{ "id": 4291514, "name": "ELMHURST PARK DISTRICT, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Sean T. Murphy, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Elmhurst Park District v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission", "decision_date": "2009-10-06", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201408\u20142289WC", "first_page": "404", "last_page": "411", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 404" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5801945 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" }, { "page": "632" }, { "page": "633-34" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3620773 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n employee may be entitled to compensation even though he may have violated a rule of his employer, especially where that rule was unenforced\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3606828 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971046 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2528132 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477020 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 1197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267059 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/1197-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283180 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4282535 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5797197 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2952836 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974996 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0193-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 792, "char_count": 19053, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14432076928037116 }, "sha256": "a372f071b41a3c35cf0b4ba28f12767985ea61968383e75766f20b4828f043aa", "simhash": "1:d86d61d760d16a41", "word_count": 2976 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:02.073967+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ELMHURST PARK DISTRICT, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS\u2019 COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Sean T. Murphy, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HUDSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nClaimant, Sean T. Murphy, worked at a fitness facility operated by respondent, Elmhurst Park District. On January 3, 2002, claimant injured his right leg while playing in a wallyball game on respondent\u2019s premises during his work shift. Claimant sought benefits for his injury pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)). Respondent asserted that claimant\u2019s injury was not compensable by virtue of section 11 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/11 (West 2002)), which precludes an employee from recovering for accidental injuries incurred while participating in \u201cvoluntary recreational programs\u201d unless the employee was ordered or assigned by the employer to participate in the activity. The arbitrator awarded claimant benefits, finding that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with respondent. The arbitrator found that section 11 did not apply because claimant\u2019s participation in the wallyball game did not constitute a \u201cvoluntary recreational activity\u201d as contemplated by section 11. The Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission (Commission) affirmed the decision of the arbitrator, and the circuit court of Cook County confirmed. On appeal, respondent contends that, despite the Commission\u2019s conclusion to the contrary, claimant was not entitled to benefits because his participation in the wallyball game was \u201cvoluntary,\u201d the wallyball game constituted a \u201crecreational\u201d activity, and respondent did not order or assign claimant to participate in the activity. See 820 ILCS 305/11 (West 2002). We find respondent\u2019s position unpersuasive and therefore affirm.\nClaimant was hired by respondent as a fitness supervisor late in 2001. Claimant testified that in this capacity one of his duties was to promote and implement the classes and programs that respondent offered its patrons. Claimant explained that promoting respondent\u2019s programs involved \u201chelp[ing] out with any of the programs or classes along with helping the members and customers.\u201d A copy of claimant\u2019s written job description was placed into evidence.\nRegarding the events of January 3, 2002, claimant testified that he was scheduled to work from noon until 8:30 p.m. At approximately 7:30 p.m. that day, Denise McElroy, a coworker, approached claimant and asked him to participate in a wallyball game. McElroy was not claimant\u2019s supervisor, and she was off duty on the evening of January 3. Claimant testified that the game in question was part of respondent\u2019s wallyball league and that the participants were paying customers. Although claimant was a regular member of the wallyball league, he declined McElroy\u2019s invitation because he did not feel well and he had other work to do. According to claimant, however, McElroy persisted. She told him that without his assistance the game could not go forward \u201cbecause they didn\u2019t have enough people to participate.\u201d At that point, claimant ceded to McElroy\u2019s \u201ccajoling\u201d and decided to \u201coblige\u201d and \u201chelp[ ] out.\u201d At about 7:45 p.m., 15 minutes after the game commenced, claimant jumped up to block a shot. When he came down, he injured his right leg. Claimant was transported by ambulance to Elmhurst Memorial Hospital, where he underwent surgery to repair a fracture. With the aid of crutches, claimant was able to return to his position as fitness supervisor on February 24, 2002.\nClaimant testified that he was not aware of any policy prohibiting park district employees from participating in league play while on duty and that he was not reprimanded by respondent for his participation in the wallyball game. In fact, claimant stated that he had played wallyball during working hours on at least three occasions prior to January 3, 2002. Claimant explained that on those occasions he would begin a game prior to the end of his shift and finish the game after the end of his shift. Claimant acknowledged that no one told him that it was mandatory for him to participate in the wallyball game on the evening in question. Nevertheless, he stated that he \u201cfelt that [it] was part of [his] job,\u201d which was \u201cto promote *** different classes and programs.\u201d\nClaimant\u2019s supervisor, Pamela Stoike, testified that in January 2002 she was employed by respondent as the manager of fitness and racquet sports at the facility where claimant worked. Stoike testified that the wallyball program is administered as part of the racquet sports department. Stoike explained that the fitness department and the racquet sports department are separate, that each department has its own \u201csub supervisor,\u201d and that claimant had no duties with respect to the racquet sports department. Stoike further testified that wally-ball was not within claimant\u2019s responsibilities and that she, as claimant\u2019s supervisor, never ordered or directed claimant to play or participate in any wallyball league. Stoike added that McElroy did not have any supervisory duties over claimant and that claimant did not have any responsibilities regarding the formation of wallyball teams or the promotion of the sport. In fact, Stoike testified that although respondent encouraged its employees to participate in sports leagues on their own time, it had a policy prohibiting employees from playing while they were on duty.\nBased on the foregoing evidence, the arbitrator concluded that claimant\u2019s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with respondent. The arbitrator found that section 11 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/11 (West 2002)) did not apply because claimant was not participating in a \u201crecreational\u201d activity but rather was performing duties incidental to his employment. The arbitrator explained that claimant was injured during an activity that \u201cwas part of the respondent\u2019s business, and therefore part of the [claimant\u2019s] overall job duties.\u201d The arbitrator stated that without claimant\u2019s participation, the wallyball game would not have been played and respondent\u2019s customers would not have been accommodated. Moreover, the arbitrator noted that claimant felt \u201ccompelled\u201d to participate based on his written job description, which provided that claimant\u2019s responsibilities included \u201c[p]romot[ing] *** programs to patrons, members, guests and staff,\u201d \u201c[d]evelop[ing] and maintain[ing] positive customer service,\u201d and \u201c[b]e[ing] available for flexible work schedules.\u201d The arbitrator added that the fact that an employee\u2019s work duties involve an activity that is \u201crecreational\u201d to the employer\u2019s customers does not make the activity \u201crecreational\u201d to the employee involved in it. The arbitrator concluded that since claimant\u2019s participation in the wally-ball game \u201cclearly benefited the respondent\u2019s business of operating a health facility and the [claimant] reasonably believed the activity was part of his work duties,\u201d claimant was not engaged in a \u201cvoluntary recreational\u201d activity. The arbitrator awarded claimant 72/y weeks of temporary total disability benefits (see 820 ILCS 305/8(b) (West 2002)) and 50 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits, representing 25% loss of use of the right leg (see 820 ILCS 305/8(e) (West 2002)). As noted above, the Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator and the circuit court of Cook County confirmed. This appeal followed.\nAn injury is compensable under the Act only if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it arose out of and in the course of his or her employment. Sisbro, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 207 Ill. 2d 193, 203 (2003). An injury is said to \u201carise out of\u2019 one\u2019s employment if its origin is in some risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment so that there is a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. Technical Tape Corp. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 58 Ill. 2d 226, 230 (1974). An injury is \u201cin the course of\u2019 employment when it occurs within the period of employment at a place where the employee can reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his or her duties and while he or she is performing these duties or a task incidental thereto. All Steel, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 221 Ill. App. 3d 501, 503 (1991).\nOn appeal, respondent does not expressly dispute that claimant has established the foregoing elements. Rather, respondent asserts that claimant is precluded from recovering benefits by virtue of the voluntary-recreational activity exclusion set forth in section 11 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/11 (West 2002)). That section provides in relevant part:\n\u201cAccidental injuries incurred while participating in voluntary recreational programs including but not limited to athletic events, parties and picnics do not arise out of and in the course of the employment even though the employer pays some or all of the cost thereof. This exclusion shall not apply in the event that the injured employee was ordered or assigned by his employer to participate in the program.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/11 (West 2002).\nThe parties do not suggest that claimant\u2019s participation in the wally-ball game was not \u201cvoluntary.\u201d Instead, they focus on whether the nature of the activity in which claimant was engaged at the time of his injury was \u201crecreational.\u201d According to respondent, the plain and unambiguous language of section 11 was meant to apply in instances such as this where an employee is injured while engaged in an activity such as wallyball, which is an \u201cathletic event.\u201d Claimant counters that section 11 was not intended to bar compensation where, as here, the injury occurs within the period of employment and while the employee is participating in an activity that is \u201cincidental\u201d to the performance of his or her duties.\nTo determine whether the exclusion set forth in section 11 precludes claimant from recovering benefits, we must determine what the legislature intended by the use of the word \u201crecreational.\u201d The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. City of Chicago v. Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Comm\u2019n, 387 Ill. App. 3d 276, 278 (2008). In interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ming Auto Body/Ming of Decatur, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 387 Ill. App. 3d 244, 253 (2008). The best indication of legislative intent is the plain and ordinary language of the statute itself. Piasa Motor Fuels v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 368 Ill. App. 3d 1197, 1203 (2006). Moreover, because the provisions of a statutory enactment are to be viewed as a whole, a court may also consider the principle purpose of the statute in ascertaining the legislative intent. See In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (2002).\nAlthough section 11 provides several general examples of activities which may be considered \u201crecreational,\u201d the Act does not expressly define the term. See Cary Fire Protection District v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 211 Ill. App. 3d 20, 25 (1991). Absent statutory definitions indicating a different legislative intention, courts will assume that words have their ordinary and popularly understood meanings. General Motors Corp., Fisher Body Division v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 62 Ill. 2d 106, 112 (1975). In determining the ordinary meaning of a statutory term, it is appropriate to consult a dictionary. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 330 (2007). The term \u201crecreational\u201d is derived from the word \u201crecreation.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1899 (2002). The word \u201crecreation\u201d in turn is defined as \u201cthe act of recreating or the state of being recreated: refreshment of the strength and spirits after toil: DIVERSION, PLAY.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1899 (2002).\nGiven the foregoing definition, we can certainly envision circumstances under which participation in a game of wallyball would constitute a \u201crecreational\u201d activity and therefore fall within the voluntary-recreational activity exclusion set forth in section 11 of the Act. However, we do not believe that the facts of this case present such a situation. Similar to a professional athlete, \u201crecreation\u201d is inherent in claimant\u2019s position as a fitness supervisor. See 2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Worker\u2019s Compensation Law \u00a722.04[l][b], at 22-12 through 22-16 (2007) (\u201cThe clearest possible example of \u2018recreation\u2019 which is the essence of the job itself is that of professional sports\u201d). As such, we find it appropriate to consider why claimant agreed to play wallyball on the date he was injured. The evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing established that claimant initially declined McElroy\u2019s invitation to participate in the wallyball game because he was not feeling well and he had other work to do. However, McElroy persisted in her request and told claimant that absent his participation, the game would be cancelled because there would not be enough participants. Thereafter, claimant decided to \u201chelp[ ] out\u201d because he \u201cfelt that [it] was part of [his] job,\u201d which was \u201cto promote *** different classes and programs.\u201d Based on this evidence, we conclude that claimant did not participate in the wallyball game for his own \u201cdiversion\u201d or to \u201crefresh\u201d or \u201cstrengthen\u201d his spirits after toil. Rather, claimant participated in the game to accommodate respondent\u2019s customers. As such, we find that claimant was not engaged in a \u201crecreational\u201d activity as contemplated by section 11 of the Act at the time of his injury.\nOur finding is further buttressed by the Commission\u2019s determination that claimant\u2019s participation in the wallyball game was incidental to his employment. Respondent asserts that claimant\u2019s duties centered on the fitness department and his supervisor testified that none of his duties involved racquet sports, the department which encompasses the wallyball program. However, according to claimant\u2019s written job description, his responsibilities included \u201c[p]romot[ing] Elmhurst Park District programs.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This clearly does not limit claimant to promoting only fitness-department programs. Similarly, claimant was required to \u201c[djevelop and maintain positive customer service with internal and external customers.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Again, this responsibility does not restrict claimant from attending to customers outside of the fitness department. Indeed, as we noted previously, claimant testified that he felt that participating in the wallyball game was part of his job because one of the requirements of his position was to help out with any programs or classes respondent offered its patrons. Claimant\u2019s belief was reasonable in light of his written job description. Therefore, the evidence supports the Commission\u2019s finding that claimant\u2019s participation in the wallyball game was incidental to his employment.\nFurthermore, we reject the suggestion that claimant\u2019s injury is not compensable because respondent had a policy prohibiting employees from playing league sports while they were on duty. Claimant\u2019s supervisor testified to such a policy. However, if the policy existed, the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing suggested that it was not enforced. See County of Cook v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 177 Ill. App. 3d 264, 272 (1988) (\u201c[A]n employee may be entitled to compensation even though he may have violated a rule of his employer, especially where that rule was unenforced\u201d). Claimant testified that he was not aware of any such policy and, in fact, that he had played wallyball during working hours on at least three occasions during his short tenure with respondent prior to the date of his injury. Moreover, claimant stated that he was not reprimanded by respondent for his participation in the wallyball game on January 3, 2002. For all these reasons, we affirm the Commission\u2019s finding that the voluntary-recreational activity exclusion did not render claimant\u2019s injury noncompensable.\nCiting to Kozak v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 219 Ill. App. 3d 629 (1991), respondent vigorously asserts that wallyball is clearly an \u201cathletic event\u201d and therefore claimant\u2019s injury is not compensable. In Kozak, the employee suffered a fatal heart attack while participating in a tennis round-robin tournament conducted for the purpose of selecting a tennis team to represent the employer in a national invitational championship. Kozak, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 630. The petitioners, the decedent\u2019s widow and son, thereafter sought benefits under the Act. In upholding the Commission\u2019s decision to deny compensation, we stated that \u201c \u2018section 11 applies if an employee is injured while participating in a voluntary activity regardless of the purpose of the activity.\u2019 \u201d Kozak, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 632. Further, we cited two reasons for declining the petitioners\u2019 request to define \u201crecreational activities\u201d beyond the description contained in section 11 of the Act:\n\u201cIn the first instance, it is absolutely clear in the case before us that participation in a round-robin elimination tennis tournament is an \u2018athletic event\u2019 within the meaning of the Act. Second, any additional explication of the possible types of conduct which may be within or without the Act would be, at best, dicta and, at worst, an impermissible advisory opinion in which this court may not engage.\u201d Kozak, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 633-34.\nWhile our decision in this case may, at first blush, seem antithetical to Kozak, a closer examination reveals that the two cases are distinguishable.\nAs noted above, \u201crecreation\u201d is inherent in claimant\u2019s job. Therefore, almost any activity in which claimant takes part could be considered \u201crecreational.\u201d For this reason, it is necessary to consider the purpose of claimant\u2019s participation in the wallyball game. In Kozak, there was no evidence that \u201crecreation\u201d was inherent in the employee\u2019s position. Therefore, under our analysis in this case, the result in Kozak would be the same. The evidence in Kozak indicates that the sole reason for the employee\u2019s participation in the tennis tournament was for his own \u201cdiversion.\u201d As part of the tennis competition, the employee in Kozak was flown to Texas and the employer paid all of the travel expenses. Kozak, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 631. Further, had the employee won the tournament, he would have received a trophy and an all-expense paid vacation. Kozak, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 630. Accordingly, we find respondent\u2019s reliance on Kozak misplaced.\nIn sum, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, which confirmed the decision of the Commission.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, EJ., and HOFFMAN, HOLDRIDGE, and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.\nWallyball is a team sport similar to volleyball, but which is played within the confines of a racquetball court. See American Wallyball Association, http://www.wallyball.com (last visited September 22, 2009).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HUDSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Nyhan, Bambrick, Kinzie & Lowry, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Cronin, Peters & Cook, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ELMHURST PARK DISTRICT, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS\u2019 COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Sean T. Murphy, Appellee).\nFirst District (Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission Division)\nNo. 1\u201408\u20142289WC\nOpinion filed October 6, 2009.\nRehearing denied December 3, 2009.\nNyhan, Bambrick, Kinzie & Lowry, of Chicago, for appellant.\nCronin, Peters & Cook, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0404-01", "first_page_order": 420, "last_page_order": 427 }