{ "id": 4291440, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Commission", "decision_date": "2009-09-03", "docket_number": "No. 4-06-1063", "first_page": "382", "last_page": "391", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 382" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "794 N.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578232 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "877 N.E.2d 1140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1143" }, { "page": "1145", "parenthetical": "\"[N]ew procedural rules may be applied to pending appeals without interfering with a vested right\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273138 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727-28" }, { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483568 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6-7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "866 N.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704636 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" }, { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "899 N.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "\"Because an appeal of a Commission decision is allowed by law only in those districts where the subject matter of the appeal is situated, the appellate court must meet that statutory requirement, even before it can determine which district first acquired jurisdiction\"" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3617082 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" }, { "page": "389" }, { "page": "388" }, { "page": "388" }, { "page": "389" }, { "page": "389" }, { "page": "388-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "860 N.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267018 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 N.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159551 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0672-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 832, "char_count": 23342, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.118644087747037e-08, "percentile": 0.38124770980856415 }, "sha256": "54794556f90626eeddda71830f587fec9bef3b3cdacf61cf293f239d9301cc80", "simhash": "1:101de2e823973e8c", "word_count": 3677 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:22.265343+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn November 2005, respondent Illinois Bell Telephone Company (Illinois Bell) filed tariffs with respondent Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) reclassifying as competitive specific residential local services in MSA-1, an area encompassing Chicago and outlying areas. A number of entities, including the petitioner, the People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Attorney General Lisa Madigan, participated in the investigation of and hearings on Illinois Bell\u2019s reclassification. On August 30, 2006, the Commission issued its decision reclassifying Illinois Bell\u2019s residential local service for MSA-1 as competitive. The Commission also modified and adopted a joint proposal of Illinois Bell and the Citizens Utility Board (CUB), under which Illinois Bell agreed to certain rate limits.\nPetitioner appeals the Commission\u2019s ruling. On appeal, petitioner argues (1) the First District has exclusive jurisdiction to hear this appeal, (2) the Commission erred by reclassifying \u201cmeasured\u201d or \u201cbasic service\u201d in MSA-1 as \u201ccompetitive\u201d under section 13 \u2014 502 of the Public Utilities Act (Act) (220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 502 (West 2006)), and (3) the Commission lacked the authority to adopt the Illinois Bell-CUB proposal. We agree with petitioner\u2019s first argument and transfer this appeal to the First District.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn November 2005, Illinois Bell filed tariffs declaring essentially all of its residential local services in MSA-1 competitive under section 13 \u2014 502 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 502 (West 2004)). The services labeled competitive included residence network-access lines, residence usage services, call waiting, caller identification (caller ID), and directory-listing services. A consumer could purchase these services on an a la carte basis. Illinois Bell also reclassified as competitive a number of residential-service packages. We note the Commission approved the reclassification of the residential packages and petitioner did not appeal that ruling.\nOn January 11, 2006, the Commission initiated an investigation into Illinois Bell\u2019s reclassification of its residential local services. Illinois Bell\u2019s reclassification of those services, previously deemed noncompetitive, would allow Illinois Bell to \u201cchange its prices with fewer procedural obstacles and less scrutiny from the Commission.\u201d Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 282 Ill. App. 3d 672, 675, 669 N.E.2d 628, 630 (1996). A number of parties intervened, including petitioner, the City of Chicago, CUB, and AARP Illinois (AARP). In April 2006, the Commission held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. In May 2006, Illinois Bell and CUB filed their stipulation and joint proposal. Under this proposal, those parties agreed, in part, the residence local-exchange services in MSA-1 would be reclassified as competitive and Illinois Bell would cap or reduce certain prices related to such services. The People, the City of Chicago, the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, AARR Data Net Systems, and TruComm all urged the Commission not to accept the joint proposal.\nIn July 2006, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposed order recommending, in part, the Commission reject the joint proposal and find measured service, caller ID, and call waiting be classified noncompetitive. The Commission, however, disagreed with the ALJ. On August 30, 2006, the Commission issued its decision reclassifying Illinois Bell\u2019s measured services for MSA-1 as competitive and adopting the joint proposal upon modifying it.\nIllinois Bell, petitioner, and AARIj as well as other parties, filed applications for rehearing with the Commission. On October 13, 2006, the Commission explicitly denied the applications for rehearing filed by Illinois Bell, petitioner, and other parties. The Commission did not rule on the merits of AARP\u2019s application.\nThree petitions for administrative review followed in two appellate districts. On October 13, 2006, Illinois Bell filed the first of its two petitions in this court, docketed as No. 4 \u2014 06\u20140882. On October 23, 2006, Illinois Bell filed its second (No. 4 \u2014 06\u20140911). One day later, in the First District, petitioner filed its notice of appeal and petition for administrative review (No. 1 \u2014 06\u20143014).\nIn November 2006, Illinois Bell filed, in the First District, a motion to transfer petitioner\u2019s appeal to the Fourth District or to dismiss petitioner\u2019s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Illinois Bell maintained because it filed the first appeal, the Fourth District had exclusive jurisdiction. The First District, without ruling on the jurisdiction arguments, agreed to the transfer and, in December 2006, transferred petitioner\u2019s appeal to the Fourth District. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 369 Ill. App. 3d 126, 860 N.E.2d 459 (2006). Upon transfer, the appeal was docketed as No. 4 \u2014 06\u20141063.\nOn January 4, 2007, petitioner filed in this court a motion to dismiss Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals (Nos. 4 \u2014 06\u20140882 and 4 \u2014 06\u20140911). Petitioner argued both of Illinois Bell\u2019s petitions for administrative review were prematurely filed and invalid as they were filed before the Commission resolved all of the postjudgment motions. On January 12, 2007, this court granted petitioner\u2019s motion, dismissing Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, Nos. 4 \u2014 06\u20140882, 4 \u2014 06\u20140911 cons. (January 12, 2007) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Illinois Bell did not petition the supreme court for leave to appeal.\nAlso in January 2007, this court dismissed petitioner\u2019s appeal in No. 4 \u2014 06\u20141063. We held petitioner failed to file a timely application for rehearing in the Commission and such failure precluded our review. People ex rel. Lisa Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, No. 4 \u2014 06\u2014 1063 (January 18, 2007) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois.\nIn November 2008, our supreme court reversed and remanded our decision in case No. 4 \u2014 06\u20141063. The court first concluded petitioner timely filed its application for rehearing with the Commission and this court did not lack jurisdiction on that particular ground. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 231 Ill. 2d 370, 389, 899 N.E.2d 227, 237 (2008). The court then ordered this court to (1) determine whether the subject matter of the Commission\u2019s order lies within the First or Fourth District, if either; (2) if the subject matter lies in both districts, decide which district first acquired jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s appeal; and (3) consider appellate jurisdiction in light of Supreme Court Rules 303(a)(2) (210 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2)) and 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335). Madigan, 231 Ill. 2d at 389, 899 N.E.2d at 237.\nWe consider the appeal on remand.\nII. ANALYSIS\nPetitioner\u2019s appeal is one from the decision of the Commission, an administrative body. We have jurisdiction to review administrative decisions only as provided by law. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a76; Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill. 2d 103, 121, 866 N.E.2d 227, 237-38 (2007). To review the direct appeal of an administrative action, we must exercise special statutory jurisdiction. McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 165 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7, 649 N.E.2d 404, 407 (1995). The statute that gives an appellate court jurisdiction over an administrative action also limits it. Town & Country Utilities, 225 Ill. 2d at 122, 843 N.E.2d at 238.\nIn this case, the statute that gives an appellate court power to review a decision of the Commission is section 10 \u2014 201(a) of the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 201(a) (West 2006)). Section 10 \u2014 201(a) provides two prerequisites for an appellate court to have jurisdiction. First, the subject matter of the hearing must be situated in the judicial district of the appellate court. 220 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 201(a) (West 2006). Second, if the subject matter \u201cis situated in more than one district,\u201d then the appellate court that first acquires \u201cjurisdiction of any appeal\u201d from the Commission\u2019s order is the court that maintains jurisdiction until the appeal is disposed. 220 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 201(a) (West 2006).\nIn Madigan, our supreme court concluded the jurisdictional analysis under section 10 \u2014 201(a) is sequential. See Madigan, 231 Ill. 2d at 388, 899 N.E.2d at 237 (\u201cBecause an appeal of a Commission decision is allowed by law only in those districts where the subject matter of the appeal is situated, the appellate court must meet that statutory requirement, even before it can determine which district first acquired jurisdiction\u201d). According to section 10 \u2014 201(a) and court order, we must first determine where the subject matter is situated before we may turn to the question of which appellate court first acquired jurisdiction. See Madigan, 231 Ill. 2d at 388, 899 N.E.2d at 237.\nA. Situs of the Subject Matter\nThe parties dispute whether the subject matter of the Commission\u2019s order is situated in the Fourth District. Petitioner\u2019s position is the subject matter is situated in the First District and not in the Fourth District. Petitioner argues Illinois Bell cannot specify any evidence showing the Commission considered competition, phone lines, or customers within the jurisdiction of the Fourth District. Petitioner further maintains William Taylor, an expert witness presented by Illinois Bell, testified the \u201cChicago LATA\u201d does not include part or all of any county within the Fourth District. Taylor testified the relevant market within the Chicago LATA contained Cook County, which is in the First District, as well as other counties in the Second and Third Districts.\nIllinois Bell argues the subject matter of the order is situated in the Fourth District. Illinois Bell acknowledges most of the customers affected by the order are in the First District but argues MSA-1 extends into part of Livingston County, a county in the Fourth District. Illinois Bell emphasizes when the Commission reclassified services, it did so in \u201cMSA-1.\u201d In its appellee brief, the Commission adopted Illinois Bell\u2019s argument. We agree with Illinois Bell and find the subject matter is situated in the Fourth District.\nIn their arguments on appeal, the parties emphasize two different geographical areas: the Chicago LATA and MSA-1. Petitioner focuses on the Chicago LATA, while Illinois Bell and the Commission use the MSA-1 term. According to Taylor\u2019s expert testimony, \u201cLATA\u201d stands for \u201cLocal Access and Transport Area.\u201d LATAs were created as part of the 1984 divestiture of the Bell system. There are 14 LATAs in Illinois. In contrast, an MSA, or metropolitan statistical area, \u201cis a county or group of counties having a large clustered population, including adjacent areas having a high degree of community of interest with the core population center.\u201d The Chicago LATA and MSA-1 do not have the same boundaries, but their geographical areas overlap significantly: \u201calmost 98[%] of the lines in the Chicago LATA are in the Chicago MSA.\u201d The Commission, in its order, made its findings in relation to MSA-1. For example, it determined \u201cthe market for measured service is properly classified as competitive in MSA-1.\u201d\nThe record shows expert witness Taylor identified, on a table, the counties in the Chicago LATA and MSA-1. The table is entitled \u201cCounty Comparisons Among the LATA, DMA[,] and MSA.\u201d None of the counties listed fall within the Fourth District.\nThe record, however, also contains expert testimony MSA-1 extends into part of Livingston County. When asked to define MSA-1, W Karl War din, an expert witness preferred by Illinois Bell, testified the area covered the Chicago metropolitan area, \u201cincluding all of Cook County and all of the surrounding collar counties of Lake, DuPage, Kendall!,] and Will; most of McHenry, Kane, Grundy!,] and Kankakee !C]ounties; part of LaSalle and Iroquois [C]ounties; and a fraction of Livingston [C]ounty.\u201d In addition, at least one schedule offered by Wardin lists the town of Dwight among other cities and suburbs, such as Chicago, Des Plaines, Aurora, and Wheaton. By listing Dwight on this schedule, Wardin indicates there are Livingston County residential access lines within the Chicago LATA. We note, after responding to the question defining MSA-1, Wardin referred to both MSA-1 and the Chicago LATA as the Chicago LATA.\nIn addition to this testimony by Wardin, petitioner, in other filings before this court, admitted consumers in Livingston County are affected by the Commission\u2019s order. We take judicial notice of petitioner\u2019s motion to dismiss Illinois Bell\u2019s consolidated appeals in Nos. 4 \u2014 06\u2014 0882 and 4 \u2014 06\u20140911. Petitioner stated the following:\n\u201cThe overwhelming majority of the 2.4 million consumers affected by the Order reside in the First, Second[,] and Third Judicial Districts, including Cook, Lake, DuPage, Kendall, Will, most of McHenry, Kane, Grundy, Kankakee, and part of LaSalle and Iroquois Counties. *** The consumers affected by the Order living in the Fourth Judicial District are only those in the Dwight area, representing a fraction of Livingston County, and a tiny fraction of all customers affected by the Order.\u201d\nWe agree with petitioner this is not a concession as to this court\u2019s jurisdiction, but it may be interpreted as petitioner\u2019s accepting War-din\u2019s testimony as true.\nWe further conclude the petitioner wrongly states there is no evidence in the record showing the Commission considered competition, phone lines, or customers within the Fourth District. While the Commission does not explicitly reference the residential lines in Livingston County, there is evidence listing Dwight and identifying the level of competition for retail residential access lines among Dwight customers. This evidence appears in a schedule, which we referred to above, that (1) lists exchanges by city; (2) identifies the numbers of \u201cChicago LATA Retail Residential Access Lines,\u201d \u201cWireless Estimate\u201d numbers, and \u201cAT&T CLEG [(Competitive Local Exchange Carriers)] Chicago LATA Residential Access Lines\u201d users; and (3) provides the ratio for residential CLEG and wireless users to Illinois Bell users by city. In its order, when summarizing Illinois Bell\u2019s position, the Commission used this 23.9% figure when it made the following statement: Illinois Bell \u201cpresented evidence showing that at the time the residential services at issue were classified as competitive, CLECs and wireless carriers alone served approximately 24% of the residence lines in [Illinois Bell\u2019s] service territory in the Chicago LATA.\u201d The Dwight consumer information appears to have been part of the analysis and the Commission\u2019s ultimate decision.\nGiven the above testimony, petitioner\u2019s earlier concession, and the evidence cited by the Commission, we find the subject matter of the hearing lies within the Fourth District, as well as in the First, Second, and Third Districts. Although the number of consumers and the size of the territory in the Fourth District is very small in relation to the other districts, section 10 \u2014 201 does not indicate a preference for jurisdiction based upon which district possesses proportionately more subject matter or affected persons.\nB. First Acquired Jurisdiction\nHaving determined the subject matter is situated in more than one district, we turn to the question of which district first acquired jurisdiction over an appeal from the Commission\u2019s order. Petitioner argues the First District first acquired jurisdiction, even though its appeal was not the first filed. Petitioner\u2019s appeal (No. 1 \u2014 06\u20143014) was filed in the First District on October 24, 2006, while Illinois Bell filed its appeals in the Fourth District on October 13 and 23, 2006 (Nos. 4 \u2014 06\u20140882, 4 \u2014 06\u20140911). Petitioner emphasizes because this court dismissed Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals for lack of jurisdiction, the Fourth District did not have jurisdiction over any appeal of the Commission\u2019s order when the First District acquired jurisdiction over its appeal.\nIllinois Bell acknowledges the dismissed appeals, but argues the supreme court\u2019s decision in Madigan indicates we should \u201ctake a fresh look at this issue.\u201d Illinois Bell maintains petitioner made the same argument in Madigan, but the supreme court \u201cobviously did not accept the [petitioner\u2019s] theory that the dismissals automatically meant that the First District was first to acquire jurisdiction.\u201d Illinois Bell contends this court was then instructed to determine which district first acquired jurisdiction and consider Supreme Court Rule 303 (210 Ill. 2d R. 303). Illinois Bell then essentially challenges our decision in Nos. 4 \u2014 06\u20140882 and 4 \u2014 06\u20140911 by arguing its appeals were timely.\nWhile Illinois Bell urges this court to \u201ctake a fresh look\u201d at its earlier appeals, Illinois Bell cites no supreme court rule or statute that gives this court authority to open those cases. Illinois Bell filed its appeals in October 2006. In January 2007, petitioner moved to dismiss Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals as untimely. Illinois Bell filed a brief in response. On January 12, 2007, we agreed with petitioner and dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. Illinois Bell did not file a petition for rehearing under Supreme Court Rule 367(a) (210 III. 2d R. 367(a)) or appeal to the supreme court under Rule 315(b) (210 Ill. 2d R. 315(b)). After the deadlines in those rules expired, this court lacked authority to reopen those appeals.\nRule 303(a)(2) does not make Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals timely or authorize reconsideration of those appeals. Illinois Bell relied on an amended version of Rule 303(a)(2) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(2) (eff. May 1, 2007)) in support of its argument its appeals were timely. This version, however, became effective on May 1, 2007 \u2014 almost four months after this court\u2019s January 12, 2007, final decision finding Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals untimely. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(2) (eff. May 1, 2007).\nAt the time of the January 2007 ruling, the applicable Rule 303(a)(2) appeared at 210 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2). Interestingly, it is this version of the rule the Madigan court told this court to consider. See Madigan, 231 Ill. 2d at 389, 899 N.E.2d at 237. Under this version, petitions for review filed in the appellate court before the Commission resolved all of the postjudgment motions were untimely and deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction over such petitions. 210 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2) (\u201cWhen a timely postjudgment motion has been filed by any party ***, a notice of appeal filed before the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudment motion shall have no effect\u201d). In contrast, the amended version provides \u201cwhen a timely postjudgment motion has been filed, a notice of appeal filed before \u2018the final disposition of any separate claim\u2019 does not become effective until the order disposing of the separate claim is entered.\u201d In re Marriage of Duggan, 376 Ill. App. 3d 725, 727-28, 877 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (2007), quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(2) (eff. May 1, 2007). While the amended version may have applied if it were effective while Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals were pending, it cannot be used to resurrect a final judgment. See generally Duggan, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 730, 877 N.E.2d at 1145 (\u201c[N]ew procedural rules may be applied to pending appeals without interfering with a vested right\u201d (emphasis added)).\nOur supreme court also noted Supreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335) may apply. Madigan, 231 Ill. 2d at 389, 899 N.E.2d at 237. Rule 335, entitled \u201cDirect Review of Administrative Orders by the Appellate Court,\u201d provides the procedures for statutory direct reviews of administrative-agency orders. 155 Ill. 2d R. 335. We find it does not provide a procedure permitting review of Illinois Bell\u2019s orders.\nIn addition, Madigan does not authorize this court to reconsider our rulings in the Illinois Bell appeals. Contrary to Illinois Bell\u2019s assertion, the supreme court did not reject petitioner\u2019s argument that because Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals were dismissed the First District automatically had jurisdiction; the supreme court simply refused to consider the argument at that time. The supreme court summarized the arguments and left the jurisdictional questions under section 10\u2014 201(a) to this court, while observing neither this district nor the First District had yet considered those arguments. Madigan, 231 Ill. 2d at 388-89, 899 N.E.2d at 237.\nNot only have we found no rule or statute authorizing us to reopen Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals, but also the collateral-estoppel doctrine prohibits such an action. Under this doctrine, relitigating an issue already determined is barred in the following circumstances:\n\u201c(1) the court rendered a final judgment in the prior case; (2) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case; and (3) the issue decided in the prior case is identical with the one presented in the instant case.\u201d People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396, 794 N.E.2d 238, 247 (2002).\nAll three elements apply here.\nWe note petitioner argues the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes revisiting Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals. Like the collateral-estoppel doctrine, the law-of-the-case doctrine prevents parties from relitigating issues already decided. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d at 395, 794 N.E.2d at 247. Unlike collateral estoppel, however, the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to issues already determined in the same case. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d at 396, 794 N.E.2d at 247. Illinois Bell\u2019s appeals and petitioner\u2019s appeal were not the same case. One is not a continuation of another, the appeals were not consolidated, and section 10 \u2014 201\u2019s reference to multiple appeals contemplates separate actions from the same order.\nThis court has not acquired jurisdiction over any appeal from the Commission\u2019s order. Because petitioner\u2019s appeal was filed in the First District, that district may have jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s appeal. As our earlier analysis shows, it is clear the subject matter of the Commission\u2019s order lies in the First District, satisfying the first part of section 10 \u2014 201. The question remains, however, whether the First District has jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s appeals under the supreme court rules. We defer to the First District on that matter.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the stated reasons, we find this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, and we transfer the appeal to the First District.\nAppeal transferred.\nMcCULLOUGH, EJ., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Susan L. Satter, Janice A. Dale, and Diane M. Potts (argued), Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for petitioner.", "John T. Lenahan, Karl B. Anderson, and Louise Sunderland, all of Illinois Bell Telephone Company, and J. Tyson Covey (argued) and Demetrios G. Metropoulos, both of Mayer Brown LLP, both of Chicago, for respondent Illinois Bell Telephone Company.", "John P. Kelliher and Thomas R. Stanton, Special Assistant Attorneys General, both of Chicago, for respondent Illinois Commerce Commission." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201406\u20141063\nOpinion filed September 3, 2009.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Susan L. Satter, Janice A. Dale, and Diane M. Potts (argued), Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for petitioner.\nJohn T. Lenahan, Karl B. Anderson, and Louise Sunderland, all of Illinois Bell Telephone Company, and J. Tyson Covey (argued) and Demetrios G. Metropoulos, both of Mayer Brown LLP, both of Chicago, for respondent Illinois Bell Telephone Company.\nJohn P. Kelliher and Thomas R. Stanton, Special Assistant Attorneys General, both of Chicago, for respondent Illinois Commerce Commission." }, "file_name": "0382-01", "first_page_order": 400, "last_page_order": 409 }