{ "id": 4293427, "name": "ANTONI MATEJCZYK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Matejczyk v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "2009-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201408\u20141208", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "13", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "911 N.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Claims dismissed without an opportunity to amend are final even if the case is not dismissed in its entirety\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4288868 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "\"Claims dismissed without an opportunity to amend are final even if the case is not dismissed in its entirety\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385513 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3614077 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "900 N.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283246 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" }, { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "809 N.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5462174 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "901 N.E.2d 986", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283398 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" }, { "page": "888" }, { "page": "888-89" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "889-90" }, { "page": "893" }, { "page": "894" }, { "page": "893" }, { "page": "895" }, { "page": "894" }, { "page": "894" }, { "page": "895-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 N.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778589 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "832 N.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5730930 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1000" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 1082", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140254 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "916 N.E.2d 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4290524 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 N.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Rein I" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5209231 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13-14", "parenthetical": "Rein I" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "14-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 1199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55986 ], "weight": 24, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339-40" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "339-40" }, { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "337-39" }, { "page": "328" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331-32" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "341" }, { "page": "342", "parenthetical": "\"Until the plaintiffs attempted to refile *** no reason existed for defendants to object\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 N.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2965210 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477544 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "889 N.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706768 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "472-73" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "480", "parenthetical": "\"had the plaintiffs themselves not insisted on bringing a negligence suit against an entity that is statutorily immune, they would not be in [this] predicament\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "07 L 9824", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Lans. Ch.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "06 L 11961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Lans. Ch.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 981, "char_count": 32048, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6733484630896141e-07, "percentile": 0.6962998614977166 }, "sha256": "d42107d7f3c9ddb2fa98939d511cb5c1e7d81294b9737e72739ddea3eafbe461", "simhash": "1:7f2475f3b169d5f4", "word_count": 5296 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:15:46.302641+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ANTONI MATEJCZYK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Antoni Matejczyk, appeals from the dismissal of his negligence complaint against the defendant, the City of Chicago (the City), on res judicata grounds. In November 2006, Matejczyk filed an initial complaint, under circuit court number 06 L 11961, to recover for injuries he allegedly sustained while walking on a public sidewalk. Thereafter, Matejczyk filed a two-count, amended complaint. The City filed a motion to dismiss count II pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619(a)(9) (West 2006)) as barred by the statute of limitations. On August 31, 2007, Judge Jeffrey Lawrence granted the City\u2019s motion to dismiss count II, with Matejczyk being granted leave to refile count II within 28 days. On September 5, 2007, Matejczyk instead filed a second amended complaint with a single count. The following day, Matejczyk voluntarily dismissed his one-count, second amended complaint. On September 18, 2007, Matejczyk filed, under circuit court number 07 L 9824, a new lawsuit with two counts in which he acknowledged the new action was a refiling of the complaint filed in 2006. Judge Diane Larsen granted the City\u2019s motion to dismiss the 2007 complaint on res judicata grounds; Matejczyk appeals.\nBecause Matejczyk filed his one-count, second amended complaint after the entry of the order of August 31, 2007, which granted the City\u2019s motion to dismiss count II on the merits, the voluntary dismissal of his second amended complaint triggered res judicata as to the entire cause of action, barring this subsequent refiling. Consequently, we affirm.\nBACKGEOUND\nOn November 15, 2006, Matejczyk filed a one-count negligence complaint against the City, seeking recovery for injuries he allegedly sustained when he fell on November 26, 2005, on a public sidewalk. Matejczyk alleged that he fell in a lV2-inch deep hole left in the sidewalk after a traffic signal installed in the forties was removed on February 8, 1985. He alleged that the City breached its duty by failing to fill the hole, post any warnings, or barricade the area surrounding the hole.\nOn June 19, 2007, Matejczyk filed a first amended complaint, which contained two counts. Each count repeated the allegations that the City failed to fill the hole, post any warnings, or barricade the area surrounding the hole. However, while count I alleged that the signal was removed \u201c[sjometime after 1996,\u201d count II alleged that the signal was removed on February 8, 1985.\nThe City filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619(a)(9) (West 2006)). The City argued that it was immune from liability for the claims in both counts regarding its failure to warn or barricade the area pursuant to section 3\u2014104 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) (745 ILCS 10/3\u2014104 (West 2006)), and that count II was barred by the applicable 10-year statute of limitations in the Code (735 ILCS 5/13\u2014214(b) (West 2006)). On August 31, 2007, Judge Lawrence entered an order granting the motion to dismiss \u201cas to all allegations regarding failure to barricade or warn.\u201d The order also granted the City\u2019s motion to dismiss count II as barred by the statute of limitations; Matejczyk was granted leave to replead count II \u201cshould [he] wish to do so within 28 days.\u201d The order did not contain Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), and Matejczyk did not seek to appeal.\nOn September 5, 2007, Matejczyk filed a second amended complaint containing only one count. That count again alleged that the City breached its duty by failing to fill the hole, post any warnings, or barricade the area surrounding the hole, which was allegedly caused by the removal of the signal \u201cprior to November 26, 2005.\u201d The following day, September 6, 2007, Matejczyk moved to voluntarily dismiss the suit. The same day, Judge Lawrence voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice in what was styled an \u201cagreed order.\u201d\nTwelve days later, on September 18, 2007, Matejczyk filed the present action under a new circuit court number. His complaint acknowledged that it was a \u201cre-filing\u201d of the prior case. Matejczyk again alleged that \u201cprior to November 26, 2005,\u201d the City removed the traffic signal, breaching its duty by failing to fill the hole, post any warnings, or barricade the area surrounding the hole. On December 19, 2007, the City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(4) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619(a)(4) (West 2006)) as barred by res judicata. On April 16, 2008, Judge Diane Larsen granted the City\u2019s motion to dismiss with prejudice, \u201chaving found that this issue is controlled by Hudson v. City of Chicago, [228 Ill. 2d 462, 889 N.E.2d 210 (2008)].\u201d Matejczyk timely appeals from that order.\nANALYSIS\nRes judicata bars a subsequent action if (1) a final judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) there is an identity of parties or their privies, and (3) there is an identity of cause of action. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 467, citing Downing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 162 Ill. 2d 70, 73-74, 642 N.E.2d 456 (1994). \u201cRes judicata bars not only what was actually decided in the first action but also whatever could have been decided.\u201d Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 467, citing La Salle National Bank v. County Board of School Trustees, 61 Ill. 2d 524, 529, 337 N.E.2d 19 (1975). Matejczyk concedes that his 2006 lawsuit and his 2007 lawsuit arose from the same incident and involved identical parties, meeting the second and third elements of res judicata. His only dispute is with the finding that the 2006 lawsuit ended with a final judgment on the merits, the first element of res judicata.\nA. Ruling on the Merits\nMatejczyk first contends that res judicata does not apply because no final order on the merits was entered in the 2006 suit to trigger the doctrine. Matejczyk argues that in both the 2006 and 2007 lawsuits, he alleged only a single cause of action for negligence. He contends it was this single cause of action that he voluntarily dismissed on September 6, 2007, under the 2006 case number, which he refiled on September 18, 2007, as a new action under the 2007 case number, the subject of this appeal.\nThe City counters that Judge Lawrence\u2019s August 31, 2007, order granting its motion to dismiss count II was a final adjudication on the merits of that count in the then-pending two-count complaint. While the negligence theory of recovery was shared by the two counts, the respective allegation in paragraph 3 of each count differed. It was Matejczyk that pled his cause of action in two counts, which the City properly addressed as distinct claims. Matejczyk should not be allowed on appeal to recast his first amended complaint into one that seeks to render pointless Judge Lawrence\u2019s ruling. We agree with the City.\nThe significance of a dismissal of certain counts in a complaint was the preliminary question in Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 339-40, 665 N.E.2d 1199 (1996). In Rein, actions of various plaintiffs were consolidated; the complaints asserted counts based on common law and counts seeking rescission. Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 230 Ill. App. 3d 12, 13-14, 595 N.E.2d 565 (1992) (Rein I). The rescission counts were dismissed by the circuit court as barred by the statute of limitations. Rein I, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 14. Subsequently, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining common law counts and appealed the dismissal of the rescission counts. Rein I, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 14-15. The Second District in Rein I affirmed the dismissal. Rein I, 230 Ill. App. 3d 12. On review of Rein I, the supreme court phrased the initial question as \u201cwhether the dismissal of the rescission counts in Rein I was a final judgment on the merits.\u201d Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 335. The court noted, \u201cThe trial judge in Rein I dismissed the rescission counts with prejudice, pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(5) of the Code, as being barred by the statute of limitations in section 13(D) of the [Illinois Securities Law of 1953 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 121\u00bd, pars. 137.12 (F), (G))].\u201d Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 335. As authority that the dismissal was a final judgment on the merits, the court cited to Supreme Court Rule 273: \u201c \u2018Unless the order of dismissal or a statute of this State otherwise specifies, an involuntary dismissal of an action, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.\u2019 \u201d Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 335, quoting 134 Ill. 2d R. 273. The court noted a dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits under \u201cRule 273 *** only to an involuntary dismissal of an action, such as that which occurs when a motion to dismiss under section 2\u2014615 or 2\u2014619 of the Code is granted.\u201d Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 335-36.\nWe note that count II of Matejczyk\u2019s 2006 first amended complaint was dismissed by Judge Lawrence pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(9) of the Code as barred by the statute of limitations. To quote the supreme court in Rein, it follows, \u201c[therefore, under Rule 273, the trial judge\u2019s decision to grant [the City\u2019s] motion to dismiss [count II] *** based on the applicable statute of limitations is a final adjudication on the merits and operates as a final judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata.\u201d Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 336.\nMatejczyk\u2019s contention that his case differs from Rein because Judge Lawrence\u2019s order did not specify the dismissal of count II \u201cwith prejudice\u201d is unavailing. \u201c \u2018[T]he effect of a dismissal order is determined by its substance and not by the incantation of any particular magic words,\u2019 and therefore, a trial court\u2019s description of a final judgment as being \u2018without prejudice\u2019 or \u2018with prejudice\u2019 is not determinative\u201d of its finality. Kiefer v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 394 Ill. App. 3d 485, 494, 916 N.E.2d 22 (2009), quoting Schal Bovis, Inc. v. Casualty Insurance Co., 314 Ill. App. 3d 562, 568, 732 N.E.2d 1082 (1999). As the supreme court made clear, \u201c[T]he use of \u2018without prejudice\u2019 language is not sufficient to protect a plaintiff against the bar of res judicata when another part of plaintiffs case has gone to final judgment in a previous action: \u2018the trial judge\u2019s granting plaintiffs\u2019 motion to voluntarily dismiss the common law counts without prejudice under section 2\u20141009 should not be interpreted as immunizing plaintiffs against defenses defendants may raise when the voluntarily dismissed counts were refiled.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 472 n.2, quoting Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 342.\nAs we noted, Judge Lawrence\u2019s order granted Matejczyk leave to refile count II within 28 days. However, while count I remained pending sans the allegations regarding the City\u2019s failure to warn or barricade the area, Matejczyk did not refile count II; rather, he filed a single-count, second amended complaint. Matejczyk\u2019s contention that the two counts in his first amended complaint are \u201cvirtually identical\u201d except for the date set out in the respective paragraph 3 makes clear that the dismissal order as to count II was a final judgment on the merits because count II violated the statute of limitations based on the date alleged in that count\u2019s paragraph 3. But for that date, count II would have been identical to count I. Moreover, as the court noted in Rein, the dismissal of a count as barred by the statute of limitations is a ruling on the merits under Rule 273. The language of Rule 273 makes no distinction between a dismissal with prejudice and without; rather, the necessary condition under Rule 273 is an involuntary dismissal, which Judge Lawrence\u2019s order of August 31, 2007, clearly was as brought on by the City\u2019s 2\u2014619 motion to dismiss. It is also reasonable to conclude that the dismissal of count II was for all practical purposes a dismissal with prejudice because count II could not be repled with the same date alleged in paragraph 3, the only difference between count II and count I. The involuntary dismissal left Matejczyk with a single viable claim against the City in his first amended complaint. That Matejczyk recognized that his two-count, first amended complaint was reduced to a single count is reflected in his second amended complaint filed immediately thereafter with a single count.\nMatejczyk\u2019s overly broad contention that \u201c[tjhere is no indication that the court intended to dispose of an entire cause of action, or grant a final disposition of the whole case\u201d is simply beside the point. It is certainly true that Judge Lawrence\u2019s order of August 31, 2007, did not dispose of the whole case; in fact, count I was unaffected except for Judge Lawrence\u2019s ruling that certain allegations were barred by section 3\u2014104 of the Act. Matejczyk was granted leave to refile count II if he wished to do so. Matejczyk elected, however, to file a second amended complaint with a single count. Upon the filing of the second amended complaint, Matejczyk was free to pursue that single-count complaint to a final judgment. However, Matejczyk was not free to voluntarily dismiss his second amended complaint without exposing his subsequently refiled complaint to a possible res judicata defense based on the prohibition against claim-splitting. See Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 472-73, citing Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 339-40.\nNo persuasive argument is put forth by Matejczyk to avoid the clear holding in Rein that the dismissal of count II, albeit with leave to refile, was a final judgment on the merits of count II as it was pled in Matejczyk\u2019s first amended complaint. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 335-36. We reject Matejczyk\u2019s unpersuasive contentions to the contrary. We now address the consequences that flow from the voluntary dismissal of Matejczyk\u2019s second amended complaint, in light of the final judgment order dismissing count II on its merits.\nB. Claim-Splitting\nThe City contends that Matejczyk engaged in claim-splitting when he voluntarily dismissed his one-count, second amended complaint after count II had been dismissed by Judge Lawrence from his first amended complaint only to refile both claims in his 2007 lawsuit. This triggers the rule in Rein: \u201cRein *** stands for the proposition that a plaintiff who splits his claims by voluntarily dismissing and refiling part of an action after a final judgment has been entered on another part of the case subjects himself to a res judicata defense.\u201d Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 473, citing Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 337-39. \u201cWhether a subsequent claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata is a question of law which is reviewed de novo.\u201d Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp. v. Chicago Union Station Co., 358 Ill. App. 3d 985, 1000, 832 N.E.2d 214 (2005). We review Rein\u2019s analysis on claim-splitting and Hudson to determine whether Judge Larsen was correct that the issue presented by this case \u201cis controlled by Hudson.\u201d Our focus is on the City\u2019s contention that Matejczyk engaged in claim-splitting.\nIn Rein, the plaintiffs filed an eight-count complaint that sought recovery under both rescission and common law theories. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 328. The circuit court dismissed the rescission counts with prejudice, finding the rescission counts barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 329. However, no Rule 304(a) language was included in the order to render the dismissal of the rescission counts immediately appealable. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 330. It appears the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the then-pending complaint with its remaining common law counts in order to appeal the dismissal of the rescission counts. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 331. After the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the rescission counts, the plaintiffs filed a new complaint that was virtually identical to the original, with both rescission and common law counts. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 331. The defendants moved to dismiss the entire complaint on res judicata grounds; the circuit court granted the motion. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 331-32. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal in Rein I and the supreme court granted the plaintiffs leave to appeal. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 332.\nAs we noted in the preceding section, the dismissal of the rescission counts in the original complaint constituted \u201ca final adjudication on the merits[, which] operate[d] as a final judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata.\u201d Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 336. Our focus here is on the court\u2019s analysis of the rule against claim-splitting: the rule \u201cprohibits a plaintiff from suing for part of a claim in one action and then suing for the remainder in another action. [Citations.]\u201d Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 340. As the court explained: \u201cTo avoid the bar of res judicata, plaintiffs could have proceeded to a decision on the merits of the common law counts *** and, if unsuccessful, appealed both the result regarding the common law counts and the trial judge\u2019s order dismissing the rescission counts with prejudice.\u201d Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 340. Because res judicata bars \u201cnot only every matter that was actually determined in the first suit, but also every matter that might have been raised and determined,\u201d the plaintiffs were barred from refiling the voluntarily dismissed common law counts, on which no ruling on the merits was issued, because the common law counts could have been adjudicated in the earlier suit. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 338, citing Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 490, 626 N.E.2d 225 (1993).\nAs the Rein holding made clear, the plaintiffs were required to delay challenging the dismissal of the rescission counts until a decision on the merits of the remaining common law counts was rendered. If the on-the-merits ruling on the common law counts gave the plaintiffs a full remedy, it would presumably render moot the earlier decision dismissing the rescission counts. If the on-the-merits ruling on the common law counts went against the plaintiffs, then the plaintiffs could seek appellate review of both that ruling and the earlier decision dismissing the rescission counts.\nIn Hudson, the plaintiffs filed a complaint containing one negligence count and one willful and wanton misconduct count. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 464. Some three years after the circuit court dismissed the negligence count with prejudice, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining willful and wanton misconduct count. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 466. Another year later, the plaintiffs refiled the willful and wanton misconduct count in a new suit. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 466. The circuit court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds and the appellate court affirmed. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 466.\nOn review, our supreme court in Hudson once again applied the rule against claim-splitting it discussed in Rein. Our supreme court held that \u201ca plaintiff who splits his claims by voluntarily dismissing and refiling part of an action after a final judgment has been entered on another part of the case subjects himself to a res judicata defense.\u201d Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 473. The dismissal of the negligence count in the plaintiffs\u2019 original suit \u201c \u2018operate[d] as an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata.\u2019 \u201d Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 473, citing Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 338. Once again, in Hudson, the plaintiffs failed to delay the challenge to the dismissal of the negligence count until there was a ruling on the merits on the willful and wanton count. Had the plaintiffs obtained a successful final judgment on the willful and wanton count, it might have rendered moot the earlier decision dismissing the negligence count. Had judgment on the willful and wanton count gone against the plaintiffs, then the plaintiffs could have sought a review of both that ruling and the earlier decision dismissing the negligence count. Because the remaining willful and wanton misconduct claim could have been resolved in the litigation pending before the circuit court, the plaintiffs were barred from relitigating it in a separately filed suit even though no express ruling on its merits was entered. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 474.\nWe read Rein and Hudson to establish that a dismissal on the merits by the circuit court of one or more counts in a complaint puts the plaintiff on notice that, should he elect to take a voluntary dismissal under section 2\u20141009 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2\u20141009 (West 2006)) for whatever reason, he risks triggering the res judicata bar to refiling. The rule made clear in Rein and Hudson flows directly from the policy considerations behind the res judicata doctrine. \u201c \u2018Res judicata promotes judicial economy by preventing repetitive litigation and [additionally] protects parties from being forced to bear the unjust burden of relitigating essentially the same case.\u2019 \u201d Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., 387 Ill. App. 3d 887, 890, 901 N.E.2d 986 (2009), quoting Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 533, 809 N.E.2d 88 (2004). To allow the splitting of claims or causes of action even in the absence of a ruling on the merits of all claims or all causes of action is contrary to the policy consideration central to res judicata of promoting finality.\nAlthough a plaintiff may disagree with a circuit court\u2019s ruling dismissing a count in a multicount complaint, it is unquestionably a ruling on the merits of the dismissed count under Rule 273 as an involuntary dismissal. 134 Ill. 2d R. 273. The remaining portion of the complaint, with its viable counts, must proceed to final judgment, else risk triggering res judicata.\nTo allow voluntary dismissal of viable counts in a complaint following an involuntary dismissal of other counts with unfettered refiling of the complaint, in whole or in part, would unavoidably encourage splitting of claims or causes of action. When a circuit court issues a ruling on the merits that results in the dismissal of a count, litigation of the remaining complaint, subject to certain exceptions discussed below, must be pursued to a final judgment. To allow the voluntary dismissal of the remaining viable counts, with the right to refile, would by definition promote piecemeal litigation. Such a result is contrary to the policy consideration of promoting finality embedded in res judicata. In other words, a final judgment on the merits of an involuntarily dismissed count of a multicount complaint will render a voluntary dismissal of all remaining counts equally final to the dismissed count. To hold otherwise would promote piecemeal litigation when remaining counts are deemed to have sufficient merit to continue with litigation.\nJudge Lawrence\u2019s order of August 31, 2007, dismissing count II of the first amended complaint was a final order, the finality of which carried over to the remaining count when Matejczyk voluntarily dismissed the remaining complaint on September 6, 2007. Stated differently, the August 31, 2007, order dismissing count II rendered the voluntary dismissal of Matejczyk\u2019s second amended complaint a final judgment on the merits, which precluded the refiling of the same claims under the 2007 case number, the subject of this appeal.\nC. Exceptions to Claim-Splitting\nFinally, Matejczyk argues that his case triggers exceptions to the rule against claim-splitting described in Rein and Hudson. Specifically, Matejczyk argues that two exceptions to the rule apply here: \u201c \u2018(1) the parties have agreed in terms or in effect that plaintiff may split his claim or the defendant has acquiesced therein; [and] (2) the court in the first action expressly reserved the plaintiffs right to maintain the second action.\u2019 \u201d Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 472, quoting Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 341. Neither of Matejczyk\u2019s contentions that either of the two exceptions applies is persuasive.\nFirst, we reject his entirely unsupported argument that Judge Lawrence\u2019s order voluntarily dismissing his original case signaled the City\u2019s acquiescence to claim-splitting simply because it was titled an \u201cagreed order.\u201d Neither the form nor the language of that order in any way indicates that the City intended to allow Matejczyk to refile his claim at a later date. Nor was the City required to voice its objection to refiling before Matejczyk attempted to refile. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 342 (\u201cUntil the plaintiffs attempted to refile *** no reason existed for defendants to object\u201d). When Matejczyk did refile, the City promptly moved to dismiss on res judicata grounds, which negates Matejczyk\u2019s claim that the City acquiesced in the refiling.\nSecond, we reject Matejczyk\u2019s argument that Judge Lawrence expressly reserved Matejczyk\u2019s right to maintain a second action by granting him leave to refile count II within 28 days. There is no indication in the record that the dismissal order was written with an exception to claim-splitting in mind. Judge Lawrence\u2019s order contained no language granting Matejczyk the right to file a subsequent suit seeking identical relief despite the general prohibition against claim-splitting. Allowing him to refile would not be \u201cwithin the purpose and spirit\u201d of the exception as Matejczyk claims; the exception clearly applies only where the circuit court expressly reserves the plaintiff\u2019s right to refile.\nMatejczyk also contends that this case should be allowed to proceed to trial based upon this court\u2019s recent decision in Piagentini. We find that case distinguishable.\nIn Piagentini, the plaintiffs were injured in a car accident and filed suit against the automobile manufacturer. Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 888. The eight counts in the plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint sought recovery on strict liability and negligence theories, but shared allegations that the defendant\u2019s car was designed with insufficient stability and lacked an adequate seatbelt system. Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 888-89. Based on the plaintiffs\u2019 failure to disclose any witnesses to substantiate its \u201cinsufficient stability\u201d allegations, the circuit court entered an agreed order for partial summary judgment related to those allegations. Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 889. That order dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, but granted leave to replead under both theories so long as the counts did not include any allegations regarding stability. Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 889. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint excluding the stability allegations, but later voluntarily dismissed that complaint. Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 889. Nearly a year later, the plaintiffs refiled their claims, including those relating to vehicle stability. Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 889. After litigating for 3xk years, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds only three months prior to trial, which the circuit court granted. Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90.\nThis court reversed the dismissal, holding that the circuit court\u2019s partial summary judgment order in the original suit was not final because it \u201cwas granted as to certain allegations within separate counts of the complaint but no actual count was dismissed.\u201d Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 893. Because \u201cboth counts [of the original complaint] remained standing as bases for recovery,\u201d the order did not dispose of a separate branch of the controversy and was not final. Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 894. As an independent basis for its decision, the Piagentini court also reasoned that the circuit court\u2019s summary judgment order was not final because it \u201cdismissed the complaint in its entirety but expressly granted plaintiffs 28 days in which to replead those allegations relating to defective seatbelts.\u201d Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 893. Relying on Jackson v. Victory Memorial Hospital, 387 Ill. App. 3d 342, 352, 900 N.E.2d 309 (2008), the Piagentini court held that \u201can order dismissing a complaint is not final until the trial court enters an order dismissing the suit with prejudice.\u201d Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 895, citing Jackson, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 352.\nNeither of the bases supporting the Piagentini decision applies here. Unlike the circuit court\u2019s order in Piagentini, Judge Lawrence\u2019s order did not leave \u201cboth counts [of the initial complaint] standing as bases for recovery\u201d (Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 894); instead, Judge Lawrence dismissed one of the two counts of Matejczyk\u2019s amended complaint, in addition to claims that the City failed to properly warn about the hole or barricade it. This order disposed of a \u201cseparate branch\u201d of the controversy and was therefore final. Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 894, citing Hull v. City of Chicago, 165 Ill. App. 3d 732, 733, 520 N.E.2d 720 (1987). Further, unlike the order in Piagentini dismissing the case in its entirety, Judge Lawrence\u2019s order dismissed only part of Matejczyk\u2019s original complaint, with leave to replead, if he wished, the remainder; because the entire complaint was not dismissed, leave was not granted to replead the complaint in its entirety because the date alleged in count II fell outside the statute of limitations. As discussed earlier, dismissal of count II rendered Judge Lawrence\u2019s ruling a final judgment on the merits of count II. Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 502-03, 687 N.E.2d 871 (1997); see also Doe v. Gleicher, 393 Ill. App. 3d 31, 36, 911 N.E.2d 532 (2009) (\u201cClaims dismissed without an opportunity to amend are final even if the case is not dismissed in its entirety\u201d).\nIf Matejczyk desired review of Judge Lawrence\u2019s August 31, 2007, order, he was obligated to litigate his suit to judgment on count I, which he premised on his claim that the City negligently failed to fill the hole, and only then appeal the earlier involuntary dismissal of count II and his alternative claims. Of course, given that counts I and II were nearly identical but for the date allegation, litigation of count I to a final judgment would likely have rendered the dismissal of count II moot. However, rather than continue with the litigation, Matejczyk inexplicably elected to file a new suit. Had Matejczyk not insisted on pursuing his negligence suit in two counts that offered him no greater chance of recovery, he would not be in the predicament he finds himself today. See Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 480 (\u201chad the plaintiffs themselves not insisted on bringing a negligence suit against an entity that is statutorily immune, they would not be in [this] predicament\u201d).\nCONCLUSION\nMatejczyk\u2019s first amended 2006 complaint contained two counts, each including claims based upon the City\u2019s failure to fill the hole, post any warnings, or barricade the area surrounding the hole in a public sidewalk. On August 31, 2007, Judge Lawrence dismissed count II. Under Rule 273, that order was a final adjudication on the merits of count II. As such, the order bars Matejczyk, after a voluntary dismissal of that litigation, from refiling in his 2007 lawsuit those claims that could have been litigated in his original 2006 suit. We affirm Judge Larsen\u2019s dismissal of this refiling on res judicata grounds.\nAffirmed.\nHALL, RJ., and LAMPKIN, J., concur.\nThe Piagentini court separately found that even if the summary judgment order was a final ruling on the merits, the defendant acquiesced in the refiling of the suit when the defendant waited over 3V2 years before filing its motion to dismiss based on res judicata. Piagentini, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 895-96. The City, here, promptly moved to dismiss Matejczyk\u2019s refiled lawsuit on res judicata grounds.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sidney Ezra, of Law Office \u00f3f Sidney Ezra, and Theodore T. Scudder, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Julian N. Henriques, Jr., Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANTONI MATEJCZYK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201408\u20141208\nOpinion filed December 21, 2009.\nSidney Ezra, of Law Office \u00f3f Sidney Ezra, and Theodore T. Scudder, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nMara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Julian N. Henriques, Jr., Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 17, "last_page_order": 29 }