{ "id": 4291910, "name": "THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CANDY PORTER, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant (The Civil Service Commission et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "Department of Human Services v. Porter", "decision_date": "2009-12-23", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201408\u20140894", "first_page": "701", "last_page": "729", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 701" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "888 F. Supp. 901", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 576515 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "906", "parenthetical": "issue was not whether the employee's past conduct violated public policy but whether reinstatement of the employee violated public policy" }, { "page": "908-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/888/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "883 N.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "\"deference is accorded because the parties have chosen by contractual agreement how their dispute is to be decided, and judicial modification of an arbitrator's decision deprives the parties of their choice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 1078", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274832 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1081", "parenthetical": "\"deference is accorded because the parties have chosen by contractual agreement how their dispute is to be decided, and judicial modification of an arbitrator's decision deprives the parties of their choice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/1078-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 N.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "a court cannot enforce an arbitrator's award that violates public policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147633 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318", "parenthetical": "a court cannot enforce an arbitrator's award that violates public policy" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "699 N.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "166" }, { "page": "166" }, { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "also rejecting the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement that \"one incident of striking, that causes no apparent injury, does not amount to 'resident abuse' \"" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073618 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" }, { "page": "637" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "639" }, { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753", "parenthetical": "policy stating that an employee found guilty of mistreatment \" 'will be subject to discharge' \" was not the equivalent of \"will!shall be discharged\" (emphases in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578675 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "policy stating that an employee found guilty of mistreatment \" 'will be subject to discharge' \" was not the equivalent of \"will!shall be discharged\" (emphases in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 N.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429312 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862" }, { "page": "862" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333110 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" }, { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 N.E.2d 1257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1262", "parenthetical": "\"the appellate court may reverse an administrative ruling only if there is error which prejudiced a party in the proceeding\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 988", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2959905 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993", "parenthetical": "\"the appellate court may reverse an administrative ruling only if there is error which prejudiced a party in the proceeding\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0988-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475", "parenthetical": "the court \"should limit its inquiry to ascertaining whether the findings and decision of the agency are against the manifest weight of the evidence\"" }, { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577987 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "the court \"should limit its inquiry to ascertaining whether the findings and decision of the agency are against the manifest weight of the evidence\"" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "847 N.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264387 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 N.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762", "parenthetical": "finding the administrative agency properly applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in case involving charges that the police officer violated department rules, which conduct also constituted a crime" }, { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260327 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170", "parenthetical": "finding the administrative agency properly applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in case involving charges that the police officer violated department rules, which conduct also constituted a crime" }, { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" }, { "page": "267", "parenthetical": "something more than conflicting testimony is necessary to find an administrative agency's credibility findings erroneous" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 997", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3000212 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1000" }, { "page": "1004" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0997-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 984", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "991" }, { "page": "992" }, { "page": "992" }, { "page": "992" }, { "page": "992", "parenthetical": "noting that a separate hearing is provided for a teacher prior to suspension or revocation of his or her teaching certificate" }, { "page": "992" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "993" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173273 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "190-91" }, { "page": "192-93" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192-93" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889", "parenthetical": "finding the plaintiff forfeited the argument that the ALJ applied the wrong standard of proof by failing to raise the issue before the ALJ or the Board" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587661 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286-87", "parenthetical": "finding the plaintiff forfeited the argument that the ALJ applied the wrong standard of proof by failing to raise the issue before the ALJ or the Board" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "903 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284085 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/388/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1119", "parenthetical": "due process requires that charges in an administrative decision need only advise the respondent of the charges so that she can prepare a defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738801 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "due process requires that charges in an administrative decision need only advise the respondent of the charges so that she can prepare a defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "908 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "providing that where a party fails to cite supporting authority, the issues may be considered forfeited" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4285711 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "providing that where a party fails to cite supporting authority, the issues may be considered forfeited" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "867 N.E.2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" }, { "page": "41-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268765 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851-52" }, { "page": "850" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" }, { "page": "887" }, { "page": "887" }, { "page": "886-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469434 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "550-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" }, { "page": "544" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3529472 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" }, { "page": "39" }, { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623607 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" }, { "page": "272-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "861 N.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "appellate court reviews the decision of the administrative agency, not the circuit court" }, { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267775 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "appellate court reviews the decision of the administrative agency, not the circuit court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he summons issued to the Commission upon the written request of the instant claimant brought before the circuit court the employer's objections to the Commission's award\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2513023 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" }, { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 N.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722", "parenthetical": "rejecting the argument that the plaintiff forfeited the issue of whether the remand procedure was proper by not objecting in the trial court; the appellate court could review all questions of law and fact presented by the record" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2718364 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860-61", "parenthetical": "rejecting the argument that the plaintiff forfeited the issue of whether the remand procedure was proper by not objecting in the trial court; the appellate court could review all questions of law and fact presented by the record" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 952", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "956" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3595069 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.E.2d 1159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1164", "parenthetical": "addressing the trial court's finding of neglect of duty where it appears the employee only challenged his demotion and suspension; appellate court noted that the review of an administrative decision extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the record" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35392 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482", "parenthetical": "addressing the trial court's finding of neglect of duty where it appears the employee only challenged his demotion and suspension; appellate court noted that the review of an administrative decision extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the record" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "860 N.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474", "parenthetical": "affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint for administrative review for failure to name the Board" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266775 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40", "parenthetical": "affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint for administrative review for failure to name the Board" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. Reg. 12451", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "weight": 8, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1870, "char_count": 67962, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.34683045227733356 }, "sha256": "1a8407d0035dc0cbc63f5dba125932a28eeb86a78e304825fdc161c387ab0a71", "simhash": "1:aca7903e376389dc", "word_count": 10923 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:39:01.503812+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CANDY PORTER, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant (The Civil Service Commission et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Illinois Department of Human Services (Department) appeals the decision of the Illinois Civil Service Commission (Commission), Chris Kolker, Raymond Ewell, Barbara J. Peterson, Ares G. Daliaois, and Betty Bukraba, to suspend Candy Porter in lieu of discharge. Porter cross-appeals, arguing (1) the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by Porter in her counterclaim for administrative review and (2) the Commission\u2019s finding that Porter committed abuse was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nFor 18 years, Porter worked as a mental-health technician II at Murray Developmental Center (Center) in Centralia, Illinois. The Center is operated by the Department.\nPorter worked in Fir Cottage, which housed very low functioning, developmentally disabled adults, most of whom were nonverbal. Porter\u2019s responsibilities included feeding and bathing the residents.\nIn September 2006, a coworker, Sandra Coats, accused Porter of two separate incidents of abuse against residents of Fir Cottage: (1) squeezing the hands of three residents to force them to eat and (2) hitting a resident on the back of the head and yelling \u201cstop that rocking.\u201d\nA. The Charges Against Porter\nThe office of Inspector General (OIG) investigated the allegations against Porter. In December 2006, OIG filed a report on each incident, finding both allegations of abuse substantiated. On January 11, 2007, a predisciplinary hearing was held.\nOn February 8, 2007, the Illinois Department of Central Management Services (CMS) sent Porter the Department\u2019s two written charges of recipient abuse and notified her that the Department was seeking her discharge. The statement of charges alleged as follows:\n\u201cCHARGE [No.] 1:\nRECIPIENT ABUSE, in that during the week prior to September 1, 2006, Ms. Candy Porter, [m]ental [h]ealth [technician II at the Murray Developmental Center, working first shift on Fir Cottage, B1 unit, was seen to be \u2018squeezing\u2019 the hands of D.B., J.S., and S.G. in an effort to force these individuals to eat their meals.\nCHARGE [No.] 2:\nRECIPIENT ABUSE, in that on or about September 1, 2006, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Ms. Candy Porter, [m]ental [h]ealth [t]echnician II at the Murray Developmental Center, while working first shift on Fir Cottage, B1 unit, used her left hand to hit individual [J.D.] in [sic] the back of the head and yelled \u2018stop that rocking.\u2019 \u201d\nTestimony at the March 2007 hearing established that charge No. 2 contained a typographical error that identified the resident as S.D. when in fact the resident was J.D. Porter affirmed at the hearing that she knew the allegation was that she struck J.D.\nThe charges alleged that Porter violated the following rules, regulations, policies, and procedures: (1) the Department\u2019s employee handbook, indicating that violation of any Department policy or regulation could result in disciplinary action up to and including discharge; (2) the Department\u2019s administrative directive No. 01.02.03.040, providing that an employee who fails to comply with Department rules will be subject to discipline up to and including discharge; (3) the Center\u2019s standard operating policy and procedure No. 320, prohibiting the mistreatment of mentally ill or developmentally disabled individuals and providing that an employee found guilty of mistreatment will be subject to discharge; (4) the Center\u2019s standard operating policy and procedure No. 11.1, defining abuse and requiring the reporting of abuse; (5) the Department\u2019s program directive No. 02.01.06.010, providing that it is a violation of Department policy to abuse an individual and that any employee who abuses an individual is subject to discipline, up to and including discharge; and (6) the Department\u2019s policy and procedure directive No. 01.05.06.08, providing that an employee who abuses a recipient may be subject to discipline, up to and including discharge. Porter requested a hearing with the Commission.\nB. Evidence Presented at the Hearing\nAt the March 7, 2007, hearing, the Department presented six witnesses: Porter (called as an adverse witness); Bradley Davis, the OIG investigator; Coats; coworker Stacy Bryant; Connie Eversgerd, the Center\u2019s labor-relations administrator; and Jamie Veach, the Center\u2019s director. Porter testified on her own behalf and also called Eversgerd and Veach.\nCoats testified she had known Porter for over 20 years, having worked with her at the Center as well as a previous nursing home. Coats and Porter got along well and had no problems. Porter also testified that she and Coats had a positive working relationship. Porter referred to Coats as \u201cgrandma\u201d or \u201cG-ma.\u201d\nCoats testified that around September 1, 2006, she returned to the living room of the unit a few minutes early after her lunch break. Other residents were in the living room, but no other staff members were present. Coats saw Porter sitting on a couch next to J.D. with her arm around him.\nPorter testified that J.D. often rocked back and forth. Workers were directed to prompt him to stop rocking because the rocking sometimes caused J.D. to vomit. Coats testified that on other occasions, Porter had told her, matter of factly, that it aggravated her (Porter) when J.D. rocked.\nCoats testified that as she entered the room, she saw Porter slap J.D. on the back of the head and heard Porter tell J.D. to \u201cstop that rocking.\u201d When asked about J.D.\u2019s reaction to the slap, Coats testified, he \u201csnapped forward and came back.\u201d Coats agreed it would take a significant amount of force to knock J.D. forward, but J.D. did not make a sound. The slap itself did not make a sound either. However, Coats testified the room was \u201csomewhat noisy.\u201d\nAfter seeing Porter hit J.D., Coats told Porter, \u201cLeave that boy alone.\u201d Porter stood up and said she was leaving for lunch.\nShortly after the incident, Coats told coworker Bryant what happened and asked Bryant if she had heard anything. Coats could not remember what Bryant told her. However, on September 7, 2006, Coats told OIG Investigator Davis that Coats thought Bryant had heard Coats say \u201cLeave that boy alone.\u201d As of the date of the hearing, Coats was no longer sure whether Bryant heard anything.\nAccording to Coats, Bryant told the cottage director, Debbie Dunnavan, what happened. The first time Coats talked to any supervisor about the incident was September 7, 2006.\nWhen asked whether she had ever seen Porter act inappropriately toward other residents, Coats testified that she witnessed Porter squeeze the hands of three residents, D.B., J.S., and S.G., while feeding them. Coats believed it occurred about a week before the J.D. incident, which occurred around September 1, 2006. Coats could not recall at which meal it occurred (although Investigator Davis testified that Coats told him it occurred during breakfast).\nCoats testified that she saw Porter feeding D.B. Coats was approximately 10 feet away at another table. Nothing obstructed her view. Coats saw Porter squeezing D.B.\u2019s fingers. D.B. pulled back, straightened his legs, and grimaced. Coats asked Porter \u201cif she wasn\u2019t squeezing that boy\u2019s hand too tight.\u201d Porter said \u201cshe didn\u2019t think so.\u201d That same day, during the same meal, Coats also saw Porter squeezing J.S.\u2019s and S.G.\u2019s hands too tightly. J.S. and S.G. also appeared to pull back. J.S. yelled out. Coats testified J.S. did sometimes yell out, although it was not common for J.S. to react in that manner during feeding. Other staff members were present in the room when Porter squeezed the hands. No other coworker claimed to have seen Porter squeeze residents\u2019 hands. (The written statements of four coworkers interviewed by Investigator Davis were admitted by agreement of the parties. Those documents reflect that the four coworkers reported they had never witnessed Porter squeeze the hands of residents.)\nCoats did not say anything to Porter about Porter squeezing J.S.\u2019s and S.G.\u2019s hands. Coats testified she should have reported the hand squeezing but did not. The first time Coats reported the hand squeezing to a supervisor was when she was \u201ccalled on the carpet\u201d for not reporting the September 1, 2006, incident regarding J.D. When asked why she waited to report the hand squeezing, Coats said she was not sure. When asked why she disclosed the information at all, Coats testified the information needed to be turned in, and she was there to protect the residents. However, Porter was her friend, and Coats was sad that Porter was discharged. Coats testified she received a written reprimand for failing to report the alleged abuse of J.D., D.B., J.S., and S.G. (Eversgerd, however, testified Coats received an oral reprimand.)\nBryant, a mental-health technician II, testified only regarding certain uncharged conduct that the administrative law judge (ALJ) admitted over objection on the ground that it was admissible only for the purpose of impeaching Porter\u2019s credibility. Bryant testified the incident occurred at the evening meal on approximately September 1, 2006, although she did not believe it occurred on the same day as the incident regarding J.D. Bryant observed Porter squeeze S.G.\u2019s hand while feeding her. Bryant told coworker Cathy McCown but did not report it to her supervisor, although she knew she was required to report it. Bryant testified she received a written reprimand for failing to report the incident. (Eversgerd, however, testified Bryant received an oral reprimand.)\nPorter testified that she had worked at the Center from February 1988 through the fall of 2006. She knew that physical abuse of a resident was absolutely prohibited. Porter agreed that squeezing hands or striking a resident on the back of the head constituted physical abuse, but she denied having done so. Porter denied slapping J.D. Porter testified that it was not difficult to get J.D. to stop rocking and that slapping him on the head might cause him stress and induce him to vomit. Moreover, Porter testified the couch where the incident allegedly occurred was in full view of the nurse\u2019s aide station. However, she did not recall if anyone was at the nurse\u2019s aide station at the time.\nPorter also denied squeezing any of the residents\u2019 hands. Porter testified that she would face no adverse consequences if the residents did not eat and agitating them or causing them pain would not cause them to eat. In addition, D.B. and S.G. had feeding tubes and could be fed that way if they did not eat or drink enough. Moreover, Porter did not recall Coats saying something to her about holding a resident\u2019s hand too tightly.\nAccording to Porter, it was not uncommon to gently hold a resident\u2019s hand while feeding. She did not recall, however, whether she told Investigator Davis that she never held the residents\u2019 hands while feeding them. The following exchange between Porter and the assistant Attorney General occurred regarding Porter\u2019s handwritten statement to Investigator Davis:\n\u201cQ. Okay. I\u2019m going to refer you to what is A-4, page three of three on your report. It was asked to [sic] you, \u2018have you ever held their hands while feeding?\u2019 Could you tell me what your response is there?\nA. \u2018No.\u2019\nQ. Okay. And it\u2019s my understanding that you just testified that you do hold their hands while you\u2019re feeding?\nA. Well, just like holding like this, but I\u2019m not like talking like holding a grip, no.\nQ. Okay. And I believe you were also asked here if you squeezed their hands, and you reported no; right?\nA. Yeah, I don\u2019t squeeze hands, no.\nQ. Okay. And then you were actually asked if all you do is ever hold their hands while feeding, and your response to that question was [\u2018]no[\u2019]. It wasn\u2019t [\u2018]sometimes.[\u2019] It wasn\u2019t [\u2018]maybe[\u2019]. It wasn\u2019t [\u2018]I don\u2019t recall.[\u2019] It was [\u2018]no[\u2019]; is that correct?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nPorter\u2019s written statement to Investigator Davis provided, in part, as follows:\n\u201c[S.G.] on a good day, feeds herself, you might have to help to finish up her meal. When you have to help, she will usually hold her head up & if not I will put *** a couple of my fingers under her chin to help hold it up.\n[D.B.] I have no problem with him, if he knows it is me feeding him, he will hold his head up the entire time [and] laugh at me.\n[J.S.] is fed. If he will not hold his head up I will also put [two] fingers under his chin to help hold his head up.\n[Q.] When is it necessary to hold a person that we serve\u2019s [sic] hand during feeding a meal?\n[A.] Never that I know of!\n[Q.] Have you squeezed the hands of Mr. S[.] while feeding?\n[A.] No \u2014 it would make him mad \u2014 then he would not eat.\n[Q.] Did you squeeze Ms. G[.\u2019s] hand to get her to eat?\n[A.] No \u2014 she feeds herself for the most part.\n[Q.] Did you squeeze Mr. B[.\u2019s] hand while feeding him?\n[A.] No \u2014 he always eats good for me.\n[Q.] When you are feeding the people we serve, where are your hands?\n[A.] My left one has the spoon [and] my right is either holding the plate or two fingers under their chin if necessary.\n[Q.] Have you ever held their hands while feeding?\n[A.] No.\n[Q.] Is there a reason that you aware of why anyone would allege that you squeeze their hands to get them to eat?\n[A.] Not to my knowledge.\u201d\nDavis, the OIG investigator, testified that he investigated the two separate allegations of abuse against Porter. In both cases, Davis found the allegations substantiated. Davis testified that when he interviewed Porter, she was not cooperative. However, Porter denied in writing and orally that she abused any residents.\nDavis was unable to establish a date for the hand-squeezing incident but found the incident occurred approximately one week prior to September 1, 2006, at the breakfast meal. Davis testified that no one corroborated Coats\u2019 testimony.\nThe ALJ admitted the OIG reports \u201cto the extent that the[ ] documents were relied upon by [the Department] in making the decision to discharge Porter.\u201d In addition, Porter\u2019s statement to Investigator Davis about the hand-squeezing incident was also admitted as a statement inconsistent with Porter\u2019s testimony at the hearing.\nSeveral individuals testified about the appetite logs. An appetite log is a document that contains a list of the residents\u2019 names, a place to mark how much each resident ate or drank, and a place for the initials of the \u201cmonitor.\u201d Porter\u2019s initials did not appear next to the name of D.B., J.S., or S.G. on any of the breakfast appetite logs for August 23, 24, 25, 26, or 27.\nVeach, the Center director, and Eversgerd, the labor-relations administrator, both testified that the appetite logs were supposed to be accurate and, if they became aware of inaccuracies, the inaccuracies would be investigated. However, Coats testified that the purpose of the appetite logs was to keep track of how much the residents ate and drank at meals. Although the person that fed a particular resident was supposed to initial the appetite log, that did not always happen. Coats testified that sometimes the appetite log did not get filled out or someone else asked how the resident ate and signed off on the appetite log. Coats had also observed occasions when one person fed a resident and his or her initials did not appear on the appetite log. However, if an individual does initial the sheet, that means he or she at least had some role in feeding the resident. Coats did not recall whether anyone other than Porter fed D.B., J.S., and S.G. the day she saw Porter squeezing their hands. However, when asked whether, to the best of her knowledge, Porter was the only one who fed D.B., J.S., and S.G. on the day in question, Coats responded, \u201cyes.\u201d According to Coats, Porter should have initialed the appetite logs that day. When asked if it was a violation for Porter to have fed the individuals and not put her initials, Coats said it was, but that \u201c[i]t happens all the time.\u201d\nInvestigator Davis testified that he was familiar with appetite logs. Davis testified that the appetite logs were supposed to be completed accurately and complete but that was not always the case. The initials were not always accurate because one person may start to feed a resident and another staff member may step in. Moreover, Davis testified that the purpose of the appetite logs was to monitor food intake, not track who fed each resident. He used the appetite logs only to identify witnesses.\nPorter testified that the appetite logs should contain the initials of the person who fed the resident. If more than one person feeds a resident, both initials should be listed, but that does not always occur. Porter testified the appetite logs did not show her feeding D.B., J.S., or S.G. breakfast any of the days between August 23 and August 27, 2006. The Department tendered, but the ALJ ultimately refused to consider, one appetite log for lunch and one appetite log for dinner the week prior to September 1, 2006.\nVeach, the Center director, testified he was the final decision maker. He reviewed the OIG reports but did not take that information into consideration when determining whether Porter should be discharged. Veach explained that if the report \u201cstates it\u2019s a substantiated case of abuse, it\u2019s automatic discharge.\u201d This was based on Department of Human Services Secretary Carol Adams\u2019 unwritten zero-tolerance policy.\nVeach also testified that a medical examination is required after an allegation of abuse is made. Over a hearsay objection, Veach testified that he had reviewed a report from a doctor who examined the residents. The report indicated one resident \u2014 Veach believed it was D.B., but he was not sure \u2014 required a follow-up for a nondisplaced fracture on the left hand, fourth metacarpal. By the time the specialist saw the resident, the specialist could not determine the date the injury occurred because the injury had already begun to heal.\nEversgerd testified she was familiar with Porter\u2019s personnel file. Porter only had one prior disciplinary action relating to \u201csome sick time usage many years ago.\u201d Porter had good evaluations. Eversgerd also came across language in Porter\u2019s personal file characterizing her as a caring employee. Porter had no prior reports of abuse or neglect. However, because of the substantiated allegation of abuse, termination was automatic. When asked the license ramifications for an employee who abused a resident, Eversgerd testified that the employee\u2019s name will be placed on the \u201c[Nurse] Aide Registry,\u201d which prevents an employee from working around residents cared for through the State.\nDue to the employees\u2019 failures to report the suspected abuse by Porter, the Department of Public Health placed the Center on \u201cimmediate jeopardy,\u201d the second highest level of discipline a facility can receive short of decertification. An \u201cimmediate jeopardy\u201d required a 10-day action plan be submitted to the Department of Public Health, which is then reviewed by CMS. In response to the \u201cimmediate jeopardy,\u201d Veach implemented a policy increasing the punishment for a failure to report from progressive discipline (oral warning, written reprimand, et cetera) to a 10-day suspension for a first violation, 20-day suspension for a second violation, and discharge for a third violation.\nC. The ALJ\u2019s Recommended Decision\nOn July 19, 2007, the ALJ entered a recommended decision that the written charges for discharge be found proved and that \u201csound public opinion recognized the prove[d] charges as good cause for *** Porter to no longer hold the position of [m]ental[-h]ealth [technician II.\u201d The ALJ found that the matter came down to the credibility of two witnesses and that Coats was more credible than Porter. The ALJ noted that Coats and Porter got along professionally and personally, and Coats did not have a bias against Porter or a motive to testify falsely. Coats\u2019 testimony that she witnessed Porter slap J.D. and squeeze the hands of D.B., J.S., and S.G. was credible. The ALJ found \u201cnothing in [Coats\u2019] tone, demeanor[,] or in the content of her testimony to indicate that Coats was lying, mistaken[,] or testifying falsely against Porter.\u201d\nThe ALJ further found that Porter received good work evaluations, had no previous discipline, and appeared to care about the residents she served. However, the ALJ found Porter was not credible:\n\u201cAgain, Porter flat out denied the charges. Porter did not state that she might have squeezed the residents\u2019 hands, or touched J.D.\u2019s head, simply to get the residents\u2019 attention. She did not testify that there might have been physical contact as witnessed by Coats but there was no harm, and/or intent to harm, the residents. Rather, Porter testified that the events described in the charges simply did not happen.\u201d\nThe ALJ also found Porter\u2019s statements regarding charge No. 1 were \u201cinconsistent.\u201d Porter initially told Investigator Davis she never held the residents\u2019 hands while feeding them. At the hearing, however, Porter testified that she might \u201cgently\u201d hold a resident\u2019s hand during the meal. Coats and Bryant offered credible testimony that they each witnessed Porter squeezing the hands of residents while feeding them, in direct contradiction to Porter\u2019s assertion that she never squeezed residents\u2019 hands.\nThe ALJ also concluded:\n\u201cDespite over 18 years of public service with the State of Illinois, no prior discipline, positive work evaluations, and an indication of genuine empathy for the residents she served, sound public policy warrants the discharge of [Porter.] Throughout this case, [Porter] has flat out denied the allegations (as opposed to acknowledging that the events giving rise to the charges might have happened but the degree of force was misinterpreted or exaggerated by Coats). However, the preponderance of the evidence indicates Porter used physical force \u2014 a force that was not \u2018gentle\u2019 \u2014 to manipulate the residents\u2019 conduct. This behavior was not necessary, nor reasonable, and it falls squarely under the definition of mistreatment and/or abuse. For the most part, the residents of Fir Cottage have the intellectual capacity of infants. Most residents are nonverbal, barely able to meaningfully communicate with others. In sum, they are defenseless and the behavior described in the charges, and ultimately proved at the hearing, is the antithesis of Porter\u2019s duty as a [m]ental[-h]ealth [technician II: to protect and care for the residents. For these reasons, sound public policy warrants the discharge of [Porter].\u201d\nD. The Commission\u2019s Decision\nIn July 2007, Porter filed objections to the recommended decision, including objections to the ALJ\u2019s (1) credibility findings; (2) failure to give weight to the appetite logs showing Porter did not feed D.B., J.S., and S.G. breakfast during the time in question; and (3) failure to give any weight to the argument that Porter was denied her right to due process and to adequately defend against the charges because Porter did not know the date the abuse allegedly occurred.\nOn July 19, 2007, the Commission, with one member dissenting, modified and adopted the recommended decision of the ALJ:\n\u201cIt is hereby determined that the written charges for discharge approved by the Director of [CMS], have been prove[d], but the unique factual circumstances surrounding the discharge did not rise to the level which sound public policy recognized as good cause for the employee to no longer hold the position. This is supported by [Porter\u2019s] 18 years of service to the State and the lack of a discipline on her record. The Commission expressly finds that [Porter] committed the actions she is charged with, but in no way is this to be interpreted to mean that unwarranted physical contact with clients is an undisciplineable [sic] offense. The said prove[d] charges warrant a 90-day suspension in lieu of discharge. It is further recommended that [Porter] undergo any available training regarding the care of residents under her charge. This is a final administrative order subject to the Administrative Review Act.\u201d\nE. The Circuit Court Proceedings Affirming the Commission\nOn August 21, 2007, the Department filed a complaint for administrative review. The Department asserted that the Commission\u2019s decision to suspend Porter for 90 days in lieu of discharge was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to mandatory Department policies, legally erroneous, and contrary to sound public policy.\nOn September 6, 2007, Porter answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim for administrative review. In her counterclaim, Porter sought administrative review of the Commission\u2019s decision to the extent it adopted the factual findings of the ALJ and imposed any discipline on Porter. Porter requested the circuit court reverse the Commission\u2019s decision and order the Department to immediately reinstate Porter with back pay, benefits, and seniority.\nIn September and October 2007, the Department and the Commission, respectively, each filed a motion to dismiss Porter\u2019s counterclaim asserting the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. In January 2008, the court dismissed the counterclaim, finding the 35-day requirement jurisdictional. The court held that Porter failed to independently file a complaint for administrative review within 35 days of the Commission\u2019s decision.\nThe parties briefed the issue raised in the Department\u2019s complaint for administrative review. In her brief, Porter asked the circuit court to review the Commission\u2019s factual findings. Porter also asked the court to take judicial notice of two administrative proceedings.\nFirst, Porter asked the court to take judicial notice that the Department agreed to a dismissal of its Nurse Aide Registry petition against Porter. Porter attached (1) a February 2, 2007, letter to Porter from OIG Investigator Davis notifying Porter that due to the substantiated allegation of physical abuse, OIG would report her identity and the findings to the Nurse Aide Registry and (2) an August 21, 2007, notice of dismissal in a Department of Human Services proceeding (Nos. 07 \u2014 NAR\u2014006, 07 \u2014 NAR\u2014007, OIG No. 5807 \u2014 04, and OIG No. 5807 \u2014 005), noting receipt of a stipulated agreement between the Department and Porter and Porter\u2019s request that \u201cher appeal be withdrawn.\u201d\nSecond, Porter asked the circuit court to take judicial notice of the final administrative order and decision and recommendation of Chief ALJ Naomi Bean Dunn\u2019s decision in Department of Public Health, State of Illinois v. Candy Porter, No. CNA 07 \u2014 0013, pertaining to the same allegations as the instant case. Porter argued that \u201c[b]ased upon the exact same charges and the same witnesses, the Department of Public Health found the same charges to be unsubstantiated and refused to revoke [Porter\u2019s] CNA [(certified nursing assistant)] license or to impose discipline on Porter.\u201d Porter attached (1) the January 17, 2008, final order adopting the recommendations of the ALJ and providing \u201c[t]he finding and allegations of resident abuse is NOT AFFIRMED and SHALL NOT be included in the Nurse Aide Registry\u201d; and (2) the ALJ\u2019s recommended decision, dated January 15, 2008, in which the ALJ found Porter credible, did not find Coats\u2019 testimony credible, found that the behaviors witnessed by Coats did not rise to the level of abuse as \u201cdefined by the Act,\u201d and found the Department had not proved that Porter committed the abuse.\nOn September 17, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing. No transcript of the hearing is contained in the record on appeal.\nOn October 16, 2008, the circuit court entered a written order. The court declined to take judicial notice of the documents attached to Porter\u2019s brief that were outside the administrative record. The court also declined Porter\u2019s request to review the Commission\u2019s factual findings because she did not timely file a complaint for administrative review seeking review of the factual findings. The court reviewed the Commission\u2019s decision that Porter\u2019s abuse of the residents did not meet the standard for discharge and applied the clearly erroneous standard to its finding. The court held:\n\u201c5. The Commission is the agency charged with administering the regulation at issue [(80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71.170, as amended by 19 Ill. Reg. 12451, eff. August 21, 1995)] and is presumably in touch with what sound public opinion would recognize as good cause for discharge. Moreover, the [c]ourt does not find it was error for the Commission to consider [Porter\u2019s] 18-year unblemished work record, as the regulation specifically provides for consideration of performance record and length of continuous service.\n6. Accordingly, in light of the [c]ourt\u2019s duty to give due deference to the Commission as the agency charged with applying its own regulation and its obligation to be in touch with what sound pubhc opinion would recognize as good cause for discharging [Porter], the [c]ourt does not find the Commission\u2019s decision to impose a 90-day suspension on [Porter] in lieu of discharge was clearly erroneous.\u201d\nThis appeal and cross-appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nIn its appeal, the Department argues the Commission\u2019s decision not to discharge Porter should be reversed. In her cross-appeal, Porter argues (1) the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by Porter in her counterclaim for administrative review; and (2) the Commission\u2019s finding that Porter committed abuse was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Both Porter and the Commission argue that the Commission\u2019s decision to suspend Porter in lieu of discharge should be affirmed. Equip for Equality, Inc., filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Department. We first address jurisdiction.\nA. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction Over Porter\u2019s Counterclaim In her cross-appeal, Porter argues the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by Porter in her counterclaim for administrative review. The Commission argues that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over Porter\u2019s counterclaim for administrative review because Porter did not seek review within the time and manner provided by the Administrative Review Law \u2014 within 35 days of receipt of the Commission\u2019s decision. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 through 3 \u2014 113 (West 2008). The Department adopted the Commission\u2019s argument.\nSection 11a of the Personnel Code provides that final administrative decisions of the Commission are subject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 through 3 \u2014 113 (West 2008)). 20 ILCS 415/lla (West 2008); see also 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71.300, as amended by 19 Ill. Reg. 12451, eff. August 21, 1995 (\u201cAll final decisions of the Commission shall be subject to appeal by the parties to the proceedings under the Administrative Review Act\u201d). Under the Administrative Review Law, circuit courts are vested with jurisdiction to review final administrative decisions. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104 (West 2008). To obtain review of a final administrative decision, an action must be commenced within 35 days of service of the decision:\n\u201cEvery action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to he reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision ***.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2008).\nSee also 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71.300, as amended by 19 Ill. Reg. 12451, eff. August 21, 1995 (providing for appeal of a final decision of the Commission by filing a complaint and issuing summons within 35 days from the date the decision was served on the party affected). \u201cUnless the action is commenced within the 35 days, the trial court lacks subject[-]matter jurisdiction and the complaining party is barred from obtaining judicial relief.\u201d McGaw Medical Center of Northwestern University v. Department of Employment Security, 369 Ill. App. 3d 37, 40, 860 N.E.2d 471, 474 (2006) (affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint for administrative review for failure to name the Board).\nThe Commission argues that Porter was required to file her cross-complaint for administrative review within 35 days of her receipt of the Commission\u2019s decision. According to the Commission, because Porter did not do so, the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over her counterclaim. We disagree.\nThe Administrative Review Law requires that an action be commenced within 35 days of service of the final administrative decision. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2008). That occurred here. When the Department filed a complaint for administrative review within 35 days of the Commission\u2019s decision, the circuit court was vested with subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire matter, including the issue raised in Porter\u2019s counterclaim, pursuant to section 3 \u2014 110 of the Administrative Review Law:\n\u201cEvery action to review any final administrative decision shall be heard and determined by the court with all convenient speed. The hearing and determination shall extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record before the court.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2006).\nGiven the plain language in section 3 \u2014 110, once the action was timely filed by the Department, the court had the authority to hear and determine all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record. This included the Commission\u2019s decision that Porter had committed the abuse. See, e.g., Huff v. Rock Island County Sheriff\u2019s Merit Comm\u2019n, 294 Ill. App. 3d 477, 482, 89 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 (1998) (addressing the trial court\u2019s finding of neglect of duty where it appears the employee only challenged his demotion and suspension; appellate court noted that the review of an administrative decision extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the record); Washington v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 120 Ill. App. 3d 822, 827-28, 458 N.E.2d 952, 956 (1983) (holding that the filing of the cross-complaint did not constitute the commencement of review and that the proceeding was commenced within the 35-day period when the plaintiff filed his complaint for review; but also incorrectly holding that the 35-day timing requirements were procedural, not jurisdictional, limitations); Colaw v. University Civil Service Merit Board of the University Civil Service System, 37 Ill. App. 3d 857, 860-61, 341 N.E.2d 719, 722 (1975) (rejecting the argument that the plaintiff forfeited the issue of whether the remand procedure was proper by not objecting in the trial court; the appellate court could review all questions of law and fact presented by the record).\nThis conclusion is supported by the analogous procedure in workers\u2019 compensation cases. Section 19(f)(1) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides that a proceeding for judicial review must be commenced within 20 days of notice of the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission\u2019s decision. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(l) (West 2008). Similar to the Administrative Review Law, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act gives the circuit court, \u201cby summons to the Commission[,] [the] power to review all questions of law and fact presented by such record.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/19(0(1) (West 2008). In Hurt v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 191 Ill. App. 3d 733, 738, 548 N.E.2d 122, 126 (1989), this court noted that an opposing party is not required to file its own summons to preserve his, her, or its \u201cright to object to questions arising on the record or questions involved in the decision reviewed.\u201d Hurt, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 738, 548 N.E.2d at 126 (holding that \u201c[t]he summons issued to the Commission upon the written request of the instant claimant brought before the circuit court the employer\u2019s objections to the Commission\u2019s award\u201d).\nMoreover, section 1 \u2014 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) provides that the civil-practice provisions contained in article II of the Code apply to article III proceedings (the provisions pertaining to administrative review), except as otherwise provided in article III. 735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 108 (West 2008). One of the provisions contained in article II of the Code is section 2 \u2014 608, which defines a \u201ccounterclaim\u201d as any claim by a defendant against a plaintiff and provides that a \u201ccounterclaim shall be part of the answer.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 608(a), (b) (West 2008).\nThe Administrative Review Law requires the filing of an answer by an agency and permits the filing of an appearance by any other defendant within the time provided by supreme court rules. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 106 (West 2008). The time within which to file an appearance under the supreme court rules is 30 days. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 101(d).\nThe Administrative Review Law does not prohibit the filing of an answer by a party other than the agency. Here, Porter filed an answer within 30 days of service. As part of that answer, she filed a counterclaim. The filing of the counterclaim was not prohibited nor does the Administrative Review Law \u201cotherwise provide.\u201d Consequently, Porter\u2019s counterclaim was timely filed under the supreme court rules, and the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the counterclaim.\nTherefore, the circuit court erroneously determined it lacked jurisdiction over Porter\u2019s counterclaim. However, because this court reviews the Commission\u2019s decision and not the trial court\u2019s decision, remand is not required. See, e.g., Kimball Dawson, LLC v. City of Chicago Department of Zoning, 369 Ill. App. 3d 780, 786, 861 N.E.2d 216, 222 (2006) (appellate court reviews the decision of the administrative agency, not the circuit court).\nB. The Commission\u2019s Finding That Abuse Occurred Was Not Against the Manifest Weight\nPorter raises several arguments related to the Commission\u2019s decision that Porter committed abuse. Porter argues (1) she did not have adequate notice of the charges; (2) the Commission applied the wrong standard for the burden of proof because, when a crime is charged in a civil administrative hearing, the evidence proving such a crime should be by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the finding that the Department sustained its burden of proof was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\n1. Standard of Review\nThe standard of review in cases involving the Administrative Review Law depends upon whether the issue is one of fact or law. Exelon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266, 272 (2009). Factual questions are reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, questions of law are reviewed de novo, and mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed for clear error. Exelon, 234 Ill. 2d at 272-73.\nIn discharge cases, \u201c[t]he scope of review of an administrative agency\u2019s decision regarding discharge is generally a two-step process involving first, a manifest-weight standard, and second, a determination of whether the findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for the agency\u2019s conclusion that cause for discharge does or does not exist.\u201d Brown v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 133 Ill. App. 3d 35, 39, 478 N.E.2d 541, 544 (1985), citing Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 85 Ill. 2d 547, 550, 426 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1981); see also Hermesdorf v. Wu, 372 Ill. App. 3d 842, 851-52, 867 N.E.2d 34, 43 (2007).\n2. Porter Had Adequate Notice of the Charges\nPorter argues she did not have adequate notice of the charges against her. Porter asserts she was forced to defend against a charge that only specified she abused three residents during the week prior to September 1, 2006. Porter also argues that Coats\u2019 delay in reporting the incident regarding J.D. also deprived her of the opportunity to properly \u201crespond and defend.\u201d\nPorter raised this issue in her objection to the ALJ\u2019s recommendation and raised the issue in her briefing to the circuit court. However, Porter does not support her argument on appeal with citation to authorities. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7) (requiring that argument contain citation to authorities). Therefore, the issue is forfeited. See Orzel v. Szewczyk, 391 Ill. App. 3d 283, 287, 908 N.E.2d 569, 573 (2009) (providing that where a party fails to cite supporting authority, the issues may be considered forfeited).\nEven if this court were to address the issue, we would find that Porter had adequate notice. The Commission\u2019s regulations require the charges be \u201cspecific enough to apprise the employee of the nature and substance of the cause alleged for discharge.\u201d 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71.160(a), as amended by 19 Ill. Reg. 12451, eff. August 21, 1995. The regulations also require the charges be set forth in separate paragraphs and contain \u201cthe dates, names of persons, places, and facts necessary to properly allege cause.\u201d 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71.160(b), as amended by 19 Ill. Reg. 12451, eff. August 21, 1995; see also Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 93, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1119 (1992) (due process requires that charges in an administrative decision need only advise the respondent of the charges so that she can prepare a defense).\nHere, the charges apprised Porter of the approximate date, the names of persons involved, and the places where the incidents allegedly occurred. Porter had adequate notice. See, e.g., Morgan v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 388 Ill. App. 3d 633, 668, 903 N.E.2d 799, 828 (2009) (holding that where the complaint contained specific allegations of misconduct, specific citations to the regulatory provisions alleged to have been violated, and a general time period \u2014 \u201c \u2018in or about December 2004\u2019 \u201d \u2014 the respondent was given adequate notice of the charges against him).\n3. The Commission Properly Applied Preponderance Standard of Proof\nPorter next argues that the Commission applied the wrong standard of proof. Porter argues that when a crime is charged in a civil administrative hearing, the evidence proving such a crime should be clear and convincing.\nPorter has forfeited this argument by not raising it before the ALJ, the Commission, or the circuit court. See Smith v. Department of Professional Regulation, 202 Ill. App. 3d 279, 286-87, 559 N.E.2d 884, 889 (1990) (finding the plaintiff forfeited the argument that the ALJ applied the wrong standard of proof by failing to raise the issue before the ALJ or the Board).\nEven if Porter had not forfeited the issue, the Commission clearly applied the appropriate standard of proof. Notably, the Commission\u2019s regulations require only proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71.232(a), as amended by 19 Ill. Reg. 12451, eff. August 21, 1995. Moreover, under the required balancing test established by the supreme court in Board of Education v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d 173, 194, 497 N.E.2d 984, 993 (1986), the preponderance burden of proof was appropriate.\nIn Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 194, 497 N.E.2d at 993, the Illinois Supreme Court held that due process did not require a clear and convincing standard of proof in a tenured-teacher dismissal proceeding even where the conduct charged might also constitute a crime. In that case, when determining the appropriate burden of proof, the court balanced the private interests affected by the proceeding, the countervailing governmental interest, and the risk of error created by the government\u2019s chosen procedure. Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 190-91, 497 N.E.2d at 991.\nUnder the first balancing factor \u2014 the private interest affected\u2014 the supreme court examined the nature of the private interest threatened and the permanency of the threatened loss. Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 192-93, 497 N.E.2d at 992. The supreme court concluded that teachers have an economic interest in their positions, but that monetary interests are adequately protected by the preponderance standard. Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 192, 497 N.E.2d at 992. Moreover, although teachers have an interest in teaching as a profession, the court found that was an interest shared by teachers dismissed for noncriminal conduct as well as criminal conduct. Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 192, 497 N.E.2d at 992. The court also noted that dismissal does not prevent a teacher from teaching; therefore, the threatened loss was not permanent. Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 192-93, 497 N.E.2d at 992 (noting that a separate hearing is provided for a teacher prior to suspension or revocation of his or her teaching certificate). The supreme court contrasted tenured-teacher proceedings with attorney disciplinary hearings. Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 193, 497 N.E.2d at 992. Attorney disciplinary hearings required clear and convincing evidence, but such proceedings may result in disbarment. Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 193, 497 N.E.2d at 192.\nExamining the governmental interest, the supreme court noted that a school board had a legitimate interest in dismissing teachers whose conduct violated the law or those who are incompetent. Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 194, 497 N.E.2d at 993. The school had an interest in applying a standard that reduces the risk of error that may result in an unfit individual continuing to teach. Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 194, 497 N.E.2d at 993.\nUnder the third balancing factor \u2014 the risk of error \u2014 the supreme court found it appropriate for the teacher and the school board to share the risk of error in dismissal proceedings in a roughly equal manner where the possible harm to each was roughly equal. Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d at 194, 497 N.E.2d at 993; see also Feliciano v. Illinois Racing Board, 110 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1000, 443 N.E.2d 261, 264 (1982) (\u201cThe primary purpose of assigning a particular standard of proof to an adjudicatory proceeding is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions,\u201d and the individual should not share the risk where the possible harm to the individual is greater than the possible harm to the governmental entity).\nThe same analysis applies here. Porter has an economic interest in her position, but that interest is adequately protected by the preponderance standard. Porter\u2019s threatened loss is not permanent (the status of her licensing was subject to a separate proceeding). The Department also has an interest in dismissing mental-health technicians who are unfit to work with residents in the facility. Because the two interests are roughly equal, both Porter and the Department should share the risk of error in the dismissal proceedings. The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was therefore appropriate. See Teil v. City of Chicago, 284 Ill. App. 3d 167, 170, 671 N.E.2d 759, 762 (1996) (finding the administrative agency properly applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in case involving charges that the police officer violated department rules, which conduct also constituted a crime).\n4. The Commission\u2019s Decision Was Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence\nPorter argues that under either standard \u2014 clear and convincing or preponderance of the evidence \u2014 the Commission\u2019s finding that Porter committed the abuse was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Porter argues that the only admissible evidence supporting the charges was the unsupported testimony by Coats, and several factors directly contradict Coats, including the following: (1) Porter denied the charges; (2) Coats failed to immediately report the incidents; (3) no one else saw the incidents; (4) the evidence established that inflicting pain on the residents would make them harder to feed; (5) Porter\u2019s initials did not appear on any of the appetite logs for the breakfast meals the week prior to September 1, 2006; (6) regarding the squeezing incident, Coats only heard noises and movements she interpreted as pain but the residents often cry out and make movements for no reason; and (7) despite the force of the blow to J.D., he did not make a sound and the slap did not make a sound.\nThis court reviews the Commission\u2019s decision, not the circuit court\u2019s. Ahmad v. Board of Education, 365 Ill. App. 3d 155, 162, 847 N.E.2d 810, 817 (2006). When reviewing the administrative agency\u2019s decision, this court presumes that the agency\u2019s findings of fact are prima facie true and correct. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2008) (\u201cThe findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct\u201d).\nAs stated in Exelon, 234 Ill. 2d at 272:\n\u201c[W]hen a court reviews an administrative agency\u2019s factual findings, it will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Rather, the court will only ascertain whether such findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d\nSee also Sheehan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 158 Ill. App. 3d 275, 287, 509 N.E.2d 467, 475 (1987) (the court \u201cshould limit its inquiry to ascertaining whether the findings and decision of the agency are against the manifest weight of the evidence\u201d). An administrative agency\u2019s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the court concludes that \u201call reasonable and unbiased persons, acting within the limits prescribed by the law and drawing all inferences in support of the finding, would agree that the finding is erroneous and that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.\u201d Sheehan, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 287, 509 N.E.2d at 475-76.\nThis court will not reweigh the evidence here or make independent determinations of credibility. The Commission adopted the ALJ\u2019s specific factual findings. The case came down to Porter\u2019s testimony against Coats\u2019 testimony. The Commission believed Coats. The Commission found the evidence indicated Coats did not have a bias against Porter or a motive to testify falsely. Coats testified Porter was her friend and she felt sad that Porter was discharged. Porter also testified that she and Coats had a positive working relationship.\nThe Commission found Porter\u2019s testimony not credible, in part, because she denied in her written statement to Investigator Davis that she ever held the hands of the residents while feeding them but testified at the hearing that she sometimes gently held the residents\u2019 hands. While the difference between Porter\u2019s testimony at hearing and her statement to Investigator Davis may appear factually inconsistent, when read in context, the statements may not be inconsistent but merely a matter of semantics. Nonetheless, this court will not reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. The Commission\u2019s findings on credibility are supported by the evidence.\nPorter argues that nothing corroborated Coats\u2019 testimony and that none of the appetite logs shows Porter fed those three residents the breakfast meal during the time in question. However, evidence was presented that the appetite logs were not always accurate. More than one person may feed a resident but only one set of initials may appear on the appetite log. Although Coats did not recall that anyone else fed' D.B., J.S., or S.G. on the day in question, the Commission found her observations credible.\nThe Commission also believed Coats\u2019 testimony about Porter hitting J.D. Porter argues it was unlikely she could hit J.D. with such force without J.D. or the slap making a sound. However, Coats testified the room was \u201csomewhat noisy.\u201d\n\u201c[I]t is the responsibility of the administrative agency to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses[,] and resolve conflicts in testimony.\u201d Teil, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 170, 671 N.E.2d at 762; see also Feliciano, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1004, 443 N.E.2d at 267 (something more than conflicting testimony is necessary to find an administrative agency\u2019s credibility findings erroneous). If the record contains evidence that supports the agency\u2019s determination, it must be affirmed. Kimball, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 786, 861 N.E.2d at 222. The Commission found the abuse occurred. The evidence supports that decision.\nPorter argues she was entitled to a presumption similar to the missing-evidence jury instruction. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 5.01 (2006) (instruction pertaining to the failure to produce evidence or a witness). Specifically, Porter argues that when a document is under the control of a party, the party does not produce it, and in all likelihood the party would have produced the document, the trier of fact may infer that the document would be unfavorable. However, the appetite logs for the breakfast meals on August 23, 2006, through August 27, 2006, were produced and did not show that Porter fed any of the residents in question their breakfast meal. Porter does not point to anything suggesting that additional pertinent appetite logs were withheld from her. Therefore, Porter has not demonstrated she would even be entitled to such a presumption.\nPorter also argues that Veach\u2019s testimony about one of the residents suffering a nondisplaced fracture was irrelevant and should not have been relied on by the Commission. Porter argues Veach was a layman interpreting an unidentified X-ray report.\nThe applicable administrative regulation provides as follows:\n\u201ca) Irrelevant, immaterial[,] or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. The rules of evidence and privilege as applied in civil cases in the circuit courts of Illinois shall be followed. However, evidence not admissible under such rules of evidence may be admitted (except where precluded by statute) if it is of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs.\u201d 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71.233(a), as amended by 19 Ill. Reg. 12451, eff. August 21, 1995.\nPorter argues no prudent person would rely on Veach\u2019s layman\u2019s interpretation of an unidentified X-ray report.\nThe record contains the X-ray report finding the nondisplaced fracture. That document was a part of the OIG report. However, the OIG report was admitted only to the extent the report was relied on in making the decision to discharge. Veach testified that the only thing he relied upon in making the discharge decision was the substantiated finding of abuse. As such, it does not appear that the testimony about the nondisplaced fracture was relevant, as it was not considered by Veach in making the discharge decision.\nHowever, even if the admission of the testimony was in error, Porter cannot show prejudice. Section 3 \u2014 111(b) of the Administrative Review Law requires a showing of prejudice:\n\u201cTechnical errors in the proceedings before the administrative agency or its failure to observe the technical rules of evidence shall not constitute grounds for the reversal of the administrative decision unless it appears that such error or failure materially affected the rights of any party and resulted in substantial injustice to him or her.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 111(b) (West 2008).\nSee also McCleary v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 251 Ill. App. 3d 988, 993, 622 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (1993) (\u201cthe appellate court may reverse an administrative ruling only if there is error which prejudiced a party in the proceeding\u201d). Nothing in the record demonstrates the Commission considered such evidence. The Commission\u2019s decision was based on the credibility of Coats. Porter did not suffer prejudice as the admission of the evidence did not affect the outcome.\nFinally, Porter asks this court to take judicial notice of ALJ Dunn\u2019s decision in Department of Public Health, State of Illinois v. Candy Porter, No. CNA 07 \u2014 0013, which involved the same allegations as in the instant case. Porter asks this court to take judicial notice that, based on the exact same charges and the same witnesses, the Department of Public Health found the charges unsubstantiated and refused to revoke Porter\u2019s CNA license or impose discipline. Porter notes that ALJ Dunn specifically found Porter\u2019s testimony credible and Coats\u2019 testimony not credible. Porter also asks this court to take judicial notice that the Department of Human Services, which Porter identifies as the \u201cvery same entity which is the [ajppellant in this case,\u201d dismissed its Nurse Aide Registry petition against Porter relating to these charges.\nSection 3 \u2014 110 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 110 (West 2008)) provides, in part, that \u201c[n]o new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination!;,] or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the [reviewing] court.\u201d However, notwithstanding section 3 \u2014 110, documents containing readily verifiable facts may be judicially noticed if taking judicial notice will \u201caid in the efficient disposition of a case.\u201d Muller v. Zollar, 267 Ill. App. 3d 339, 341, 642 N.E.2d 860, 862 (1994). Moreover, the appellate court can take judicial notice even if judicial notice was not sought in the trial court. Muller, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 341, 642 N.E.2d at 862.\nThis court may take judicial notice of a written decision that is part of the record in another court or administrative tribunal because such documents fall within the category of readily verifiable facts \u201c \u2018which are capable of \u201cinstant and unquestionable demonstration.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Hermesdorf, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 850, 867 N.E.2d at 41-42, quoting May Department Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 743, 64 Ill. 2d 153, 159, 355 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1976), quoting 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence \u00a72571, at 548 (3d ed. 1940). Therefore, this court will take judicial notice of the fact that Porter\u2019s license was not revoked and that her name is not listed on the Nurse Aide Registry. However, Porter apparently wants this court to take judicial notice of those documents to undermine the Commission\u2019s decision in this case. Porter cites no authority in support of doing so. Moreover, this court cannot reweigh evidence or independently determine credibility. Therefore, while this court will take judicial notice of the two orders, those orders do not support reversal of the Commission\u2019s decision in this case.\nC. The Commission\u2019s Decision To Suspend Porter in Lieu of Discharge Was Not Arbitrary, Unreasonable, or Unrelated to the Requirements of the Service\nIn its appeal, the Department argues the Commission\u2019s decision to suspend Porter for 90 days in lieu of discharge should be reversed. The Department argues the Commission\u2019s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, and contrary to public policy. Equip for Equality, Inc., filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the Department. The Commission and Porter argue that the Commission\u2019s decision to suspend Porter in lieu of discharge should be affirmed.\nAs noted above, the \u201cscope of review of an administrative agency\u2019s decision regarding discharge is generally a two-step process involving first, a manifest-weight standard, and second, a determination of whether the findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for the agency\u2019s conclusion that cause for discharge does or does not exist.\u201d Brown, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 39, 478 N.E.2d at 544, citing Department of Mental Health, 85 Ill. 2d at 550, 426 N.E.2d at 887. However, \u201can agency\u2019s determination of cause to discharge is not prima facie true and correct and is subject to judicial review.\u201d Brown, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 39, 478 N.E.2d at 544. Nonetheless, the Commission\u2019s decision \u201cwill not be reversed unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of service.\u201d Department of Mental Health, 85 Ill. 2d at 552, 426 N.E.2d at 887.\nThe Commission\u2019s regulations define \u201ccause for discharge exists\u201d as follows:\n\u201ca) Cause for discharge consists of some substantial shortcoming which renders the employee\u2019s continuance in his position in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and which the law and sound public opinion recognize as good cause for the employee no longer holding the position.\nb) In determining the appropriate penalty for an offense of which the employee is found guilty, the Commission shall consider the employee\u2019s performance record and the employee\u2019s length of continuous service unless the offense would warrant immediate discharge.\u201d 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71.170, as amended by 19 Ill. Reg. 12451, eff. August 21, 1995.\nPursuant to the regulations, discharge was proper where Porter\u2019s continued employment would be detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the Center and where the law and sound public opinion recognized that good cause existed for Porter to no longer hold the position.\nWhile the Center had an unwritten, zero-tolerance policy requiring discharge for abuse, all of the Center and Department policies contained in the record reflect that abuse would result in discipline, up to and including discharge, or that such employee would be subject to discharge. Such language does not require discharge. See, e.g., American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. State of Illinois, 158 Ill. App. 3d 584, 590, 511 N.E.2d 749, 753 (1987) (policy stating that an employee found guilty of mistreatment \u201c \u2018will be subject to discharge\u2019 \u201d was not the equivalent of \u201cwill!shall be discharged\u201d (emphases in original)).\nMoreover, given Porter\u2019s employment history, good evaluations, and genuine empathy for the residents, the Commission\u2019s decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of service. See Department of Mental Health, 85 Ill. 2d at 550-52, 426 N.E.2d at 886-88 (affirming Commission\u2019s decision to suspend the defendant in lieu of discharge where the defendant, when punched and scratched by a patient, \u201c \u2018punched and kicked [the] patient who was under restraint\u2019 the Commission found that the reaction was not calculated but was a result of his sudden loss of control).\nThe Department also argues that public policy required Porter\u2019s discharge. According to the Department, suspension in lieu of discharge violated the public policy in favor of protecting the vulnerable, eliminating the risk of future harm, and deterring others. The Department borrows this terminology from arbitration cases, which provide that while review of an arbitrator\u2019s decision is very limited, a court may vacate the arbitrator\u2019s award if the award is contrary to public policy. County of De Witt v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 298 Ill. App. 3d 634, 637, 699 N.E.2d 163, 166 (1998); see also American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 318, 671 N.E.2d 668, 678 (1996) (a court cannot enforce an arbitrator\u2019s award that violates public policy). In such cases, a two-step analysis applies: (1) the identification of a well-defined public policy and (2) determination of whether the arbitrator\u2019s award violated public policy. De Witt, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 637, 699 N.E.2d at 166.\nWe question whether this analysis applies here. This is not a collective-bargaining situation where we are reviewing the parties\u2019 bargained-for labor contract. See, e.g., International Ass\u2019n of Firefighters v. City of Springfield, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1081, 883 N.E.2d 590, 592 (2008) (\u201cdeference is accorded because the parties have chosen by contractual agreement how their dispute is to be decided, and judicial modification of an arbitrator\u2019s decision deprives the parties of their choice\u201d). However, even if such analysis applied here, public policy did not prevent Porter\u2019s reinstatement. The parties do not dispute that Illinois recognizes a public policy of protecting those who cannot help themselves, including the protection and care for persons with developmental disabilities. Therefore, the only question here is whether reinstating Porter violates public policy. See, e.g., Jacksonville Area Ass\u2019n for Retarded Citizens v. General Service Employees Union, Local 73, 888 F. Supp. 901, 906 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (issue was not whether the employee\u2019s past conduct violated public policy but whether reinstatement of the employee violated public policy).\nThe Commission adopted the ALJ\u2019s findings that Porter had no prior discipline, positive work evaluations, and indicated genuine empathy for the residents she served. The Commission determined that given Porter\u2019s years of service and lack of discipline, a 90-day suspension was warranted in lieu of discharge. The Commission also recommended further training for Porter regarding the care of residents under her charge. Implicit in these findings is that Porter was amenable to discipline. See American Federation, 173 Ill. 2d at 322, 671 N.E.2d at 680 (\u201cas long as the arbitrator makes a rational finding that the employee can be trusted to refrain from the offending conduct, the arbitrator may reinstate\u201d the employee and the reviewing court will affirm). Moreover, no law prohibits Porter\u2019s employment. See, e.g., Jacksonville Area Ass\u2019n for Retarded Citizens, 888 F. Supp. at 908-09 (concluding that the arbitrator\u2019s award reinstating employees who, to satisfy their own curiosity, examined a mentally and/or physically impaired client to determine if the client was a hermaphrodite, was not against public policy where the arbitrator implicitly found they were amenable to discipline and where no law prohibited their employment, reemployment, or reinstatement); 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 210 (West 2008) (prohibiting an employee suspected of abuse from contact with recipients of service until the outcome of the investigation or disciplinary action against the employee, thus indicating that once disciplinary action has occurred, contact is no longer prohibited).\nThe case cited by the amicus, De Witt, 298 Ill. App. 3d 634, 699 N.E.2d 163, does not require a different result. In De Witt, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 638, 699 N.E.2d at 166, this court concluded that the arbitrator\u2019s decision to completely reinstate an employee who hit a resident, without any reprimand for her behavior, was against public policy. This court found the arbitrator lacked a rational basis for concluding the employee would not repeat such conduct and did not take any precautionary steps to deter future misconduct or ensure it will not be repeated. De Witt, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 638, 699 N.E.2d at 166 (also rejecting the arbitrator\u2019s interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement that \u201cone incident of striking, that causes no apparent injury, does not amount to \u2018resident abuse\u2019 \u201d).\nIn contrast here, the Commission found that Porter did commit the abuse but that Porter was a good employee, had no prior discipline, and cared about the residents. Moreover, Porter received a severe discipline \u2014 a 90-day suspension \u2014 unlike the complete reinstatement with back pay awarded in De Witt. De Witt, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 639, 699 N.E.2d at 167. In addition, the Commission recommended she receive additional training, whereas in De Witt, no additional training was recommended. De Witt, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 639, 699 N.E.2d at 167. We note that in De Witt, this court recognized that in other cases where the arbitrator concluded that the employee could be trusted to refrain from future misconduct, the employee admitted wrongdoing. Porter did not admit wrongdoing here. However, Porter recognized that such conduct, if it occurred, would constitute abuse. The record supports the Commission\u2019s conclusion that Porter posed no threat for future abuse.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nTURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Mary E. Welsh (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Eric L. Terlizzi (argued), of Salem, for appellee Candy Porter.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Seodro, Solicitor General, and Brian E Barov (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees.", "Deborah Kennedy and Karen I. Ward, both of Equip for Equality, Inc., of Chicago, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CANDY PORTER, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant (The Civil Service Commission et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellees).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201408\u20140894\nArgued September 17, 2009.\n\u2014Opinion filed December 23, 2009.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Mary E. Welsh (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nEric L. Terlizzi (argued), of Salem, for appellee Candy Porter.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Seodro, Solicitor General, and Brian E Barov (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees.\nDeborah Kennedy and Karen I. Ward, both of Equip for Equality, Inc., of Chicago, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0701-01", "first_page_order": 717, "last_page_order": 745 }