{ "id": 4291563, "name": "AMERICAN STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY OF WISCONSIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGER L. SLIFER, Defendant (Helen M. Brown, Independent Adm'x of the Estate of Lee J. West, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "American Standard Insurance v. Slifer", "decision_date": "2009-11-06", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201409\u20140326", "first_page": "1056", "last_page": "1063", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 1056" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "369" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "372-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351011 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" }, { "page": "243" }, { "page": "243" }, { "page": "243-44" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "250-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "A notice provision affords an \"insurer an opportunity to make a timely and thorough investigation and to gather and preserve possible evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2952869 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "A notice provision affords an \"insurer an opportunity to make a timely and thorough investigation and to gather and preserve possible evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "875 N.E.2d 1082", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1090" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610622 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "823 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450488 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" }, { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448460 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "874 N.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4271807 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "871 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 990", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7328950 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/374/0990-01" ] }, { "cite": "879 N.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705638 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0102-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 736, "char_count": 16794, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.471702598405084e-08, "percentile": 0.3432595877211374 }, "sha256": "662ab36df9150183e04e61cc43b967b0671aa3537f1ebfb32f4e50b9edecf527", "simhash": "1:ab98c9dea7dc9544", "word_count": 2665 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:02.073967+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AMERICAN STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY OF WISCONSIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGER L. SLIFER, Defendant (Helen M. Brown, Independent Adm\u2019x of the Estate of Lee J. West, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn July 2007, defendant Helen M. Brown, independent administratrix of the estate of Lee J. West, deceased, sued defendant Roger L. Slifer under (1) the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 through 2.2 (West 2002)) and (2) section 27 \u2014 6 of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act) (755 ILCS 5/27 \u2014 6 (West 2002)) for the August 2002 hit- and-run death of her son, West. In May 2008, plaintiff, American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin (American Standard), filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment under section 2 \u2014 701 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 701 (West 2008)), arguing that it was not obligated to indemnify Slifer against Brown\u2019s claims because Slifer failed to comply with the prompt-notification provision of his insurance policy. In January 2009, American Standard and Brown filed cross-motions for summary judgment on American Standard\u2019s amended complaint for declaratory judgment.\nIn March 2009, the trial court denied Brown\u2019s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of American Standard. Brown appeals.\nBecause we conclude that (1) the notice provision that directed Slifer to promptly notify American Standard of any car accidents or losses was part of the contractual agreement of his insurance policy and (2) Slifer failed to notify American Standard of the August 2002 accident in accordance with that notice provision, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe following facts were taken from the parties\u2019 pleadings and other documents filed with the trial court.\nOn August 2, 2002, West was walking down a rural road when he was struck by a hit-and-run driver. West was eventually discovered and taken to a hospital, where he died the following day from his injuries.\nIn June 2007, Slifer confessed to police that he drove the vehicle that struck and killed West. Slifer later pleaded guilty to failure to report an accident involving great bodily harm or death and was sentenced to 14 years in prison.\nIn July 2007, Brown filed a complaint at law against Slifer, seeking compensatory damages under (1) the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 through 2.2 (West 2002)) and (2) section 27 \u2014 6 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/27 \u2014 6 (West 2002)) for the August 2002 death of West.\nIn May 2008, American Standard filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment under section 2 \u2014 701 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 701 (West 2008)), arguing that it was not obligated to provide indemnity, coverage, protection, or any other benefit relating to Brown\u2019s claims because Slifer had failed to comply with the prompt-notification provisions of the vehicle insurance policy in effect in August 2002.\nIn January 2009, American Standard and Brown filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1005 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005 (West 2008)). American Standard argued that because Slifer failed to comply with the notice provision of his policy by concealing the August 2002 accident for over five years, he breached his contractual obligation and was not entitled to the coverage afforded by the policy. Thus, American Standard contended that it was not obligated to indemnify Slifer for any claims arising from Brown\u2019s suit. Brown argued that (1) the notice provision was ambiguous and (2) because the notice provision appeared before the \u201cAgreement\u201d section of the policy \u2014 in which she claimed the parties\u2019 contractual duties and obligations were set forth \u2014 the notice provision was merely advisory rather than contractually binding.\nThe location of the notice provision at issue appeared on the first page of Slifer\u2019s insurance policy as follows:\n\u201cIF YOU HAVE AN AUTO ACCIDENT OR LOSS NOTIFY US\nTell us promptly. Give time, place, and details. Include names and addresses of injured persons and witnesses.\nOTHER DUTIES\nEach person claiming any coverage of this policy must also:\n1. Assist us in any claims or suits.\n6. Give us statements and answer questions under oath when asked by any person we name as often as we reasonably ask, and sign copies of the answers.\nEach person claiming Uninsured Motorist coverage must promptly notify the police if a hit-and-run driver is involved.\nEach person claiming Car Damage coverages must also:\n1. Take responsible steps after loss to protect the vehicle and its equipment from further loss. *** * * *\n4. Answer questions under oath when asked by any person we name as often as we reasonably ask, and sign copies of the answers\nAGREEMENT\nWe agree with you, in return for your premium payment, to insure you subject to all the terms in this policy. We will insure you for the coverages and the terms of liability in the declarations of this policy.\u201d (Emphases in original.)\nFollowing the aforementioned \u201cAgreement\u201d section, a separate section defined terms used throughout the policy. The remainder of the policy consisted of six parts that delineated the following: (1) liability coverage, (2) medical-expense coverage, (3) uninsured-motorist coverage, (4) car-damage coverages, (5) emergency-road-service coverage, and (6) general provisions.\nIn March 2008, the trial court entered a written order granting American Standard\u2019s summary-judgment motion and denying Brown\u2019s summary-judgment motion.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. THE TRIAL COURT\u2019S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT\nA. Summary Judgment and the Standard of Review\n\u201cSummary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions!,] and affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Kajima Construction Services, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 227 Ill. 2d 102, 106, 879 N.E.2d 305, 308 (2007); see 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2008). Summary judgment should be granted only if the movant\u2019s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Bluestar Energy Services, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 374 Ill. App. 3d 990, 993, 871 N.E.2d 880, 884 (2007). We review de novo the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment. Reppert v. Southern Illinois University, 375 Ill. App. 3d 502, 504, 874 N.E.2d 905, 907 (2007).\nB. Brown\u2019s Claim That the Trial Court Erred by Granting American Standard\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment\nBrown argues that the trial court erred by granting American Standard\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Brown contends that the notice provision was ambiguous because (1) it appeared before the section of the policy entitled \u201cAgreement\u201d and (2) it was not expressed in mandatory terms. Thus, Brown asserts that the court should have construed the aforementioned ambiguities against American Standard and in favor of coverage. We address Brown\u2019s contentions in turn.\n1. Brown\u2019s Claim That the Notice Provision Was Ambiguous\na. The Location of the Notice Provision\nBrown contends that the notice provision was ambiguous because it appeared before the section of the policy entitled \u201cAgreement.\u201d We disagree.\nIf the words of an insurance policy are reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, they are considered ambiguous and will be construed strictly against the insurer who drafted the policy. Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 141, 153, 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (2004). This is especially true with regard to provisions that limit or exclude coverage. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 119, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1217 (1992). However, \u201c!a] contract is not rendered ambiguous merely because the parties disagree on its meaning.\u201d Central Illinois Light Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 153, 821 N.E.2d at 214. \u201cAlthough policy terms that limit an insurer\u2019s liability will be liberally construed in favor of coverage, this rule of construction only comes into play when the policy is ambiguous.\u201d Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17, 823 N.E.2d 561, 564 (2005).\nAlthough Brown contends that the notice provision was ambiguous, she does not base this contention on a claim that the words used to construct the provision were susceptible to different interpretations. Rather, Brown claims that the notice provision was ambiguous solely because it appeared before the \u201cAgreement\u201d section of the policy. Brown maintains that an ambiguity exists because the notice provision was merely advisory rather than contractually binding.\nTo the extent that Brown argues that the language of the notice provision created an ambiguity, we reject her claim. Our review of the plain language of the notice provision shows that \u2014 with regard to the reporting requirement \u2014 the provision is unambiguous in that it plainly directs Slifer to promptly notify American Standard in the event of an accident or loss. Thus, we conclude that the language of the notice provision at issue is not ambiguous.\nb. The Language of the Notice Provision\nBrown also contends that the notice provision was merely advisory and not contractually binding because it was not expressed in mandatory terms \u2014 that is, the terms of the notice provision were not sufficiently imperative. We disagree.\nBecause Brown essentially contests the effect of the notice provision of Slifer\u2019s insurance policy, the task before us involves interpreting that provision within the context of Slifer\u2019s and American Standard\u2019s intent when they entered into the contractual agreement.\nIn Rich v. Principal Life Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d 359, 371, 875 N.E.2d 1082, 1090 (2007), the supreme court outlined the rules that govern the court\u2019s interpretation of insurance policy language as follows:\n\u201cWhen construing the language of an insurance policy, a court\u2019s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed by the words of the policy. [Citations.] Because the court must assume that every provision was intended to serve a purpose, an insurance policy is to be construed as a whole, giving effect to every provision [citation], and taking into account the type of insurance provided, the nature of the risks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract [citations]. \u2018All the provisions of the insurance contract, rather than an isolated part, should be read together to interpret it ***.\u2019 [Citation.] If the words used in the policy are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning [citation], and the policy will be applied as written, unless it contravenes public policy [citation].\u201d\nBy its very terms, the insurance policy agreement between Slifer and American Standard stated that American Standard would provide insurance to protect Slifer\u2019s interests if a car accident occurred in which (1) he suffered a loss due to the negligence of another motorist or, in the alternative, (2) it was determined that he was negligent\u2014 that is, American Standard would defend and indemnify Slifer. In exchange for providing that insurance protection, American Standard would receive adequate compensation for assuming the risk it was underwriting on Slifer\u2019s behalf.\nInherent to the successful operation of their contractual agreement is the intention that if Slifer experienced an accident or loss\u2014 regardless of fault \u2014 he would report the claim to American Standard so that it could not only protect Slifer\u2019s interests according to the terms of the policy but also protect its interests as well. See Barrington Consolidated High School v. American Insurance Co., 58 Ill. 2d 278, 281, 319 N.E.2d 25, 27 (1974) (A notice provision affords an \u201cinsurer an opportunity to make a timely and thorough investigation and to gather and preserve possible evidence\u201d).\nConsistent with the aforementioned intent, the first and only section that includes a notice provision prominently appears before the \u201cAgreement\u201d section and is couched in mandatory terms. Specifically, immediately after the notice provision \u2014 which we note is the first provision of the policy \u2014 the \u201cOther Duties\u201d subsection specifically refers to the notice provision by mandating that \u201c[e]ach person claiming any coverage of this policy must also\u201d perform other functions associated with processing a claim. (Emphasis added.) In addition, each of the two subsections following that provision contain mandatory language pertaining to uninsured-motorist claims and car-damage claims.\nOur review of the plain meaning of the notice provision of Slifer\u2019s insurance policy \u2014 within the context of the entire policy \u2014 indicates that he had a contractual obligation to promptly report the August 2002 accident that resulted in West\u2019s death to American Standard. To conclude otherwise, as Brown urges, would essentially render the notice provision a nullity, which would (1) violate our mandate to assume that every provision serves a purpose and (2) thwart the aforementioned intent of Slifer and American Standard when they entered into the contractual agreement. Thus, although we agree that American Standard could have structured its policy to better convey the mandatory nature of the notice provision, we nonetheless reject Brown\u2019s contention that the notice provision was merely advisory rather than contractually binding because it was not expressed in mandatory terms. However, our analysis does not end here.\n2. Slifer\u2019s Compliance With the Notice Provision\nIn this case, the uncontested facts are that (1) in August 2002, Slifer drove a vehicle that struck and killed West; (2) at the time of the accident, Slifer had a valid insurance policy with American Standard; (3) Slifer failed to report the August 2002 accident in accordance with the notice provision of his insurance policy; and (4) American Standard did not learn of Slifer\u2019s accident until August 6, 2007, over five years later. Thus, given that we have previously concluded that the notice provision of Slifer\u2019s insurance policy with American Standard was contractually binding, we further conclude that Slifer breached the terms of his insurance policy when he failed to notify American Standard of the August 2002 accident in accordance with that provision. We find support for our conclusion that Slifer breached the terms of his insurance policy in the Second District\u2019s decision in American Country Insurance Co. v. Bruhn, 289 Ill. App. 3d 241, 682 N.E.2d 366 (1997), which did not address the binding nature of the notice provision but did involve similar facts and a similarly worded notice provision.\nIn Bruhn, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 243, 682 N.E.2d at 367, Todd Raymond Nebel was driving his vehicle when he struck and killed two pedestrians. Nebel concealed his involvement in the hit-and-run accident until three years and eight months later when he confessed to police. Bruhn, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 243, 682 N.E.2d at 367. The administratrix of the decedents\u2019 estate subsequently sued Nebel for negligence, wrongful death, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Bruhn, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 243, 682 N.E.2d at 368. American Country Insurance Company (American) later filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, claiming that although it had issued the car insurance policy in effect at the time of accident, it had no duty to defend Nebel because he failed, in part, to comply with the notice provisions of his policy. Bruhn, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 243-44, 682 N.E.2d at 368. At a hearing on American\u2019s complaint, the trial court granted Bruhn\u2019s motion for a directed finding after the close of American\u2019s case, finding that Nebel\u2019s notice to American was sufficient under the insurance policy\u2019s notice provision. Bruhn, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 682 N.E.2d at 369.\nIn reversing the trial court determination, the Second District concluded, in part, that, while not an absolute bar to coverage in every circumstance, (1) Nebel had breached the mandatory notice provision of his insurance policy (Bruhn, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 249, 682 N.E.2d at 371) by not reporting the accident until three years and eight months later and (2) public policy did not preclude denial of coverage (Bruhn, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 250-51, 682 N.E.2d at 372-73).\nAccordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by granting American Standard\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, EJ., and TURNER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert M. Owen (argued), of Decatur, for appellant.", "William P. Hardy (argued) and Russell L. Reed, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AMERICAN STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY OF WISCONSIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGER L. SLIFER, Defendant (Helen M. Brown, Independent Adm\u2019x of the Estate of Lee J. West, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201409\u20140326\nOpinion filed November 6, 2009.\nRobert M. Owen (argued), of Decatur, for appellant.\nWilliam P. Hardy (argued) and Russell L. Reed, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1056-01", "first_page_order": 1072, "last_page_order": 1079 }