{ "id": 4292214, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRANDON J. CASH, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cash", "decision_date": "2009-12-10", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201408\u20140245", "first_page": "931", "last_page": "951", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 931" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3218511 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 1030", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600488 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1033-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/1030-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4135194 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3614825 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274499 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203-04", "parenthetical": "Lytton, PJ., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 F.3d 90", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 988 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/103/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 U.S. 93", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5902037 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/544/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 U.S. 692", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1313927 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704-05" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "2595" }, { "page": "702-03" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "2594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/452/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008 OK CR 1", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "OK CR", "case_ids": [ 8390813 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "363-64" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "1111" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/176/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 P.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318-19", "parenthetical": "court held that the defendant was seized at the moment the police pulled up behind the defendant's parked vehicle and switched on their emergency lights" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Wash. App. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1826988 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396", "parenthetical": "court held that the defendant was seized at the moment the police pulled up behind the defendant's parked vehicle and switched on their emergency lights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/30/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Va. App. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va. App.", "case_ids": [ 1080278 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "the driver in a parked vehicle was seized when the police car pulled in behind him and activated its emergency lights; such a person would not have felt free to leave or otherwise avoid the encounter" }, { "page": "741-42", "parenthetical": "the driver in a parked vehicle was seized when the police car pulled in behind him and activated its emergency lights; such a person would not have felt free to leave or otherwise avoid the encounter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va-app/32/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.W.3d 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 8981082 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317", "parenthetical": "the activation of emergency lights constituted a seizure because it was a show of authority from which a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or to decline the encounter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/185/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Md. App. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 157418 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616-18" }, { "page": "951", "parenthetical": "the activation of emergency lights was held to effect a seizure because it communicated to a reasonable person in the parked car the officer's intent to curtail the defendant's freedom to leave or avoid the encounter; the defendant complied with show of authority and remained stopped" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/120/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Kan. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 12163355 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20", "parenthetical": "the defendant was seized at the moment the officers pulled up behind his parked car and activated their emergency lights" }, { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "the defendant was seized at the moment the officers pulled up behind his parked car and activated their emergency lights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/276/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "780 So. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11118936 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/780/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 A.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780", "parenthetical": "the defendant held to be seized at the moment the police pulled up behind his parked vehicle and switched on their flashing lights" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Conn. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 1238890 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643", "parenthetical": "the defendant held to be seized at the moment the police pulled up behind his parked vehicle and switched on their flashing lights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/251/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Cal. Rptr. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236-37", "parenthetical": "police pulled in behind a parked car and turned on emergency lights; the defendant was held to be seized because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or decline the encounter" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Cal. App. 3d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2182029 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405-06", "parenthetical": "police pulled in behind a parked car and turned on emergency lights; the defendant was held to be seized because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or decline the encounter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/176/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922645 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "parked car was seized when the officer activated the emergency light; the emergency light was a show of authority that would indicate to a reasonable person he was not free to decline the encounter" }, { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "parked car was seized when the officer activated the emergency light; the emergency light was a show of authority that would indicate to a reasonable person he was not free to decline the encounter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3617207 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274, 287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5455119 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218-19" }, { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574541 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "848" }, { "page": "849" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "851" }, { "page": "848" }, { "page": "849" }, { "page": "848-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222591 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" }, { "page": "75" }, { "page": "75" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 Ill. App. 3d 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4287686 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress often presents separate questions of law and fact" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/392/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799408 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "175" }, { "page": "175" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602037 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "557" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621641 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4276386 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4022646 ], "weight": 17, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" }, { "page": "347-48" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350", "parenthetical": "activation of lights and siren directed at an individual is interpreted as a command to stay put" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0346-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1438, "char_count": 50151, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6922169990516086e-08, "percentile": 0.2945928507801034 }, "sha256": "2ebdc649199e9c762686e16f0c4b83b071a44b7a5814171477fef043431a07d9", "simhash": "1:1ba7345ac244f1e6", "word_count": 8348 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:39:01.503812+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRANDON J. CASH, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Brandon J. Cash, was charged with possession with the intent to deliver between 30 and 500 grams of cannabis while within 1,000 feet of a school (720 ILCS 550/5.2(b) (West 2006)). Defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence. The circuit court of Winnebago County heard and granted defendant\u2019s motion, finding that the brief activation of a police car\u2019s emergency lights and siren constituted a seizure of defendant without reasonable suspicion. The State appeals, contending that the trial court did not properly consider the totality of the evidence and that no evidence was adduced indicating that defendant submitted to the officers\u2019 show of authority. We affirm.\nThe following facts are taken from the record and the testimony of Special Agent Greg Brotan of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to quash and suppress. Brotan testified that, on April 17, 2007, he and other agents were in Rockford, keeping a house belonging to Nicholas Castronovo under surveillance. Brotan testified that the surveillance was pursuant to a warrant to search the Castronovo house. The warrant had not been executed yet because Brotan had received information that Castronovo possessed an AK-47 assault rifle and other firearms in the house. In consideration of the firearm information, the agents did not want to chance a forced entry into the house; instead, they decided to wait until Castronovo left the house, at which time he could be more safely approached. Bro-tan explained that this was why they were keeping the house under surveillance.\nAt some point that day, Castronovo left the house, alone, apparently unarmed, and drove a maroon Lincoln Town Car. Brotan and two other officers followed Castronovo\u2019s car. Brotan testified that he did not have either a search warrant for Castronovo\u2019s car or an arrest warrant for Castronovo or defendant. Brotan testified that, as he followed Castronovo\u2019s car, he did not see Castronovo commit any traffic violations. Castronovo stopped and parked his car in the 2200 block of Edgebrook Drive.\nBrotan testified that there were other cars parked along Edge-brook Drive. Castronovo parked his car behind another Lincoln Town Car. Brotan did not clearly recall the color of the second Lincoln, but believed it may have been silver. Brotan testified that both cars were legally parked. Brotan testified that he was in an unmarked vehicle, as was each of the other two officers, Special Agent Hilgers of the DEA and Officer Mott.\nBrotan testified that, shortly after Castronovo had parked, Hilgers and Mott pulled in behind the Castronovo vehicle. By that time, defendant had joined Castronovo in the car.\nBrotan was initially unable to recall whether Hilgers used his lights and siren. After referring to his report, Brotan testified that Hilgers \u201chit the lights and siren real quick.\u201d Brotan explained that Hilgers activated the lights and siren to let Castronovo know that he was behind his car.\nBrotan testified that, by the time he had arrived and parked his car behind the other two police cars, Hilgers and Mott were already out of their cars and on either side of Castronovo\u2019s car. Both defendant and Castronovo were already out of the car. Brotan testified that he did not hear Hilgers or Mott say anything to Castronovo or defendant, but he also testified that the officers had asked Castronovo and defendant to get out of the car. Brotan testified that it was reported to him that, when Castronovo and defendant opened the doors to the car, Hilgers saw a plastic bag on the seat, and both Hilgers and Mott smelled a strong odor of marijuana as soon as the car doors were opened.\nBrotan testified that, as he approached Castronovo\u2019s car, he also noticed a strong odor of marijuana. Brotan explained that, based on the pungency of the odor, he believed that the marijuana had been grown hydroponically, as that tends to concentrate the THC content and leads to a more pungent smell than observed in marijuana that is not grown hydroponically. Brotan testified that the bag inside Castronovo\u2019s car contained a number of clear plastic bags, all of which contained marijuana. The total weight of the marijuana recovered totaled 87.5 grams. Brotan testified that $9,680 in cash was also recovered. According to Brotan, defendant eventually admitted that he was using the money to purchase marijuana from Castronovo.\nFollowing Brotan\u2019s testimony and argument by the parties, the trial court gave the following ruling from the bench:\n\u201cWe all know the fourth amendment says in essence that all searches must be premised by a search warrant based upon probable cause unless there\u2019s some exception.\nI understand by the testimony that on April 17th of \u201907 the officers had with them a search warrant for the address of 4010 High-crest Road.\nThe Court understands the reason why officers didn\u2019t go in, because they had information that there may be weapons involved and they\u2019re concerned about their safety. Rather than entering the residence pursuant to that lawfully issued search warrant, they backed off and observed Mr. Castronovo leaving the scene in a Lincoln Town Car, they followed, and the Town Car pulled into another location.\nThere were other officers involved besides Officer Brotan, *** and it\u2019s quite clear by the testimony that the vehicle that Mr. Castronovo had been driving was stopped.\nOne of the exceptions of the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment is search incident to the automobile search, which means, in essence, if the officers have probable cause to believe that evidence is located in a vehicle and that vehicle is moving or about to be moved, they have the authority to stop and search.\nThe question I have is was there any information in the officers\u2019 minds when Castronovo left the home whether or not he had any evidence of crimes or contraband in the vehicle. The officers testified they had no information that there were any weapons present on Mr. Castronovo, nor did they have any other information that any other contraband or illegal substance may be located in that car.\nThe car was stopped, and the issue now is, one, did the officers have \u2018the right to seize the occupants in the vehicle.\u2019\nThere\u2019s been testimony that there were no traffic violations, no parking violations, and the officers pulled up, two other officers in different squads in addition to officer or Agent Brotan. The question is did the other officers have the opportunity to seize. The issue is seizure.\nI think it\u2019s quite clear, and the Court is familiar with the cases, once the officer turns on lights, whether the vehicle is stopped by the officer or vehicle stopped, there must he some reason to seize that vehicle. And that\u2019s the question before the Court. We know that two other agents approached the vehicle where Mr. Castronovo was the driver, and passenger now would be this [defendant. Was the initial seizure, the turning on the lights and tapping the siren, was that justified?\nBased on case law submitted to the Court, the Court finds there was a seizure and that the officers \u2014 did the officers have any reasonable articulable suspicion at that time that criminal activity was afoot that would even justify a Terry stop? I find that\u2019s not present in this case. There\u2019s been no testimony regarding the justification regarding the seizure of the vehicle. If the officers had pulled behind and walked up, would he a different story but, as the case law appropriately points out, case of [People v. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d 346 (2004)], just to read a portion, \u2018Driver of vehicle that was stopped on shoulder of road was detained for purpose of fourth amendment when officer pulled behind the vehicle and activated emergency overhead lights.\u2019\nSo at the time the officers activated emergency lights there was seizure. And was that seizure justified? And I find there is no evidence presented that the seizure was lawful.\nI\u2019m going to grant the Defendant\u2019s Motion to Suppress the Evidence.\u201d\nAbout three weeks later, the State filed a motion to reconsider. Nearly three months after the motion was filed, the court heard arguments and made the following ruling:\n\u201cWe have a unique set of facts in this case, and I point out that the cases that [the State] has cited are distinguishable regarding the facts of this case. And this is why I\u2019m going to go over my notes again.\nAnd my recollection of the facts[,] and the transcript bears [this out,] that on April 17 of \u201907, the officer was involved with another officer in a search warrant for the address of 4010 High Crest Road. They were conducting surveillance, and there was no testimony presented that while the surveillance was going on, while the car left, that other officers arrived, and the search warrant was executed. I don\u2019t know when the search warrant was executed if it was, if [sic] fact, executed.\nAnd they indicated the address belonged to a Nick Castronovo. The car that left was a maroon Lincoln Town Car. They had no arrest warrant for Mr. Castronovo or the defendant, in this case Brandon Cash.\nThey followed the vehicle, and the officer testified there were no violations of traffic violations, no other violations, and he gave the address of the 2200 block of Edgebrook.\nThen there was a silver Lincoln Town Car parked, and then the car they were following pulled behind the other one, and they were both parked legally.\nAnd then the officer says Castronovo was the second person.\nMR. VELLA [defense counsel]: Second car behind.\nTHE COURT: The second car behind the first car. They were in an unmarked squad car. He was with another agent.\nThere\u2019s another agent who pulled behind his squad, meaning Agent Brotan, B-R-O-T-A-N. There were a total of three agents\u2019 cars there. And then one of the agents activated the lights and the siren was also put on. At that time the court determined that there was a stop based on the case law I cited.\nNow, the court is aware of Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968),] which states, basically, we know that if there is articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, an officer may stop a person walking near the location or in a vehicle, but I find as the officer testified the search warrant had not been executed. I heard no facts involved in that, and the officer, once they activated the lights, that was the point in time when there was quote a detention. If they hadn\u2019t executed \u2014 strike\u2014if they hadn\u2019t activated lights and put siren on, a different story, but they did. I can\u2019t change the facts in this case.\nThere was a detention. Based on the illegal detention, they walked up to the car and saw what they saw. They exceeded the stop for which they \u2014 they hadn\u2019t stopped the vehicle. There was no stop here, but when the lights were activated, that\u2019s when the stop occurs.\nAnd I see no reason under \\Terry\\ or the cases cited by the [S]tate that the court should change its decision, and again, under this unique set of facts involved, there is a detention and it\u2019s unwarranted. Motion to reconsider is heard and denied.\u201d\nWithin 30 days of the denial of the motion to reconsider, the State filed its notice of appeal. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to file a late notice of appeal and we granted that motion.\nAs an initial matter, defendant argues that, under People v. Marker, 382 Ill. App. 3d 464 (2008), the State\u2019s original notice of appeal was untimely, depriving us of jurisdiction. However, our supreme court reversed that decision in People v. Marker, 233 Ill. 2d 158 (2009), holding that the State may first file a timely motion to reconsider, and then file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the resolution of the motion to reconsider. Thus, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Further, we withdraw our grant of the State\u2019s motion to file a late notice of appeal as unnecessary, because the State\u2019s original notice of appeal was valid and vested us with jurisdiction over the appeal.\nOn appeal, the State argues that, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. The State contends that a police officer\u2019s activation of lights and siren does not automatically result in a seizure as of the moment of activation. Turning to defendant\u2019s arguments, the State contends that the trial court mechanically applied Laake\u2019s result (activating lights or siren behind a parked car results in a seizure at the moment the lights or siren are activated) without adequately considering Laake\u2019s admonition to fully consider the totality of the circumstances (Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 349). The State then advances the argument that there was no evidence to demonstrate that either defendant or Castronovo demonstrated that they were submitting to the authority of the police. Without such a submission, the State argues that there was no seizure of defendant or Castronovo before the officers were able to smell the scent of marijuana as defendant and Castronovo exited Castronovo\u2019s vehicle. The State concludes that, upon smelling the odor, the police had probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed and only after that point did a seizure of defendant and Castronovo occur. The State then argues that the trial court followed outdated and repudiated case law in determining that, upon the brief activation of lights and siren, defendant and Castronovo did not feel free to leave the encounter with the DEA agents. Using the proper analytical framework set forth in People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (2006), according to the State, results in the conclusion that no seizure took place until after defendant and Castronovo had exited Castronovo\u2019s vehicle. Last, the State argues that the search warrant gave them an adequate basis to approach Castronovo\u2019s vehicle. We address each contention in turn.\nIn reviewing a circuit court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, we are usually faced with questions of law and fact. People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175 (2003); People v. Rubio, 392 Ill. App. 3d 914, 930 n.2 (2009) (noting that appellate review of a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress often presents separate questions of law and fact). The factual issues are reviewed under the deferential manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard because the trial court is in a better position to determine the weight and credibility of the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and resolve conflicts in the witnesses\u2019 testimony. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 175. If we accept the trial court\u2019s factual determinations, then we review de novo whether suppression of the evidence is warranted under those facts. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 175. We remain free to engage in our own plenary review, assessing the facts in relation to the issues presented and drawing our own conclusions when deciding what relief is warranted. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 176. With these principles in mind, we turn to the State\u2019s contentions.\nThe State first contends that the trial court erred by mechanically applying the result in Laake. The State argues that, instead, the trial court should have looked to the totality of the circumstances, which would have led to the conclusion that no seizure occurred until after the agents had smelled the odor of marijuana in Castronovo\u2019s vehicle, conferring upon them probable cause to seize defendant and Castronovo. We disagree.\nTo understand the errors in the State\u2019s argument, we first look at Laake. In that case, the police received a tip at about 3 a.m. concerning a possible intoxicated driver. The officer sent to investigate did not see any vehicles or the reported intoxicated driver in the vicinity. The officer widened his search somewhat and discovered the defendant\u2019s car stopped on the shoulder of the road, pointing in the direction the tip gave for the intoxicated driver\u2019s heading, and with its brake lights on. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 347-48. The officer pulled behind the car and turned on his overhead emergency lights, explaining that the driver of the stopped car would have been able to see the flashing lights and that he turned on the flashing lights to alert other motorists, as the location was isolated and not well lighted. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 348. The officer approached the defendant\u2019s stopped car, detected a strong odor of alcohol from inside the car, and noticed that the defendant had glassy, bloodshot eyes and was slurring his speech. The defendant\u2019s car had a flat front passenger-side tire. The defendant also admitted to the officer that he had recently been driving in the location of the tip about a possible intoxicated driver. Eventually the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 348.\nThe court noted that the issue in the case was whether the officer approached the defendant under the community caretaking function or whether, upon activating his overhead lights, the officer had commanded the defendant to remain stopped. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 349. The court stated that the standard for determining whether a detention occurred during a police-citizen encounter was whether a reasonable, innocent person in the circumstances would believe that he or she was free to leave. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 349. The court further noted that it was required to evaluate all of the circumstances surrounding the incident when determining whether a detention occurred. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 349. The court held that it was well settled \u201cthat a police officer\u2019s use of overhead emergency lights, when directed at a particular person, would be interpreted by that person as a command to stay put.\u201d Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 350. The court held that the defendant, at whom the emergency lights were directed, \u201cwould have felt compelled to stay put for [the officer\u2019s] inquiries.\u201d Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 350.\nThis did not, however, end the court\u2019s inquiry. The court further noted that, although the defendant was technically detained as a result of the activation of the officer\u2019s emergency lights, the detention would not violate the fourth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. IV) unless it was unreasonable. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 350. The court held that the officer\u2019s stated purpose in stopping, namely, to check on the driver, was a proper purpose, opining that police officers routinely provide roadside assistance in addition to performing criminal investigations. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 350. The court also held that, because such assistance was designed to ensure public safety, any \u201cconcomitant technical detention\u201d was not unreasonable. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 350. Because the officer\u2019s purpose was a factual issue and the trial court\u2019s determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that the officer\u2019s real purpose was to conduct an investigation and that his invocation of community caretaking as his reason for stopping was a pretext or subterfuge. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 350.\nOur review of the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress and the trial court\u2019s rulings convinces us that the trial court, contrary to the State\u2019s contention, did not mechanically apply Laake but, instead, considered the totality of the circumstances. The evidence demonstrated that Brotan and the others were keeping Castronovo\u2019s house under surveillance prior to executing a search warrant for the house. The agents did not have a search warrant for Castronovo\u2019s car, and they did not have an arrest warrant for either Castronovo or defendant. Because the agents had learned that Castronovo might have a significantly dangerous arsenal stored in the house, they did not want to enter the house while Castronovo was present. Instead, they wanted Castronovo to leave the house, at which time they would approach him.\nCastronovo did leave his house and proceeded to drive away in his maroon Lincoln Town Car. The agents followed. Brotan testified that they did not observe Castronovo commit any traffic violations as Castronovo drove to his rendezvous with defendant. Brotan testified that, when Castronovo arrived, he parked on the street behind defendant\u2019s car. Again, Castronovo did not commit any violations parking behind defendant\u2019s car. Likewise, the testimony revealed that defendant\u2019s car was also legally parked. Brotan further testified that neither defendant nor Castronovo appeared to be in distress at any time before they exited Castronovo\u2019s vehicle.\nHilgers and Mott parked their vehicles behind Castronovo\u2019s and defendant\u2019s. As Hilgers was pulling in behind Castronovo, he activated his overhead emergency lights and siren. Hilgers and Mott then approached Castronovo\u2019s car and asked Castronovo and defendant to get out of the car. As Castronovo and defendant complied, Hilgers observed a plastic bag on the seat and both agents smelled the odor of marijuana coming from the inside of the vehicle. These facts are undisputed.\nUnder Laake, the activation of a police car\u2019s lights and siren directed at an individual is equivalent to a command to stop or to stay put. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 350. While the Laake court was able to find that the seizure engendered by the officer\u2019s activation of lights was reasonable because it served a community caretaking purpose (because the car there had pulled onto the shoulder of the road, the hour was late, and the officer testified that he intended to render assistance to the driver), such evidence is lacking in this case. In the first place, the testimony revealed that it was daytime in an urban, not isolated, environment, with other cars parked on the street. The agents had seen nothing that would suggest that either Castronovo or defendant was in any sort of distress or needed any assistance. The trial court carefully noted these circumstances in making its ruling. Laake did not stop its analysis at determining that a seizure had occurred. Instead, it properly went on to consider if the police-citizen encounter was reasonable. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 350. Because there was no evidence that Castronovo or defendant committed any traffic, parking, or other violations, we agree with the trial court\u2019s determination that the seizure of defendant and Castronovo, effected when Hilgers activated his lights and siren and directed them at Castronovo\u2019s parked car, was unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Accordingly, we reject the State\u2019s argument that the trial court applied Laake mechanically and failed to consider the totality of the circumstances.\nNext, the State contends that there was no evidence advanced during the hearing on the motion to suppress that demonstrated that defendant and Castronovo had submitted to the agents\u2019 show of authority when Hilgers activated his lights and siren. Additionally, the State contends that the trial court based its analysis on the wrong legal standard. We disagree with both contentions.\nThe State first contends that there was no evidence elicited from Brotan that defendant or Castronovo submitted to the show of the agents\u2019 authority. In support, the State cites to People v. Brodack, 296 Ill. App. 3d 71 (1998), and to Village of Mundelein v. Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d 842 (2003). In Brodack, the officer learned from a dispatch that a car was driving erratically and he received a partial license plate number. Eventually, the officer saw the defendant\u2019s car, which had a license plate number that agreed with the partial number given to the officer. The officer followed behind the defendant\u2019s car for 400 or 500 feet and then activated his overhead emergency lights and siren, but the defendant did not pull over. After continuing on for some distance, the defendant eventually pulled into a Jewel parking lot and stopped. Brodack, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 72. The defendant argued that he had been seized at the moment the officer activated his lights and siren. This court disagreed and held that a stop did not occur until the defendant actually submitted to the show of authority by pulling over and stopping. Brodack, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 75. This court held that the seizure did not occur until the defendant actually submitted to the officer\u2019s authority by stopping in the Jewel parking lot. Brodack, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 75.\nIn Thompson, this court again dealt with the issue of the point at which a seizure occurs. In Thompson, the officer received a dispatch indicating a possible drunk driver. The tipster was driving behind the suspect vehicle. As the officer pulled behind the suspect vehicle, the tipster stated to the dispatcher that the police car was right behind the vehicle. The officer activated his lights and attempted to stop the vehicle. Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 845. As this was occurring, the tipster gave his name to the dispatcher. As the tipster was giving his address to the dispatcher, the tipster exclaimed, \u201c \u2018 \u201cMan, this guy\u2019s refusing to stop.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 850.\nThe parties and the trial court all believed that a seizure occurred when the officer attempted to halt the suspect vehicle by activating his emergency lights or siren or both. Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 848. This court held that, to the contrary, the seizure occurred only when the suspect vehicle began to submit to the officer\u2019s show of authority. Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 849. We concluded that the seizure occurred after the tipster had given his name and address to the police (Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 850), rendering the tip reliable (Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 851). This court also noted that a seizure occurs either where physical force is used on the suspect or, absent the use of physical force, where the suspect submits to the assertion of authority, stating that \u201c[i]t is merely necessary but not sufficient that, taking all circumstances into consideration, a reasonable person in the position [of the defendant] at issue would have believed that he was not free to leave.\u201d (Emphases in original.) Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 848. (We note that this case was decided before Luedemann, perhaps explaining why this court included the \u201cfree-to-leave\u201d test in its analysis of when a seizure may be deemed to occur.)\nThe rule we draw from Brodack and Thompson is that a person who is fleeing from a show of authority has not submitted to it and, therefore, has not been seized. It is only when the person begins to submit to the assertion of authority, by stopping or by beginning to stop, that we may deem a seizure of the person to have occurred. Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 849; Brodack, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 75. The distinction between stopping and beginning to stop will not often be important; however, in a case like Thompson, where the issues include the reliability of a tipster\u2019s information, we may have to parse the circumstances very finely indeed. See Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 848-50 (in determining reliability of the tip, and where the tipster was talking to police simultaneously with the officer\u2019s efforts to stop the defendant, the court concluded that the evidence showed that the tipster gave police his name and address before the defendant began to stop his vehicle, thereby submitting to the officer\u2019s show of authority).\nThe State argues that \u201cno evidence was adduced to demonstrate either\u201d \u201ca demonstration of an exercise of physical force on the part of the police against the subject, or, [a] demonstration that there was a submission on the part of the subject to the authority of the police.\u201d To the contrary, upon Hilgers\u2019 \u201ctapping of the siren and flashing of overhead lights,\u201d both defendant and Castronovo followed the implied command to stay put. See Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 350 (activation of lights and siren directed at an individual is interpreted as a command to stay put). Defendant did not get out of the car and walk away. Rather, defendant stayed put, as he had been commanded to do by the activation of the lights and siren of Hilgers\u2019 vehicle, thereby submitting to the show of authority.\nThe State\u2019s contention also appears to cover a scenario in which neither defendant nor Castronovo submitted to the show of authority because they subjectively intended to remain at the spot regardless of any actions undertaken by the agents. In such a situation, they did not submit to the show of authority, because it had no impact upon their intentions and their actions. Under the State\u2019s analysis, they were not seized, because they were not submitting to the show of authority. Further, when the agents requested that defendant and Castronovo exit the car, they still were not seized, because this was a noninvestigative encounter between the agents and defendant and Castronovo. When Castronovo and defendant opened the car doors and exited, the agents smelled a particularly strong odor of marijuana, giving them probable cause to seize defendant and Castronovo, and it was only after this point, according to the State\u2019s argument, that the men were seized. The problem, however, with the State\u2019s contention is that it sweeps too broadly. If the target of the investigative stop flees, then he or she is obviously not submitting to the show of authority. If, however, the target does not flee, then he or she is still not submitting to the show of authority, because it was his or her intent to stand his or her ground regardless of the police presence. The fly in the ointment, however, is the fact that submission appears to be exactly the same as refusing to submit. The target stays put. If such behavior denotes both submission and refusal to submit, then our inquiry is removed from the objective reasonable person and focuses on the target\u2019s subjective intent, and this would both be contrary to the law as it has developed and disturb any predictability in search-and-seizure law. The State\u2019s argument, then, cannot be accepted.\nEven under the State\u2019s subjective-intent-to-stand-his-ground argument, however, we still conclude that a seizure occurred and that it was unjustified by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Accepting for the sake of argument that defendant subjectively did not intend to submit to a show of authority, the question that must be answered upon the show of authority is whether a reasonable innocent person would have felt free to leave or to terminate the encounter with the agents. Based on the totality of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, we conclude that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or to terminate the encounter. Upon the show of authority, then, defendant was seized because a reasonable innocent person in the same circumstances would not have felt free to leave or to terminate the encounter, notwithstanding his subjective intent to stay put even absent the show of authority. In other words, defendant\u2019s subjective intent to remain at the spot does not trump the objective inquiry of whether a reasonable innocent person would have felt free to leave or to terminate the encounter.\nAccordingly, we do not accept the State\u2019s contention that there was no evidence that defendant submitted to the agents\u2019 show of authority when Hilgers briefly activated his lights and siren, because the undisputed evidence showed that defendant did not flee or otherwise attempt to leave the location, and a reasonable innocent person in the same circumstances would not have felt free to leave or to terminate the encounter. Indeed, when the agents approached Castronovo\u2019s vehicle and asked defendant to get out of it, he again complied, further indicating his submission to police authority through his cooperation, both with the earlier command to stay put and with the current request to exit.\nWe agree with defendant that Village of Mundelein v. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d 216 (2004), is instructive. There, an officer received a report of erratic driving, located the suspect, and followed him to his apparent home, noting that the suspect did not drive erratically while the officer followed. As the suspect pulled into the driveway and got out of the car, the officer pulled up behind the defendant and activated his emergency lights either at this moment or shortly before reaching the driveway. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 218-19. The defendant apparently did not notice the police vehicle until he exited his car; at that point, the defendant stopped and did not feel free to leave. This court held that, when the defendant noticed the emergency lights, he submitted to the implied command to stay put and did not leave. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 220.\nWhile Minx is not quite the static situation presented in this case, it is instructive. The defendant in Minx was in his driveway when he noticed the officer\u2019s flashing emergency lights. The defendant in Minx stopped; he did not continue walking the few steps into his house. Likewise here. When Hilgers activated his lights and siren, defendant did not attempt to leave, but he stayed put. Obeying the implied command of the lights and siren to stay put qualifies as evidence of defendant\u2019s submission to the show of authority.\nIn addition, we hold that, after Hilgers had briefly activated his lights and siren, a reasonable innocent person would not have felt free to decline the encounter. See Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 550. An innocent person conversing with another in a legally parked car in the afternoon would reasonably believe that a police car pulling behind him or her and activating its lights and siren, albeit briefly, was evidencing the desire to engage in some sort of official police-citizen encounter that the person could not ignore, decline, or terminate. Thus, when the agents approached the car, the occupants had already been seized, and, as we held above, there were no grounds evident in the record to support such a seizure. Accordingly, the agents\u2019 detection of the odor of marijuana and their observation of the suspect plastic bag occurred after the improper seizure had taken place.\nNext, the State contends that the trial court relied, improperly, on the \u201cfree-to-leave\u201d test that was impliedly modified in Luedemann. The State argues that People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262 (2008), and Luedemann set forth the factors by which the occurrence of a seizure may be determined. Specifically, the factors include the threatening presence of several police officers, the officer\u2019s display of a weapon, physical touching of the citizen\u2019s person, and the use of language or tone of voice that indicates compliance with the officer\u2019s request may be compelled. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 274, 287; Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 553. In addition, factors indicative of a seizure of a parked car include boxing it in with other vehicles, the approach on all sides by many officers, pointing a gun at the suspect, ordering the suspect to place his hands on the wheel, and the use of flashing lights as a show of authority. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 557. The State asserts that only a single factor mentioned in Luedemann is present in this case, namely, flashing lights (and siren), and then only briefly, leading to the conclusion that defendant was not seized. We disagree. Our analysis of the circumstances above leads us to conclude that Hilgers\u2019 activation of the lights and siren was a sufficient show of authority to result in deeming defendant and Castronovo seized upon that activation.\nAdditionally, we note that the cases are legion in other jurisdictions in which the activation of lights or siren or both has been deemed a sufficient show of authority to result in the seizure of a parked car. See, e.g., Hammons v. State, 327 Ark. 520, 528, 940 S.W.2d 424, 428 (1997) (parked car was seized when the officer activated the emergency light; the emergency light was a show of authority that would indicate to a reasonable person he was not free to decline the encounter); People v. Bailey, 176 Cal. App. 3d 402, 405-06, 222 Cal. Rptr. 235, 236-37 (1985) (police pulled in behind a parked car and turned on emergency lights; the defendant was held to be seized because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or decline the encounter); State v. Donahue, 251 Conn. 636, 643, 742 A.2d 775, 780 (1999) (the defendant held to be seized at the moment the police pulled up behind his parked vehicle and switched on their flashing lights); Hrezo v. State, 780 So. 2d 194, 195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (when an officer activates emergency lights behind a lawfully parked vehicle, a reasonable person would expect to be stopped if he or she tried to drive away; the defendant was seized upon the activation of the emergency lights because such activation \u201cis typically regarded as an act that initiates an investigatory stop\u201d); State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 20, 72 P.3d 570, 577 (2003) (the defendant was seized at the moment the officers pulled up behind his parked car and activated their emergency lights); Lawson v. State, 120 Md. App. 610, 616-18, 707 A.2d 947, 951 (1998) (the activation of emergency lights was held to effect a seizure because it communicated to a reasonable person in the parked car the officer\u2019s intent to curtail the defendant\u2019s freedom to leave or avoid the encounter; the defendant complied with show of authority and remained stopped); State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 317 (Tenn. 2006) (the activation of emergency lights constituted a seizure because it was a show of authority from which a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or to decline the encounter); Wallace v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 497, 503, 528 S.E.2d 739, 741-42 (2000) (the driver in a parked vehicle was seized when the police car pulled in behind him and activated its emergency lights; such a person would not have felt free to leave or otherwise avoid the encounter); State v. Stroud, 30 Wash. App. 392, 396, 634 P.2d 316, 318-19 (1981) (court held that the defendant was seized at the moment the police pulled up behind the defendant\u2019s parked vehicle and switched on their emergency lights).\nWhile the flashing lights of a police car are a sufficient show of authority to effect a seizure, the seizure must still be found to be reasonable, and there is nothing in the evidence here to suggest any justification, such as the agents were performing a community caretaking function or otherwise promoting public safety to justify the seizure in this case. There was no testimony that defendant or Castronovo was in distress or needed aid (indeed, Brotan positively testified that he observed nothing to make him think that defendant was in any sort of medical or other difficulty). The State suggests that the activation of the lights and siren was to avoid any armed confrontation with defendant or Castronovo. That justification, however, strongly supports the idea that the agents were indeed seizing defendant and Castronovo. It likewise improperly relies on the agents\u2019 subjective intent in purporting to determine whether a seizure occurred. The State does not argue that there is anything in the record to support the seizure on the basis that defendant and Castronovo were armed or even that, if they were armed that fact would justify their seizure, which, according to the State, occurred later after probable cause had been developed. Even if we were to agree that flashing lights alone might not always result in a seizure, our review of the evidence and our consideration of the totality of the circumstances convince us that an unreasonable seizure did indeed occur when Hilgers activated his emergency lights and siren.\nAdditionally, while the \u201cfree-to-leave\u201d test may not recite the proper terminology in a traffic-type stop, the appropriate test, whether a reasonable, innocent person would have felt free to decline the officer\u2019s requests or to terminate the encounter (Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 550), is functionally the same as the \u201cfree-to-leave\u201d test and involves precisely the same considerations. We do not understand the trial court\u2019s use of the \u201cfree-to-leave\u201d test to be erroneous; rather we understand the trial court\u2019s statement that defendant did not feel free to leave to mean that defendant felt he had to acquiesce to the implied command to stay put and to cooperate with the agents\u2019 inquiries. Accordingly, we hold that defendant was seized when Hilgers activated his lights and siren, and we reject the State\u2019s contention that the seizure occurred only after defendant had exited Castronovo\u2019s vehicle and the agents had observed the plastic bag and smelled the odor of marijuana.\nLast, the State contends that the search warrant gave the agents an adequate basis to seize Castronovo and defendant. In support of this argument, the State cites to Rochon v. State, 2008 OK CR 1, 176 P.3d 362. In Rochon, the police had a warrant to search the defendant\u2019s home. Before they could execute the search, the defendant and another male drove away in the defendant\u2019s car. The officer maintaining surveillance on the defendant\u2019s home requested a uniformed officer to stop the defendant\u2019s car. The uniformed officer stopped the defendant\u2019s car, noting that neither the defendant nor the other man was wearing a seatbelt. Rochon, 2008 OK CR 1, 114, 176 P.3d 362, 363. About 20 or 25 minutes into the stop of the defendant, the officers executing the search warrant at the defendant\u2019s house discovered illegal drugs in plain sight. Thereupon, the defendant was arrested and taken back to his house and held there while the search of the house was completed. Rochon, 2008 OK CR 1, 115, 176 P.3d 362, 363.\nOn appeal, the defendant argued that his detention for the traffic stop was illegal because it lasted longer than necessary to accomplish the purpose of the stop. The court, however, held that the defendant was lawfully detained while his house was being searched pursuant to the lawful search warrant. Rochon, 2008 OK CR 1, 119, 176 P.3d 362, 363-64. The court based this conclusion on the case of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981), in which the Supreme Court held:\n\u201cIf the evidence that a citizen\u2019s residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen\u2019s privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home. Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.\u201d Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 351, 101 S. Ct. at 2595.\nThe Supreme Court further held that the law enforcement interests served by the detention included the prevention of harm to officers and residents, the prevention of flight by the suspect, and the orderly completion of the search, which was facilitated by the presence of the occupants. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 350, 101 S. Ct. at 2594. Subsequently, in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 99 n.2, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 307 n.2, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 1470 n.2 (2005), the Supreme Court held that \u201cSummers makes clear that when a neutral magistrate has determined police have probable cause to believe contraband exists, \u2018[t]he connection of an occupant to [a] home\u2019 alone \u2018justifies a detention of that occupant.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d\nThe Rochon court used these holdings, plus a Tenth Circuit case interpreting them, to determine that the defendant was simply being detained as the police executed a lawful warrant to search his home for contraband. Rochon, 2008 OK CR 1, 119, 176 P.3d 362, 364. The Rochon court noted that the defendant\u2019s detention occurred as soon as practicable, due to the surveilling officer\u2019s decision to have a uniformed police officer make the stop, and further, the defendant\u2019s return to his house served the purpose, under Summers, of facilitating the orderly completion of the search of the premises, because the defendant was able to give the police the combination to a safe in which contraband was discovered, thereby allowing the police to complete the search without destroying the defendant\u2019s property. Rochon, 2008 OK CR 1, 1111, 176 P.3d 362, 365.\nWhile there are similarities to Rochon, this case is nevertheless distinguishable. Importantly, there was no evidence to demonstrate that defendant and Castronovo were being detained at the same time the police or the DEA were executing the search warrant on Castronovo\u2019s residence. Because of this lack of evidence, we cannot conclude that Castronovo\u2019s detention (and, by extension, defendant\u2019s) played any part in facilitating an orderly search of Castronovo\u2019s residence. Rather, Brotan testified only that he was \u201cinvolved\u201d in a search warrant and did not execute the search warrant at the residence before stopping Castronovo. Based on these distinctions, we find that Rochon does not apply. Rather, much like United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1996), the case Rochon cited in which the defendant was detained in a traffic stop by the side of the road but never returned to his residence during the search, leading the court to conclude that the traffic detention of the defendant played no part in facilitating the orderly execution of the search being carried out close by, we too believe that the detention here could have played no part in facilitating the orderly completion of the search warrant for Castronovo\u2019s house. Because the detention of defendant fulfilled no proper purpose, the search warrant for Castronovo\u2019s house cannot provide an adequate basis for the seizure of defendant.\nLast, we note that the State argues that the trial court erred in determining that the DEA agents \u201cstopped\u201d Castronovo\u2019s car despite the testimony that Castronovo\u2019s car was already legally parked and was not in motion at the time the agents pulled in behind it. According to the State, this mistaken premise on the trial court\u2019s part \u201cled to a flawed analysis\u201d and reversible error. We disagree.\nIn the first instance, we note that we do not look to the propriety of the trial court\u2019s reasoning, but rather, we review the trial court\u2019s result. It does not matter if the trial court used \u201ca flawed analysis\u201d so long as the trial court reached the correct result. Here, we have held that the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress evidence. Second, and more importantly, the record clearly demonstrates that the trial court correctly apprehended the circumstances and did not use an \u201cerroneous premise\u201d in analyzing the issues in this case. The court explained to the parties:\n\u201cWhen I use that phrase, \u2018pull the vehicle over,\u2019 the vehicle had stopped. There were two vehicles involved. The vehicle stopped, and the officers pulled over.\nWhen I make reference to stopping of the vehicle, when the officer places the Mars lights or red lights on and activates the siren, I use that phrase. At that point in time I believe there was a stop. That\u2019s just so it\u2019s clear on the record.\u201d\nThe court\u2019s explanation makes clear that it was attempting to conform its explanation to standard terminology used in traffic stops or Terry stops. The State\u2019s contention is without merit.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcLAREN and JORGENSEN, JJ., concur.\nPresiding Justice Lytton, in People v. Roa, 377 Ill. App. 3d 190, 203-04 (2007) (Lytton, PJ., specially concurring), vacated, 229 Ill. 2d 687 (2009), recognized that our supreme court, in Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 550, held the \u201cfree-to-leave test\u201d to be an erroneous standard in cases involving an independent restraint of the defendant by a vehicle. Instead, Luedemann held that the appropriate inquiry was whether a reasonable, innocent person would feel free to decline the officer\u2019s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 550.\nWe note that the Laake court also relied on the officer\u2019s subjective intent of rendering assistance to the driver. Our supreme court has recently reiterated that the police officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant, because the reasonableness of the seizure is considered only objectively. People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545, 566 (2008). We, therefore, do not consider Brotan\u2019s testimony about his (subjective) purpose in stopping behind Castronovo\u2019s car. To the extent that it based its determination on the officer\u2019s subjective intent, Laake erred and we do not follow it.\nLikewise, in both People v. Luedemann, 357 Ill. App. 3d 411, 419-20 (2005), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (2006), and People v. Mitchell, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1033-34 (2005), this court noted that, with respect to the community caretaking doctrine, courts have been willing to inquire into the police officer\u2019s subjective mental state for initiating an encounter with a citizen in determining whether a seizure could be justified. In light of our supreme court\u2019s holding in Wear, that the officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant, we do not believe that these statements in our Luedemann opinion and in Mitchell remain viable, and we can no longer follow them.\nJustice O\u2019Malley, writing for the majority, criticized Minx in People v. DiPace, 354 Ill. App. 3d 104 (2004). The point of disagreement, however, concerned Minx\u2019s analysis of the reliability of the tip and the tipster. Here, by contrast, we are concerned with the issue of when submission to a show of authority is evidenced. DiPace did not criticize Minx\u2019s treatment of that issue.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Philip J. Nicolosi, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Lawrence M. Bauer and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Thomas A. Lilien and Vicki E Kouros, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRANDON J. CASH, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201408\u20140245\nOpinion filed December 10, 2009.\nPhilip J. Nicolosi, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Lawrence M. Bauer and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nThomas A. Lilien and Vicki E Kouros, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0931-01", "first_page_order": 947, "last_page_order": 967 }