{ "id": 4291289, "name": "In re DETENTION OF ANDREW M. KISH (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Andrew M. Kish, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kish", "decision_date": "2009-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201408\u20140078", "first_page": "546", "last_page": "560", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 546" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "880 N.E.2d 1157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275386 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3621864 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 952", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3642305 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 N.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926982 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 N.E.2d 1026", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780273 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "890 N.E.2d 1190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 Ill. App. 3d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4278559 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/384/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 1238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909172 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588727 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958038 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536015 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477020 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 1385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073628 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "771 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58925 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307264 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0083-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 928, "char_count": 30009, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.32301593645034904 }, "sha256": "51cdde94e755df3874caced5e2e112ee1b66fd192279aebcd2595db134e60fb6", "simhash": "1:6f27ec01b3cf91a0", "word_count": 4801 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:02.073967+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re DETENTION OF ANDREW M. KISH (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Andrew M. Kish, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 1985, the State petitioned the trial court to civilly commit the respondent, Andrew M. Kish, under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 105 \u2014 1.01 et seq.). The court found the respondent to be a sexually dangerous person (SDP), and he was committed. On October 28, 2002, the respondent filed an application to show that he was recovered (725 ILCS 205/9 (West 2002)). In response to the respondent\u2019s application, the court granted him a conditional release (725 ILCS 205/9 (West 2004)) on December 22, 2004.\nOn September 5, 2006, the respondent filed a pro se motion to modify the conditions of his release. During the pendency of the respondent\u2019s motion, the State filed a petition to revoke the respondent\u2019s conditional release (725 ILCS 205/9(e) (West 2006)). Prior to the hearing on the State\u2019s petition, the respondent\u2019s attorney filed several preliminary motions on the respondent\u2019s behalf, which the court denied. Following a hearing, the court granted the State\u2019s petition to revoke.\nThe respondent appeals the revocation of his conditional release. The respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying his preliminary motions to: (1) apply the rules of civil procedure and the corresponding supreme court rules; (2) establish reasonable doubt as the State\u2019s burden of proof; (3) bar the use of polygraph evidence; (4) strike the reports of the respondent\u2019s treating psychologist and to bar the psychologist from testifying; and (5) strike and to bar certain statements made by the respondent as violative of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Additionally, the respondent submits that, at the hearing on the State\u2019s petition to revoke, the court erred by allowing the hearsay testimony of witnesses other than the polygraph examiner concerning the respondent\u2019s statements to the polygraph examiner.\nBACKGROUND\nOn December 22, 2004, the trial court issued the conditional release order. The order imposed the following conditions, among others:\n\u201c1. Mr. Kish shall be placed in a structured environment, such as a halfway house, approved by the IDOC.\n3. Mr. Kish will be supervised while on conditional release by the Parole Department of the Illinois Department of Corrections. $ $ $\n6. Mr. Kish [will] be required to attend sex offender specific treatment along with whatever other programs are deemed appropriate by [the] treatment staff. The amount of treatment will ultimately be determined by the treatment staff. Mr. Kish will follow all treatment program rules. Two weekly groups are recommended, if feasible. It is also recommended that he obtain general mental health treatment. The treatment provider(s) will be approved by the treatment staff of Big Muddy River Correctional Center/IDOC. \u00edk \u00edj;\n12. Mr. Kish [will] be required to have an initial assessment and ongoing evaluations by his sex offender treatment staff.\n13. If requested by [his] parole agent or treatment provider, Mr. Kish [will] be required to submit to a polygraph evaluation. * * *\n17. In the event that Mr. Kish becomes uncooperative, unmanageable, manipulative, at extreme high risk, or a danger to himself or others, as determined by treatment staff or a parole agent, this will be reported to the Will County State\u2019s Attorney and the State\u2019s Attorney shall determine whether or not a petition for recommitment is appropriate and upon the filing of a petition[,] a hearing shall be held pursuant to section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Unified Code of Corrections in order to determine whether Mr. Kish should be returned to the Illinois Department of Corrections. * * *\n22. Neither Mr. Kish, nor those he resides with, shall possess/ own, review, or use pornography.\u201d\nOn November 20, 2007, the State filed a petition to revoke the respondent\u2019s conditional release, alleging that he had violated paragraphs 6, 17, and 22. The petition said that, with regard to paragraph 6, he had failed to follow all treatment rules. Concerning paragraph 17, the State alleged that the respondent had become uncooperative, unmanageable, and at extreme risk, and he had presented a danger to others. Regarding paragraph 22, the petition stated that the respondent had reviewed pornography.\nThe record shows that while the respondent was on conditional release, his treating psychologist was Dr. Robert Baker, and his parole officer was Daniel Junker. The record also indicates that the respondent had been given polygraph examinations while on conditional release.\nOn November 29, 2007, prior to the hearing on the State\u2019s petition to revoke, the respondent filed a document with the trial court that contained five motions regarding the State\u2019s petition to revoke. The respondent moved to establish that the rules of civil procedure and the corresponding supreme court rules should apply. He moved that, contrary to the language of the applicable statutes (725 ILCS 205/9(e) (West 2006); 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(c) (West 2006)), which say that the State\u2019s burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence, the burden of proof should be beyond a reasonable doubt. The respondent moved in limine to bar the results of the polygraph examinations. He moved to strike Baker\u2019s reports and to bar the psychologist\u2019s testimony. The respondent moved to strike and to bar statements he was required to make under the conditions of his release, as violating his fifth amendment right not to be compelled to testify against himself.\nAt the hearing on the respondent\u2019s motions, the State argued, among other things, that it was not offering the polygraph evidence to prove that the respondent had engaged in the conduct at issue but, rather, to explain the circumstances surrounding the respondent\u2019s admissions to Baker and to Junker. At the conclusion of the hearing on the motions, the court denied them.\nThe matter proceeded to the hearing on the State\u2019s petition to revoke. During the hearing, both Baker and Junker testified that they questioned the respondent about the results of his polygraph examinations. During these conversations, the respondent admitted to Baker and to Junker that he had: (1) masturbated in public bathroom stalls; and (2) fantasized about sexual contact with male minors. Baker said that, initially, the respondent shared these admissions during group therapy. Later, however, the respondent refused to contribute to discussions in group therapy.\nAdditionally, Baker stated the following:\n\u201c[A]fter the discussions initially within group and with myself about results of the polygraph from June, it was determined that [the respondent] continued to access pornography *** when a routine examination of some of the log-in logs revealed someone had been attempting to look at pornographic web sites. The management of the building then looked at the log sheets of the people who had been accessing the lab those days and came to the conclusion that [the respondent] might be the person who was doing it.\nThey then had a meeting. [The respondent] had a meeting with the director of the building, *** at which time [the director] was told by [the respondent] that he had been, in fact, accessed [sic] pornography.\u201d\nThe respondent\u2019s attorney then objected, \u201cHe\u2019s testified regarding polygraph examinations, which I continue my objection as to that, but that was also a hearsay document; although, he has testified that he relied upon his treatment.\u201d The assistant State\u2019s Attorney said, \u201cState is asking to put on this information because it\u2019s what the doctor uses in order to make \u2014 form his opinions.\u201d The court overruled the objection.\nBaker opined that the respondent\u2019s admissions and the evidence concerning pornography showed that the respondent was at risk of committing another act of sexual abuse of a minor similar to the act that led to his original commitment as an SDE\nJunker also testified about the respondent\u2019s admissions that he had masturbated in public restrooms and had fantasized about sexually abusing male minors. The following exchange took place between Junker and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney regarding the respondent viewing pornography:\n\u201cA. I interviewed [the respondent] on the results of his first polygraph and some concerns I had. I asked him about some of the questions that he had failed, particularly, pornography, his viewing of it, you know, where he was having access to that at. At that point, he advised me that he was accessing it through [the] computer lab that is in the same building that he lives in.\nQ. Did he admit to you to viewing pornography?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And did he admit to you how many occasions?\nA. He admitted more than once that he was viewing it.\u201d\nAt this point, defense counsel said, \u201cJudge, can I just object, just to the extent that this witness is testifying about statements made by the defendant to the polygrapher, as opposed to the statements the defendant made to him?\u201d The judge replied, \u201cNo. He is making statements \u2014 the defendant is making statements to this gentleman. The statements are all inclusive.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the State\u2019s petition to revoke the respondent\u2019s conditional release. The respondent appealed.\nANALYSIS\nA. Civil Procedure/Discovery\nThe respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to apply the rules of civil procedure, and the corresponding supreme court rules, to the proceedings concerning the State\u2019s petition to revoke his conditional release. Specifically, he contends that because the State failed to follow the rules concerning discovery, disclosure, and contact with a treating physician, the testimony of Baker and Junker should have been barred. Because the respondent has more fully addressed the specific question of the State\u2019s contact with Baker in his fourth issue, we will analyze that aspect of the respondent\u2019s argument in our discussion of that issue. In this subsection of the analysis, our discussion will focus on the respondent\u2019s contentions concerning discovery.\nWe review a trial court\u2019s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 658 N.E.2d 450 (1995).\nAs the respondent points out, the Act states:\n\u201cThe proceedings under this Act shall be civil in nature ***. The provisions of the Civil Practice Law, and all existing and future amendments of that Law and modifications thereof and the Supreme Court Rules now or hereafter adopted in relation to that Law shall apply to all proceedings hereunder except as otherwise provided in this Act.\u201d 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2006).\nThe respondent contends, therefore, that the rules of civil procedure, and corresponding supreme court rules, should have applied to the proceedings concerning the State\u2019s petition to revoke.\nWe disagree. The above language, cited by the respondent, states that civil rules shall apply \u201cexcept as otherwise provided in this Act.\u201d 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2006). In this case, the Act provides alternative rules for the revocation of conditional release. The proceedings concerning a petition to revoke an SDP\u2019s conditional release are governed by section 9(e) of the Act, which states that \u201c[i]n the event the person violates any of the conditions of such [release] order, the court shall revoke such conditional release and recommit the person pursuant to Section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Unified Code of Corrections under the terms of the original commitment.\u201d 725 ILCS 205/9(e) (West 2006).\nSection 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) concerns violations, modifications, or revocations of: (1) probation; (2) conditional discharge; (3) supervision; or (4) impact incarceration. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144 (West 2006). That section was interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 771 N.E.2d 399 (2002). In Lindsey, the court held that although section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 is applicable to criminal defendants, probation revocation proceedings are civil rather than criminal proceedings. See Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 771 N.E.2d 399. Additionally, prior to the Lindsey decision, our supreme court had ruled that a probationer was not entitled to discovery in preparation for a probation revocation proceeding. See People v. DeWitt, 78 Ill. 2d 82, 397 N.E.2d 1385 (1979).\nIn the present case, according to the Act, the proceedings concerning revocation of conditional release are to follow the statute governing various types of revocations under the Code, including probation revocations. According to both the statute and case law, both conditional release revocations and probation revocations are civil proceedings. In DeWitt, our supreme court declared that discovery is impermissible in probation revocation proceedings, which are civil, under section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Code. It would logically follow that discovery, including disclosure, would also be impermissible in revocation of conditional release proceedings, which are civil, that employ the same procedures in section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Code as probation revocation proceedings. Moreover, we see no reason why an SDP should be entitled to discovery, and a criminal defendant should not be entitled to discovery, in analogous civil revocation proceedings that follow the identical section of the Code. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the respondent\u2019s motion to apply the rules of civil procedure, and the corresponding supreme court rules, to the proceedings concerning the State\u2019s petition to revoke.\nB. Reasonable Doubt Burden of Proof\n1. Statutory Construction\nThe respondent contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to establish reasonable doubt as the State\u2019s burden of proof during the revocation proceedings. The respondent acknowledges that revocation proceedings, under section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Code, designate the preponderance of the evidence as the burden of proof. However, he submits that if revocation of his conditional release requires recommitment under the terms of the original commitment, and the burden of proof for his original commitment was beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden of proof for revocation also should be beyond a reasonable doubt.\nBecause this issue involves statutory construction, which is a question of law, our review is de novo. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002). The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, which is best demonstrated by the plain language of the statute. County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 723 N.E.2d 256 (1999). If the plain language is clear, we will not read exceptions, limitations, or conditions into the statute. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d 546, 723 N.E.2d 256.\nAs we stated above, the proceedings concerning a petition to revoke a conditional release are governed by section 9(e) of the Act. Section 9(e) states that \u201c[i]n the event the person violates any of the conditions of such [release] order, the court shall revoke such conditional release and recommit the person pursuant to Section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the [Code] under the terms of the original commitment.\u201d 725 ILCS 205/9(e) (West 2006). In turn, section 5 \u2014 6\u20144(c) of the Code says that in revocation proceedings, \u201c[t]he State has the burden of *** proving the violation by the preponderance of the evidence.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(c) (West 2006).\nIn the instant case, the statutory language is clear. The plain language of section 9(e) of the Act requires revocation of conditional release proceedings to follow section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Code. In turn, the plain language of section 5 \u2014 6\u20144(c) of the Code states that the burden of proof in such proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence. We will not read into these statutes exceptions, limitations, or conditions to say that the burden of proof should be beyond a reasonable doubt rather than the preponderance of the evidence. See County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d 546, 723 N.E.2d 256. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err as a matter of law by denying the respondent\u2019s motion to establish reasonable doubt as the State\u2019s burden of proof.\n2. Contradiction\nThe respondent further contends that his argument above shows that \u201cthere is an inherent contradiction in the applicable Act and this Court should require the State to prove that [the respondent] willfully violated paragraphs *** of the conditional release by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d We interpret this subargument by the respondent to be based on the Act\u2019s internal logic rather than its statutory construction. Thus, our analysis here solely concerns whether there is a logical contradiction in the Act\u2019s burden of proof concerning violation of conditional release.\nTo analyze the logic behind the Act\u2019s burden of proof, we again look to probation revocation proceedings that are analogous to conditional release revocation proceedings. In People v. Beard, 59 Ill. 2d 220, 319 N.E.2d 745 (1974), the court ruled that although a criminal defendant is convicted under a reasonable doubt standard, probation revocation proceedings only require a preponderance of the evidence standard. This is so because a probationer has already been convicted and retains his status as a convicted criminal regardless of the outcome of the revocation proceedings. Beard, 59 Ill. 2d 220, 319 N.E.2d 745. The Beard court reasoned that such revocation proceedings do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt because the State is not required to convict the defendant a second time. Beard, 59 Ill. 2d 220, 319 N.E.2d 745.\nSimilarly, an original SDP commitment proceeding requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2006). However, as the Illinois Supreme Court has said:\n\u201c[W]hen a court conditionally releases a person who has been found to be sexually dangerous beyond a reasonable doubt [citation], it has only concluded that[,] given his conduct in an institutional setting!,] he no longer appears to be sexually dangerous [citation]. He retains the legal status of a sexually dangerous person. And until the defendant *** proves to the court that he is no longer sexually dangerous [citation], he retains that status.\u201d People v. Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d 347, 354-55, 547 N.E.2d 449, 453 (1989).\nApplying the reasoning of Beard and the holding of Cooper, we conclude that there is no logical contradiction in the Act\u2019s use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in conditional release revocation proceedings. Like the probationer in Beard, an SDP is originally committed under a reasonable doubt standard. Compare 720 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1 (West 2006) with 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2006). An SDP retains his status as sexually dangerous regardless of the outcome of the revocation proceedings. See Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d 347, 547 N.E.2d 449. Such proceedings do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt because the State is not required to prove that a respondent is an SDP for a second time. See Beard, 59 Ill. 2d 220, 319 N.E.2d 745; Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d 347, 547 N.E.2d 449.\nTherefore, we rule that the respondent in this case is incorrect to assert that there is a logical contradiction in the Act\u2019s burden of proof for revocation of conditional release proceedings.\n3. Incarceration\nThe respondent also asserts that section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 requires a respondent to be incarcerated if the State carries its burden of proof, and therefore the burden should be reasonable doubt. However, the plain language of section 9(e) of the Act states that revocation results in civil recommitment rather than in criminal incarceration. See 725 ILCS 205/9(e) (West 2006).\nMoreover, the plain language of section 5 \u2014 6\u20144(e) of the Code lists the circumstances under which revocation may result in criminal incarceration (revocation of probation, conditional discharge, supervision, or impact incarceration). See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(e) (West 2006). We note that none of those circumstances involves revocation of conditional release for an SDP Thus, the plain language of the relevant statutes both from the Act and from the Code shows that the respondent\u2019s assertion regarding incarceration is incorrect.\nC. Polygraph Evidence\nThe respondent submits that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to bar the use of polygraph evidence.\nA trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion in limine addressing the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 662 N.E.2d 1238 (1996); Jones v. Rallos, 384 Ill. App. 3d 73, 890 N.E.2d 1190 (2008).\nGenerally, evidence regarding polygraph examinations, as well as the results of those examinations, is inadmissible to prove a person\u2019s culpable conduct. See People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191, 632 N.E.2d 1026 (1994). However, such polygraph evidence is admissible to explain why a person gave inculpatory statements to state officials. People v. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d 486, 705 N.E.2d 56 (1998).\nIn this case, the polygraph evidence at issue was not being offered by the State to prove that the respondent had engaged in culpable conduct that violated the conditions of his release. The polygraph evidence was being submitted by the State to explain the circumstances surrounding the respondent giving inculpatory statements to Baker and to Junker. Thus, the polygraph evidence was admissible for the purpose for which it was offered. See Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d 486, 705 N.E.2d 56. Therefore, we rule that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the respondent\u2019s motion in limine to bar the use of polygraph evidence. See Swick, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 662 N.E.2d 1238; Jones, 384 Ill. App. 3d 73, 890 N.E.2d 1190.\nEven assuming, arguendo, that the polygraph evidence was inadmissible, the respondent was not prejudiced by its admission. The trial court could have granted the State\u2019s petition to revoke the respondent\u2019s conditional release based solely on the respondent\u2019s admissions to Baker and to Junker.\nD. Baker\u2019s Reports and Testimony\nThe respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike Baker\u2019s reports and to bar the psychologist\u2019s testimony. Specifically, the respondent asserts that Baker\u2019s reports and testimony should have been barred by the physician-patient privilege under: (1) the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Confidentiality Act) (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2006)); (2) Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986); and (3) \u201cfederal HIPPA law.\u201d The respondent also submits that Baker\u2019s records and testimony should have been barred as a sanction for the State\u2019s violations of the rules of civil procedure and supreme court rules concerning: (1) soliciting medical treatment records and reports without the respondent\u2019s valid consent; and (2) contacting Baker about his testimony without the respondent\u2019s valid consent.\nAgain, because this issue concerns a trial court\u2019s evidentiary ruling, the standard of review is whether the court abused its discretion. Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 658 N.E.2d 450.\nAs a preliminary matter, we note that the respondent has not: (1) cited authority concerning \u201cfederal HIPPA law\u201d; (2) described a body of federal law to which the abbreviation \u201cHIPPA\u201d might refer; (3) explained the provisions of this law; or (4) stated his theory regarding why this law required the evidence in question to be barred. Therefore, we need not consider the \u201cfederal HIPPA law\u201d aspect of the respondent\u2019s argument. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(3).\nUnder the Act, a person who has been found to be an SDP is initially committed to a Department of Corrections (DOC) facility set aside for the care and treatment of SDPs. See 725 ILCS 205/8 (West 2006). In this case, the record shows that when the respondent was conditionally released, he no longer resided in the DOC facility to which he was originally committed but, rather, was released to the custody of a halfway house.\nSection 9(c) of the Act states that \u201c [notwithstanding the provisions of Section 10 of the [Confidentiality Act], all evaluations conducted under this Act and all [DOC] treatment records shall be admissible at all proceedings held under this Act.\u201d 725 ILCS 205/9(c) (West 2006). The respondent asserts that this provision in section 9(c) was inapplicable to him because the treatment records at issue were not generated while he was in DOC custody. However, we note that the conditions of his release stated that both his conditional release and his treatment were under DOC authority. The release conditions stated that: (1) the halfway house where he was to receive treatment was to be approved by the DOC; (2) he was to be supervised by a DOC parole officer; and (3) his treatment providers were to be approved by the DOC. Thus, we find that Baker\u2019s treatment records were DOC treatment records, under the meaning of section 9(c), and therefore the Confidentiality Act was inapplicable to those records. See 725 ILCS 205/9(c) (West 2006).\nAdditionally, the conditions of the respondent\u2019s release included ongoing evaluations by his treatment staff. Because the respondent\u2019s conditional release was under the Act, and the evaluations were part of his conditional release, the evaluations were under the Act. Therefore, Baker\u2019s testimony concerning the respondent\u2019s evaluations also was admissible under section 9(c).\nThe respondent claims that Baker\u2019s reports and testimony were inadmissible, under the Petrillo doctrine, because of the physician-patient privilege. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986). However, we note that this privilege may be waived if the patient shared the privileged information at issue with persons other than the physician. See Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke\u2019s Medical Center, 177 Ill. App. 3d 313, 532 N.E.2d 327 (1988). We need not decide whether the judicially created Petrillo doctrine overrides the Act. In this case, the respondent shared the privileged information at issue by discussing it both in group therapy sessions and with Junker. Thus, the respondent waived any physician-patient privilege with regard to Baker\u2019s reports and testimony.\nIn summary, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the respondent\u2019s motion to bar Baker\u2019s reports and testimony.\nE. Self-Incrimination\nThe respondent contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike and to bar the admissions the respondent made to Baker and Junker as violative of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.\nOnce again, this issue concerns a trial court\u2019s evidentiary ruling, and therefore the standard of review is whether the court abused its discretion. Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 658 N.E.2d 450.\nIn Lindsey, the court noted that a person\u2019s self-incriminating statements, which were compelled by government officials, may not be used in a criminal prosecution. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 771 N.E.2d 399. The court ruled that because the probation revocation proceedings at issue were civil, the defendant\u2019s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was inapplicable. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 771 N.E.2d 399.\nLikewise, the conditional release proceedings at issue in this case were civil. Therefore, under Lindsey, the respondent\u2019s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was inapplicable. See Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 771 N.E.2d 399. Thus, we rule that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the respondent\u2019s motion to strike and to bar the admissions the respondent made to Baker and to Junker.\nE Hearsay\nThe respondent submits that, at the hearing on the State\u2019s petition to revoke, the court erred by allowing the hearsay testimony of Baker and Junker concerning the respondent\u2019s statements to the polygraph examiner.\nBecause this issue also concerns a trial court\u2019s evidentiary ruling, the standard of review is whether the court abused its discretion. Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 658 N.E.2d 450.\nHearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. In re Keith C, 378 Ill. App. 3d 252, 880 N.E.2d 1157 (2007).\nIn this case, the respondent objected to out-of-court statements the respondent made to the polygraph examiner about which both Baker and Junker testified. However, these statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, that is, what the respondent\u2019s answers were to the polygraph examiner. The out-of-court statements were offered to show the circumstances surrounding the respondent\u2019s admissions to Baker and to Junker. Because the testimony in question was not hearsay, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling the defendant\u2019s objections.\nAs we stated above, assuming, arguendo, that the contested testimony was inadmissible, the respondent was not prejudiced by its admission. The trial court could have granted the State\u2019s petition to revoke the respondent\u2019s conditional release based solely on the respondent\u2019s admissions to Baker and to Junker.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Will County circuit court granting the State\u2019s petition to revoke the respondent\u2019s conditional release.\nAffirmed.\nCARTER and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.\nAlthough it does not appear from the record supplied to this court that the trial court explicitly ruled on the respondent\u2019s motion to modify the conditions of his release, the respondent\u2019s motion became moot when the court revoked the respondent\u2019s conditional release.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul Donahue, of Joliet, for appellant.", "James Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Terry A. Mertel and Thomas D. Arado, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re DETENTION OF ANDREW M. KISH (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Andrew M. Kish, Respondent-Appellant).\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201408\u20140078\nOpinion filed September 24, 2009.\nPaul Donahue, of Joliet, for appellant.\nJames Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Terry A. Mertel and Thomas D. Arado, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0546-01", "first_page_order": 562, "last_page_order": 576 }