{ "id": 4291464, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARTHUR J. COVINGTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Covington", "decision_date": "2009-10-22", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201408\u20140930", "first_page": "996", "last_page": "1010", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 996" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "779 N.E.2d 1115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1146" }, { "page": "1146" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442059 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "807 N.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" }, { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461402 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" }, { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 N.E.2d 975", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887179 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 485885 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 959", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188696 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "399-400" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2580359 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" }, { "page": "616" }, { "page": "616" }, { "page": "614-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 943", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5264258 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "948" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0943-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177", "parenthetical": "\"the civil contemnor must be provided with the 'keys to his cell' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152411 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "\"the civil contemnor must be provided with the 'keys to his cell' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "771 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406-07", "parenthetical": "\"Criminal contempt sanctions are retrospective in nature and punish the contemnor for past acts which he cannot undo\"" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58925 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468", "parenthetical": "\"Criminal contempt sanctions are retrospective in nature and punish the contemnor for past acts which he cannot undo\"" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "709 N.E.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "\"Civil contempt proceedings have two fundamental attributes: (1) the contemnor must be capable of taking the action sought to be coerced, and (2) no further contempt sanctions are imposed upon the contemnor's compliance with the pertinent court order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564609 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Civil contempt proceedings have two fundamental attributes: (1) the contemnor must be capable of taking the action sought to be coerced, and (2) no further contempt sanctions are imposed upon the contemnor's compliance with the pertinent court order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 N.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499368 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "sanctions for criminal contempt are appropriate, inter alia, to ensure court orders are obeyed" }, { "page": "417" }, { "page": "421" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2461769 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "sanctions for criminal contempt are appropriate, inter alia, to ensure court orders are obeyed" }, { "page": "46" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "53" }, { "page": "58" }, { "page": "58-59" }, { "page": "59" }, { "page": "59-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777558 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 1182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1184" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847536 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1073" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3458350 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "860 N.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604612 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 1094", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1096" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 1080", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140166 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1083" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/1080-01" ] }, { "cite": "783 N.E.2d 1076", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1080" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599295 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "855 N.E.2d 953", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266311 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/0099-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1107, "char_count": 31950, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.83623765805139e-08, "percentile": 0.4583344434366637 }, "sha256": "96be4a1b336693d523157c765c834bd30443337d299e6e29a11f5bd264d18772", "simhash": "1:0ad83457f77f9c64", "word_count": 5267 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:02.073967+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARTHUR J. COVINGTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn August 2008, the State petitioned the trial court to adjudicate defendant, Arthur J. Covington, in indirect criminal contempt of court for failing to comply with the court\u2019s August 1, 2008, order requiring him to find full-time employment by August 25, 2008. In November 2008, the court found defendant in indirect criminal contempt of court, sentenced him to six months in jail, and ordered him to pay $796.50 in jail-meal fees.\nDefendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to find he violated a condition of the original December 2005 supervision order, (2) the court\u2019s use of improper contempt procedures violated his due-process rights, and (3) if this court remands the case, it should be remanded to a different judge. We vacate the trial court\u2019s order finding defendant in indirect criminal contempt and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn June 2004, the State charged defendant by citation with two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2) (West 2004)).\nIn November 2005, defendant pleaded guilty to count I of DUI. On the State\u2019s motion, the trial court dismissed count II.\nIn December 2005, the trial court sentenced defendant as follows:\n\u201cI am placing you on supervision for a period of 24 months. You are to report twice a month to the probation office, pay a $25.00[-] per[-]month supervision fee, fined $1,000.00, pay the $100.00 DUI equipment fee, refrain from using or possessing alcohol, cannabis, or controlled substances, undergo random testing, not enter any establishment that has as its primary source of income the sale of alcohol, obtain an alcohol and drug evaluation within 30 days of today\u2019s date, complete any recommended treatment within six months, attend VIR obey the statutory terms and conditions of supervision.\u201d\nThe April 11, 2007, docket entry shows \u201cFINE AND COSTS PAID IN FULL [AS OF] THIS DATE.\u201d\nIn June 2007, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant\u2019s supervision, alleging defendant violated supervision by testing positive for cannabis on May 21, 2007, admitting smoking cannabis on May 17, 2007, and failing to complete the DUI evaluation within the first 30 days and the recommended 10-hour DUI risk education classes within the first 6 months.\nIn August 2007, the State filed an amended petition to revoke defendant\u2019s supervision, alleging defendant again tested positive for cannabis on August 15, 2007.\nIn October 2007, the trial court held a hearing on the State\u2019s petition and revoked defendant\u2019s supervision.\nIn November 2007, the trial court entered a written order unsuccessfully discharging defendant\u2019s supervision, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced defendant to 90 days in jail. The court also ordered defendant to pay $398.25 in jail-meal fees.\nIn March 2008, the trial court called the case for hearing on defendant\u2019s ability to pay the jail-meal fees. No transcript of the proceeding is included in the record. However, the March 14, 2008, docket entry shows the following:\n\u201c[The People] appear by SA Jerry Johnson. [Defendant] appears pro se. Cause called for [hearing] on ability to pay. [Defendant] states he is unemployed and on [motion] of [the People] cause reset for further review to April 25, 2008, at 10 a.m. [Defendant] ordered to return said date with 20 completed/submitted job [applications].\u201d\nThe parties agree the court ordered defendant to appear on April 25, 2008, with 20 completed and submitted job applications.\nOn April 25, 2008, defendant appeared pro se and informed the trial court he was unemployed. However, defendant failed to present any job applications to the court.\nIn May 2008, the State filed \u201cA Petition For Rule To Show Cause Indirect Civil Contempt,\u201d alleging defendant willfully and contumaciously violated an order of the trial court by failing to return to court on April 25, 2008, with 20 completed and submitted job applications.\nIn June 2008, the trial court held a hearing on the State\u2019s petition. Defendant appeared pro se and admitted he had failed to bring the job applications to court. The court found defendant in willful contempt of court for failing to obey the March 14, 2008, order. The court then ordered defendant to purge himself of contempt by reappearing in court each weekday morning at 8:45 a.m. with a completed and submitted job application until he obtained employment.\nBetween June 20, 2008, and July 7, 2008, defendant appeared each weekday with a completed and submitted job application.\nOn July 8, 2008, defendant\u2019s case was reassigned to Judge Chris Freese due to the retirement of Judge Stephen Peters. Defendant continued to appear each weekday with a job application through July 29, 2008.\nOn August 1, 2008, defendant appeared pro se and notified the trial court he was not currently employed. The court sua sponte ordered defendant to obtain full-time employment by August 25, 2008, or face indirect criminal contempt. The following colloquy took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Well Mr. Covington, we\u2019re going to change tactics here. I\u2019m simply going to order you to get a job and be full-time employed by the next time you come to court. If you are not employed, we are going to go directly to indirect criminal contempt for which, if you are found in indirect criminal contempt, you can be sentenced to six months in the county jail. If you don\u2019t wish to work, that\u2019s fine, but you will be going to jail when you\u2019re found in contempt. I am not going to have you come back into court every week to show you have applied for a job. I am ordering you to find full-time employment. Doesn\u2019t matter if it\u2019s working at McDonald\u2019s; doesn\u2019t matter if it\u2019s hauling garbage, or mowing yards. Unless you have a letter from a doctor that says you\u2019re incapable of holding any type of employment, I expect you to be employed by the next court date. Do you understand that?\n[DEFENDANT:] I have been coming in everyday [sic], not every week.\nTHE COURT: And you\u2019re coming back again, and the next court date you will either have a job, or we will arraign you on a contempt petition. I am not going to mess around with this case any further. Do you understand that?\n[DEFENDANT:] NO RESPONSE BY DEFENDANT.\nTHE COURT: Do you understand that, Mr. Covington? You either have a job by the next court date, or we go to arraignment on a contempt petition? Is that clear?\n[DEFENDANT:] I thought I was in contempt. That\u2019s why I was here anyway.\nTHE COURT: Not according to what I show. It shows here this [case] is set for further proceedings.\n[DEFENDANT:] But\u2014\nTHE COURT: Mr. Johnson[,] what is your understanding of this case?\nMR. JOHNSON [(Assistant State\u2019s Attorney)]: Judge, it[\u2019]s been \u2014 we have been reviewing his ability to pay.\n[DEFENDANT:] I\u2019m not in contempt.\nTHE COURT: I don\u2019t show a contempt petition on file, unless you\u2019re aware of something\u2014\nMR. JOHNSON: We have been continuing this case on review of his ability to pay, and [Judge Peters] has been ordering him to come in everyday [sic] with a job application.\nTHE COURT: All right. Let\u2019s back up. There is a contempt petition on file as of May 1, 2008. Let\u2019s see if there\u2019s ever been an entry made on that case. This file is a mess.\nMR. JOHNSON: Judge, on June 18, there was a contempt petition filed.\nTHE COURT: All right.\nMR. JOHNSON: And it was set for review, so that\u2019s where we\u2019re at \u2014 indirect civil contempt.\nTHE COURT: All right, then, we will simply call the case for sanctions. Recommendations from the People.\nMR. JOHNSON: Judge, the situation was that on the [p]etition for [indirect [c]ivil [c]ontempt of [c]ourt, he did not bring in the 20 completed and submitted job applications, but since that time, he\u2019s brought in about 25 job [applications,] so he\u2019s complied with what [Judge Peters] wanted, so at this time, it seems I wouldn\u2019t be recommending that the sentence be to the DeWitt County Q]ail on that [p]etition for [c]ontempt.\nTHE COURT: All right. Show, no sanctions will be imposed. Court, on its own motion, is going to order the defendant to find full-time employment. That\u2019s 40 hours a week, one or multiple jobs. If you\u2019re not employed by the next court date, we will move forward with indirect criminal contempt for which you can go to jail for a specific sentence up to six months and be fined up to $500.00. You have until August 25, 2008, at 9 a.m. to be employed full-time. You are ordered to appear that date. If you are not employed full-time, the State will have an [indirect [c]riminal [c]ontempt [p]etition ready to be filed, and we will arraign you on that contempt petition.\u201d\nOn August 25, 2008, defendant appeared pro se and informed the trial court he had not yet obtained employment. The court ordered the State to file a petition for indirect criminal contempt.\nOn August 26, 2008, the State filed a petition titled \u201cPetition For Rule To Show Cause Indirect Criminal Contempt,\u201d alleging defendant willfully and contumaciously violated an order of the trial court by failing to obtain full-time employment by August 25, 2008.\nOn November 5, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on the State\u2019s petition. Defendant appeared pro se. Neither the State nor defendant presented any evidence. However, the State asked the court to take judicial notice of the previous proceedings. The court found defendant in indirect criminal contempt, sentenced him to six months in jail, with day-for-day credit to apply, and ordered him to pay $796.50 in jail-meal fees.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court informed defendant he would have 30 days from his release from jail \u2014 until \u201cFebruary 25, 2009, at 8:30\u201d \u2014 to find full-time employment or else the court would again find him in contempt and send him back to jail for another six months. The court stated the following:\n\u201c[T]he court is going to take this approach. We\u2019re going to have indirect criminal contempt petitions filed every [four] months; because if you\u2019re sentenced on every one of them to [six] months in jail, you\u2019re going to serve [three] months. I\u2019ll give you another 30 days to find a job. We\u2019ll come back. We\u2019ll start the process over. If you\u2019re found in contempt again, you [will] go back to jail for another [six] months. And we will do this [for] as long as I am sitting here or until you get a job and pay what you owe.\u201d\nOn November 12, 2008, the trial court entered a written order directing defendant \u201cto be employed full time\u201d on February 25, 2009.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to find him in contempt for violating a condition of the December 2005 supervision order because his supervision had been discharged; (2) the court\u2019s use of improper contempt procedures violated his due-process rights; and (3) because of the trial judge\u2019s lack of impartiality, if this court remands the case, it should be remanded to a different judge.\nA. Standard of Review\nWe will not reverse a court\u2019s contempt finding \u201cunless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence or the record reflects an abuse of discretion.\u201d In re Marriage of Charous, 368 Ill. App. 3d 99, 108, 855 N.E.2d 953, 961 (2006). \u201c \u2018 \u201cAbuse of discretion\u201d means clearly against logic; the question is not whether the appellate court agrees with the [trial] court, but whether the [trial] court acted arbitrarily, without employing conscientious judgment, or whether, in view of all the circumstances, the court exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.\u2019 \u201d Long v. Mathew, 336 Ill. App. 3d 595, 600, 783 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (2003), quoting State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Leverton, 314 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1083, 732 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (2000). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if (1) the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or (2) the trial court\u2019s finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350, 860 N.E.2d 240, 245 (2006).\nB. Jurisdiction in the Contempt Proceedings\nDefendant first argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the contempt order. Specifically, defendant contends that because the petition for rule to show cause related to an employment condition found in paragraph eight of the certificate of conditions to the discharged supervision order, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the condition. Paragraph eight of the December 2005 certificate of conditions required defendant, as a condition of supervision, to \u201c[w]ork or pursue a course of study or vocational training as directed by the [probation [o]ffice.\u201d\nThe State responds, arguing defendant\u2019s jurisdictional argument erroneously relies on paragraph eight\u2019s boilerplate language. The State maintains nothing in the record shows the trial court ordered defendant \u201cto get a job and be full-time employed\u201d to satisfy the paragraph-eight language. Instead, the State argues the court ordered defendant to get a job to pay the jail-meal fees.\nAs long as the trial court has jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter, the court also has jurisdiction to enter an order of contempt. People v. Draves, 149 Ill. App. 3d 657, 659, 500 N.E.2d 1072, 1073 (1986). Generally, a court\u2019s jurisdiction ends with the expiration of probation. People v. Wilson, 293 Ill. App. 3d 339, 341, 687 N.E.2d 1182, 1184 (1997). \u201cWhere jurisdiction is lacking, any resulting judgment rendered is void and may be attacked either directly or indirectly at any time.\u201d People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155, 619 N.E.2d 750, 754 (1993).\nWe initially note that in this case, the trial court placed defendant on supervision. \u201c \u2018Supervision\u2019 means a disposition of conditional and revocable release without probationary supervision, but under such conditions *** as are imposed by the court, at the successful conclusion of which disposition the defendant is discharged and a judgment dismissing the charges is entered.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 1 \u2014 21 (West 2006). \u201c \u2018Conditional [discharge\u2019 means a sentence or disposition of conditional and revocable release without probationary supervision but under such conditions as may be imposed by the court.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1\u20144 (West 2006). \u201c \u2018Probation\u2019 means a sentence or disposition of conditional and revocable release under the supervision of a probation officer.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1\u201418 (West 2006). We agree with defendant that for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction, supervision, conditional discharge, and probation are identical. Each provision provides for a sentence during which time a defendant is under the jurisdiction of the court, subject to conditions imposed by the court, but is not incarcerated (unless as a condition thereof).\nOn November 7, 2007, the trial court revoked defendant\u2019s supervision, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced defendant to 90 days in jail. The court also ordered defendant to pay $398.25 in jail-meal fees. The November 8, 2007, docket entry shows the court entered a written order unsuccessfully discharging defendant\u2019s supervision. At the conclusion of the November 7, 2007, hearing, the following colloquy took place:\n\u201cMR. LAMKIN [(defense counsel)]: Just to clarify, supervision is revoked, and once he\u2019s released from custody, this matter will be over with?\nTHE COURT: That is correct. Show, the remaining balance of any fine and costs are remitted. Meal fees set at $398.25. Cause continued to March 14 at 10:00 a.m. for review.\u201d\nDefendant contends that because the petition for rule to show cause related to a condition of the terminated order of supervision\u2014 i.e., to find employment, as opposed to paying the jail-meal fees \u2014 the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the employment condition of the supervision order. We disagree.\nHowever, the trial court\u2019s order did not relate to the original supervision order. Nowhere in the record is there evidence that the court\u2019s order related to directions from the probation office or the paragraph-eight language of the supervision order. Further, as the State correctly points out, the record does not show the probation office ever directed defendant to obtain employment.\nHere, the jail-meal fees originated from defendant\u2019s incarceration following his unsuccessful discharge from supervision. As stated, on November 7, 2007, the trial court revoked defendant\u2019s supervision and sentenced defendant to 90 days in jail. As part of its sentence, the court ordered defendant to pay $398.25 in jail-meal fees. As a result, the jail-meal fees were ordered subsequent to the discharge of defendant\u2019s supervision. Further, after defendant had served his 90-day sentence, the court called the case for hearing on defendant\u2019s ability to pay the $398.25 jail-meal fees. The March 14, 2008, docket entry shows the following:\n\u201c[The People] appear by SA Jerry Johnson. [Defendant] appears pro se. Cause called for [hearing] on ability to pay. [Defendant] states he is-unemployed and on [motion] of [the People] cause reset for further review to April 25, 2008, at 10 a.m. [Defendant] ordered to return said date with 20 completed/submitted job [applications].\u201d\nOn May 7, 2008, the State filed its petition for a finding of indirect civil contempt. The State\u2019s petition alleged defendant had willfully and contemptuously failed to submit 20 completed-submitted job applications on April 25, 2008. The petition did not allege defendant willfully and contemptuously failed to obey the employment conditions of the original supervision order. In fact, the trial court never referenced the original supervision order during any of the contempt proceedings.\nOn August 1, 2008, the trial court ordered defendant to get a full-time job to ensure he obeyed the court\u2019s November 7, 2007, order to pay the jail-meal fees. At the November 5, 2008, hearing on the State\u2019s petition, the court stated the following:\n\u201cIf you\u2019re found in contempt again, you [will] go back to jail for another [six] months. And we will do this [for] as long as I am sitting here or until you get a job and pay what you owe.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn this case, the trial court\u2019s order to obtain employment to pay the jail-meal fees was unrelated to the original supervision order. The record does not support the position that the court was attempting to enforce any condition of the December 2005 supervision order. Instead, the court was using its power of contempt to ensure that defendant would pay the court-ordered jail-meal fees. See In re Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 44, 558 N.E.2d 404, 416 (1990) (sanctions for criminal contempt are appropriate, inter alia, to ensure court orders are obeyed). Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the State\u2019s petition for indirect criminal contempt.\nC. The Trial Court\u2019s Procedure\nDefendant next argues the procedure used by the trial court to find him in indirect criminal contempt was improper. Specifically, defendant contends the court\u2019s procedure failed to afford him the necessary due process. Defendant argues (1) he was entitled to notice; (2) he was entitled to have proof that his failure to pay the fee was willful; (3) he was not advised of his right to counsel; (4) the court\u2019s procedure of taking judicial notice of the previous proceedings (a) denied him his right to cross-examine witnesses and (b) eliminated his right against self-incrimination; and (5) the court impermissibly shifted the State\u2019s burden of proof to defendant by asking him to show what he had done to seek employment.\nThe State argues defendant was only entitled to minimal due process. Specifically, the State contends that although the trial court found defendant in indirect criminal contempt of court, the charge against defendant was coercive rather than punitive and thus more in the nature of an adjudication of indirect civil contempt.\nDefendant replies, arguing that because defendant was not afforded any kind of purge procedure essential in civil contempt proceedings, the State\u2019s characterization of defendant\u2019s action as indirect civil contempt is improper.\n1. Indirect Criminal or Civil Contempt of Court\nThe penalties in a civil contempt case \u201cserve only to coerce the contemnor to comply with a court order, and they must cease when the contemnor complies.\u201d In re Marriage of Carpel, 232 Ill. App. 3d 806, 823, 597 N.E.2d 847, 859 (1992); Pancotto v. Mayes, 304 Ill. App. 3d 108, Ill, 709 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1999) (\u201cCivil contempt proceedings have two fundamental attributes: (1) the contemnor must be capable of taking the action sought to be coerced, and (2) no further contempt sanctions are imposed upon the contemnor\u2019s compliance with the pertinent court order\u201d).\nCriminal contempt is retrospective in nature and consists of punishing for doing what has been prohibited or not doing what has been ordered. Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 46, 558 N.E.2d at 417; see People v. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 468, 771 N.E.2d 399, 406-07 (2002) (\u201cCriminal contempt sanctions are retrospective in nature and punish the contemnor for past acts which he cannot undo\u201d).\nIn this case, the trial court did not impose sanctions to compel a future act. Instead, defendant\u2019s six-month sentence clearly sought to punish him for his prior conduct, which he cannot undo \u2014 namely, his failure to be employed full time on August 25, 2008. In addition, defendant\u2019s imprisonment was for a definite period of time. The record does not show defendant \u201cheld the keys to his cell\u201d by being able to purge himself of the contempt. As the State correctly points out, holding the keys to one\u2019s jail cell is a fundamental characteristic of indirect civil contempt. See In re Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 289, 469 N.E.2d 167, 177 (1984) (\u201cthe civil contemnor must be provided with the \u2018keys to his cell\u2019 \u201d). However, the court never indicated defendant would be immediately released upon payment of the jail-meal fees.\nMoreover, the State\u2019s petition, the trial court\u2019s order, and the record show the November 5, 2008, contempt charge was titled and continuously referenced as indirect criminal contempt. We additionally note that prior to imposing sentence, the court asked defendant if he had \u201c[ajnything [he] want[ed] to say about what the punishment should be here.\u201d (Emphasis added.) As a result, we find the contempt in this case is properly characterized as criminal in nature.\n2. Procedural Requirements\nBefore a defendant may be sanctioned for indirect civil contempt, he or she must be \u201caccorded due process of law with respect to the contempt charges.\u201d Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 52, 558 N.E.2d at 421. \u201cIn a civil contempt proceeding, the contemnor is only entitled to minimal due process, consisting of notice and an opportunity to be heard.\u201d In re Marriage of Cummings, 222 Ill. App. 3d 943, 948, 584 N.E.2d 900, 903 (1991). \u201cThe notice must, of course, contain an adequate description of the facts on which the contempt charge is based and inform the alleged contemnor of the time and place of an evidentiary hearing on the charge within a reasonable time in advance of the hearing.\u201d Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 53, 558 N.E.2d at 422.\nHowever, a person charged with indirect criminal contempt is \u201centitled to constitutional protections that are afforded to any other criminal defendant.\u201d Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d at 471, 771 N.E.2d at 408.\n\u201cOne charged with indirect criminal contempt is entitled to 1 \u201c*** know the nature of the charge against him, to have it definitely and specifically set forth by citation or rule to show cause, and *** [have] an opportunity to answer ***.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.] Also applicable to respondent in an indirect criminal contempt proceeding are the privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, and the right to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 58, 558 N.E.2d at 425.\na. Notice\n\u201c[D]ue process requires that before criminal sanctions may be imposed upon a respondent as a result of indirect criminal contempt proceedings, notice must be provided to the alleged contemnor that such sanctions are being sought and might be imposed.\u201d In re Marriage of Alltop, 203 Ill. App. 3d 606, 616, 561 N.E.2d 394, 401 (1990).\n\u201cBecause a respondent in an indirect criminal contempt proceeding enjoys the privilege against self-incrimination, he may not be called by the petitioner to testify. Accordingly, a petition initiating indirect criminal contempt proceedings ought not have the title \u2018Petition for Rule To Show Cause,\u2019 the designation commonly (and appropriately) used for a petition initiating an indirect civil contempt proceeding; instead, a petition initiating an indirect criminal contempt proceeding ought to have the title \u2018Petition for Adjudication of Criminal Contempt.\u2019 By definition, if a respondent has a right not to testify, he cannot be required to \u2018show cause\u2019 why he should not be held in indirect criminal contempt. Instead, the burden is on the petitioner to prove the charges in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt. An ancillary benefit of using such a title would be to force court and counsel into a recognition that such petitions differ from routine petitions for rules to show cause and require different procedural steps.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59, 558 N.E.2d at 425.\nThus, \u201ca pleading entitled \u2018petition for rule to show cause\u2019 is not sufficient to provide the due process to which an alleged criminal contemnor is entitled.\u201d Alltop, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 616, 561 N.E.2d at 401. Instead, the due-process \u201crequirement can be met by entitling the initial pleading, \u2018petition for adjudication of criminal contempt.\u2019 \u201d Alltop, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 616, 561 N.E.2d at 401.\nIn this case, the State did not file a petition for adjudication of criminal contempt. Instead, the State filed a petition for rule to show cause. As a result, the procedure used failed to provide defendant with proper notice that he faced criminal sanctions.\nb. Burden of Proof\nIn an indirect criminal contempt proceeding, \u201cthe burden is on the [State] to prove the charges in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 59, 558 N.E.2d at 425. To sustain a finding of indirect criminal contempt the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the existence of a court order, and (2) willful violation of that order. People v. Totten, 118 Ill. 2d 124, 138, 514 N.E.2d 959, 965 (1987). A defendant in an indirect criminal contempt proceeding has a right against self-incrimination. People v. Budzynski, 333 Ill. App. 3d 433, 439, 775 N.E.2d 275, 281 (2002). Accordingly, a defendant cannot be required to \u201c \u2018show cause\u2019 why he should not be held in contempt,\u201d because it \u201camounts to an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof.\u201d People v. Ramsell, 266 Ill. App. 3d 297, 301, 640 N.E.2d 975, 978 (1994).\nDuring the criminal contempt hearing, neither the State nor defendant presented any evidence. At the State\u2019s request, the trial court took judicial notice of the previous proceedings. At the hearing, the court sua sponte asked defendant why he did not have employment and why he should not be held in contempt. The court also asked defendant if he had any witnesses or evidence he wanted to present in opposition of the State\u2019s petition. The court stated the following: \u201cI\u2019ll direct the sheriff to retrieve whatever documents you want to bring to court to show why you didn\u2019t have a job when you were ordered to have a job on that court date.\u201d During the hearing the court asked defendant the following: \u201cNow, you\u2019re telling me you have no evidence to present, Mr. Covington; is that correct?\u201d Defendant responded, explaining, \u201cNot as far as working, no. No, sir[,] except that the year will be up in [two] days. And they said I could go back to [work,] but I don\u2019t have any evidence to show you that.\u201d Here, the court repeatedly required defendant to show what he had done to seek employment. We find this procedure impermissibly shifted the State\u2019s burden of proof.\nc. Defendant\u2019s Right to Counsel\nA person charged with indirect criminal contempt is entitled to the right to counsel. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d at 471, 771 N.E.2d at 408. However, at no point during the indirect criminal contempt proceeding was defendant admonished of his right to counsel. Instead, during the hearing, the trial court\u2019s references to counsel are limited to the following statements: \u201cDefendant is pro se. He does not have counsel, and he did not request the public defender\u201d and \u201cThis is on a [petition for [findirect [c]riminal [c]ontempt. Defendant has been, indicated he\u2019s going to represent himself. Do you still intend to represent yourselft,] Mr. Covington?\u201d In this case, the court\u2019s references to the public defender and defendant\u2019s pro se appearance were insufficient to properly admonish him of his right to have counsel present during the criminal proceeding.\nIn this case, we find the trial court erred in entering a criminal-contempt judgment against defendant without providing the necessary criminal procedural rights. See Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 59-60, 558 N.E.2d at 426; Alltop, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 614-15, 561 N.E.2d at 399-400.\nD. Defendant\u2019s Impartiality Claim\nDefendant last argues this case should be remanded to a different judge. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court\u2019s comments at the conclusion of the November 5, 2008, hearing demonstrate the court had lost its impartiality and judicial restraint with respect to defendant.\nSupreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) allows a reviewing court to make any order that a case may require. 155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5). This authority includes the power to remand the case to a different judge. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 263, 807 N.E.2d 439, 447 (2004).\n\u201cA trial judge is presumed to be impartial, and the burden of overcoming this presumption rests on the party making the charge of prejudice.\u201d Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 280, 779 N.E.2d 1115, 1146 (2002). \u201c \u2018Allegedly erroneous findings and rulings by the trial court are insufficient reasons to believe that the court has a personal bias for or against a litigant.\u2019 \u201d Raintree Homes, 209 Ill. 2d at 263, 807 N.E.2d at 448, quoting Eychaner, 202 Ill. 2d at 280, 779 N.E.2d at 1146.\nIn this case, defendant bases his argument that the trial court was biased against him on the following comments:\n\u201c[T]he court is going to take this approach. We\u2019re going to have indirect criminal contempt petitions filed every [four] months; because if you\u2019re sentenced on every one of them to [six] months in jail, you\u2019re going to serve [three] months. I\u2019ll give you another 30 days to find a job. We\u2019ll come back. We\u2019ll start the process over. If you\u2019re found in contempt again, you [will] go back to jail for another [six] months. And we will do this [for] as long as I am sitting here or until you get a job and pay what you owe.\u201d\nBecause defendant bases his contention solely on the trial court\u2019s comment, defendant failed to show the court was biased against him.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we vacate the trial court\u2019s order finding defendant in indirect criminal contempt and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nVacated and remanded with directions.\nTURNER and POPE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Gary R Peterson, and Stuart H. Shiffman (argued), all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Richard Koritz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Clinton (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Luke McNeill (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARTHUR J. COVINGTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201408\u20140930\nOpinion filed October 22, 2009.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Gary R Peterson, and Stuart H. Shiffman (argued), all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nRichard Koritz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Clinton (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Luke McNeill (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0996-01", "first_page_order": 1012, "last_page_order": 1026 }