N.E.2d at 453. Also, in Czajka, there was a nexus between the duties of a church sacristan and her protest to a parish program and policies. Czajka, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 178, 901 N.E.2d at 447.\nIn the case at hand, Butterfield had a reasonable rule and expectation that its electricians would not be on the roof of Industrial Kinetics as there was no work to be done there nor would they dismantle and remove parts from any of the HVAC units. Both Austin and Cro-cilla testified to the fact that Butterfield electricians had no business on the roof at the time Manley witnessed Sudzus dismantling a HVAC unit. Although the policy was not written down, we can make a \u201ccommonsense\u201d determination that Butterfield\u2019s electricians were not authorized to dismantle any units as that was clearly the function of a different company. Furthermore, a nexus exists between Sudzus\u2019 actions and his employment because the dismantling of units occurred during work hours at the Industrial Kinetics jobsite. Livingston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 719, 873 N.E.2d at 453; Czajka, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 176, 901 N.E.2d at 447. Therefore, the rule or policy of Butterfield prohibiting electricians from being on the roof and dismantling HVAC units was a reasonable rule within section 602(A) of the Act.\nThe final element to establish misconduct under the Act requires that either the violation caused harm to the employer or the employee repeated an action despite a warning by the employer. Here, Sudzus received a prior warning from Manley not to dismantle two HVAC units. Additionally, dismantling of HVAC units caused harm to Butter-field because of the financial obligation to repair the damage.\nSudzus further asserts that the evidence regarding the approximate cost of physical damage raises issues of hearsay. \u201c \u2018Generally, hearsay evidence is not admissible in an administrative proceeding. [Citation.] However, where there is sufficient competent evidence to support an administrative decision, the improper admission of hearsay testimony in the administrative proceeding is not prejudicial error.\u2019 \u201d Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 94, 606 N.E.2d at 1120, quoting Goranson v. Department of Registration & Education, 92 Ill. App. 3d 496, 501, 415 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (1980). However, a statement made out of court which is offered \u201cfor a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted in a statement is not \u2018hearsay.\u2019 \u201d People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 313, 692 N.E.2d 1109, Ill. (1998).\nHere, Austin testified that the Butterfield customer \u201cball parked\u201d the damage at \u201caround $8,000.\u201d Although this statement is facially hearsay, the purpose of Austin\u2019s testimony was not to prove that the cost of the damages actually amounted to $8,000 but merely to alert the Board that the damage to the HVAC units resulted in a potential monetary loss. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 312, 692 N.E.2d at 1118. Manley testified that all of the HVAC units on the roof of Industrial Kinetics were dismantled. The hearsay evidence of the customer\u2019s approximation of damages was admissible because its purpose was to establish harm rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted and supports the notion that harm in the form of financial responsibility resulted from the dismantling of units. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 312-13, 692 N.E.2d at 1118; Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 94, 606 N.E.2d at 1120.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find that Sudzus has failed to demonstrate that the Board\u2019s decision regarding the unauthorized practice of law or the denial of unemployment benefits was clearly erroneous. We likewise find that the conduct of the administrative hearing comported with the standards of procedural due process. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court upholding the decision of the Board.\nAffirmed.\nFITZGERALD SMITH, EJ., and O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TOOMIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lonny Ben Ogus, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Rachel Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for ap-pellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL SUDZUS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 08\u20142255\nOpinion filed July 24, 2009.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied September 4, 2009.\nLonny Ben Ogus, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Rachel Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for ap-pellees." }, "file_name": "0814-01", "first_page_order": 830, "last_page_order": 844 }