{ "id": 4292629, "name": "CHERYL A. HEIDEN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DNA DIAGNOSTICS CENTER, INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee (Northern Illinois Clinical Laboratory, Ltd., et al., Third-Party Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Heiden v. DNA Diagnostics Center, Inc.", "decision_date": "2009-11-09", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201407\u20140620", "first_page": "135", "last_page": "144", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 135" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034209 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 965", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4285259 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "968" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0965-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 883", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 253146 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0883-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265683 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81-82" }, { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 1102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3749435 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "hereinafter In re County Treasurer" }, { "page": "1109" }, { "page": "1109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/1102-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436734 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5424705 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "holding that a motion for clarification is not a proper postjudgment motion because it is not directed against the judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576586 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "a proper postjudgment motion within the meaning of Rule 303(a)(1) must be \"directed against the judgment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269407 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" }, { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269956 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/373/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275502 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442062 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26-27" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083882 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325", "parenthetical": "noting in dicta that, under Kingbrook, counsel could have \"avoid[ed] the jurisdictional hurdle\" by \"add[ing] a tag line to the motion to clarify requesting rehearing\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 1102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3749435 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1104-06" }, { "page": "1109" }, { "page": "1109" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/1102-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436734 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" }, { "page": "185-86" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "186" }, { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5424705 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576586 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461", "parenthetical": "\"even where a motion seeks to modify the judgment, it does not constitute a post-trial motion within the meaning of [Rule 303(a)(1)] unless it is 'directed against the judgment' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442062 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "single-sentence motion asking the court \" 'to reconsider its decision granting [summary] judgment in favor of the Defendants' \" qualified as a postjudgment motion" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0024-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 853, "char_count": 25478, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14438814772598713 }, "sha256": "5d505301dabd0116b56547b6b8c44493bd85edad343a7f4bc7735c0b84b9f786", "simhash": "1:e9abd466716cdd65", "word_count": 4188 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:39:01.503812+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHERYL A. HEIDEN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DNA DIAGNOSTICS CENTER, INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee (Northern Illinois Clinical Laboratory, Ltd., et al., Third-Party Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Cheryl A. Heiden and Amelia Heiden, appeal the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County, which granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, DNA Diagnostics Center, Inc. (the Center). We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\nFACTS\nOn February 24, 1999, Cheryl, on her own behalf and on behalf of her then-minor daughter, Amelia, filed a petition against Craig H. Ottinger, who is not a party to this appeal, to determine the existence of a father-child relationship pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Act) (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Cheryl claimed that Craig was the natural father of Amelia, and she asked the court to find that he was the natural father and to order him to pay a sum certain for Amelia\u2019s support. On October 4, 2000, the trial court entered an agreed order for the parties to submit to blood tests to be conducted by the Center. In 2001, the Center tested an unlabeled vial of blood, which it presumed was Craig\u2019s, and the results excluded Craig as the father. However, blood tests taken in 1987 had revealed that there was a 99.93% chance that Craig was the father. The trial court granted Craig\u2019s motion for summary judgment, declaring that he was not the biological father of Amelia. We reversed the order granting summary judgment to Craig and remanded the cause for further proceedings (Heiden v. Ottinger, No. 2 \u2014 02\u20141331 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)), finding, in part, that the 1987 blood test raised a material issue of fact regarding the reliability of the 2001 blood test. Heiden, slip op. at 10. We also observed that the failure to label Craig\u2019s blood vial raised questions regarding the reliability of the chain of custody with respect to the 2001 blood test. Heiden, slip op. at 11.\nThe present lawsuit arises out of the Center\u2019s agreement with Cheryl to perform the 2001 blood test. Third-party defendant, Northern Illinois Clinical Laboratory, Ltd. (NICL), drew blood from plaintiffs and Craig at different sites and mailed the samples to the Center in Ohio for testing. Plaintiffs sued the Center based on the failure to properly label the sample purported to be Craig\u2019s. Plaintiffs sued the Center under various legal theories, including breach of agreement. The Center filed a third-party complaint against NICL and Gemma Ledesma, seeking contribution and indemnity. The Center also moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs\u2019 complaint.\nOn April 13, 2007, the trial court entered a final and appealable order that granted the Center summary judgment on the claim in plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint. The order stated that it was a final and appealable order and that no just cause existed to delay its enforcement or appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). During the hearing, the court expressly stated that the Center\u2019s third-party complaint also was resolved, and NICL and Ledesma are not parties to this appeal.\nOn May 14, 2007, plaintiffs filed a \u201cMotion to Reconsider Court Order of April 13, 2007, and For Clarification of said Order.\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 motion requested that the court amend its April 13 order to expressly reflect that it also disposed of the Center\u2019s third-party complaint, although the trial court already had ruled on this precise issue during the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The substance of plaintiffs\u2019 motion did not request a rehearing or reconsideration regarding the summary judgment entered on behalf of the Center. In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs \u201crequested that [the trial court] enter an Order reconsidering its Order of April 13, 2007[,] and/or clarifying its said Order, reflecting [the trial court\u2019s] written disposition of the Third Party Complaint herein.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nAt the hearing on plaintiffs\u2019 motion, the trial court explained that the matter had been addressed at the hearing on April 13, and \u201csince it was a third party contribution action[,] it fell on its own because there was nothing independent, no independent cause of action that would stand alone against [NICL and Ledesma].\u201d\nIn response to the court\u2019s concern whether the motion was filed within 30 days of the order, plaintiffs\u2019 counsel stated that it had been and that it was \u201ca motion to clarify the order.\u201d The Center\u2019s counsel suggested that plaintiffs\u2019 motion was \u201ca motion to reconsider I guess.\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel responded, \u201cIt\u2019s a motion to clarify, Judge.\u201d The Center\u2019s counsel noted for the record that there was no argument in the motion that the trial court erred with respect to summary judgment; that the motion \u201cis complaining that there is no affirmative language in the order that disposed of the third party claim.\u201d The Center\u2019s counsel wondered if there were adequate grounds to bring a motion to reconsider. He commented that a motion for reconsideration of summary judgment should argue that there was an error made with respect to the ruling itself. The Center\u2019s counsel stated: \u201cThis ruling, I guess, it\u2019s titled a motion to reconsider, but it\u2019s asking for clarification.\u201d The trial court agreed that the motion was \u201cnot truly a motion to reconsider, *** calling it a clarifying [motion].\u201d On May 22, 2007, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion.\nOn June 20, 2007, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal. The Center moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely under Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1)) because the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the entry of the judgment. The Center argued that plaintiffs\u2019 motion requesting the court to enter an order \u201creconsidering its Order of April 13, 2007 and/or clarifying its said Order, reflecting this Honorable Court\u2019s written disposition of the Third Party Complaint\u201d was not a motion to reconsider but a motion to clarify, which did not qualify as a proper postjudgment motion that would toll the 30-day period to file an appeal, and that therefore this court was without jurisdiction. Plaintiffs responded that their motion met the parameters of section 2 \u2014 1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203(a) (West 2008)) and based on Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, 202 Ill. 2d 24 (2002), qualified as a proper postjudgment motion because the title of the motion included the word \u201creconsider\u201d and because the prayer for relief requested that the trial court enter an order reconsidering the April 13, 2007, order.\nWe granted the Center\u2019s motion, and the appeal was dismissed on November 21, 2007. Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal and the Center responded. Thereafter, we allowed the motion to reconsider and reinstated the appeal.\nANALYSIS\nBefore explaining why this appeal must be dismissed, we observe that, although we allowed the motion to reconsider and reinstated the appeal, we may reconsider the matter at any time before we dispose of the case. See First Bank v. Phillips, 379 Ill. App. 3d 186, 188 (2008).\nA timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional. In re Marriage of Sin-gel, 373 Ill. App. 3d 554, 556 (2007). Rule 303(a)(1) governs when a notice of appeal must be filed in a civil case. Under Rule 303(a)(1), a party generally must file an appeal no more than 30 days after the entry of the final order. Rule 303(a)(1) also provides that the timely filing of a motion directed against the judgment defers the running of the 30 days, and the deadline for filing a notice of appeal is then 30 days from the resolution of the last timely and proper postjudgment motion. 210 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1); In re Estate of Russell, 372 Ill. App. 3d 591, 594 (2007). Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on June 20, 2007, more than two months after the entry of the April 13, 2007, order, so their appeal could be timely only if they filed it within 30 days of the resolution of a timely and proper motion directed against the final judgment.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 appeal was untimely because they did not file a post-judgment motion that extended the time for filing their notice of appeal under Rule 303(a)(1). A postjudgment motion extends the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 303(a)(1) only when it seeks rehearing, retrial, modification or vacation of the judgment, or other similar relief. See Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1990) (a proper postjudgment motion within the meaning of Rule 303(a)(1) must be \u201cdirected against the judgment\u201d). After the trial court granted summary judgment to the Center, plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the trial court amend its order to expressly reflect that the order also disposed of the Center\u2019s third-party complaint. Plaintiffs\u2019 request was not for a modification of the judgment, as the trial court had already ruled on the issue. For purposes of Rule 303(a)(1), a motion for modification of the judgment must challenge the judgment, not simply request modification of the language of the judgment. See Russell, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 594; Giammanco v. Giammanco, 253 Ill. App. 3d 750, 755 (1993) (holding that a motion for clarification is not a proper postjudgment motion because it is not directed against the judgment). Plaintiffs\u2019 motion did not request a rehearing or substantive reconsideration regarding the summary judgment and did not provide any basis for reconsideration of the summary judgment. The request to modify the language of the order thus was not a request to modify the judgment, and it did not extend the time for appeal under Rule 303(a)(1). Plaintiffs\u2019 appeal was thus untimely, and we must dismiss it.\nIn response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs relied on King-brook and argued that their postjudgment motion was proper because the title and the prayer for relief indicated that plaintiffs sought both reconsideration and clarification of the judgment. In Kingbrook, the plaintiff filed a document titled \u201cMotion For Reconsideration.\u201d The body of that document read, in its entirety, as follows:\n\u201c \u2018N[ow comes] the plaintiff, K[ingbrook, Inc.], an Illinois corporation, by and through its attorneys, B[arrick], S[witzer], L[ong], B[alsley] & V[an Evera], and hereby moves the Court to reconsider its decision granting severing [sic] judgment in favor of the Defendants.\u2019 \u201d Kingbrook, 202 Ill. 2d at 26-27.\nThe issue there concerned the sufficiency of the motion and whether a postjudgment motion must present some detail or argument to toll the time to appeal. The supreme court found no basis for a specificity requirement in the plain language of the Code or the supreme court rules. Kingbrook, 202 Ill. 2d at 31. While specificity is not required, the present case \u201cpresents a step beyond Kingbrook,\u201d where plaintiffs presented a \u201cmotion with considerable detail.\u201d Muirfield Village-Vernon Hills, LLC v. K. Reinke, Jr. & Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d 178, 185 (2007).\nIn Muirfield, another case upon which plaintiffs rely, the substance of the plaintiffs\u2019 motion \u201cto reinstate\u201d and for \u201cleave to file an amended complaint\u201d sought only leave to file a fourth amended complaint. Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185. Ordinarily we would not find such a motion directed at the judgment for purposes of qualifying as a postjudgment motion. Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185. However, in addition to requesting leave to amend their complaint, the plaintiffs also specifically requested that the trial court reinstate their cause of action. Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185. We interpreted the request to reinstate their cause to be a request to modify or vacate the trial court\u2019s judgment of dismissal with prejudice, thus allowing the cause to continue. Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185. The plaintiffs sought to reinstate their cause so that they could file an amended complaint.\nIn both Kingbrook and Muirfield, the issue concerned the specificity of the motion and whether the filer was required to explain what he or she sought from the court and how and why the judgment should be modified. Here, the question is whether plaintiffs sought any modification of the judgment at all. Although the caption and the prayer for relief requested that the court enter an order \u201creconsidering its Order of April 13, 2007[,] and/or clarifying its said Order,\u201d we do not interpret the request to be directed against the judgment. Plaintiffs\u2019 motion did nothing more than request the court to reconsider its order to reflect the court\u2019s oral finding regarding the third-party complaint.\nTwo post-Kingbrook cases have addressed the precise issue presented in this case. In In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1102 (2005) (hereinafter In re County Treasurer), the petitioner\u2019s postjudgment motion to reconsider asked the trial court to reconsider and strike factual findings. The appellate court held that this postjudgment motion asked the court to reconsider two factual findings and did not challenge the trial court\u2019s judgment. In re County Treasurer, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1109. In Shutkas Electric, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 366 Ill. App. 3d 76, 81-82 (2006), the plaintiffs postjudgment motion was titled \u201c \u2018Motion to Modify Order Entered February 24, 2005[,] Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1205.\u2019 \u201d However, the relief requested in the body of the motion asked the trial court to add a party plaintiff and for leave to file a second amended complaint. The appellate court found that the motion did not qualify as a proper motion under section 2 \u2014 1203, because \u201c \u2018[t]he nature of a motion is determined by its substance rather than its caption.\u2019 \u201d Shutkas, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 81, quoting J.D. Marshall International, Inc. v. First National Bank of Chicago, 272 Ill. App. 3d 883, 888 (1995).\nThe dissent attempts to distinguish In re County Treasurer because the opinion paraphrased the motion as a motion to reconsider. The court stated, \u201cCraig\u2019s August 20, 2004, motion to reconsider asked the court to reconsider and strike two factual findings included in the court\u2019s August 13, 2004, order ***.\u201d In re County Treasurer, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1109. It is clear that the motion requested reconsideration, but the appellate court, in examining the substance of the motion, determined that the motion was not directed against the judgment.\nAs to Shutkas, the dissent contends that the appellate court could consult the body of the motion because it was captioned a motion to \u201cmodify\u201d as opposed to a motion to \u201creconsider.\u201d 396 Ill. App. 3d at 143. The dissent reasons that \u201c[a] request for \u2018modification,\u2019 without more, does not bring a motion within the ambit of Rule 303(a)(1).\u201d 396 Ill. App. 3d at 144. To toll the time for appeal, a postjudgment motion must request at least one of the forms of relief specified in section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 2008)), namely rehearing, retrial, modification, vacation, or other relief directed against the judgment. In re Marriage of Valkiunas, 389 Ill. App. 3d 965, 968 (2008), citing Vanderplow v. Krych, 332 Ill. App. 3d 51, 53 (2002). If the caption of a motion to reconsider controls over the substance of that motion, as the dissent maintains, it is difficult to discern why the substance of a motion to modify would control over its caption.\nAlthough the caption and the prayer for relief of the motion in this case request reconsideration, the substance of the motion asks only for clarification of the court\u2019s earlier ruling as it related to the third-party complaint.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is dismissed.\nAppeal dismissed.\nMcLAREN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" }, { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY,\ndissenting:\nI believe that, under Kingbrook and its application in Muirfield, plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cMotion to Reconsider Court Order of April 13, 2007, and For Clarification of said Order\u201d was a proper postjudgment motion for purposes of Rule 303(a)(1). In Muirfield, as here, the substance of the motion belied its caption and prayer for relief, but that did not change the character of the motion for purposes of Rule 303(a)(1).\nIn Muirfield, the motion was captioned a motion to reinstate the plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action and for leave to file an amended complaint. The prayer for relief likewise requested both leave to file an amended complaint and reinstatement of the plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action. We determined that a request to reinstate a cause of action is \u201cdirected against the judgment\u201d for purposes of Rule 303(a)(1). Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185. We also found it immaterial that the request was bare and undeveloped. We reasoned that, if (as Kingbrook held) a one-sentence motion requesting reconsideration of a judgment but specifying no grounds whatsoever qualifies as a postjudgment motion, then a similarly unadorned request for reinstatement of a cause of action also must qualify as a postjudgment motion. Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185-86. We noted that \u201csubstantively,\u201d however, the motion sought only leave to file an amended complaint. See Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185. This additional content, we concluded, did not disqualify the filing as a postjudgment motion:\n\u201c[I]t would be contrary to the supreme court\u2019s intent in Kingbrook to hold that a motion with no detail but requesting the appropriate relief is sufficient to toll the 30-day time period, while a motion with plenty of irrelevant detail requesting the same relief is insufficient to qualify as a postjudgment motion. We will not penalize plaintiffs for incorporating more than they needed to in the motion, where they have at least requested the appropriate relief specified in section 2 \u2014 1203(a) of the Code.\u201d Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 186.\nTo put it otherwise: Given that neither Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) nor section 2 \u2014 1203(a) of the Code imposes any content requirement, whatever content is added to a motion that contains an otherwise sufficiently phrased request for relief cannot detract from that motion\u2019s nature as a postjudgment motion.\nThe logic of Muirfield applies irresistibly here. Plaintiffs\u2019 motion was captioned a motion to \u201creconsider\u201d and for \u201cclarification,\u201d and the prayer for relief likewise sought \u201creconsider[ation] *** and/or clarif[ication].\u201d The request for reconsideration, like the request for reinstatement in Muirfield, was sufficiently directed against the judgment. See Kingbrook, 202 Ill. 2d at 27 (single-sentence motion asking the court \u201c \u2018to reconsider its decision granting [summary] judgment in favor of the Defendants\u2019 \u201d qualified as a postjudgment motion). Here, as in Muirfield, there was additional content in which the relief sought \u2014 clarification\u2014was not directed against the judgment. See Giammanco, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 755. No more here than in Muirfield, however, could such additional content lift the motion out of the scope of Rule 303(a)(1).\nThe majority unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish Muirfield. The majority suggests that, in both Kingbrook and Muirfield, \u201cthe issue concerned the specificity of the motion and whether the filer was required to explain what he or she sought from the court and how and why the judgment should be modified.\u201d 396 Ill. App. 3d at 139-40. \u201cHere,\u201d the majority remarks, \u201cthe question is whether plaintiffs sought any modification of the judgment at all.\u201d 396 Ill. App. 3d at 140. I do not see the distinction. The central question in Muirfield was not whether the request for clarification failed for want of specificity but whether the additional content in the motion disqualified it as a postjudgment motion. Hence our comment that the case presented \u201ca step beyond Kingbrook.\u201d Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185. As for the question of \u201cwhether plaintiffs sought any modification of the judgment at all,\u201d the majority overlooks Muirfield\u2019s logic and lets the body of plaintiffs\u2019 motion override the prayer for relief, which, because it seeks \u201creconsider[ation]\u201d as an alternative to \u201cclarifi[cation],\u201d brings this case squarely under Kingbrook.\nThis conclusion is not undermined by either In re County Treasurer or Shutkas. In In re County Treasurer, the petitioner, Craig, was issued a tax deed for the respondent\u2019s, Brown\u2019s, property. Brown moved to vacate the tax deed and to have certain provisions of the property tax code declared unconstitutional. Craig filed a response to the motion to vacate and also moved for summary judgment on the constitutional issue. The trial court granted Craig\u2019s motion. In re County Treasurer, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1104-06. Craig thereafter filed a motion whose only description in the disposition was as follows:\n\u201cCraig\u2019s August 20, 2004, motion to reconsider asked the trial court to reconsider and strike two factual findings included in the court\u2019s August 13, 2004, order \u2014 namely, that (1) the \u2018verified motion to vacate the tax deed establishes [Brown\u2019s] equitable ownership of the subject premises\u2019 and (2) \u2018[Brown] attempted to redeem the property but was prevented from doing so.\u2019 \u201d In re County Treasurer, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1109.\nThe court concluded that \u201cCraig\u2019s August 20, 2004, motion did not challenge the trial court\u2019s judgment.\u201d In re County Treasurer, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1109.\nIn re County Treasurer presents interpretive problems because the motion is only paraphrased in the decision. I assume the interpretation that renders the case consistent with Kingbrook. That is, I assume that the difference in those cases\u2019 outcomes lies in whether and how the plea for reconsideration in each case was tempered. In King-brook, the plea for reconsideration was general and unspecified. In In re County Treasurer, as I interpret it, there never was a plea for \u201creconsideration\u201d that was distinguishable from a request for striking certain factual findings that were nonessential to the judgment. Indeed, given that Craig was the prevailing party, he hardly would have been expected to make a more substantive attack on the judgment.\nIn contrast, it was the nonprevailing party in this case who made the motion, as in Kingbrook. Moreover, the \u201creconsideration\u201d sought was not clearly identical to the \u201cclarification\u201d sought. Rather, the \u201creconsideration\u201d and \u201cclarification\u201d were pleaded alternatively in the prayer for relief.\nShutkas also is distinguishable. The motion (brought by the non-prevailing party) in Shutkas was captioned a motion to \u201c \u2018[mjodify\u2019 \u201d and the appellate court consulted the \u201cbody\u201d of the motion for further clues as to its substance, ultimately concluding that the motion sought leave to add a party plaintiff and file a second amended complaint, neither of which requests amounted to relief directed against the judgment. Shutkas, 366 111. App. 3d at 81. The court\u2019s further inquiry was justified. A request for \u201cmodification,\u201d without more, does not bring a motion within the ambit of Rule 303(a)(1). See Giammanco, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 755, quoting Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 461 (\u201ceven where a motion seeks to modify the judgment, it does not constitute a post-trial motion within the meaning of [Rule 303(a)(1)] unless it is \u2018directed against the judgment\u2019 \u201d). In Shutkas, as in In re County Treasurer, the appellate court only paraphrased the \u201cbody\u201d of the motion. I presume that the motion in Shutkas never used the word \u201creconsider,\u201d \u201creconsideration,\u201d or like language, otherwise the court would have had to examine whether that request for reconsideration had any immediate qualification, as I presume the request in In re County Treasurer had. In In re County Treasurer (at least, on the reading I believe is consistent with Kingbrook), the request for reconsideration was never presented but as a request for the striking of certain factual findings. Here, by contrast, the motion in at least one place suggested that the reconsideration sought was not identical to the clarification sought.\nThe majority believes that Kingbrook and Muirfield allow a court to take the full measure of a motion in order to test whether it really is, as it states, a motion to \u201creconsider\u201d or for \u201creconsideration.\u201d In fact, Kingbrook and Muirfield together hold that, where a motion requests \u201creconsideration\u201d and such request is not immediately qualified, as in In re County Treasurer, in such a way that it is obvious that the request is actually for relief (such as clarification) that is not against the judgment, then whatever additional substance the motion contains cannot lift it out of the scope of Rule 303(a)(1). See R&G, Inc. v. Midwest Region Foundation for Fair Contracting, Inc., 351 Ill. App. 3d 318, 325 (2004) (noting in dicta that, under Kingbrook, counsel could have \u201cavoid[ed] the jurisdictional hurdle\u201d by \u201cadd[ing] a tag line to the motion to clarify requesting rehearing\u201d). The motion at hand contained a request for \u201creconsideration\u201d that was not obviously tantamount to \u201cclarification,\u201d and so, under Kingbrook and Muirfield, the motion was a postjudgment motion per Rule 303(a)(1).", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY," } ], "attorneys": [ "W Randal Baudin, of Baudin & Baudin, of West Dundee, for appellants.", "Jeffrey Singer, Paul E. Wojcicki, and Chad J. Layton, all of Segal, McCambridge, Singer & Mahoney, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee DNA Diagnostics Center, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHERYL A. HEIDEN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DNA DIAGNOSTICS CENTER, INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee (Northern Illinois Clinical Laboratory, Ltd., et al., Third-Party Defendants).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201407\u20140620\nOpinion filed November 9, 2009.\nO\u2019MALLEY, J., dissenting.\nW Randal Baudin, of Baudin & Baudin, of West Dundee, for appellants.\nJeffrey Singer, Paul E. Wojcicki, and Chad J. Layton, all of Segal, McCambridge, Singer & Mahoney, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee DNA Diagnostics Center, Inc." }, "file_name": "0135-01", "first_page_order": 151, "last_page_order": 160 }