{ "id": 4291354, "name": "In re JAY. H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jason Hodges, Respondent-Appellant).-In re JAY. H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Shannon Toler, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hodges", "decision_date": "2009-11-09", "docket_number": "Nos. 4\u201409\u20140439, 4\u201409\u20140460 cons.", "first_page": "1063", "last_page": "1072", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 1063" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "784 N.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599269 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "819 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 883", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3362952 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0883-01" ] }, { "cite": "818 N.E.2d 1214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2443992 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "768 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472391 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "699 N.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "the trial court's determination at the subsequent best-interest hearing is afforded great deference by the reviewing court" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073565 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "the trial court's determination at the subsequent best-interest hearing is afforded great deference by the reviewing court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "852 N.E.2d 474", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265594 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "867 N.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 817", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268791 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0817-01" ] }, { "cite": "899 N.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479", "parenthetical": "the purpose of the best-interest hearing is to minimize further damage to the child by shifting the court's scrutiny to the child's best interest" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "386 Ill. App. 3d 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4281322 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697", "parenthetical": "the purpose of the best-interest hearing is to minimize further damage to the child by shifting the court's scrutiny to the child's best interest" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/386/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "890 N.E.2d 710", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "the purpose of the dispositional hearing is for the trial court to determine what is in the child's best interest" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4278403 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315", "parenthetical": "the purpose of the dispositional hearing is for the trial court to determine what is in the child's best interest" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773", "parenthetical": "where this court concluded that the civil rules of evidence apply to fitness hearings" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5148734 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "946", "parenthetical": "where this court concluded that the civil rules of evidence apply to fitness hearings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "699 N.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175-76" }, { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073728 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628-29" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "777 N.E.2d 930", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "940" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1476994 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 N.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "\"Although hearsay and other types of incompetent evidence may not be admissible at the adjudicatory hearing, they are admissible at the dispositional hearing\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5238888 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187", "parenthetical": "\"Although hearsay and other types of incompetent evidence may not be admissible at the adjudicatory hearing, they are admissible at the dispositional hearing\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "760 N.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281446 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "799 N.E.2d 994", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 1260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3718161 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1262-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/1260-01" ] }, { "cite": "897 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" }, { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3617129 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "874 N.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269329 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "743 N.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096295 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "893 N.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 Ill. App. 3d 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4278946 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/384/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "905 N.E.2d 757", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772", "parenthetical": "a respondent's failure to object at trial forfeits consideration of the claimed error on appeal unless respondent can demonstrate plain error" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619394 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "a respondent's failure to object at trial forfeits consideration of the claimed error on appeal unless respondent can demonstrate plain error" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0408-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 899, "char_count": 23115, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.161828885495153e-08, "percentile": 0.3829047562232393 }, "sha256": "0ef85f160d310e5f1acc5010957ded1b6a619b605c18ef3b67c795c3809379e5", "simhash": "1:4afac0c294dfd338", "word_count": 3737 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:02.073967+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re JAY. H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jason Hodges, Respondent-Appellant).\u2014In re JAY. H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Shannon Toler, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn January 2009, the State filed an amended petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent mother, Shannon Toler, as to her children Jay. H. (born April 22, 2005), Jas. H. (born June 4, 2004), and T.W (born September 9, 1994). In March 2009, the State filed a first supplemental amendment to its petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of respondent father, Jason Hodges, as to his children Jay. H. and Jas. H. (Respondent father is not T.W\u2019s biological father.) Following hearings in February and May 2009, the trial court found respondent mother and respondent father, respectively, unfit. At a separate May 2009 hearing, the court determined that it would be (1) in the best interest of Jay. H. and Jas. H. to terminate the parental rights of both respondent mother and respondent father and (2) in T.W\u2019s best interest to terminate respondent mother\u2019s parental rights.\nRespondent mother and respondent father appeal (Nos. 4 \u2014 09\u2014 0460 and 4 \u2014 09\u20140439, respectively), arguing that (1) the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of various documents at the best-interest hearing and (2) the court\u2019s best-interest findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn March 2008, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. were neglected minors under section 2 \u2014 3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act), in that their environment was injurious to their welfare because respondent mother and respondent father (collectively, respondents) had unresolved issues of substance abuse (705 ILCS 405/ 2 \u2014 3(1)(b) (West 2008)). At an April 2008 adjudicatory hearing, respondents admitted the State\u2019s allegations in its petition for wardship. After accepting the State\u2019s evidence, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W neglected minors. Following a July 2008 dispositional hearing, the court entered an order adjudicating Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. wards of the court and appointed the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as their guardian.\nIn January 2009, the State filed an amended petition to terminate parental rights, alleging, in pertinent part, that respondent mother was an unfit parent under section l(D)(k) of the Adoption Act, in that she was alcohol-dependent and addicted to drugs, other than those prescribed by a physician, for at least one year immediately prior to the start of the unfitness hearing (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(k) (West 2008)).\nIn March 2009, the State filed a first supplemental amendment to its amended petition to terminate parental rights, alleging, in pertinent part, that respondent father was an unfit parent under section 1(D) (i) of the Adoption Act, in that he was depraved because (1) he had at least three felony convictions and (2) one of his convictions occurred within five years of the filing of the State\u2019s petition seeking termination of his parental rights (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(i) (West 2008)).\nAt a February 2009 hearing, the trial court found respondent mother unfit based on her admission at the hearing that she had a drinking problem and was addicted to drugs. The State\u2019s evidence showed that (1) in May 2005, DCFS took Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. into protective custody (McLean County case No. 05 \u2014 JA\u201456) based on respondent mother\u2019s substance-abuse issues; (2) respondent mother had attempted substance-abuse treatment multiple times, including February 2007, in which she was diagnosed as opiate-, cocaine-, and alcohol-dependent; and (3) respondent mother tested positive for cocaine in November 2008.\nAt a May 2009 hearing, the trial court found respondent father unfit based on his admission at the hearing that he had at least three felony convictions, with one of those convictions occurring within five years of the filing of the State\u2019s petition. Without objection, the court admitted into evidence respondent father\u2019s 5 separate sentencing orders, showing his convictions over the previous 10 years (from 1998 through 2008) for (1) delivery of cannabis (2 separate convictions), (2) delivery of cocaine, (3) possession of cannabis, and (4) aggravated battery.\nAt respondents\u2019 best-interest hearing that immediately followed respondent father\u2019s May 2009 fitness hearing, the trial court took judicial notice, without objection, of the following documents from McLean County case No. 05 \u2014 JA\u201456: (1) the docket entries, (2) the petition for adjudication of wardship, (3) the shelter-care order, (4) an investigative summary, (5) a social-history report, (6) the adjudicatory and dispositional reports and orders, and (7) various permanency orders and reports. The court also took judicial notice, without objection, of the following documents in this case: (1) the petitions, orders, and docket entries; (2) a June 2008 dispositional report; (3) two October 2008 permanency reports; and (4) respondent mother\u2019s November 2008 and February 2009 positive drug-screen results.\nIn addition, at that best-interest hearing, the trial court also received and considered a May 2009 best-interest report, which was prepared by a DCFS-contracted caseworker who had been the sole caseworker assigned to respondents\u2019 case since its inception in May 2005. That report stated the following.\nIn May 2005, Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W were taken into protective custody (McLean County case No. 05 \u2014 JA\u201456) because (1) respondent mother was found under the influence of cannabis and cocaine and (2) respondent father had an extensive criminal history that involved the possession and delivery of controlled substances. Although the caseworker characterized respondent mother\u2019s progress in completing her client-service-plan goals as inconsistent, in December 2007, Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W were returned to respondent father\u2019s care after he successfully completed his client-service-plan goals.\nIn February 2008, respondent mother was arrested for obstructing justice. At the time of her arrest, she was intoxicated, and she admitted that she had relapsed. Later that same month, DCFS took protective custody of Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. after police charged respondent father, in part, with delivery of cannabis. DCFS subsequently placed Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. with respondent father\u2019s sister, Tiffany Hodges, who had since expressed a clear desire to adopt all three children.\nIn summarizing his finding, the caseworker provided the following:\n\u201c[Respondent mother] has not demonstrated that she is capable of caring for [Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W] She has not been able to maintain sobriety for extended periods of time[, n]or has she been able to maintain a consistent income through any source other than [respondent father], [Respondent father] is now incarcerated with a projected parole date of [February 29, 2013]. He has an extensive criminal history of drug charges. The one stable parental figure [Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W.] have had is Tiffany Hodges. [Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W.] need permanency with a parent they can depend on and trust to put their needs first. [I] strongly believe[ ] that [Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W] need the security, safety, and stability they would be afforded through adoption by Tiffany Hodges.\u201d\nRespondent mother testified, in pertinent part, that she (1) had struggled with substance-abuse issues for about 20 years; (2) had maintained her sobriety for 7 months, which she had not accomplished since she was 14 years old; and (3) loved her children. In addition, respondent mother admitted that she (1) had not independently parented Jay. H., Jas. H., or T.W. throughout their lifetimes; (2) had not maintained a relationship with her other 11-year-old child, who lived in Kentucky with another aunt; and (3) might maintain her relationship with respondent father.\nAfter considering the evidence, counsel\u2019s arguments, and the statutory factors under section 1 \u2014 3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2008)), the trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it was in the minors\u2019 best interest to terminate (1) respondent mother\u2019s parental rights as to Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. and (2) respondent father\u2019s parental rights as to Jay. H. and Jas. H. (Although the court also terminated the parental rights of T.W\u2019s biological father, he is not a party to this appeal.)\nBoth respondents filed appeals, which this court sua sponte consolidated.\nII. RESPONDENTS\u2019 CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE OF VARIOUS DOCUMENTS AT THE BEST-INTEREST HEARING\nA. The Trial Court\u2019s Decision To Take Judicial Notice of Various Documents\nRespondents argue that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of various documents at the best-interest hearing. Initially, we note that because respondents failed to object at that hearing to the admission of the various documents about which they now complain, they have forfeited this argument on appeal. See In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 430, 905 N.E.2d 757, 772 (2009) (a respondent\u2019s failure to object at trial forfeits consideration of the claimed error on appeal unless respondent can demonstrate plain error). Nonetheless, respondents urge this court to consider their claim under the plain-error doctrine because the best-interest hearing was fundamentally unfair in that the court took judicial notice of a \u201csubstantial quantum of incompetent evidence.\u201d\n\u201cThis court may review an error under the plain-error doctrine if (1) the evidence is closely balanced or (2) the error is \u2018so substantial that it affected the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.\u2019 \u201d People v. Hostetter, 384 Ill. App. 3d 700, 707, 893 N.E.2d 313, 319 (2008), quoting People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 335, 743 N.E.2d 521, 539 (2000). However, before addressing whether respondents\u2019 forfeited claim constitutes plain error, we will first determine whether it constitutes any error at all. People v. Owens, 372 Ill. App. 3d 616, 620, 874 N.E.2d 116, 118 (2007).\nBased upon the following analysis of the interrelationship between the Juvenile Court Act and Adoption Act, we conclude that we need not consider respondents\u2019 argument under a plain-error analysis because the trial court did not err.\n1. Proceedings Under the Juvenile Court Act\nThe Juvenile Court Act sets forth the two-step process a trial court must employ in deciding whether a minor should be made a ward of the court. In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 241, 254, 897 N.E.2d 733, 740 (2008). The first step is the adjudicatory hearing on a petition for adjudication of wardship at which \u201cthe court shall first consider only the question whether the minor is abused, neglected!,] or dependent.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(1) (West 2008). In making that determination, the rules of evidence in the nature of civil proceedings apply. A.W., 231 Ill. 2d at 256, 897 N.E.2d at 741; 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(1) (West 2008). If the trial court determines that the minor child is abused, neglected, or dependent, the court shall then proceed to the second step \u2014 the dispositional hearing \u2014 and determine whether the minor should be made a ward of the court. In re Timothy T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 1260, 1262-63, 799 N.E.2d 994, 996 (2003); 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(2) (West 2008). Proceedings at the dispositional hearing are governed by section 2 \u2014 22(1) of the Juvenile Court Act, which provides as follows:\n\u201cAt the dispositional hearing, the court shall determine whether it is in the best interests of the minor and the public that he be made a ward of the court, and, if he is to be made a ward of the court, the court shall determine the proper disposition best serving the health, safety!,] and interests of the minor and the public. The court also shall consider the permanency goal set for the minor, the nature of the service plan for the minor and the services delivered and to be delivered under the plan. All evidence helpful in determining these questions, including oral and written reports, may be admitted and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value, even though not competent for the purposes of the adjudicatory hearing.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 22(1) (West 2008).\nThe plain language of section 2 \u2014 22(1) of the Juvenile Court Act shows the legislature\u2019s intent to give trial courts wide latitude in admitting evidence at the dispositional hearing. In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 245, 261, 760 N.E.2d 101, 114 (2001); see also In re D.L., 226 Ill. App. 3d 177, 187, 589 N.E.2d 680, 686 (1992) (\u201cAlthough hearsay and other types of incompetent evidence may not be admissible at the adjudicatory hearing, they are admissible at the dispositional hearing\u201d).\n2. Proceedings Under the Adoption Act\nIn In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494-95, 777 N.E.2d 930, 940 (2002), the supreme court outlined the following two-step process a trial court must employ when dealing with petitions to terminate parental rights under the Adoption Act:\n\u201cThe involuntary termination of parental rights upon the petition of the State is governed by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 [citation], and the Adoption Act [citation]. A two-step process is mandated. First, the State must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is \u2018unfit,\u2019 as that term is defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act [citation]. *** If the court makes such a finding, it will then consider whether it is in the best interest ] of the child that parental rights be terminated.\u201d\nIn addition, section 2.1 of the Adoption Act provides, in pertinent part, that the Adoption Act shall be construed in concert with the Juvenile Court Act. 750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 2008).\n3. The Formal Rules of Evidence Do Not Apply at Best-Interest Hearings\nConstruing the Adoption Act in concert with the Juvenile Court Act, we hold that the Adoption Act is the structural equivalent of the Juvenile Court Act. Further, we note that this structural equivalency is hardly a new or novel concept.\nIn In re J.G., 298 Ill. App. 3d 617, 628-29, 699 N.E.2d 167, 175-76 (1998), this court rejected the State\u2019s argument that at a fitness hearing under the Adoption Act, the trial court could take judicial notice of the entire record that preceded the parental-termination proceeding without first finding that the contents of the court file were admissible under the civil rules of evidence. In so doing, we concluded that it would be illogical to apply the rules of evidence to adjudicatory hearings, the result of which may only be temporary, but not to apply those same rules to parental-fitness hearings, where parents face permanent revocation of parental rights. J.G., 298 Ill. App. 3d at 629, 699 N.E.2d at 175; see also In re M.S., 239 Ill. App. 3d 938, 946, 606 N.E.2d 768, 773 (1992) (where this court concluded that the civil rules of evidence apply to fitness hearings).\nFurther construing the acts under section 2.1 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 2008)), we likewise conclude that the second step of both proceedings \u2014 the dispositional hearing under the Juvenile Court Act and the best-interest hearing under the Adoption Act \u2014 are functional equivalents. These respective second steps are subject to the same relaxed standard regarding the admission of evidence \u2014 that is, the formal rules of evidence do not apply. Thus, at both second-step hearings, all evidence helpful (in the trial court\u2019s judgment) in determining the questions before the court may be admitted and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value, even though that evidence would not be admissible in a proceeding where the formal rules of evidence applied. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 -22(1) (West 2008).\nIn support of this conclusion, we note that the primary issue before the trial court in both dispositional hearings and best-interest hearings is the same \u2014 namely, what action is in the child\u2019s best interest? See In re Y.A., 383 Ill. App. 3d 311, 315, 890 N.E.2d 710, 714 (2008) (the purpose of the dispositional hearing is for the trial court to determine what is in the child\u2019s best interest); see also In re B.B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 686, 697, 899 N.E.2d 469, 479 (2008) (the purpose of the best-interest hearing is to minimize further damage to the child by shifting the court\u2019s scrutiny to the child\u2019s best interest).\n4. The Trial Court\u2019s Taking Judicial Notice Was Appropriate\nAs noted, respondents argue that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the aforementioned documents at the best-interest hearing. We disagree.\nBecause cases under the Juvenile Court Act are sui generis and must be decided on the basis of their unique facts, this court gives great deference to the trial court\u2019s determinations at the dispositional hearing, given that the court is in the best position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and the parties, assess credibility, and weigh the evidence presented. In re Gabriel E., 372 Ill. App. 3d 817, 823, 867 N.E.2d 59, 65 (2007), citing In re Sharena H., 366 Ill. App. 3d 405, 415, 852 N.E.2d 474, 482 (2006). This same deferential standard of review applies to the court\u2019s determinations at the best-interest hearing. See In re D.M., 298 Ill. App. 3d 574, 581, 699 N.E.2d 212, 217 (1998) (the trial court\u2019s determination at the subsequent best-interest hearing is afforded great deference by the reviewing court).\nThe record shows that the various orders, reports, docket entries, and results of which the trial court took judicial notice solely concerned the parental relationship between respondents and Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W In particular, the evidence showed that in May 2005, DCFS took Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. into protective custody because (1) respondent mother was found under the influence of cannabis and cocaine and (2) respondent father had an extensive criminal history that involved the possession and delivery of controlled substances. These problems persisted until February 2008, when DCFS again took Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. into their protective custody because respondents continued to engage in the same destructive activities\u2014 that is, respondent mother continued her substance abuse and respondent father continued his illegal drug activity.\nBy taking judicial notice of the aforementioned evidence at the best-interest hearing, the trial court obviously viewed that evidence as probative of its determination as to what decision was in the best interest of Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. Because the court is allowed to consider all evidence that it finds helpful in answering the best-interest question, we conclude that the trial court did not err by taking judicial notice of the aforementioned documents.\nIII. THE TRIAL COURT\u2019S BEST-INTEREST FINDINGS\nRespondent mother and respondent father also argue that the trial court\u2019s best-interest findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.\nAfter a finding of parental unfitness, the trial court must give full and serious consideration to the child\u2019s best interest. In re G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d 18, 24, 768 N.E.2d 367, 372 (2002). At the best-interest stage of termination proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child\u2019s best interest. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 366, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1228 (2004). When determining whether termination is in the child\u2019s best interest, the court must consider, in the context of a child\u2019s age and developmental needs, the following factors: (1) the child\u2019s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child\u2019s identity; (3) the child\u2019s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (4) the child\u2019s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child\u2019s wishes; (6) the child\u2019s community ties; (7) the child\u2019s need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parental figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2008).\nWe will not reverse the trial court\u2019s best-interest determination unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d 883, 890, 819 N.E.2d 813, 819 (2004). A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite result. In re D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766, 773, 784 N.E.2d 304, 310 (2002).\nIn this case, the evidence presented at the May 2009 best-interest hearing showed that respondent mother (1) had a substantial and serious history of alcohol and drug abuse, (2) admitted that she had problems maintaining her sobriety for any considerable length of time, and (3) had not maintained any independent parental relationship with Jay. H., Jas. H., or T.W In addition, respondent father (1) had an extensive criminal history that involved the possession, manufacturing, and delivery of controlled substances; (2) was currently incarcerated for manufacturing and distributing cannabis; and (3) would remain incarcerated until February 2013. Alternatively, since February 2008, Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W had been thriving in a loving, caring environment with Tiffany, respondent father\u2019s sister, who had (1) provided for the health, welfare, and emotional needs of Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W and (2) expressed a sincere interest in adopting them.\nOur review of the record shows that the trial court appropriately applied this evidence to each of the statutory factors under section 1 \u2014 3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2008)), finding that, in addition to other applicable factors, the current home environment, familiarity, sense of security, and continuity of affection afforded Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. warranted termination of respondents\u2019 parental rights.\nGiven our standard of review, we conclude that the court\u2019s finding that it was in the best interest of Jay. H., Jas. H., and T.W. to terminate respondents\u2019 parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nNo. 4 \u2014 09\u20140439\u2014Affirmed.\nNo. 4 \u2014 09\u20140460\u2014Affirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, EJ., and TURNER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Adele M. Saaf, of Bloomington, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re JAY. H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jason Hodges, Respondent-Appellant).\u2014In re JAY. H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Shannon Toler, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNos. 4\u201409\u20140439, 4\u201409\u20140460 cons.\nOpinion filed November 9, 2009.\nAdele M. Saaf, of Bloomington, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1063-01", "first_page_order": 1079, "last_page_order": 1088 }