{ "id": 4293197, "name": "AUSTIN BANK OF CHICAGO, as Trustee under Trust No. 4261, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF BARRINGTON HILLS, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Austin Bank v. Village of Barrington Hills", "decision_date": "2009-11-09", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201408\u20142315", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "15", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "908 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to cite supporting authority is a violation of Rule 341(e)(7) [now Rule 341(h)(7)], and we may consider those issues forfeited\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4285711 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to cite supporting authority is a violation of Rule 341(e)(7) [now Rule 341(h)(7)], and we may consider those issues forfeited\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.E. 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1907, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5626649 ], "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/227/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 919", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5251786 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "934-35" }, { "page": "935" }, { "page": "921-22" }, { "page": "923" }, { "page": "922-23" }, { "page": "924" }, { "page": "934" }, { "page": "934" }, { "page": "934" }, { "page": "934-35" }, { "page": "934" }, { "page": "936" }, { "page": "936" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0919-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600916 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" }, { "page": "550", "parenthetical": "condemning a \"deliberate attempt to preclude [a petitioner] from satisfying the [factors] of the disconnection statute\"" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2583672 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477020 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "818 N.E.2d 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3362596 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266-67" }, { "page": "267" }, { "page": "266-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "902 N.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619166 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" }, { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260172 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154-55" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5197189 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "828 N.E.2d 1193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599104 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 N.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "under section 7 - 3-6, if the circuit court's finding that the requirements for disconnection have been met is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, disconnection follows" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2543729 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "under section 7 - 3-6, if the circuit court's finding that the requirements for disconnection have been met is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, disconnection follows" }, { "page": "215-16", "parenthetical": "it was for the trial court to resolve conflicting opinions presented by the parties' expert witnesses" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/81/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 N.E.2d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2980672 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "328" }, { "page": "328" }, { "page": "328" }, { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "county code \"prohibits 'spite' strips in 'new subdivisions' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3309914 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904-05", "parenthetical": "county code \"prohibits 'spite' strips in 'new subdivisions' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0901-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1183, "char_count": 36578, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14441980980358315 }, "sha256": "5f2d36e18ab122674cb48cb45ebbd7350413cb6ca794032bdfd09d818374088a", "simhash": "1:0cc774842f00fccf", "word_count": 5851 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:39:01.503812+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AUSTIN BANK OF CHICAGO, as Trustee under Trust No. 4261, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF BARRINGTON HILLS, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Village of Barrington Hills (the Village) appeals from an order granting the petition of Austin Bank of Chicago to disconnect a 145-acre parcel of land (the subject property) from the Village\u2019s jurisdiction pursuant to section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 of the Illinois Municipal Code (the Code) (65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 3\u20146 (West 2006)). The Village contends the disconnection of the subject property leaves two adjacent \u201cbarrier parcels\u201d at the southeastern corner of the Village isolated from the remainder of the Village in violation of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146. Because the record supports the circuit court\u2019s ruling that the Village retained jurisdiction over the barrier parcels as a legal gimmick to prevent disconnection of the subject property, we affirm Judge Peter Flynn\u2019s order granting Austin Bank\u2019s disconnection petition.\nBACKGROUND\nPrior to 1997, the southeast boundary of the Village\u2019s jurisdiction was a 45-acre parcel of land directly east of Route 59 (1997 boundary parcel). The 1997 boundary parcel was part of a larger 600-acre tree nursery owned and operated by the Klehm family (Klehm property), which extended farther north and east. At the time, the remainder of the Klehm property was in unincorporated Cook County. Immediately west of the 1997 boundary parcel and Route 59 is the subject property.\nIn 1997, Mesirow-Stein, a real estate development firm, purchased the entire Klehm property, including the 1997 boundary parcel. Mesirow-Stein sought to develop all of the Klehm property for high-density residential housing, a type of housing not permitted under the Village\u2019s zoning laws. To avoid the Village\u2019s restrictive zoning laws, Mesirow-Stein sought and obtained a disconnection of the 1997 boundary parcel from the Village\u2019s jurisdiction.\nHad the entire 1997 boundary parcel been disconnected from the Village, the subject property would have become the easternmost point remaining under the Village\u2019s jurisdiction. However, two parcels within the 1997 boundary parcel were not disconnected. Under a Village ordinance granting the disconnection of the 1997 boundary parcel, two \u201cbarrier parcels,\u201d each 301 feet in width and less than 2 acres in area, directly east of Route 59 and the subject property, remained within the Village\u2019s jurisdiction. These two parcels became the easternmost points of the Village\u2019s border.\nThe central issue in the litigation below was the significance of the barrier parcels remaining within the Village\u2019s jurisdiction vis-a-vis the petition for disconnection filed by Austin Bank. The Village took the position that because the barrier parcels are the easternmost point still within its jurisdiction, adjacent to the subject property across from Route 59, the disconnection of the subject property would leave those barrier parcels isolated from the remainder of the Village in violation of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 of the Code. Austin Bank asserted that the Village only retained the barrier parcels as a subterfuge to block disconnection of the subject property and, under existing case law, the circuit court, in giving a liberal reading to section 7 \u2014 3\u20146, which favors disconnection, could find that disconnection is not defeated based on the isolation of the artificially created barrier parcels. We set out at length the evidence adduced at trial concerning the Village\u2019s decision to retain the barrier parcels.\nRetention of the Barrier Parcels\nOn February 9, 1998, Mesirow-Stein representatives and Village officials met to discuss the possible disconnection of the 1997 boundary parcel. The next day, Michael Szkaltukski, a developer with Mesirow-Stein, wrote a memo describing \u201cissues brought to the table by [the Village]\u201d at the meeting. The memo discussed the possibility of disconnecting most of the 1997 boundary parcel from the Village, while leaving a small area within the Village\u2019s jurisdiction. The memo noted, \u201cThe dimensions of the remaining parcel must be sufficient in size to prohibit the disconnection of [the subject property].\u201d According to the memo, Village officials \u201csuggested a minimum of 300 feet\u201d in width. Village officials added \u201cthat the area which remains in [the Village] will be reviewed based on their requirement for storm detention and run off.\u201d Szkaltukski wrote that leaving an area under the jurisdiction of the Village would prevent disconnection of the subject property under section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 of the Code because disconnection would make the barrier parcels \u201can island.\u201d Szkaltukski testified that there was no engineering reason to leave some of the 1997 boundary parcel in the Village\u2019s jurisdiction.\nAnthony Iatarola, a beneficiary of the Austin Bank trust that holds title to the subject property, testified that in the summer of 1998 he attended a public meeting conducted by Mesirow-Stein to outline its development plans of the Klehm property, including the 1997 boundary parcel. At the meeting, Iatarola asked Mesirow-Stein\u2019s attorney, Ted Novak, whether the 1997 boundary parcel would be disconnected in its entirety. Novak said that remnants of the parcel would remain under the Village\u2019s jurisdiction to act as \u201clegal spite strips,\u201d a term commonly used to describe artificial strips of land created to frustrate a neighboring landowner\u2019s land use right. See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. Andrews, 68 Ill. App. 3d 901, 904-05, 386 N.E.2d 923 (1979) (county code \u201cprohibits \u2018spite\u2019 strips in \u2018new subdivisions\u2019 \u201d).\nVillage officials expressed similar reasons for carving out the barrier parcels from the disconnection of the 1997 boundary parcel. Bruce Trego, an administrator from neighboring South Barrington, testified that Robert Kosin, the director of administration in the Village, told Trego in the summer of 1998 that the Village planned to maintain jurisdiction over the barrier parcels to prevent future disconnection of the subject property. James Kempe, the president of the Village when the barrier parcels were retained, testified that he decided to \u201cgo along\u201d with the barrier parcel proposal because he would \u201crather lose 43 acres [of the 1997 boundary parcel] than lose the 145 [of the subject property] across the street.\u201d\nIn 2000, Mesirow-Stein formally presented a petition to the Village\u2019s zoning board of appeals to disconnect 42 acres of the 1997 boundary parcel, leaving only the barrier parcels under the Village\u2019s jurisdiction.\nJack Train, the chairman of the Village\u2019s zoning board of appeals, conducted a public hearing on the petition on June 19, 2000. In the circuit court below, Train testified that prior to the hearing, Kosin informed him that the disconnection petition had been approved by the Village\u2019s attorneys to give the Village a legal ground to oppose any future effort to disconnect the subject property. The zoning board hearing focused primarily on the storm water management benefits the Village would retain by maintaining jurisdiction over the barrier parcels; protection of the Village\u2019s borders was not expressly raised at the hearing.\nMesirow-Stein did not file a disconnection petition in the circuit court. Instead, on June 26, 2000, the board of trustees passed an ordinance that disconnected from the Village the 1997 boundary parcel except for the two barrier parcels.\nSome time after the zoning board hearing on the disconnection of the 1997 boundary parcel, Iatarola met with Train to express an interest in disconnecting the subject property. Train informed him that because the Village retained jurisdiction over the barrier parcels, the barrier parcels would legally prevent disconnection of the subject property.\nStorm Water Management\nIn the circuit court, the Village sought to demonstrate the benefits of its retention of the barrier parcels as part of the storm water management for the Village. Robert Gudmundson, a Mesirow-Stein engineer, testified that the barrier parcels were intended to function as storm water detention ponds controlling the flow of water toward the Village through two culverts that ran underneath Route 59, immediately east of the subject property. Gudmundson also testified that because the Village retained jurisdiction over the barrier parcels, Mesirow-Stein was required to submit storm water management plans in the course of its development of the 1997 boundary parcel within the Klehm property for the Village\u2019s approval.\nTo rebut Gudmundson\u2019s testimony, Austin Bank introduced testimony from engineering expert Christopher Burke. Burke testified that only 12 acres of the approximately 600 in Mesirow-Stein\u2019s development drained to either of the barrier parcels; the remainder drained through approximately seven other culverts that ran under Route 59. In Burke\u2019s opinion, the barrier parcels provided the Village with no benefit \u201cfrom a storm water management perspective.\u201d\nThe Petition for Disconnection\nIn May 2001, Austin Bank filed its petition in the circuit court to disconnect the subject property, alleging it satisfied all six disconnection factors set forth in section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 of the Code. 65 ILCS 5/7\u2014 3 \u2014 6 (West 2006). The Village filed a motion to dismiss based on Austin Bank\u2019s failure to allege a challenge to the disconnection ordinance. Judge Robert V Boharic granted the motion, reasoning that because the disconnection of the 1997 boundary parcel occurred by way of an ordinance, Austin Bank was required to demonstrate that the ordinance itself was \u201carbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,\u201d which it failed to do.\nIn May 2002, Austin Bank filed an amended two-count petition for disconnection. Count I alleged that the Village\u2019s decision to retain jurisdiction over the barrier parcels was \u201carbitrary, capricious, and a sham.\u201d Count II, as an alternative basis for relief, sought disconnection by leaving a 7.77-acre strip of the subject property connecting the barrier parcels and the Village under the Village\u2019s jurisdiction. The Village filed a motion to dismiss, which Judge Flynn, who had replaced the recently retired Judge Boharic, denied.\nAfter discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Judge Flynn granted the Village\u2019s motion as to count II, which argued that the proposed strip to remain within the Village was \u201ctoo long and narrow to be \u2018contiguous.\u2019 \u201d Austin Bank\u2019s motion sought partial summary judgment, contending that four of the six elements of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 of the Code were satisfied: (1) the subject property is more than 20 acres in area; (4) disconnection will not unreasonably disrupt the Village\u2019s plan and growth prospects; (5) disconnection will not substantially disrupt municipal services facilities such as sewers and lighting; and (6) the Village will not lose significant tax revenue from disconnection. See 65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 3\u20146 (West 2006) (numbering the factors for disconnection). Judge Flynn granted Austin Bank\u2019s motion, finding that no material question of fact existed as to factors (4) and (6) and that the parties were in agreement that factors (1) and (5) were satisfied. See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(d) (West 2006).\nAustin Bank amended count II to propose that the Village retain jurisdiction over a larger, 24.99-acre strip of the subject property adjacent to the barrier parcels. Judge Flynn denied the Village\u2019s motion to dismiss count II as amended. The case proceeded to trial on factors (2) and (3) for disconnection under counts I and II. See 65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 3\u20146 (West 2006).\nBased on the evidence summarized above, Judge Flynn issued detailed findings on the record. Judge Flynn reaffirmed that the subject property satisfied factors (1), (4), (5), and (6) of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146. He also found that factor (2) was satisfied as the subject property \u201cis located on the border of the municipality.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/7\u2014 3 \u2014 6 (West 2006). With regard to factor (3), that no \u201cisolation of any part of the municipality\u201d will result if disconnection is allowed, Judge Flynn found \u201cthat the [only] purpose of the barrier parcels was to block disconnection of the [subject property].\u201d Judge Flynn found that \u201cwater management was at best an after-the-fact rationalization,\u201d and that the testimony suggesting that the barrier parcels gave the Village significant water management benefits \u201cwas just not credible.\u201d Noting that cases addressing the factors under section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 \u201chave inveighed against mere subterfuge in attempting to *** frustrate disconnection,\u201d Judge Flynn held that \u201cthe barrier parcels were in fact a sham or subterfuge.\u201d As such, the isolation of the barrier parcels is \u201cinsufficient to defeat disconnection of the [subject property].\u201d Judge Flynn granted Austin Bank\u2019s petition for disconnection on count I and, \u201cin the alternative,\u201d on count II.\nThe Village timely appeals.\nANALYSIS\nThe Village first contends that \u201c[b]ecause the Village\u2019s decision to maintain control over the Barrier Parcels was done pursuant to the Klehm Disconnection Ordinance, *** its decision is \u2018presumptively valid,\u2019 \u201d citing Village of Algonquin v. Village of Barrington Hills, 254 Ill. App. 3d 324, 328, 626 N.E.2d 329 (1993). According to the Village, absent a finding that the ordinance is invalid, Judge Flynn erred as a matter of law in finding that the creation of the barrier parcels was a \u201csham and subterfuge.\u201d In other words, a presumptively valid disconnection ordinance forecloses a factual finding that goes behind the passage of the disconnection ordinance to find the true intention of the ordinance. The Village argues that only upon a finding that the ordinance creating the barrier parcels is invalid, which Judge Flynn did not enter, can Austin Bank\u2019s petition be granted. We disagree. We find Village of Algonquin, as the principal authority for the Village\u2019s contention that Austin Bank was \u201crequired to prove \u2018by clear[,] affirmative [and admissible] evidence\u2019 that the Klehm Disconnection Ordinance \u2018constitutes arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable municipal action,\u2019 \u201d inapposite to the issue before us.\nVillage of Algonquin involved a direct challenge to the \u201cvalidity of a resolution adopted by defendant, the Village of Barrington Hills\u201d closing a road at Barrington Hills\u2019 municipal border with neighboring Algonquin. Village of Algonquin, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 326. As part of its legal efforts to challenge the Barrington Hills ordinance, Algonquin claimed the ordinance \u201cwas void ab initio because it was adopted for an improper purpose.\u201d Village of Algonquin, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 328. Algonquin acknowledged that Barrington Hills \u201chas the right, pursuant to statute, to regulate the use of its streets. [Citation.]\u201d Village of Algonquin, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 328. In the context of Barrington Hills\u2019 right to regulate the use of its streets, Algonquin also \u201crecognize [d] the well-established rule that a municipal enactment, adopted pursuant to statutory authority, is presumptively valid.\u201d Village of Algonquin, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 328. Ultimately, the Second District ruled that the ordinance was not void as \u201cadopted for purely private purposes.\u201d Village of Algonquin, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 329. We find Village of Algonquin offers no guidance to the issue before us, whether the six factors for disconnection under section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 were satisfied. See LaSalle National Bank v. Village of Burr Ridge, 81 Ill. App. 2d 209, 225 N.E.2d 33 (1967) (under section 7 \u2014 3\u20146, if the circuit court\u2019s finding that the requirements for disconnection have been met is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, disconnection follows). Either the factors are satisfied or they are not.\nAbsent direct authority, we reject the Village\u2019s implied argument that because the barrier parcels came into existence by way of an ordinance that allowed the disconnection of the 1997 boundary parcel (see 65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 3\u20144 (West 2006)), Austin Bank\u2019s petition seeking disconnection by judicial procedure is subject to factors different than those set forth in section 7 \u2014 3\u20146. We find no authority under the Municipal Code for the Village\u2019s implied claim that a disconnection petition in the context of this case should trigger a heightened scrutiny greater than that required under the express terms of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146. The relief sought by Austin Bank does not require that it challenge the Village\u2019s Klehm disconnection ordinance. That the ordinance is considered to be presumptively valid has no impact on whether the petition of Austin Bank satisfied the six factors of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146. Regardless of the outcome of Austin Bank\u2019s petition, the Village will retain jurisdiction over the barrier parcels, at least until it decides otherwise. We reject the Village\u2019s effort to conflate these separate issues.\nStandard of Review\nBecause this is a review of Judge Flynn\u2019s decision to grant a disconnection petition, the standard on review is whether Judge Flynn\u2019s finding that Austin Bank \u201cestablished the statutory requirements for disconnection *** is clearly contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d JLR Investments, Inc. v. Village of Barrington Hills, 355 Ill. App. 3d 661, 668, 828 N.E.2d 1193 (2005), citing City of De Kalb v. Town of Cortland, 233 Ill. App. 3d 307, 310, 599 N.E.2d 153 (1992).\nFactors for Disconnection\nUnder section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 of the Code, the owner of record of any area of land within an Illinois municipality may file a petition in circuit court to disconnect that property from the municipality\u2019s jurisdiction. 65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 3\u20146 (West 2006). To win disconnection, the petitioner must prove that the subject property satisfies six factors. 65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 3\u20146 (West 2006). Although a petitioner has the burden to prove that his property meets each of the statutory factors, \u201cthe disconnection statute is to be liberally construed in favor of disconnection.\u201d JLR, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 668, citing Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Barrington Hills, 133 Ill. 2d 146, 154-55, 549 N.E.2d 578 (1989). \u201cThe common theme is to allow disconnection absent a hardship or impairment to the municipality.\u201d JLR, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 668.\nIn its direct challenge to the judgment below, the Village contends that Judge Flynn\u2019s finding that the isolation factor does not defeat disconnection is in direct conflict with the literal language of factor (3) of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146: disconnection of the subject property \u201cwill not result in the isolation of any part of the [Village] from the remainder of the [Village].\u201d 65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 3\u20146 (West 2006). Austin Bank contends that the manifest weight of the evidence supports Judge Flynn\u2019s finding that the technical \u201cisolation came about through a sham transaction engineered by lawyers for the developer and the Village for the very purpose of preventing Petitioner from exercising its statutory rights.\u201d\nOur primary objective in interpreting section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 is to \u201cascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.\u201d People ex rel. Madigan v. Kinzer, 232 Ill. 2d 179, 184, 902 N.E.2d 667 (2009). \u201cThe best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language given its plain and ordinary meaning.\u201d Kinzer, 232 Ill. 2d at 184. However, reviewing courts should guard against a statutory interpretation that conflicts with the spirit of a statute. Where \u201ca literal interpretation of a particular clause would defeat the [legislature\u2019s] obvious intent,\u201d it does not control. Grever v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 353 Ill. App. 3d 263, 266-67, 818 N.E.2d 401 (2004), citing In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 312, 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002). Thus, reviewing courts should not literally apply a statute if the result is a \u201cgreat injustice that was not contemplated by the General Assembly.\u201d Grever, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 267, citing Robinson v. Meadows, 203 Ill. App. 3d 706, 710, 561 N.E.2d 111 (1990). Each case under section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 \u201cpresents its own problems, and the court can only adopt a common sense interpretation\u201d of the statute. Indian Valley Golf Club, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 135 Ill. App. 3d 543, 551, 481 N.E.2d 277 (1985).\nAlthough disconnection of the subject property would isolate the barrier parcels, we decline to begin and end our analysis with a literal interpretation of the isolation factor of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146. In the context of this case, we are compelled to examine whether such a literal application would reward blatant manipulation of the factor, as Austin Bank contends. We examine the circuit court\u2019s findings of fact to determine whether an injustice would occur should the disconnection be disallowed, where it appears the Village is unable to demonstrate any hardship or impairment. See Grever, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 266-67. In the context of this case, we consider whether the Village\u2019s actions, as found by Judge Flynn, in creating the barrier parcels unduly frustrated the legislative intent behind section 7 \u2014 3\u20146, favoring disconnection. See Indian Valley, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 550 (condemning a \u201cdeliberate attempt to preclude [a petitioner] from satisfying the [factors] of the disconnection statute\u201d); Village of Fox River Valley Gardens v. Lake County Forest Preserve District, 224 Ill. App. 3d 919, 934-35, 586 N.E.2d 813 (1992). Thus, we decline the Village\u2019s invitation to limit our analysis to a \u201cblack-and-white\u201d or literal interpretation of the statute. We agree with Judge Flynn that a liberal construction of the factors of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 favoring disconnection requires that we examine whether the Village\u2019s actions amounted to a deliberate frustration of the statute\u2019s intent.\nThe legislature intended section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 to liberally permit disconnection \u201cabsent a hardship or impairment to the municipality.\u201d JLR, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 668, citing Indian Valley, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 547. While courts have consistently applied this liberal interpretation of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146, \u201cthe legislature has not altered the liberal construction given the statute.\u201d Harris Trust, 133 Ill. 2d at 154. It is against the backdrop of this liberal construction that courts have warned against the use of \u201cmere subterfuge\u201d or a \u201clegal gimmick\u201d to frustrate the purpose of statutes concerning municipal borders. See Wild v. People ex rel. Stephens, 227 Ill. 556, 561, 81 N.E. 707 (1907); Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 935.\nJudge Flynn expressly found that \u201cthe purpose of the barrier parcels was to block disconnection of the [subject property].\u201d This purpose triggered a direct conflict with the legislature\u2019s intent favoring disconnection. The manifest weight of the record evidence supports Judge Flynn\u2019s finding and his ruling that the tension between the isolation of the barrier parcels and the intent favoring disconnection embodied in section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 should be resolved in favor of disconnection.\nSzkaltukski\u2019s memo indicated that even in its earliest discussions with Mesirow-Stein, the Village desired to retain jurisdiction over a portion of the 1997 boundary parcel sufficient in size to prevent disconnection of the subject property. Mesirow-Stein\u2019s attorney Novak reflected the Village\u2019s intent to frustrate future attempts at disconnection by referring to the barrier parcels as \u201clegal spite strips.\u201d The evidence demonstrates that the Village officials, Kosin and Kempe, knew that the barrier parcels were intended as a legal barrier to the disconnection of the subject property, as they explained in voicing their support for the disconnection ordinance. Kosin informed Train that the barrier parcels were intended to prevent the possible disconnection of the subject property prior to the public hearing on MesirowStein\u2019s disconnection petition.\nUnable to rebut the persuasiveness of the evidence as to the Village\u2019s motivation for passing the ordinance, the Village points to the water management benefits the Village would derive from the creation of the barrier parcels. The Village argues that Judge Flynn\u2019s finding that \u201cwater management was at best an after-the-fact rationalization\u201d is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.\nBoth Kempe and Kosin testified that they did not have engineers assess the significance of any storm water management of the barrier parcels prior to the enactment of the disconnection ordinance. Although the public hearing on Mesirow-Stein\u2019s disconnection petition focused primarily on water management, the public hearing was held after Train was told by Kosin of the barrier parcels\u2019 role as a means of protecting the Village\u2019s border.\nThe claimed value of the barrier parcels as aiding storm water management was a point of factual dispute before Judge Flynn. While Gudmundson, the Mesirow-Stein engineer, testified that the barrier parcels were intended to provide storm water retention ponds that would divert water through culverts under Route 59, he offered no opinion as to the efficacy of the water retention ponds in serving that purpose. Austin Bank\u2019s engineering expert Burke testified that only 12 acres of the approximately 600 in Mesirow-Stein\u2019s development drained to the barrier parcels. According to Burke, the barrier parcels had little or no role in managing storm water. It was well within Judge Flynn\u2019s role as finder of fact to find the Village\u2019s claimed need for the barrier parcels for storm water management as no more than an \u201cafter-the-fact\u201d rationale. See LaSalle National Bank, 81 Ill. App. 2d at 215-16 (it was for the trial court to resolve conflicting opinions presented by the parties\u2019 expert witnesses). Our review of the record finds Judge Flynn\u2019s characterization of this offered purpose for the barrier parcels consistent with the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe Village argues that even if carving out the barrier parcels from the disconnection of the 1997 boundary property was motivated by its desire to \u201cprotect its borders,\u201d protection of a municipality\u2019s border is a legitimate concern in accord with the spirit of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146. Whether border protection is a proper consideration under section 7 \u2014 3\u20146, our review of two cases, Indian Valley and Fox River, leads us to conclude that border protection may not occur by any means.\nIn Indian Valley, the Indian Valley Golf Club sought to disconnect property from the corporate limits of Long Grove. \u201c[N] early a year and a half after Indian Valley filed its original petition to disconnect,\u201d Long Grove annexed a lot on the northern border of Indian Valley\u2019s property. Indian Valley, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 548. To avoid isolating the annexed lot, Indian Valley filed an amended petition carving out a portion of the proposed land to be disconnected to avoid violating the isolation factor regarding the annexed lot. Indian Valley, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 548.\nOn review of the dismissal of the amended petition to disconnect, the appellate court reversed, concluding \u201cthat the proposed disconnection met the requisites of the statute.\u201d Indian Valley, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 551. The Indian Valley court rejected Long Grove\u2019s claim that the annexed lot was \u201cisolated\u201d within the meaning of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 \u201cbecause it is inaccessible to the village by road and, thus, incapable of being provided with police services by the village.\u201d Indian Valley, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 548. While the holding of the case turns on the annexed lot sharing a sufficient boundary with the carved out portion of the subject property not disconnected from Long Grove \u201cto establish contiguity,\u201d the appellate court found Long Grove\u2019s post-petition annexation of the lot was an \u201coffensive *** attempt to preclude Indian Valley from satisfying the [factors] of the disconnection statute.\u201d Indian Valley, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 550. \u201cGiving the statute the liberal construction the courts have advocated,\u201d the Indian Valley court found no isolation under section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 to preclude disconnection. Indian Valley, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 551.\nIn Fox River, the Lake County Forest Preserve District brought an eminent domain action to condemn property annexed by Fox River Valley Gardens; the annexation was agreed to by the private partnership that purchased the property. Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 921-22. The private partnership then donated to Fox River Valley Gardens a 20-foot-wide strip of land within the property the District sought to condemn, but lying \u201centirely within[ ] the bed of the river.\u201d Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 923. As its defense to the eminent domain action, Fox River argued that condemnation of this \u201cpublic property\u201d was prevented by statute. Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 922-23. The trial court dismissed the Forest Preserve District\u2019s eminent domain action. Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 924.\nOn review, the Fox River court found the record left \u201cno doubt that the 20-foot strip was conveyed to the Village for the immediate and specific purpose of blocking any attempt by the District to condemn the [condemnation property].\u201d Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 934. As evidence supporting this finding, the court quoted from correspondence from the attorney of the private partnership that conveyed the strip of land to the village, evidence much like the evidence before us in the instant appeal. \u201c \u2018The intent of the conveyances is to create an area of discontiguity between [the condemnation property] and existing or proposed publicly owned parks, forest preserves or conservation areas.\u2019 \u201d Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 934. At trial, the attorney for the private partnership made clear the motivation behind the conveyance: \u201c \u2018We\u2019re here to tell you that the purpose of the deeded 20 foot strip is to protect the municipal boundary from being invaded by the Forest Preserve in the event they somehow sought to achieve contiguity ***.\u2019 *** [T]he mayor of the Village testified to essentially the same reason for the Village\u2019s acceptance of the 20-foot strips.\u201d Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 934. The court found Fox River\u2019s goal to protect its borders through a \u201clegal gimmick\u201d was \u201crepugnant to the clear intent\u201d of the legislature. Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 934-35.\nThe Fox River court found fatal fault with the conveyance on two grounds. First, \u201cthe Village, which is a non-home-rule municipality, may acquire and hold title to real property only for a legitimate corporate purpose. [Citation.] As a general rule, when land is acquired by a municipality, the land itself must be put to use. Here, we can think of no way in which a 20-foot-wide strip of river bottom could serve a corporate purpose in the usual sense.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 934. Second, \u201cthe deed used to accomplish the donation was subject to what we perceive to be, at the very least, a questionable requirement for reconveyance at the Partnership\u2019s request.\u201d Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 936. Ultimately, the Fox River court concluded \u201cthat the conveyance was a sham [that] cannot be used to prevent the exercise of the District\u2019s power of eminent domain.\u201d Fox River, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 936.\nIn each case, the reviewing court rejected the efforts of each municipality to protect its border through legal gimmickry. In other words, border protection may not be accomplished by any means.\nLikewise here, the evidence amply supports Judge Flynn\u2019s finding that the Village\u2019s true purpose in retaining jurisdiction over the barrier parcels was to prevent disconnection of the subject property. The Village\u2019s manipulation of factor (3) of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 by creating \u201can island\u201d of the barrier parcels from the disconnection of the 1997 boundary parcel to preclude the satisfaction of the isolation factor by Austin Bank contravenes the intent of the legislature favoring disconnection. Indian Valley, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 550. Based on Judge Flynn\u2019s findings, we reject the Village\u2019s contention that it engaged in proper border protection.\nIn an effort to distinguish its actions from the actions of the municipalities in Fox River and Indian Valley, the Village argues it did not gain any new rights in the barrier parcels when the 1997 boundary parcel was disconnected; its actions did not restrict or deprive Austin Bank of any rights to the subject property. However, as Judge Flynn noted, it was the Village\u2019s retention of jurisdiction over the barrier parcels that provided a technical legal obstacle to the disconnection of the subject property. If the entire 1997 boundary parcel had been disconnected, the Village \u201cwould not otherwise have had\u201d a basis to complain.\nFurther, Fox River and Indian Valley make clear that actions by a municipality to protect its borders are subject to challenge when the actions constitute a sham or legal gimmick that stand in the way of giving deference to the legislature\u2019s intent favoring disconnection. That the Village acted in anticipation of Austin Bank\u2019s disconnection petition does not insulate its efforts from challenge. It is the improperly motivated actions that are offensive to the legislative intent. The Village\u2019s retention of the barrier parcels clearly frustrated section 7 \u2014 3\u20146\u2019s purpose to liberally permit disconnection. See JLR, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 668; Harris Trust, 133 Ill. 2d at 154. The Village retained the barrier parcels simply to create an artificial hardship, an action we will not condone.\nAs a last-ditch effort to have this court reverse Judge Flynn\u2019s considered findings, the Village contends that Judge Flynn improperly made additional findings on factors (4) and (6) in his ruling following trial, even though findings under section 2 \u2014 1005(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(d) (West 2006)) were made by Judge Flynn prior to trial.\nWe reject the Village\u2019s characterization of Judge Flynn\u2019s recitation of his findings during his ruling after trial on factors (4) and (6) as additional findings that went beyond what he stated in his summary judgment ruling. In its main brief, the Village contends that Judge Flynn erred by restating his finding as to factors (4) and (6) because he \u201cbarred the Village from presenting any evidence on these issues by granting summary judgment on these elements.\u201d We find no error in Judge Flynn\u2019s oral ruling that included mention of factors (4) and (6). Nor has the Village provided a single citation to authority for its claim of error. See Orzel v. Szewczyk, 391 Ill. App. 3d 283, 287, 908 N.E.2d 569 (2009) (\u201cA party\u2019s failure to cite supporting authority is a violation of Rule 341(e)(7) [now Rule 341(h)(7)], and we may consider those issues forfeited\u201d).\nBecause the manifest weight of the evidence supports Judge Flynn\u2019s findings that the isolation of the barrier parcels was the result of a legal gimmick by the Village to improperly defeat Austin Bank\u2019s disconnection petition and that all other factors under section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 were established to warrant disconnection of the subject property, we affirm Judge Flynn\u2019s order granting Austin Bank\u2019s petition on count I. Our holding reflects the Village\u2019s inability to demonstrate any \u201chardship or impairment\u201d as a result of the disconnection. JLR, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 668; see also Harris Trust, 133 Ill. 2d at 154.\nFinally, because we affirm Judge Flynn\u2019s ruling in favor of Austin Bank on count I, we do not consider the Village\u2019s contention of error in Judge Flynn\u2019s ruling in favor of Austin Bank on count II, providing for relief to Austin Bank in the alternative.\nCONCLUSION\nJudge Flynn\u2019s finding that Austin Bank\u2019s disconnection petition meets the factors of section 7 \u2014 3\u20146 was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Although disconnection of the subject property would result in the technical isolation of the barrier parcels, the Village\u2019s preemptive efforts to frustrate disconnection by retaining those parcels through legal gimmickery defeats its attempt to overturn Judge Flynn\u2019s decision. We affirm the circuit court\u2019s order granting count I of Austin Bank\u2019s petition to disconnect the subject property from the Village\u2019s jurisdiction. Because we grant relief pursuant to count I, we do not address the grant of alternative relief in count II of Austin Bank\u2019s petition.\nAffirmed.\nHALL, EJ., and EATTI, J., concur.\nWe adopt this term used by the parties at trial.\nOf course, there is no \u201cbenefit\u201d to the Village from the existence of the barrier parcels if the subject property is disconnected.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "George J. Lynch, Aaron H. Stanton, and Daniel S. Klapman, all of Burke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella, PC., of Chicago, for appellant.", "John B. Murphey, of Rosenthal, Murphey & Coblentz, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AUSTIN BANK OF CHICAGO, as Trustee under Trust No. 4261, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF BARRINGTON HILLS, Respondent-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201408\u20142315\nOpinion filed November 9, 2009.\nGeorge J. Lynch, Aaron H. Stanton, and Daniel S. Klapman, all of Burke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella, PC., of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn B. Murphey, of Rosenthal, Murphey & Coblentz, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 17, "last_page_order": 31 }