{ "id": 4294312, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT KELLY, Defendant (Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., et al., Intervenors-Appellants)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kelly", "decision_date": "2009-12-11", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201408\u20141728", "first_page": "232", "last_page": "270", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 232" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333180 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "a \"gag order\" directed to the parties and their attorneys \"is properly the subject of an interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1)\"" }, { "page": "152", "parenthetical": "\"the gag order constitutes an indirect restraint on the press\"" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "148", "parenthetical": "\"In determining whether the circuit court abused its discretion\" in restraining the speech of parties and their attorneys, \"we will not compare what we might have done with what the [trial] court did\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461402 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "\"Lack of standing is an affirmative matter that may be raised as a ground for dismissal under a section 2-619 motion to dismiss\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 539", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179887 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562", "parenthetical": "to assess \"the probable extent of publicity,\" the trial court properly relied on \"newspapers demonstrating that the crime had already drawn intensive news coverage\"" }, { "page": "699", "parenthetical": "to assess \"the probable extent of publicity,\" the trial court properly relied on \"newspapers demonstrating that the crime had already drawn intensive news coverage\"" }, { "page": "2804", "parenthetical": "to assess \"the probable extent of publicity,\" the trial court properly relied on \"newspapers demonstrating that the crime had already drawn intensive news coverage\"" }, { "page": "563-64" }, { "page": "700" }, { "page": "2805", "parenthetical": "discussing alternatives such as changing venue and voir dire" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238507 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273675 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4282707 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183161 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 555", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787572 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J." }, { "parenthetical": "Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J." }, { "parenthetical": "Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 501", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200566 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "Press-Enterprise I" }, { "page": "635", "parenthetical": "Press-Enterprise I" }, { "page": "821", "parenthetical": "Press-Enterprise I" }, { "page": "510" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "508" }, { "page": "637" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 Ill. App. 3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171568 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242", "parenthetical": "presumption did not apply to court proceedings authorizing a wiretap" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203186 ], "weight": 42, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8", "parenthetical": "Press-Enterprise II" }, { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "Press-Enterprise II" }, { "page": "2740", "parenthetical": "Press-Enterprise II" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "2739" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "2742", "parenthetical": "presumption applied to preliminary hearing that lasted 41 days, including both fact and scientific witnesses, who were subject to vigorous cross-examination" }, { "page": "7, 12" }, { "page": "9, 12" }, { "page": "2740, 2742", "parenthetical": "presumption of access applied to a California preliminary hearing since it \"functions much like a full-scale trial\"" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "10" }, { "page": "2740" }, { "page": "14-15" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "2743" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "10" }, { "page": "2740", "parenthetical": "\"even when a right of access attaches, it is not absolute\"; it is a \"qualified\" right" }, { "page": "13-14" }, { "page": "13-14" }, { "page": "2743" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "13-14" }, { "page": "2743" }, { "page": "9-10" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "2741", "parenthetical": "the findings must be \"specific enough that a reviewing court can determine\" the propriety of closure" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "2743" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "2743", "parenthetical": "normally, voir dire can \"identify those jurors whose prior knowledge of the case would disable them from rendering an impartial verdict\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/478/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 L. Ed. 2d 35", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38", "parenthetical": "\"the balance of interests must be struck with special care\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6193857 ], "weight": 23, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45", "parenthetical": "\"the balance of interests must be struck with special care\"" }, { "page": "2215", "parenthetical": "\"the balance of interests must be struck with special care\"" }, { "page": "47", "parenthetical": "presumption of a public trial under sixth amendment applied to a hearing to determine admissibility of wiretap evidence" }, { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "presumption of a public trial under sixth amendment applied to a hearing to determine admissibility of wiretap evidence" }, { "page": "2216", "parenthetical": "presumption of a public trial under sixth amendment applied to a hearing to determine admissibility of wiretap evidence" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "2216" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "2214" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "2213" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "2213" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "2215-16" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "2215-16" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "2216" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "2214" }, { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4280308 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4280017 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272-73", "parenthetical": "although protective orders are ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion, a de novo standard applied to a preceding, purely legal issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264851 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "applied an abuse of discretion standard to question of whether trial court violated defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial when it excluded certain spectators" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 1037", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456144 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1040", "parenthetical": "\"Where a protective order is challenged on appeal as an unconstitutional 'prior restraint,' the trial court's decision on the matter will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion\"" }, { "page": "1040-41", "parenthetical": "appellants \"are unable to articulate any prejudice that they may have suffered\" from the alleged prior restraint on speech" }, { "page": "1040", "parenthetical": "\"[w]here a protective order is challenged on appeal as an unconstitutional 'prior restraint,' the trial court's decision on the matter will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/1037-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705676 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4-5, 11", "parenthetical": "issue concerned whether defense counsel had used peremptory challenges to strike women from the jury" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4259423 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" }, { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4282072 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 U.S. 393", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6175706 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399-400" }, { "page": "540" }, { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/419/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092172 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 U.S. 186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166554 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "204" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/369/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114522 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276-77" }, { "page": "276-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2695151 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209988 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "490-91", "parenthetical": "consideration of the issues will not affect the result and \"a decision on the merits cannot result in appropriate relief to the prevailing party\"" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538463 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "our supreme court heard a Rule 307(a)(1) appeal from a trial court's temporary gag order, which prohibited defendant from talking to the press only \" 'until judgment is entered' \"" }, { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "observing that the trial court had to \"achieve the delicate balance between the desirability of free discussion and the necessity for fair adjudication, free from interruption of its processes\"" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "235, 242", "parenthetical": "an interlocutory appeal from a \" 'gag' \" order was permitted \"[pjursuant to Rule 307\"" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291634 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697-98" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "696-98" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "698, 700" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "698", "parenthetical": "\"a denial of contemporaneous access to sidebar conferences\" is not appealable" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564516 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "\"interlocutory restraints upon publication of information are reviewable as interlocutory injunctive orders under Rule 307(a)(1)\"" }, { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "even \"temporary\" restraining orders are reviewable under Rule 307(a)(1)" }, { "page": "257-58" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "258" }, { "page": "258" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "258-59", "parenthetical": "\"we do not agree that appellant must demonstrate that\" the law will \"be applied in precisely the same circumstances or for precisely the same reasons,\" for the \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" exception to apply" }, { "page": "251", "parenthetical": "balancing rights where a minor was \"[arrested] in connection with a fatal shooting\"" }, { "page": "264", "parenthetical": "\"A prior restraint is a 'predetermined judicial prohibition restraining specified expression' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 1077", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269853 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1077-79", "parenthetical": "affirming the trial court, which had granted the newspaper's petition to intervene in a civil case, but denied access to the patient names at issue" }, { "page": "1079" }, { "page": "1079" }, { "page": "1080", "parenthetical": "\" 'An order denying a motion to unseal a court file or document is reviewed for an abuse of discretion' \"" }, { "page": "1080" }, { "page": "1082", "parenthetical": "\"balancing this compelling interest [of victim privacy] against the public's right of access\" in a civil case" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/1077-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 1004", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3632799 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1009", "parenthetical": "declaratory action could not he used to force the Chicago Bar Association to publish its reasons for not recommending a judicial candidate" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/1004-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 1068", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499658 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075", "parenthetical": "appellate court reversed where \"trial court abused its discretion by denying access\"" }, { "parenthetical": "reversing the trial court, which had denied access to the media intervenors in a civil case" }, { "page": "1069" }, { "page": "1069" }, { "page": "1075" }, { "page": "1075" }, { "page": "1071-73" }, { "page": "1075", "parenthetical": "\"[u]nder either a common law or first amendment analysis\"" }, { "page": "1075", "parenthetical": "\"Under either a common law or first amendment analysis, we find the trial court abused its discretion by denying access to the court records and transcripts in the two proceedings\"" }, { "page": "1075" }, { "page": "1075", "parenthetical": "trial court's order must contain \"specific factual findings\" in order to justify denying access" }, { "page": "1074", "parenthetical": "presumption applied to certain documents but not others in a civil case" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/1068-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 989", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3218184 ], "weight": 20, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1003", "parenthetical": "appellate court reversed where \"the trial court abused its discretion by sealing the entire court file\"" }, { "page": "990-91", "parenthetical": "reversing the trial court, which had denied access to the media intervenor in a civil case" }, { "page": "990-91" }, { "page": "990-91" }, { "page": "990" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "990" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994", "parenthetical": "\"An order denying a motion to unseal a court file or document is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, regardless of whether a purported right of access is based on the common law or the first amendment\"" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "995" }, { "page": "996", "parenthetical": "trial court sealed court files \"without making specific findings\"" }, { "page": "1002" }, { "page": "998", "parenthetical": "presumption applied to a civil proceeding concerning a family's asset distribution" }, { "page": "998", "parenthetical": "a trial court must exercise \"great care\" when faced with a media petition for access in a case involving a minor" }, { "page": "997", "parenthetical": "\"[a]dequate findings relieve the appellate courts of having to grope through the record\"" }, { "page": "997", "parenthetical": "after holding that the trial court's findings were not sufficiently \"specific,\" we conducted \"[o]ur own review\" of the record" }, { "page": "998" }, { "page": "998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0989-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4259554 ], "weight": 24, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533-34" }, { "page": "538" }, { "page": "538", "parenthetical": "appellate court reversed where trial court failed to meet \"the rigorous standard\" required by the first amendment to close a proceeding" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "534", "parenthetical": "\"[t]his interlocutory appeal followed\" the trial court's denial of the media intervenor's petition for access" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "534", "parenthetical": "\" 'upon selection of the jury, the transcript of this hearing will be released' \"" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "holding that the trial court failed to make the specific factual findings needed to justify even a short denial" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "535", "parenthetical": "\"opening the [criminal] process to neutral observers is an important means of assuring the fairness of criminal proceedings\"" }, { "page": "533-34" }, { "page": "534-35" }, { "page": "535", "parenthetical": "\"balancing the right of the defendant to a fair trial against the public right of access\" in a case where defendant boyfriend was accused of drowning his girlfriend's three young children" }, { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "holding that \"the trial court failed to make specific factual findings\" justifying closure, without stating whether it was applying a de novo or abuse of discretion standard" }, { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "\"trial court failed to make specific factual findings\"" }, { "page": "535", "parenthetical": "\"balancing the right of the defendant to a fair trial against the public right of access to criminal proceedings\"" }, { "page": "536", "parenthetical": "presumption applied to pretrial hearing to determine admissibility of certain statements in a criminal trial" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 A.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11302053 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "holding that intervention \"has no place in a criminal [case],\" while also conceding that other jurisdictions find intervention to be the proper vehicle for the press to assert a right of access" }, { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/496/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229720 ], "weight": 19, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" }, { "page": "221" }, { "page": "221-22" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "231-33" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "231-32", "parenthetical": "in this civil case, our supreme court recognized that the public had a right of access \"embodied in the first amendment\"" }, { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "\"presumption can be rebutted\"" }, { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "\"trial court neglected to state why it ordered\" sealing of document" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "231-33" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "221-22", "parenthetical": "an order prohibiting a party from disseminating information was properly reviewed under Rule 307" }, { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 Ill. App. 3d 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4279047 ], "weight": 24, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780-81" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "779-80" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780", "parenthetical": "Illinois \"seems to\" prefer intervention over declaratory actions" }, { "page": "777" }, { "page": "778, 784", "parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's reasons for denying access" }, { "page": "778", "parenthetical": "the trial court noted that its ruling on access could change as the evidence unfolded" }, { "page": "777", "parenthetical": "balancing rights in a case against \"an accused stalker who allegedly committed sexual assault against several different victims\"" }, { "page": "780-81" }, { "page": "780-81" }, { "page": "783-84", "parenthetical": "presumption of access did not apply to evidence deposition that had not yet been entered into evidence in a criminal case" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "783-84", "parenthetical": "presumption of access did not apply to pretrial deposition that had not yet been entered into evidence in the criminal trial" }, { "page": "777" }, { "page": "777" }, { "page": "777" }, { "page": "780-81, 783-84" }, { "page": "782-83" }, { "page": "782-83" }, { "page": "782-83", "parenthetical": "potential evidence does not carry a presumption of access until its use in court" }, { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/384/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 F. Supp. 2d 963", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11138282 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964" }, { "page": "968" }, { "page": "969" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/131/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 323", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Loy. U. Chi. 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ROBERT KELLY, Defendant (Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., et al., Intervenors-Appellants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this appeal, members of the media claim that their first amendment right to freedom of speech was violated. Specifically, they claim that a trial court erred: (1) when it sealed certain pretrial proceedings and records during the criminal prosecution of Robert Kelly; and (2) when it issued a \u201cDecorum Order\u201d which restrained the speech of the attorneys and witnesses in the R. Kelly case. The sealed proceedings concerned mainly two topics: proposed questions for potential jurors, and a motion by the state requesting the trial court for permission to introduce evidence of other criminal acts by the defendant.\nOn April 22, 2008, the Chicago Sun-Times, Inc. (Sun-Times), the Tribune Company (Tribune) and the Associated Press (collectively, the media intervenors) filed an \u201cemergency motion\u201d (1) to intervene in the criminal case against defendant Kelly; (2) to obtain access to certain closed pretrial proceedings and records; and (3) to vacate the Decorum Order. While the trial court granted their petition to intervene, it denied their motion for access to the closed proceedings and documents, and their motion to vacate the Decorum Order.\nThe subject of this appeal is the trial court\u2019s order, entered May 16, 2008, which denied their motion. The appellants are the media intervenors, and the appellee is the State of Illinois. Robert Kelly, the defendant in the underlying criminal case, was acquitted, and he is not a party to this appeal. Kelly was described in an affidavit by a Tribune reporter as \u201ca prominent entertainer,\u201d and this case was described as one that had \u201cbeen the subject of news coverage for years.\u201d\nFor the following reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s orders. We find: (1) that a petition to intervene was the appropriate vehicle to seek access to sealed court proceedings and records; (2) that appellate jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 307 (188 Ill. 2d R. 307) was proper to review the trial court\u2019s order denying access; (3) that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine allows us to hear this appeal; (4) that we review de novo the question of whether a presumption of access applies to this type of proceeding, and we review for an abuse of discretion the trial court\u2019s balancing of competing interests and determining the appropriate parameters of closure; (5) that the presumption of access did not apply to the pretrial proceedings and documents at issue here; (6) that, even if the presumption did apply, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying access; and (7) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering the Decorum Order.\nBACKGROUND\nIn June 2002, the State of Illinois charged Robert Kelly with multiple counts of child pornography. At the heart of these charges were the State\u2019s allegations that defendant Kelly made a videotape of sexual acts between himself and a minor. After close to six years of continuances, Kelly\u2019s jury trial was scheduled to begin on May 9, 2008. The jury trial resulted in an acquittal, when the jury found Kelly not guilty of the charges.\n1. Procedural History\nThe relevant procedural history is summarized below. The closed proceedings, the Decorum Order, and the order appealed from are described in greater detail, with each topic described in its own section. In addition, there is also a section describing the documents missing from the record.\nWith the jury selection set to commence on May 9, 2008, the State filed, on April 1, a pretrial motion to allow evidence of other crimes, which was filed under seal. On April 11, 15 and 21, the trial court held pretrial hearings, which it closed to the public. On April 22, the media intervenors filed their motion (1) to intervene, (2) to obtain access to the three previously closed hearings, (3) to obtain access to the hearing scheduled for April 25, and (4) to vacate the Decorum Order. When the parties appeared in court on April 24, both the State and the defendant requested time to respond to the intervenors\u2019 motion.\nOn April 24, the trial court granted the intervenors\u2019 motion to intervene but denied their motion for the immediate release of the transcripts of the previously closed hearings and for the opening of the April 25 hearing. The April 24 order also set the matter for hearing on May 8. In open court on April 24, the trial court stated:\n\u201cIf I articulated and made a factual basis out of why the hearings were sealed, then I would be telling you everything.\nSo I have to use conclusions, and one of those would be it\u2019s [sic] for the protection of the selection of the jury. But I am not making any decisions on that right now[,] on the motion.\nAgain, I can\u2019t disclose the factual basis without disclosing the whole thing. So it actually is because of the proximity of jury selection, which is in about two weeks, and the chance that this might deprive Mr. Kelly of a fair trial. Those are the generalized basis. Again, I can\u2019t malee the factual basis.\u201d\nBefore the motion was scheduled to be heard before the trial court, the media intervenors filed, on April 28, an emergency motion with the Illinois Supreme Court, entitled \u201cEmergency Motion for Supervisory Order Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 383 To Unseal Court Records and Proceedings and Related Relief.\u201d\nOn May 2, defendant Kelly filed his \u201cObjections\u201d to the intervenors\u2019 motion before our supreme court. Defendant Kelly objected both to unsealing the transcripts of the closed proceedings and to vacating the Decorum Order, on the ground that these actions would endanger his right to a fair trial. Defendant Kelly stated that the case had received \u201cworld-wide publicity,\u201d and in support, he quoted a front-page, Chicago Tribune article that stated: \u201cMore than 330 reporters have expressed interest in covering the case with news agencies from as far away as France, Japan, Australia and England indicating they\u2019ll attend.\u201d The article, which was attached as an exhibit to defendant Kelly\u2019s objections, stated that a \u2018 \u2018[c]elebrity-obsessed culture will turn its eyes toward the R. Kelly trial next month\u201d and that \u201chordes of reporters and cameramen [are] expected to descend\u201d on the courthouse. Defendant Kelly also observed that the trial court was striking \u201ca balance,\u201d since it had previously denied the motions of both the defense and the prosecution to prohibit the public from viewing the videotape in open court.\nOn May 5, 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the intervenors\u2019 motion for a supervisory order. After the supreme court\u2019s denial, defendant Kelly renewed his objections before the trial court. On May 6, the State filed its response, opposing the intervenors\u2019 motion. On May 16, the trial court issued its order denying the intervenors\u2019 motion to obtain access and to vacate the Decorum Order. On June 10, the media intervenors filed a notice of appeal which appealed the May 16 order, but which did not seek an expedited appeal. This appeal followed.\n2. Documents Missing From the Appellate Record\nThis appeal concerns four closed pretrial hearings, with the first closed hearing occurring on April 11; and certain documents, which were filed under seal and were sought in the intervenors\u2019 April 22 motion.\nThe record on appeal is missing certain documents. First, it does not contain the documents, filed under seal, that were sought by the intervenors, namely, the State\u2019s other-crimes motion, its supplemental answer, or the witness lists. Second, it does not contain the transcript of the public portion of the April 11 hearing. In their brief to this court, the media intervenors stated that, on April 11, \u201cthe public was ejected from the courtroom.\u201d Presumably, if the public was ejected, then there had already occurred a public portion, for which we are lacking a transcript. The April 11 transcript in the record states that it is an \u201cexcerpt.\u201d The missing transcript may be significant, if the trial court made findings in open court, prior to closing the first proceeding.\nDuring oral argument before the appellate court on October 29, 2009, the appellate court asked the assistant State\u2019s Attorney to list the times that the trial court made findings concerning closure. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney began:\n\u201cOn the 11th, and it is in the record, the April 11, 2008 record at [page] 5. Prior to the April 11th closure, the court stated, in open court, the motion filed under seal was a matter that could affect the jury pool.\u201d\nIn the above quote, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney referred to a page number in the \u201crecord.\u201d She was not referring to the appellate record. In the ensuing colloquy, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney described a statement made by the trial court on April 15 that appeared \u201cat the record at 8\u201d; that statement appeared not on page 8 of the appellate record, but on page 8 of the individual transcript for the April 15 proceeding. Similarly, when she described a statement made by the trial court on April 24 that appeared \u201cin the record at 10,\u201d that statement appeared not on page 10 of the appellate record, but on page 10 of the individual transcript for the April 24 proceeding. Presumably then, when the assistant State\u2019s Attorney observed, in the above quote, that the trial court made a finding in \u201cthe April 11, 2008 record at 5,\u201d she was referring to page 5 of the transcript of the open portion of the April 11 proceeding. She made this reference without apparently realizing that this transcript had not been provided to us in the appellate record.\n3. The Closed Proceedings and Records\nAs noted, the trial court closed four pretrial hearings on: (1) April 11, 2008; (2) April 15, 2008; (3) April 21, 2008; and (4) April 25, 2008. The first three hearings were comprised of argument from and discussions with counsel. Only the last hearing, on April 25, involved a witness. As noted, the media intervenors\u2019 April 22 motion also sought the following documents, which were filed under seal: (1) the State\u2019s pretrial motion to allow evidence of other crimes, filed April 1, 2008; (2) the State\u2019s supplemental answer to discovery; and (3) both parties\u2019 witness lists.\nAt the beginning of the excerpt of the April 11 proceeding contained in the appellate record, the attorneys for the prosecution and the defense stated their names for the record, and the trial court observed that the only other persons present were \u201cmy deputies and my clerk and our court reporter and my staff attorneys.\u201d\nThe closed portion of the proceeding on April 11 concerned two topics: (1) the State\u2019s motion to use evidence of other crimes; and (2) proposed questions for potential jurors. The trial court heard argument from counsel concerning the State\u2019s motion and discussed jury questionnaires with counsel. As noted, neither side called witnesses or introduced evidence.\nDuring the April 11 proceeding, the prosecutor argued that, since the defendant had placed at issue the identity of the male depicted on the videotape, the State sought to introduce evidence of other uncharged acts. As part of her argument, the prosecutor stated the names of the individuals involved in the uncharged acts, including the name of the minor. She explained why their identity was important to proving the charged offense, and she discussed the similarities between the charged and uncharged acts. The prosecutor also observed that, as part of the State\u2019s motion, the State had submitted a chart detailing the similarities, to show that the acts were \u201cdistinct and unusual.\u201d Defense counsel also discussed the acts, arguing that they were not similar. After listening to counsel\u2019s argument, the trial court held that the uncharged acts were admissible.\nPrior to closing the courtroom on April 15, the trial court and counsel discussed which attorneys would be representing the parties at trial. Still in open court, the trial court observed that \u201ctoday was up for additional questions for the jury questionnaire\u201d and for a motion that was filed under seal. In open court, the trial court explained that the motion was filed under seal \u201cbecause of the proximity of Mr. Kelly\u2019s case going to trial.\u201d Then the trial court stated that there would be a short recess to \u201cclear the court and do the proceedings that have to be sealed.\u201d\nThe closed hearing on April 15 concerned primarily: questionnaires for the potential jurors and the State\u2019s reiteration of its proffer of other-crimes evidence and the defense\u2019s anticipated response to it. Specifically, counsel and the trial court discussed the defense\u2019s anticipated cross-examination concerning a witness\u2019s attempt to obtain money from the defendant in exchange for a videotape. The State also proffered that this same witness met with an attorney, that she did not tell the attorney about sex acts with the minor victim, and that she then received the rest of the money that had been promised to her.\nThe closed April 21 hearing concerned primarily the jury questionnaires. The defense proposed seven questions, such as whether the jurors had any \u201cfeelings\u201d which might affect their judgment in this case, concerning \u201clesbian sexual activity\u201d or \u201cthree-way sex, man and two women\u201d or sex acts by a minor \u201cwith another woman and a man while being videotaped\u201d or adultery or urination on another person.\nAt the closed April 25 hearing, the trial court heard from a witness, who was depicted on the videotape, but who was not the minor. Before hearing from the witness, defense counsel stated his reasons for seeking to close the hearing. He stated, in part, \u201cwe have a concern that we are on the eve of jury selection and given the nature of the allegations which involve alleged sex with a minor as well as a three-way sexual contact that if that type of information were leaked [to the public] before the trial it would poison the jury pool\u201d; and that voir dire questions alone would not \u201cprotect\u201d the defendant. Defense counsel also remarked that the front page of that day\u2019s Chicago Tribune contained photographs of the defendant, the trial judge and other participants in the case.\nOn April 25, the trial court also elaborated on his reasons for closure:\n\u201cPart of my findings are the same as what [defense counsel] and the State has agreed with is that the motion for proof of other crimes elicited testimony concerning the participation in different sex acts with a minor. So that is one of the primary reasons why these proceedings have been sealed. The others are that you all are aware that certainly this trial is under great public scrutiny. In fact, the Tribune this morning, and usually I don\u2019t read the papers but someone pointed it out to me, Miss Stacy St. Clair reported that over 330 news organizations have shown interest in getting credentials. So certainly this is a very high profile file. And as we speak there is somebody from an agency, which I will pronounce it, Agence France-Presse, a Miss Mira Oberman, who provides press service for overseas media. Also as brought out there have been inquiries from Australia, France, Japan and there was another country I forgot which one. So this has drawn international as well as national scrutiny.\nWith the proximity of the jury selection happening also within two weeks it is important that the jury pool not be contaminated or prejudiced unduly by this type of publicity. Those are the reasons why these hearings are sealed.\u201d\nLike the prior hearings, the April 25 hearing also concerned the jury questionnaires; but unlike the prior hearings, this hearing also concerned testimony by a witness. The purpose of taking the testimony was to establish that one of defendant\u2019s attorneys did not have a potential conflict of interest. The trial court asked the witness a few questions that established that she had received money \u201cin exchange for an item,\u201d but that the attorney was not involved. The trial court then ruled that there was no conflict of interest. There was no cross-examination, and only the trial court examined the witness.\n4. The Decorum Order\nOn June 22, 2007, the trial court issued an order that the trial court and the parties to this case refer to as the Decorum Order. The order was never challenged by the parties to the underlying criminal action, namely, the State and defendant Kelly, or by the witnesses, to whom the order also applied. The order was contested only by the motion of the media intervenors, filed almost a year later, on April 22, 2008.\nThe Decorum Order stated that it applied only to: (1) the attorneys \u201cconnected [with] this case as Prosecutor or Defense Counsel,\u201d \u201cany other attorney working in or \"with the offices of either of them,\u201d and \u201ctheir agents, staff, or experts,\u201d (2) \u201cany judicial officer or court employee,\u201d and \u201cany law enforcement employee of any agency involved in this case,\u201d and (3) \u201cany persons subpoenaed or expected to testify! ] [in] this matter.\u201d\nThe Decorum Order prohibited these individuals from doing any of the following acts:\n\u201c(1) Release or authorize the release for public dissemination of any purported extrajudicial statement of either the defendant or witnesses relating to this case;\n(2) Release or authorize the release of any documents, exhibits, photographs or any evidence, the admissibility of which may have to be determined by the Court;\n(3) Make any statement for public dissemination as to the existence or possible existence of any documents, exhibits, photographs or any evidence, the admissibility of which may have to be determined by the Court,\n(4) Express outside of court an opinion or make any comment of public dissemination as to the weight, value, or effect of any evidence as tending to establish guilt or innocence;\n(5) [M]ake any statement outside of court as to the content, nature, substance or effect of any statements or testimony that have been given or is expected to be given in any proceeding relating to this matter;\n(6) Issue any statement as to the identity of any prospective witness, or the witness\u2019s probable testimony, or the effect thereof;\n(7) Make any out-of-court statement as to the nature, source or effect of any purported evidence alleged to have been accumulated as a result of the investigation of this matter.\u201d\n5. The Order Appealed From\nThe media intervenors appealed from the trial court\u2019s order, entered on May 16, 2008. The May 16 order is an eight-page and detailed order, denying the media intervenors\u2019 motion to unseal the transcripts of the closed proceedings, and to vacate the Decorum Order. Previously, on April 24, 2008, the trial court had granted the media intervenors\u2019 petition to intervene, but had denied their motion for the immediate release of the transcripts of the previously closed hearings and for the opening of the April 25 hearing. The April 24 order, however, was not named in the intervenors\u2019 notice of appeal.\nSince the May 16 order was issued after the four hearings had already been held, the focus was on whether the transcripts of the closed hearing should remain sealed. In the May 16 order, the trial court stated that, prior to the start of hearings on the State\u2019s other-crimes motion, \u201cdetailed and specific findings were made on the record demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.\u201d The trial court observed that, although it sealed these findings, they were available to a reviewing court. The trial court stated that \u201cthe justification for closure will once again be articulated here, exclusive of any facts which necessitate the closure at issue.\u201d\nThe May 16 order stated that \u201cclosure is necessary to protect the minor victim and the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial by ensuring the jury will not be exposed to inadmissible or highly prejudicial evidence.\u201d The trial court found that the concern over widespread publicity in the case at bar was not speculative, considering that (1) \u201cover 330 reporters, both here and abroad, *** have applied for media credentials to cover the trial\u201d; and (2) \u201cthe case has been on the front page of both major Chicago area publications numerous times in the last three weeks.\u201d In a footnote, the trial court stated that the major publications to which it referred were the Chicago Sun-Times and the Chicago Tribune, which were also media intervenors.\nThe order stated that the sealed transcripts would be made available to the media intervenors after either trial or sentencing. Since the trial ended in an acquittal, the transcripts were made available after the trial.\nIn the May 16 order, the trial court considered various alternatives to sealing the transcripts, such as: (1) redacting them; (2) using pseudonyms; (3) questioning potential jurors during voir dire concerning pretrial publicity; and (4) changing the venue of the trial. However, the order explained why these alternatives would not work. First, the trial court, which was thoroughly familiar with the contents of the transcripts, found that \u201credaction or use of pseudonyms would result in a collection of unintelligible nonsense or a concession of the information justifying closure.\u201d Second, the trial court found that neither voir dire nor a venue change could protect the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial, in light of (1) \u201cthe highly prejudicial\u201d details of the crime contained in the transcripts, and (2) the \u201conslaught of pre-trial publicity\u201d generated by the \u201ccelebrity of the defendant.\u201d The trial court found that, if the information was released, changing the trial\u2019s location would do nothing to reduce the resulting prejudice, since this was a case of \u201cnationwide interest.\u201d In addition, \u201cthe likelihood of extensive jury contamination\u201d was even greater, since the trial was scheduled to begin soon. Based on these findings, the trial court found that the various possible alternatives would not work, due to the specific facts and circumstances of this case.\nIn the May 16 order, the trial court also refused to vacate the Decorum Order, entered nearly a year before. The trial court stated that the order was an exact \u201creplica\u201d of the order entered in a high-profile criminal case against celebrity Michael Jackson (People v. Jackson, No. 1133603 (Cal. App. Super. January 4, 2004)), and of an order that the trial court had used in a 2007 case (People v. Luna, 02 CR 15430 (2007)). The media interevenors had claimed that the order constituted a prior restraint upon freedom of speech. The trial court held, first, that the order \u201cdoes not place any restraints whatsoever upon the press,\u201d since it \u201cgoverns the conduct of the attorneys and parties only.\u201d The trial court observed that neither the defendant nor the State had asked for the order to be lifted. The trial court found, second, that even if the order was a prior restraint, it was needed to protect the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial, in light of the \u201ctorrent of media interest in this case.\u201d\nOn June 10, 2008, the media intervenors filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, appealing from the trial court\u2019s May 16 order. This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nThis appeal raises a number of preliminary issues: (1) the appropriate suit or motion to be brought by the press in order to obtain access to closed court proceedings; (2) the propriety of appellate jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 307 (188 Ill. 2d R. 307) to review a trial court\u2019s order denying access; (3) the possible mootness of a denial of access, where the criminal trial at issue has already concluded and access has since been granted; and (4) the appropriate standard of review for a trial court\u2019s order denying access to the press.\nAfter deciding these preliminary issues, we may proceed to the question of whether the trial court\u2019s order violated the public\u2019s right of access by closing certain proceedings and sealing certain records. The public has three different claims to a right of access. People v. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d 776, 780-81 (2008). First, there is a constitutional right of access, grounded both in the first amendment to the federal constitution and in the first article of our state constitution. U.S. Const., amend. I (\u201cCongress shall make no law *** abridging the freedom *** of the press\u201d); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a74 (\u201cAll persons may speak, write and publish freely ***\u201d); Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 780. Second, in addition to the constitutional right of access, there is a \u201cparallel common-law right of access,\u201d recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 780, citing Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill. 2d 214, 230 (2000). Third, there is a statutory right of access, created by our state legislature, as part of the Illinois Clerks of Courts Act (705 ILCS 105/16 (6) (West 2008)). Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 781.\nFinally, we must decide whether the trial court\u2019s Decorum Order constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech.\n1. Procedure and 2. Jurisdiction\nWe find both (1) that a petition to intervene was the appropriate vehicle to seek access to sealed court proceedings and records; and (2) that appellate jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 307 was proper to review the trial court\u2019s order denying access.\nIn the case at bar, for the purpose of obtaining access to sealed court records and proceedings, appellants Sun-Times and Tribune filed an \u201cemergency motion\u201d to intervene in the criminal case against defendant Kelly.\nInstead of filing a motion to intervene in the criminal case, appellants could have tried filing a separate civil action, seeking a declaratory judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014701 (West 2008) (providing for actions seeking a declaratory judgment). In Pelo, the appellate court observed that some jurisdictions find intervention to be the proper vehicle for the press to assert a right of access in a criminal case, while other jurisdictions find that a separate civil action is more appropriate. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 779-80, citing State v. Cianci, 496 A.2d 139, 146 (R.I. 1985) (holding that intervention \u201chas no place in a criminal [case],\u201d while also conceding that other jurisdictions find intervention to be the proper vehicle for the press to assert a right of access). The Pelo court stated: \u201cIllinois seems to be one of those jurisdictions that takes interlocutory appeals concerning right-of-access [cases].\u201d (Emphasis added.) Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 780. In support of its \u201cseems to be\u201d statement, the Pelo court cited one case: People v. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d 532 (2005). In LaGrone, the trial court granted the media intervenors\u2019 petition to intervene in the criminal case, but denied their petition for access. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 533-34. On review, the appellate court reversed the trial court\u2019s denial of access, hut without discussing whether intervention was the proper vehicle. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 538. Neither LaGrone nor Pelo is dispositive on the issue of whether intervention is proper, since LaGrone never reached the issue and Pelo's \u201cseems to be\u201d statement is far from definitive.\nWhile the parties before us did not brief the issue of whether intervention is proper, they did brief the issue of whether an interlocutory appeal was proper pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307. 188 Ill. 2d R. 307. The two issues are intertwined. If we are going to permit intervention, then we need to also permit some path to review. It cannot be that important first amendment issues are decided by trial courts and then insulated from further review. That makes no sense. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 538 (appellate court reversed where trial court failed to meet \u201cthe rigorous standard\u201d required by the first amendment to close a proceeding); A.P. v. M.E.E., 354 Ill. App. 3d 989, 1003 (2004) (appellate court reversed where \u201cthe trial court abused its discretion by sealing the entire court file\u201d); In re Marriage of Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1075 (1992) (appellate court reversed where \u201ctrial court abused its discretion by denying access\u201d).\nWe find that, in Illinois, intervention is the proper vehicle. First, we were not able to locate, after diligent searching, any Illinois case in which a media plaintiff employed a declaratory action to obtain access to sealed court records or proceedings. Second, we did find cases which seemed to indicate that a declaratory action was not the correct vehicle. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 780 (Illinois \u201cseems to\u201d prefer intervention over declaratory actions). Cf. Matchett v. Chicago Bar Ass\u2019n, 125 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1009 (1984) (declaratory action could not he used to force the Chicago Bar Association to publish its reasons for not recommending a judicial candidate). Third, we did locate a number of Illinois cases where a media party, faced with the same issue, was allowed to intervene in both criminal and civil cases. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 777 (affirming the trial court, which had \u201cgranted [the newspaper\u2019s] petition to intervene but denied access\u201d to the transcript at issue in a criminal case); LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 533 (reversing the trial court, which had denied access to the media intervenor in a criminal case); Coy v. Washington County Hospital District, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1077-79 (2007) (affirming the trial court, which had granted the newspaper\u2019s petition to intervene in a civil case, but denied access to the patient names at issue); A.P. v. M.E.E., 354 Ill. App. 3d 989, 990-91 (2004) (reversing the trial court, which had denied access to the media intervenor in a civil case); In re Marriage of Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1068 (1992) (reversing the trial court, which had denied access to the media intervenors in a civil case).\nLast, but not least, intervention has advantages from a policy standpoint, over a declaratory action. With intervention, the judge in the criminal trial, who is already familiar with the reasons favoring or disfavoring disclosure, is the judge who decides the disclosure issue. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 778, 784 (affirming the trial court\u2019s reasons for denying access). By contrast, with a declaratory action, a civil judge would have to start from scratch, learning the pros and cons of disclosure in a criminal case. Cianci, 496 A.2d at 146 n.5 (the civil judge would review \u201cthe case anew\u201d). With intervention, the criminal defendant, who has an interest in the disclosure issue, is already before the court, with counsel. By contrast, with a declaratory action, the criminal defendant may be forced to retain counsel to intervene in the civil suit. With intervention, a media party may intervene after a criminal defendant has filed a motion to close proceedings. LaGrone, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 533 (media parties were allowed to intervene after defendant filed a motion to file proffers of evidence under seal). With a declaratory action, you run the risk of inconsistent rulings, when a criminal judge grants the defendant\u2019s motion to close proceedings, but a subsequent civil judge rules that the first amendment rights of the press require their opening. Cianci, 496 A.2d at 146 n.5 (a civil court in a declaratory action may \u201cquestion the case anew since it would not be controlled by the doctrine of the law of the case\u201d). With intervention, the judge in the criminal trial may change or amend his or her interlocutory disclosure orders, as the needs of the case and the evidence unfolds. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 778 (the trial court noted that its ruling on access could change as the evidence unfolded). By contrast, in a separate declaratory action, the declaratory judgment is a final order, rather than an interlocutory order, and thus it cannot adapt to the unfolding and possibly shifting needs of a criminal case. Thus, based on case law and policy considerations, we conclude that intervention is the proper vehicle in the State of Illinois.\nIf intervention is the proper vehicle, then there has to be some contemplated path to review. As noted above, the first amendment questions at issue are too important to insulate them from review. The question then becomes whether the path to review is through Supreme Court Rule 307(a) or some other rule or statute. 188 Ill. 2d R. 307. Neither party has suggested another rule or statute that would be a better path to review. The media intervenors before us argue that Rule 307 review is proper; and the State argues that it is not, without offering an alternative.\nSupreme Court Rule 307(a) provides, in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) An appeal may be taken to the Appellate Court from an interlocutory order of court:\n(1) granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction[J\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1).\nSupreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from a trial court order that denies or grants injunctive relief. 188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1). Stating that this rule should be construed \u201cbroadly,\u201d our supreme court held that \u201can interlocutory order circumscribing the publication of information is reviewable as an interlocutory injunctive order, pursuant to Rule 307(a)(1).\u201d Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 221; In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 263 (1989) (\u201cinterlocutory restraints upon publication of information are reviewable as interlocutory injunctive orders under Rule 307(a)(1)\u201d).\nBuilding on the Skolnick holding, the appellate court in A.P. held that a trial court\u2019s order denying access to a media intervenor is \u201cin the nature of injunctive relief, and, therefore, this court possesses the necessary jurisdiction to entertain [an intervenor\u2019s] interlocutory appeal,\u201d pursuant to Rule 307(a)(1). A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 990-91, citing 188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1), and Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 221-22. Although in other cases we did not identify the basis for our appellate jurisdiction, we have regularly heard appeals from media intervenors seeking access. Coy, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1079; LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 534 (\u201c[t]his interlocutory appeal followed\u201d the trial court\u2019s denial of the media intervenor\u2019s petition for access); Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1069. Presumably, the source of appellate jurisdiction in these other cases was also Supreme Court Rule 307(a). 188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1). The parties do not suggest otherwise. We see no reason to abandon this long line of appellate cases, which is well-grounded in supreme court jurisprudence.\nIn response, the State relies on this court\u2019s decision in People v. Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d 696 (1995). In Reynolds, the media intervenor (coincidentally the Chicago Tribune, as in the case at bar) claimed that this court had appellate jurisdiction, not under Rule 307 which is at issue before this court, but under Rules 301 and 304. Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 697-98, citing 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 304, 307. After ruling that appellate jurisdiction did not exist under Rules 301 or 304, the Reynolds court proceeded sua sponte to consider the possibility of jurisdiction under Rule 307. Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 698. The Reynolds court noted that normally it would have ordered the parties to brief this question, but that since the media intervenor had moved to expedite, it would answer the question for this particular case, without the benefit of briefs. Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 698.\nIn Reynolds, the trial court\u2019s order denied access to sidebar conferences during trial, but directed the release of all sidebar transcripts at the conclusion of the trial. Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 696-98. The Reynolds court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under Rule 307 to review the trial court\u2019s order, because the order was \u201cministerial and administrative,\u201d rather than injunctive as Rule 307 required. Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 699.\nThe Reynolds court held that the order was administrative rather than injunctive, for two reasons. First, the trial court\u2019s order did not enjoin the newspaper from publishing information that it already possessed, but instead restricted the newspaper\u2019s access to court transcripts. Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 699. Second, since the order only \u201ctemporarily\u201d limited that access, it was not a permanent denial of access but was an administrative order providing \u201cwhen\u201d access would occur. Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 698, 700. The denial was temporary, since access was denied only until the conclusion of the trial. Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 698. In the case at bar, the State argues that Reynolds is similar because, first, the media intervenors were not enjoined from publishing information that they already possessed; and, second, they received, at the end of the trial, the transcripts of the closed proceedings.\nWhat the State overlooks is that, in Reynolds, the Chicago Tribune did not even have the opportunity to assert its own Rule 307 arguments, since its own motion to expedite impeded its own ability to be heard. Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 698. The jurisdictional holding in Reynolds is thus limited to the unique set of facts of that case, which involved the specific demands created by the media\u2019s own request for an expedited appeal.\nSince the time of the Reynolds decision, this court has held, first, that a denial of access is injunctive in nature for purposes of Rule 307 jurisdiction. A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 990-91. In addition, we have regularly permitted appeals from media intervenors seeking access, which were presumably made pursuant to Rule 307. Coy, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1079; LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 534; Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1069. Second, this court has found that even a temporary denial of access to court proceedings is not merely administrative, but instead raises important first amendment concerns. In LaGrone, for example, the trial court ordered the sealing of a pretrial hearing transcript, just until the completion of jury selection. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 534 (\u201c \u2018upon selection of the jury, the transcript of this hearing will be released\u2019 \u201d). Cf. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 260 (even \u201ctemporary\u201d restraining orders are reviewable under Rule 307(a)(1)). The length of denial in LaGrone was even shorter than the length of denial in Reynolds: in LaGrone, it was only to the end of jury selection, while in contrast, in Reynolds, it was until the end of the entire trial. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 534; Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 698. In LaGrone, we held that even this short denial of access implicated important first amendment concerns. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 537 (holding that the trial court failed to make the specific factual findings needed to justify even a short denial). We did not consider this order to be merely ministerial, and we permitted the interlocutory appeal. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 534. See also Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 112 Ill. 2d 223, 235 (1986) (our supreme court heard a Rule 307(a)(1) appeal from a trial court\u2019s temporary gag order, which prohibited defendant from talking to the press only \u201c \u2018until judgment is entered\u2019 \u201d). For these reasons, we do not find Reynolds dispositive of the jurisdiction issue before us.\nIn addition, the State attempts to distinguish A.P and Skolnick on the grounds that they involved civil cases, while this appeal involves a criminal case. A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 990; Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 216. However, the State fails to explain why the need to review closure orders would be less compelling in a criminal case than in a civil case\u2014if anything, the need to review would be more compelling in a criminal case. This court has previously stressed the importance of public access to criminal trials as a way of ensuring their fairness. E.g., LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 535 (\u201copening the [criminal] process to neutral observers is an important means of assuring the fairness of criminal proceedings\u201d).\nIn sum, on the procedural and jurisdictional issues, we find that a petition to intervene is the appropriate vehicle in Illinois for the media to seek access to closed court proceedings; that there must be some mechanism to review the important first amendment concerns raised by these petitions; that a line of appellate cases appears to have found Rule 307 to be the appropriate vehicle for review; and that we see no reason to depart from this line of precedent.\n3. Mootness\nWe find that the issues in this appeal are not moot, because they fall within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.\na. Parties\u2019 Arguments\nThe State argues that the issues before this court are moot, since the media intervenors now have the transcripts to the previously closed hearings, and since the effect of the Decorum Order ceased when the underlying criminal suit concluded. Both sides acknowledge that, after the jury acquitted defendant Kelley, the trial court released the transcripts of the four closed hearings. The State claims that both the release of the transcripts and the conclusion of the underlying criminal trial make this appeal moot and require us to dismiss it.\nIn response, the media intervenors argue that mootness is not a bar to this appeal, because the facts of this case fall within two separate exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the \u201cpublic interest\u201d exception; and (2) the \u201ccapable of repetition yet evading review\u201d exception. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 257-58.\nIn reply, the State claims that the public interest exception does not apply, because the exact issues will not recur. The State argues that the exact issues will not recur, since: (1) defendant Kelly is not subject to retrial; (2) the media intervenors do not dispute the applicable legal rules, but only the way in which the applicable rules were applied to the facts of this case; and (3) the facts of this case were unusual since they included a media celebrity, alleged sexual activity, and a minor. The State claims that the \u201cevading review\u201d exception also does not apply, where the media intervenors failed to seek an expedited appeal.\nb. The Public Interest Exception\nAs a general rule, Illinois appellate courts will not review moot cases. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998). A case on appeal becomes moot, when \u201c \u2018the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist,\u2019 \u201d and it is \u201cimpossible for the appellate court to grant the complaining party effectual relief.\u201d In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 255, quoting La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 375, 378-79 (1954); In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 490-91 (consideration of the issues will not affect the result and \u201ca decision on the merits cannot result in appropriate relief to the prevailing party\u201d). The goal of the rule is for courts to avoid hearing cases where the parties no longer have \u201c \u2018 \u201c[a] personal stake in the outcome.\u201d \u2019 \u201d In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 255, quoting People ex rel. Black v. Dukes, 96 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77 (1983), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703 (1962). Without a personal stake, parties lack the incentive to \u201csharpen[ ]\u201d their arguments or to illustrate the issues with the \u201cconcrete\u201d facts of their problems; and reviewing courts depend on the parties\u2019 sharp and concrete presentation for the fullest \u201cillumination\u201d of the issues. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 255, quoting Black, 96 Ill. 2d at 276-77, quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 204, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 678, 82 S. Ct. at 703.\nAs with almost every rule, there are exceptions. Two exceptions to the mootness doctrine include (1) the \u201c \u2018 \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review\u201d \u2019 \u201d exception; and (2) the public interest exception. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 258, quoting Madison Park Bank v. Zagel, 91 Ill. 2d 231, 236 (1982), quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-400, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532, 540, 95 S. Ct. 553, 557 (1975).\nTo receive the benefit of the \u201c \u2018capable of repetition yet evading review\u2019 \u201d exception, the complainant must \u201cdemonstrate that: (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.\u201d In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491, quoting without quotation marks, In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 258. Since we find, as discussed below, that the public interest exception applies, we do not consider the \u201ccapable of repetition yet evading review\u201d exception.\nThe criteria for the public interest exception are well established and not in dispute. \u201c \u2018In order to fall into the public interest exception (1) the question must be of a public nature; (2) an authoritative determination of the question must be desirable for the purpose of guiding public officers; and (3) the question must be likely to recur.\u2019 \u201d Filliung v. Adams, 387 Ill. App. 3d 40, 56 (2008), quoting Brown v. Duncan, 361 Ill. App. 3d 125, 134 (2005). Applying these criteria to the facts before us, we find that the public interest exception allows us to hear this appeal.\nFirst, the question is of a public nature, since it involves when the substance of pretrial hearings and their supporting records should be made public. Reviewing this first criterion, our supreme court held that a newspaper\u2019s \u201cinterest in the publication of newsworthy information\u201d is an issue of \u201csurpassing public concern.\u201d In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 257. The appellate court in LaGrone was faced with a case\u2014like we are now\u2014in which the trial court denied media access to a pretrial hearing, and the State claimed on appeal that the question was moot. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 533-34. The LaGrone court held that the question was one of \u201cgreat public interest,\u201d even though the press in that case was denied access to the transcript only until the close of jury selection. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 534-35. If the denial of access for such a short duration qualified as \u201ca question of great public interest,\u201d then so does a denial of access that lasted until the conclusion of trial. Thus, we find that the first criterion is satisfied.\nSecond, the determination of this question will guide trial judges, who are public officers. The State claims that our determination will not guide trial judges, since the media intervenors are not seeking new rules or standards, but rather are challenging only the way in which well-established rules and standards were applied to the facts of this case.\nIt has never been the case that appellants must seek new rules or standards in order to utilize the public interest exception, and the State does not cite a case to that effect. Illustrating the proper way to apply existing rules to a particular fact pattern also provides guidance to trial judges who must apply those rules, not in a vacuum or to some idealized set of examples, but to ever-changing fact patterns. In LaGrone, for example, the appellate court found that the public interest exception applied, even though the media intervenors were not seeking new rules or standards, but were simply challenging the way in which the trial court had applied those rules and standards to the facts of that case. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 536 (\u201c[w]e agree with the intervenors that the trial court\u2019s specific findings do not constitute a sufficient basis for closure\u201d under existing rules and standards). As the appellate court did in LaGrone, we find that guidance about the proper application of existing rules does satisfy the second criterion.\nIn addition, neither LaGrone nor any of the other cases cited by the parties involved as famous a criminal defendant as the Kelly case did. Illinois trial courts will benefit from appellate guidance concerning the way to handle celebrity cases. In the case at bar, the trial court turned for guidance to the California criminal case against the now deceased celebrity, Michael Jackson. People v. Jackson, No. 1133603 (Cal. App. Super. January 4, 2004). It is time to provide Illinois trial courts with guidance based on Illinois cases and rules. For all these reasons, we find the second criterion satisfied.\nAlthough the State claims that none of the public interest criteria are met, then arguments target the third criterion: the likely recurrence of the question at issue. The State argues that the question will not recur since (1) defendant Kelly is not subject to retrial; and (2) the facts of this case were unusual since they included a media celebrity and alleged sexual activity with a minor.\nIf defendant Kelly was subject to retrial, then the question would not be moot, because presumably the trial court would still have not released the transcripts and the bar to access would be a continuing one. However, appellate courts have found that the public interest exception applies, without requiring a retrial to be on the horizon. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 535. Cf. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 258-59 (\u201cwe do not agree that appellant must demonstrate that\u201d the law will \u201cbe applied in precisely the same circumstances or for precisely the same reasons,\u201d for the \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review\u201d exception to apply). Thus, the lack of a potential retrial in the case at bar does not bar the application of the public interest exception.\nIn addition, while the facts of every case are unique in certain ways, illustrating the proper way to apply the law to those facts still provides guidance to trial judges. The case at bar required the trial court, in a high profile case, to balance the public\u2019s right to know, against both the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial and the court\u2019s desire to protect an alleged victim of then minor age. Unfortunately, this type of balancing is likely to recur in future cases. See LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 535 (\u201cbalancing the right of the defendant to a fair trial against the public right of access\u201d in a case where defendant boyfriend was accused of drowning his girlfriend\u2019s three young children); Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 777 (balancing rights in a case against \u201can accused stalker who allegedly committed sexual assault against several different victims\u201d); In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 251 (balancing rights where a minor was \u201c[arrested] in connection with a fatal shooting\u201d). See also Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 112 Ill. 2d 223, 244 (1986) (observing that the trial court had to \u201cachieve the delicate balance between the desirability of free discussion and the necessity for fair adjudication, free from interruption of its processes\u201d). Thus, we find the third criterion is also satisfied.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the criteria for the public interest exception are satisfied, and thus the mootness doctrine is not a bar to our review of this appeal.\n4. Standard of Review\nOur last preliminary issue is to determine the appropriate standard of review for a trial court\u2019s denial of access to the press.\na. Parties\u2019 Arguments\nThe media intervenors claim that de novo is the appropriate standard of review for the trial court\u2019s ultimate decision to deny access. They cite People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1 (2007), which applied a bifurcated standard of review to a constitutional issue, though not a first amendment one. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d at 4-5, 11 (issue concerned whether defense counsel had used peremptory challenges to strike women from the jury). Under the Rivera standard, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court\u2019s factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d at 11. However, under the Rivera standard, the reviewing court will consider de novo the trial court\u2019s \u201cultimate\u201d decision, made by applying the law to the trial court\u2019s factual findings. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d at 12.\nThe media intervenors ask us to reject the abuse of discretion standard utilized by the appellate court in A.P. In A.P., this court utilized an abuse of discretion standard to review whether a trial court had properly denied a motion by a media intervenor (Chicago Tribune) to unseal court records. A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 994. The A.P. court held that \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d was the appropriate standard, \u201cregardless of whether a purported right of access is based on the common law or the first amendment.\u201d A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 994. The A.P. case concerned an asset division agreement made by the well-known Pritzker family which affected its minor children. A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 990. Thus, the A.P. case, like the case at bar, involved: a media intervenor, sealed court records, a celebrity name, and minors. In the case at bar, the media intervenors do not attempt to distinguish A.P., except to say that it is a civil case, while the case at bar is criminal. However, they offer no explanation why this difference leads to a different standard of review.\nThe State agrees with the media intervenors that the Rivera standard of review applies to the first amendment claim. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d at 11. However, the State claims that the common law and statutory claims require a lesser standard of review, namely abuse of discretion; and the State cites in support In re Marriage of Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1068 (1992).\nHowever, in Johnson, the appellate court found that the abuse of discretion standard applied \u201c[u]nder either a common law or first amendment analysis.\u201d Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1075. In Johnson, the appellate court held that a trial court had abused its discretion, when the trial court had denied a motion by a media intervenor for access to sealed court transcripts and records. Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1075. Like the case at bar, the Johnson case involved: a media intervenor; sealed court transcripts and records; a denial of access by the trial court; and claims under both the first amendment and the common law, as well as under the Clerks of the Courts Act. Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1071-73.\nIn essence, the State claims that we should follow the part of the Johnson holding that applied an \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d standard to common law claims, but that we should reject the second part of that same holding that applied the same standard to first amendment claims. The State offers no rationale for splitting the holding in half, except to say that we should do it that way.\nIn sum, the parties appear to agree that the Rivera standard of review applies to the first amendment claim, but differ concerning the appropriate standard for the common law and statutory claims. Neither party offers us a basis to reject this court\u2019s prior holding in A.P., or the Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s similar holding in Skolnick, upon which A.P. is based, or either part of the Johnson holding. A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 994, citing Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 231-33; Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1075 (\u201c[u]nder either a common law or first amendment analysis\u201d).\nb. Case Law\nBoth parties appear to agree that de novo review is required for the \u201cultimate\u201d decision of the first amendment claim, and cite in support a case that has nothing whatsoever to do with the first amendment. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d at 11.\nThe question for us, however, is not what standard of review we would devise if we were writing on a clean slate; the question for us is what standard of review does our precedent require us to follow. In several prior cases, both the Illinois Supreme and Appellate Courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard to first amendment claims, as well as to statutory and common law claims, seeking disclosure or access. For example, in Skolnick, our supreme court stated that \u201cwhether court records in a particular case are opened to public scrutiny rests with the trial court\u2019s discretion, which must take into consideration all facts and circumstances unique to that case.\u201d Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 231. Our supreme court made clear that this standard applied to both the first amendment and common law claims before it, when it held: \u201cregardless of whether we proceed under a common law or a first amendment analysis, we reach the same conclusion: the trial court abused its discretion.\u201d Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 233. Accord A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 994 (\u201cAn order denying a motion to unseal a court file or document is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, regardless of whether a purported right of access is based on the common law or the first amendment\u201d); Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1075 (\u201cUnder either a common law or first amendment analysis, we find the trial court abused its discretion by denying access to the court records and transcripts in the two proceedings\u201d). See also Coy v. Washington County Hospital District, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1080 (\u201c \u2018An order denying a motion to unseal a court file or document is reviewed for an abuse of discretion\u2019 \u201d), quoting A.P. v. M.E.E., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 994. Cf. Zielke v. Wagner, 291 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1040 (1997) (\u201cWhere a protective order is challenged on appeal as an unconstitutional \u2018prior restraint,\u2019 the trial court\u2019s decision on the matter will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion\u201d).\nA distinction between our case and the prior cases is that the prior cases were civil, while our case is criminal. In criminal cases involving denial of media access, the reviewing courts decided the first amendment issues without specifying the standard of review. For example, in Pelo, which is a criminal case, the appellate court discussed the first amendment right of access in one paragraph, and then discussed the common law right of access in a separate paragraph. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 780-81. In the common law paragraph, the appellate court identified abuse of discretion as the correct standard of review, but without stating whether it also applied to the first amendment claim. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 780-81. See also LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 537 (holding that \u201cthe trial court failed to make specific factual findings\u201d justifying closure, without stating whether it was applying a de novo or abuse of discretion standard).\nWe do not find the civil/criminal distinction to be controlling. In civil cases as in criminal cases, the parties have a right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, and the press has a right of access. U.S. Const., amend. V (no person shall \u201cbe deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law\u201d); U.S. Const., amend. XIV (no state shall \u201cdeprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law\u201d); Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 231-32 (in this civil case, our supreme court recognized that the public had a right of access \u201cembodied in the first amendment\u201d). In criminal cases, the defendant also has a constitutional right to a public trial. U.S. Const., amend. VI (\u201cIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a *** public trial ***\u201d). However, in both criminal and civil cases, the trial court is charged with the duty of balancing competing rights and achieving the correct balance. We see no reason to apply an abuse of discretion to civil cases and then apply a different standard in criminal cases. Cf. People v. Cooper, 365 Ill. App. 3d 278, 282 (2006) (applied an abuse of discretion standard to question of whether trial court violated defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to a public trial when it excluded certain spectators).\nIn the case at bar, the trial court had to determine, first, whether the presumption of public access applied to this particular type of court record or proceeding. E.g., Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 783-84 (presumption of access did not apply to evidence deposition that had not yet been entered into evidence in a criminal case). This is a purely legal question, and we review purely legal questions de novo. Willeford v. Toys \u201cR\u201d Us-Delaware, Inc., 385 Ill. App. 3d 265, 272-73 (2008) (although protective orders are ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion, a de novo standard applied to a preceding, purely legal issue).\nHowever, after the trial court found that the presumption applied, it had to determine whether the presumption was rebutted by other concerns. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 232 (\u201cpresumption can be rebutted\u201d); Coy, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1080; A.P., 354 Ill App. 3d at 995; Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1075. In order to close the court proceeding, the trial court was required to make specific findings that rebutted the presumption and thus justified the closure. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 233 (\u201ctrial court neglected to state why it ordered\u201d sealing of document); LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 537 (\u201ctrial court failed to make specific factual findings\u201d); A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 996 (trial court sealed court files \u201cwithout making specific findings\u201d); Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1075 (trial court\u2019s order must contain \u201cspecific factual findings\u201d in order to justify denying access). To the extent that these findings involved findings of fact, we owe deference, as an appellate court traditionally owes to a trial court\u2019s factual findings. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d at 11; People v. Johnson, 385 Ill. App. 3d 585, 590 (2008).\nIn deciding to deny access to certain proceedings and records for a certain length of time, the trial court had to craft a careful and delicate balance among competing interests. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 535 (\u201cbalancing the right of the defendant to a fair trial against the public right of access to criminal proceedings\u201d); Coy, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1082 (\u201cbalancing this compelling interest [of victim privacy] against the public\u2019s right of access\u201d in a civil case); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 81 L. Ed. 2d 35, 38, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2215 (1984) (\u201cthe balance of interests must be struck with special care\u201d). The trial court had \u201c[t]o take into consideration all facts and circumstances unique to that case\u201d and decide the appropriate parameters of closure, namely, for what proceedings and for how long. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 231; A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 1002 (trial court erred by sealing the entire court file; case was remanded so trial court could determine which document required sealing, since \u201c[t]he determination regarding sealing a particular document *** is properly left to the trial court in the first instance\u201d). To this balancing of interests and determination of parameters, we apply an abuse of discretion standard, as required by the supreme court and appellate court cases that we have discussed above.\n5. Presumption of Access\nNext, we must determine whether the presumption of access applied to the court proceedings and records at issue. If the presumption did not apply, our analysis ends there. If the presumption did apply, then we must examine the propriety of the trial court\u2019s denial of access.\nThe constitutional presumption applies to court proceedings and records (1) which have been historically open to the public; and (2) which have a purpose and function that would be furthered by disclosure. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 232; Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 780; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 8, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2740 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II) (\u201cwhether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public\u201d and \u201cwhether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question\u201d). Although the presumptions under common law and state statutory law have different sources, our supreme court has held that they are \u201cparallel\u201d to the first amendment presumption and thus has analyzed the three presumptions together. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 231-33. We will do the same.\nIn the case at bar, the trial court closed four pretrial hearings, on (1) April 11, 2008; (2) April 15, 2008; (3) April 21, 2008; and (4) April 25, 2008. In addition, the following documents were filed under seal: (1) the State\u2019s pretrial motion to allow evidence of other crimes; (2) the State\u2019s supplemental answer to discovery; and (3) both parties\u2019 witness lists.\nThis issue, of the presumption\u2019s applicability to pretrial criminal proceedings, has arguably arisen, in two prior Illinois Appellate Court cases: (1) Pelo and (2) LaGrone. Compare Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 783-84 (presumption of access did not apply to pretrial deposition that had not yet been entered into evidence in the criminal trial), with LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 536 (presumption applied to pretrial hearing to determine admissibility of certain statements in a criminal trial). Compare In re Consensual Overhear, 323 Ill. App. 3d 236, 242 (2001) (presumption did not apply to court proceedings authorizing a wiretap), with Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31, 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2216 (1984) (presumption of a public trial under sixth amendment applied to a hearing to determine admissibility of wiretap evidence). See also A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 998 (presumption applied to a civil proceeding concerning a family\u2019s asset distribution); In re Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1074 (presumption applied to certain documents but not others in a civil case).\nFirst, the Pelo case concerned a criminal defendant who was accused of stalking and sexually assaulting several victims. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 777. Since a potential witness was scheduled to leave the country for military service, the parties deposed him at the courthouse. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 777. A newspaper, which had been reporting about the case, filed a petition to intervene and to gain access to the videotape of the deposition. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 777. The appellate court held that no presumption attached under the first amendment, the common law or the applicable Illinois statute (705 ILCS 105/16(6) (West 2006)). Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 780-81, 783-84. No presumption of access attached until, and if, the videotape was introduced into evidence and thus became part of the judicial record. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 782-83.\nSecond, the LaGrone case concerned a boyfriend accused of murder when his girlfriend\u2019s three children drowned, after her vehicle sank into a lake. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 533. The defendant moved to bar certain hearsay statements of one of the murder victims and to bar certain evidence concerning his \u201ccharacter attributes\u201d and to close the hearing on these two motions. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 533. The Associated Press and two newspapers petitioned to intervene and to obtain access to the hearing. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 533. Although the trial court directed the closure of the hearing, it ruled that, \u201c \u2018upon selection of the jury, the transcript of this hearing will be released.\u2019 \u201d LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 534. In LaGrone, the appellate court never considered whether the presumption applied. We have no way of knowing if this issue was conceded by the parties. Skipping over the question of whether the presumption applied and jumping to the question of whether the trial court appropriately balanced the presumption against other concerns, the appellate court held that the trial court failed to make the specific findings needed to rebut the presumption. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 537. As a result, the LaGrone case provides little guidance to us in determining whether the presumption applies.\nThe United States Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Waller is instructive, because it also concerned a pretrial criminal proceeding. Although Waller concerned the defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to a public trial, the United States Supreme Court held that the same analysis applied. Waller, 467 U.S. at 47, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 39, 104 S. Ct. at 2216; Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 9, 106 S. Ct. at 2739. Thus, whether a court is determining the propriety of closure under either the first or the sixth amendments, the analysis is the same.\nIn Waller, the United States Supreme Court held that the presumption attached to a hearing to determine the admissibility of wiretap evidence. Waller, 467 U.S. at 43, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 36, 104 S. Ct. at 2214. The State had moved to close the hearing, on the ground that it would involve persons who were indicted but not yet on trial. Waller, 467 U.S. at 42, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 35-36, 104 S. Ct. at 2213. Over the defendant\u2019s objection, the trial court had closed the hearing, which lasted seven days. Waller, 467 U.S. at 42, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 36, 104 S. Ct. at 2213; see also Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 12, 106 S. Ct. at 2742 (presumption applied to preliminary hearing that lasted 41 days, including both fact and scientific witnesses, who were subject to vigorous cross-examination). The Supreme Court held that the presumption applied to a suppression hearing, reasoning that, first, in many cases, a suppression hearing will be, in effect, the only trial if the defendant subsequently pleads guilty pursuant to a plea bargain; second, that a suppression hearing often resembles a bench trial, with testimony by witnesses, arguments by counsel, and determinations by the trial court; and third, that the need for a public hearing is \u201cparticularly strong\u201d when the issue is suppression pursuant to the fourth amendment, since the public has \u201ca strong interest in exposing substantial allegations of police misconduct to the salutary effects of public scrutiny.\u201d Waller, 467 U.S. at 47, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 39, 104 S. Ct. at 2215-16.\nNone of the United States Supreme Court\u2019s reasons apply here. First, in the case at bar, the defendant did not plead guilty and a full trial was held. Second, the hearings at issue bore absolutely no resemblance to the proceeding in Waller. In contrast to the Waller proceeding which resembled a full-scale bench trial, the hearings at issue concerned primarily argument by counsel, with a few questions asked by the trial court itself, to one witness, on a very limited issue. Waller, 467 U.S. at 47, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 39, 104 S. Ct. at 2215-16; see also Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7, 12, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 9, 12, 106 S. Ct. at 2740, 2742 (presumption of access applied to a California preliminary hearing since it \u201cfunctions much like a full-scale trial\u201d). Third, in the case at bar, the hearings did not concern allegations of police misconduct, which carry a \u201cparticularly strong\u201d need for public scrutiny. Waller, 467 U.S. at 47, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 39, 104 S. Ct. at 2216.\nApplying Pelo and Waller to the proceedings and records before us, we find that the presumption did not attach to the hearings, to the State\u2019s motion concerning potential evidence, to the State\u2019s discovery, or to the parties\u2019 witness lists. As in Pelo, the media intervenors did not have a right to a potential exhibit that had not yet been introduced into evidence; similarly, in the case at bar, the media intervenors did not have a right to discovery, other-crimes evidence, or a list of witnesses, because none of it had been introduced into evidence. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 782-83. As already discussed, the hearings at issue bore no resemblance to the hearing in Waller, where the presumption of access applied. Waller, 467 U.S. at 43, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 36, 104 S. Ct. at 2214.\nIn addition, we find that the subject matter of these proceedings is not one that has been historically open to the public or which have a purpose and function that would be furthered by disclosure. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 232; Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d 780; Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 10, 106 S. Ct. at 2740. The proceedings at issue here concerned primarily: (1) questionnaires for potential jurors; and (2) the State\u2019s other-crimes evidence.\nFirst, the media intervenors have not cited a case for the proposition that juror questionnaires have historically been made public prior to their use. The questioning and selection of jurors have historically been open to the public. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 505, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629, 635, 104 S. Ct. 819, 821 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I) (presumption of access applies to voir dire questioning and selection of jurors). However, we have not been presented with a case that the presumption applies to counsel\u2019s argument concerning what questions those jurors should be asked. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 598 n.23, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 1004 n.23, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2839 n.23 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.) (\u201cwhen engaging in interchanges at the bench, the trial judge is not required to allow public or press intrusion upon the huddle\u201d); Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 698 (\u201ca denial of contemporaneous access to sidebar conferences\u201d is not appealable). Making the questions public to the very pool from which the jurors are about to be drawn would completely undermine their function, of eliciting honest and unrehearsed responses from the potential jurors. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 51 n.9, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 638 n.9, 104 S. Ct. at 824 n.9 (purpose of questioning potential jurors is \u201cto ensure a fair impartial jury\u201d).\nSecond, the State\u2019s other-crimes evidence has historically not been accessible to the public prior to its introduction at trial. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 782-83 (potential evidence does not carry a presumption of access until its use in court). In addition, the function of the hearing could be undermined if the public and potential jurors received access to the information, even if the trial court ruled that the State was not entitled to use it. Although the Unites States Supreme Court held that this reason did not \u201cautomatically\u201d justify refusing access specifically in the case of fourth amendment suppression hearings or California preliminary hearings, it found that public access to an admissibility hearing posed \u201c \u2018special risks of unfairness,\u2019 \u201d where publicity could undermine \u201c \u2018the whole purpose of such hearings\u2019 \u201d which is \u201c \u2018to screen out unreliable or illegally obtained evidence.\u2019 \u201d Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14-15, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 14, 106 S. Ct. at 2743, quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).\nFor these reasons, we find that the presumption of access did not apply.\n6. Trial Court\u2019s Findings\nEven if we were to find that the presumption of access applied to these pretrial proceedings and related documents, we could not find that the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the competing interests at stake here and crafting appropriate parameters.\nA holding that the presumption applies is only one step in the analysis. The presumption provides only a qualified right of access. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 10, 106 S. Ct. at 2740 (\u201ceven when a right of access attaches, it is not absolute\u201d; it is a \u201cqualified\u201d right). That right still must be balanced against competing interests, such as the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial and the privacy right of a victim who was both an alleged sex crime victim (Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10 n.2, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 11 n.2, 106 S. Ct. at 2741 n.2 (\u201cThe protection of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny may justify closing certain aspects of a criminal proceeding\u201d)) and a minor at the time of the alleged acts (A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 998 (a trial court must exercise \u201cgreat care\u201d when faced with a media petition for access in a case involving a minor)).\nIf the presumption applies to a certain type of proceeding or record, the trial court cannot close this type of proceeding or record, unless it makes specific findings demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve those values. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 13-14, 106 S. Ct. at 2743; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 638, 104 S. Ct. at 824. If the value asserted is the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial, then the trial court\u2019s findings must demonstrate, first, that there is a substantial probability that defendant\u2019s trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure will prevent; and second, that reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant\u2019s fair trial rights. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 13-14, 106 S. Ct. at 2743.\na. Trial Court\u2019s Declaration of Reasons\nIn the case at bar, the trial court articulated its reasons both in writing and orally in court. On April 11, in open court, the trial court apparently made a statement that it was closing the proceeding due to the proximity of jury selection and the impact that it could have on potential jurors. On April 15, in open court, the trial court stated that the State\u2019s motion had been filed under seal \u201cbecause of the proximity of Mr. Kelly\u2019s case going to trial.\u201d On April 24, in open court, the trial court explained that it could not \u201cdisclose the factual basis\u201d for closure without compromising the very interest that the closed proceeding sought to protect. However, the trial court did state that \u201cthe generalized basis\u201d was \u201cthe proximity of jury selection, which is in about two weeks, and the chance that this might deprive Mr. Kelly of a fair trial.\u201d On April 25, during the first closed hearing after the intervenors\u2019 motion, the trial court elaborated on its reasons, which it had mentioned briefly, in open court the day before. Then, after the State and the defendant received time to respond, as they had both requested, the trial court issued on May 16, 2008, a detailed, public, eight-page order that explained the need for closure.\nThe media intervenors criticize the trial court for failing to make a formal declaration of reasons, prior to closing the first proceeding on April 11. However, from the record before us, we cannot tell whether the trial court did, or did not, make findings before closing the proceeding. The record on appeal contains only an excerpt from the April 11 proceeding. The appellants failed to provide us with the transcript of the open portion of the April 11 proceeding, which would have revealed whether the trial court did, or did not, make a formal declaration of reasons before it cleared the public and the press from the courtroom.\nThe burden is on the appellant to provide a reviewing court with a complete record. \u201cIt is well settled that any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant, as it is the burden of the appellant to provide a sufficiently complete record to support a claim of error.\u201d Poliszczuk v. Winkler, 387 Ill. App. 3d 474, 494 (2008), citing Truserv Corp. v. Ernst & Young LLP, 376 Ill. App. 3d 218, 225 (2007).\nEven if the transcript of the open proceedings did not contain a formal declaration of reasons, we cannot fault the trial judge. It is absurd to expect a trial court to issue a formal declaration, when the parties did not object to closure, when the media had not yet filed a motion objecting to closure and when the presumption of access did not even apply to that proceeding.\nIn addition, the reasons for closure are obvious from the record. The purpose of requiring a trial court to make findings is to facilitate appellate review. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9-10, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 11, 106 S. Ct. at 2741 (the findings must be \u201cspecific enough that a reviewing court can determine\u201d the propriety of closure); A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 997 (\u201c[a]dequate findings relieve the appellate courts of having to grope through the record\u201d). Although we require a trial court to make specific factual findings to justify closing a proceeding, a reviewing court may affirm the closure even if the trial court failed to make a \u201cformal declaration\u201d of findings, if the reasons are both obvious from the record and sufficient to justify closure. People v. Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84, 100 (1990); A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 997 (after holding that the trial court\u2019s findings were not sufficiently \u201cspecific,\u201d we conducted \u201c[o]ur own review\u201d of the record).\nIn the case at bar, we find both that the trial court articulated its reasons orally in court and in writing; and that the reasons are also obvious from the record.\nb. Trial Court\u2019s Balancing of Interests\nEven if the presumption of access applied, we could not find that the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the competing interests, in light of the unique facts and circumstances of this case.\nFirst, this is a case where the defendant asserted his right to a fair trial, claiming that opening these particular proceedings would violate that right. The defendant asserted his right in briefs filed both before our supreme court and before the trial court. Thus, the defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to a public trial was not at issue; and if the trial court had opened the proceedings, it would have had to do so over the defendant\u2019s voiced concerns for his constitutional right to a fair trial. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 n.6, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 39 n.6, 104 S. Ct. at 2216 n.6 (noting the need for defendant to object to closure to trigger an analysis of his sixth amendment right to a public trial, and the difficulties of closing a proceeding over defendant\u2019s objection). This court is confident that if defendant Kelly had been convicted, we would he presented with an allegation by the defendant that a media-circus atmosphere precluded him from receiving a fair trial. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 38, 104 S. Ct. at 2215 (\u201c[t]he central aim of a criminal proceeding must be to try the accused fairly\u201d); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 637, 104 S. Ct. at 823 (\u201cNo right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial\u201d).\nSecond, this is a case described by the media intervenors themselves as attracting media \u201chordes.\u201d In a newspaper article attached as an exhibit to defendant Kelly\u2019s objections, one of the intervenors wrote that \u201c [c] elebrity-obsessed culture will turn its eyes toward the R. Kelly trial next month\u201d and that \u201chordes of reporters and cameramen [are] expected to descend\u201d on the courthouse. The front-page article also stated: \u201cMore than 330 reporters have expressed interest in covering the case with news agencies from as far away as France, Japan, Australia and England indicating they\u2019ll attend.\u201d Thus, the intense coverage of this case by the media is an undisputed fact. Nebraska Press Ass\u2019n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683, 699, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1976) (to assess \u201cthe probable extent of publicity,\u201d the trial court properly relied on \u201cnewspapers demonstrating that the crime had already drawn intensive news coverage\u201d).\nThird, this case concerned an alleged sex crime victim who was also a minor at the time of the alleged crime. Protecting the privacy interests of both sex crime victims and minors is a paramount concern of the courts. Concerning sex crime victims, the United States Supreme Court has stated, \u201c[t]he protection of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny may justify closing certain aspects of a criminal proceeding.\u201d Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9 n.2, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 11 n.2, 106 S. Ct. at 2741 n.2. Concerning minors, this court has stated that a trial court must exercise \u201cgreat care\u201d when faced with a media petition for access in a case involving a minor. A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 998. The minor is entitled to the court\u2019s \u201ctenderest consideration.\u201d A.P., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 998. In the case at bar, where the minor was alleged to have participated in three-way sex, lesbian sex and other various sex acts, the trial court was justly concerned with protecting the alleged victim, who was a minor at the time of the acts.\nFourth, the trial court\u2019s attempt to strike a careful balance was evident, not only from the concerns that it expressed several times in court and in writing on this subject, but also from the fact that it had previously denied the motions of both the defense and the prosecution to prohibit the public from viewing the videotape in open court.\nFifth, the trial court considered several alternatives to closure. A trial court may resort to closure only if \u201creasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant\u2019s fair trial rights.\u201d Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 14, 106 S. Ct. at 2743; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 639, 104 S. Ct. at 825 (\u201c[ajbsent consideration of alternatives to closure, the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir dire\u201d). In the case at bar, the trial court considered the alternatives of: (1) redacting; (2) using a pseudonym; (3) questioning potential jurors during voir dire\\ and (4) changing the venue of trial. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563-64, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 700, 96 S. Ct. at 2805 (discussing alternatives such as changing venue and voir dire). Rejecting these alternatives, the trial court explained that redaction and use of pseudonyms would result in \u201ca collection of unintelligible nonsense,\u201d and that neither voir dire questions nor a venue change could protect the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial, in light of the highly prejudicial details of the crime, the onslaught of pretrial publicity, the national and international media attention, and the proximity of jury selection. Although \u201cvoir dire is the preferred method for guarding against the effects of pretrial publicity,\u201d we have recognized that there are \u201ccircumstances\u201d where voir dire cannot remove the taint. LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 537; Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 15, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 14, 106 S. Ct. at 2743 (normally, voir dire can \u201cidentify those jurors whose prior knowledge of the case would disable them from rendering an impartial verdict\u201d). These \u201crare cases\u201d occur when there has been media saturation, as the trial court found in the case at bar. See LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 537.\nIn addition, the trial court\u2019s findings in the case at bar share little resemblance with the findings in LaGrone, which the appellate court found to be inadequate. In LaGrone, the trial court failed to \u201cprovide[ ] this [appellate] court with sufficient factual material\u201d; and the trial court made \u201cno mention of alternatives to closure other than to state that [there were] none.\u201d LaGrone, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 536-37. By contrast, in the case at bar, the trial court did provide us with factual material, such as the fact that over 330 reporters had applied for media credential to cover this case, and that the case had been on the front page of both major Chicago newspapers, numerous times in just the prior three weeks. Also, in the case at bar, the trial court carefully considered several different alternatives to closure and explained why each one would not work in the unique circumstances of this case. Thus, the findings in the case at bar share little resemblance with the inadequate findings in LaGrone.\nFor these reasons, we find that, even if the presumption applied, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking a balance among the competing interests of the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial, the public\u2019s right of access, and the privacy right belonging to the victim as both a minor and an alleged sex crime victim. We make our analysis based on the unique facts of this case, acknowledging the rights of the media to free speech and to provide a free press.\n7. Decorum Order\nThe media intervenors challenge the Decorum Order as a prior restraint on free speech. Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 112 Ill. 2d 223, 246 (1986). Like the closed proceedings and records, the Decorum Order raises several preliminary issues that we must decide before reaching the substantive issue of prior restraint.\na. Preliminary Issues\nThe preliminary issues are: (1) standing; (2) jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 307; and (3) the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.\nFirst, the issue of standing was raised at the oral argument of this appeal, with respect to the Decorum Order. Standing is not an issue in this case. Standing is an affirmative defense which, if not raised by the opposing party, is waived. The Illinois Supreme Court held in Skolnick\u2014which was a right of access case like the case at bar\u2014that \u201cstanding is an affirmative defense\u201d which is waived if not raised. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 237; Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 262 (2004) (\u201cLack of standing is an affirmative matter that may be raised as a ground for dismissal under a section 2\u2014619 motion to dismiss\u201d). The supreme court in Skolnick seemed to be critical of the appellate court for raising this issue, seemingly sua sponte. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 237. In the case at bar, since the issue was not raised, either at the trial level or in the appellate briefs, it was waived for purposes of this appeal.\nSecond, as previously discussed, Supreme Court Rule 307 permits an appeal from \u201can interlocutory order of [a trial] court *** refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction.\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1). In the case at bar, the Decorum Order enjoined the parties\u2019 attorneys and witnesses from speaking on certain topics. The trial court\u2019s May 16 order \u201crefus[ed] to dissolve or modify\u201d this injunction, as Supreme Court Rule 307 requires. Thus, the language of Rule 307 permits this appeal. Kemner, 112 Ill. 2d at 235, 242 (an interlocutory appeal from a \u201c \u2018gag\u2019 \u201d order was permitted \u201c[pjursuant to Rule 307\u201d); In re J.S., 267 Ill. App. 3d 145, 147 (1994) (a \u201cgag order\u201d directed to the parties and their attorneys \u201cis properly the subject of an interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1)\u201d). See also Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 221-22 (an order prohibiting a party from disseminating information was properly reviewed under Rule 307). While the Decorum Order did not purport to enjoin the media intervenors, the issue of standing was waived, as discussed above. See also J.S., 267 Ill. App. 3d at 152 (\u201cthe gag order constitutes an indirect restraint on the press\u201d); Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1056, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888, 911, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2735 (1991) (\u201c[bjecause attorneys participate in the criminal justice system and are trained in its complexities, they hold unique qualifications as a source of information about pending cases upon which \u201cthe press and public rely\u201d).\nThird, like the closed proceedings and records, the Decorum Order also qualifies for the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. As previously stated, the public interest exception requires: (1) a question of \u201c \u2018a public nature\u2019 \u201d; (2) the need for a determination to \u201c \u2018guide[ ] public officers\u2019 \u201d: and (3) a question that is \u201c \u2018likely to recur.\u2019 \u201d Filliung, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 56, quoting Brown, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 134. First, the Decorum Order involves a question of \u201ca public nature,\u201d since it concerns when and if certain information will become \u201cpublic.\u201d Second and third, there is a need to guide \u201cpublic officers,\u201d i.e., trial judges; and the question will certainly recur, since the trial court has used this same Decorum Order before and presumably will continue to use it, until and unless we, the reviewing court, say not to use it again. In its May 16 order, the trial court observed that \u201cthis same decorum order was used during the trial of People v. Luna, (02CR 15430) *** which was covered extensively by\u201d the same media intervenors. The Luna case was a case of local notoriety, that involved murders at a \u201cBrown\u2019s Chicken\u201d restaurant. Thus, not only did this same Decorum Order recur, it recurred against these same media intervenors. For these reasons, we find that the public interest exception permits us to hear an appeal from the portion of the May 16 order that concerned the Decorum Order.\nOn the preliminary issues, we find that: (1) any objections to standing were waived; (2) we have jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 307; and (3) the public interest exception applies. Thus, we may proceed to the substantive issue concerning the Decorum Order, which is whether it constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of speech.\nb. Prior Restraint\nThe media intervenors claim that the Decorum Order was an unconstitutional \u201cprior restraint[ ] on [the] freedom of speech\u201d of the parties\u2019 attorneys. Kemner, 112 Ill. 2d at 246; J.S., 267 Ill. App. 3d at 148, quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 264 (\u201cA prior restraint is a \u2018predetermined judicial prohibition restraining specified expression\u2019 \u201d). Although the Decorum Order was also directed at the parties\u2019 witnesses, the appellate briefs of the media intervenors discuss only the restraint of the attorneys\u2019 speech. Thus, we will limit our analysis to that topic as well.\nThe media intervenors claim that this prior restraint was unconstitutional, because the trial court failed to make findings to justify it. Kemner, 112 Ill. 2d at 244. In Kemner, the Illinois Supreme Court held that before a trial court could restrain attorneys from making extrajudicial comments \u201cabout a pending civil trial,\u201d it had to make \u201cspecific findings\u201d that the attorneys\u2019 \u201cconduct pose[d] a clear and present danger or a serious and imminent threat to the fairness and integrity of the trial.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Kemner, 112 Ill. 2d at 244. After Kemner, the Illinois Supreme Court redrafted the rule governing attorney conduct and pretrial publicity, in order to clarify, in advance, what subjects would pose this \u201cserious and imminent threat to the fairness of [the] proceeding.\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6.\nThe trial court\u2019s Decorum Order tracks closely, in substance if not in language, to Rule 3.6(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. 188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6(b). The Rules of Professional Conduct comprise Article VIII of the Illinois Supreme Court rules, and they govern the conduct of attorneys in Illinois courts. \u201cViolation of these rules is grounds for discipline.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d art. VIII, Preamble. Rule 3.6 governs the conduct of Illinois attorneys with respect to \u201ctrial publicity.\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6. In the case at bar, none of the parties have argued that we should find Rule 3.6 unconstitutional. In fact, both sides cite Rule 3.6 in support of their arguments, with the media intervenors arguing that the Decorum Order was broader than Rule 3.6 and the State arguing that it was not. Thus, to the extent that the Decorum Order tracks Rule 3.6(b), it is proper.\nSubsection (b) of Rule 3.6 provides a list of subjects that should not be discussed outside of court, because their discussion \u201cwould pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness\u201d of a jury proceeding. 188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6(b). Subsection (b) provides in full:\n\u201c(b) There are certain subjects which would pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury or a criminal matter. These subjects relate to:\n(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;\n(2) in a criminal case, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of a confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person\u2019s failure to make a statement;\n(3) the performance or results of any examination \u00f3r test or the failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;\n(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case;\n(5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial; or\n(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6(b).\nEffective January 1, 2010, the Illinois Supreme Court removed subsection (b) from the text of the rule and moved it, almost verbatim, to the Committee Comments that accompany the rule. Ill. S. Ct. R. 3.6 (eff. January 1, 2010). This change has no effect on our analysis since subsection (b), as quoted above, was in effect in 2008, at the time of the Kelly trial.\nA section by section comparison of the Decorum Order with Rule 3.6(b) shows their similarity. The first section of the Decorum Order prohibited the dissemination of any \u201cextrajudicial statement\u201d of the defendant or witnesses. This section is similar to Rule 3.6(b)(2) which concerns the dissemination of a \u201cstatement given by a defendant or suspect\u201d and to Rule 3.6(b)(1) which concerns the release of a witness\u2019s identity or \u201cexpected testimony.\u201d\nThe second and third sections of the Decorum Order concerned the release or discussion of exhibits whose admissibility the trial court had yet to determine. These sections correspond to Rule 3.6(b)(5) (188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6(b)(5)), which concerns \u201cinformation\u201d that a lawyer \u201creasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial.\u201d\nThe fourth section of the Decorum Order concerned expressing an opinion about guilt or innocence. This section is similar to Rule 3.6(b)(4) (188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6(b)(4)), which concerned \u201cany opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case.\u201d\nThe fifth section of the Decorum Order concerned testimony that was \u201cgiven or is expected to be given in any proceeding relating to this matter.\u201d This section is similar, in part, to Rule 3.6(b)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6(b)(1)), which concerns \u201cthe expected testimony of a parly or witness.\u201d This section is different, in that it also concerns testimony that was already \u201cgiven\u201d at trial.\nThe sixth section concerns the \u201cidentity of any prospective witness, or the witness\u2019s probable testimony.\u201d This section is similar to Rule 3.6(b)(1), which concerns a witness\u2019s \u201cidentity\u201d and \u201cexpected testimony.\u201d\nThe seventh section concerns \u201cthe nature\u201d of \u201cany purported evidence alleged to have been accumulated as a result of the investigation of this matter.\u201d This section is similar to Rule 3.6(b)(3) (188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6(b)(3)) which concerns \u201cthe nature of physical evidence expected to be presented.\u201d\nThus, with the exception of testimony already \u201cgiven\u201d at trial, the substance of the Decorum Order tracked Rule 3.6. The media intervenors offer no explanation of how they were prejudiced by a lack of attorney statements describing trial testimony, which was already given and made public. We cannot find a first amendment violation based on that section alone. Zielke, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 1040-41 (appellants \u201care unable to articulate any prejudice that they may have suffered\u201d from the alleged prior restraint on speech).\nFor these reasons, we find that the trial court\u2019s Decorum Order was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court. J.S., 267 Ill. App. 3d at 148 (\u201cIn determining whether the circuit court abused its discretion\u201d in restraining the speech of parties and their attorneys, \u201cwe will not compare what we might have done with what the [trial] court did\u201d); see also Zielke, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 1040 (\u201c[w]here a protective order is challenged on appeal as an unconstitutional \u2018prior restraint,\u2019 the trial court\u2019s decision on the matter will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion\u201d); Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 224. However, in the future, it may be the better practice for Illinois trial courts simply to use the exact language of Rule 3.6(b) when drafting a Decorum Order, if they felt one was needed.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s orders. We find: (1) that a petition to intervene was the appropriate vehicle to seek access to sealed court proceedings and records; (2) that appellate jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 307 was proper to review the trial court\u2019s order denying access and confirming the Decorum Order; (3) that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine allowed us to hear this appeal; (4) that we review de novo the question of whether a presumption of access applied to this type of proceeding, and we review for an abuse of discretion the trial court\u2019s balancing of competing interests and determining the appropriate parameters of closure; (5) that the presumption of access did not apply to the pretrial proceedings and documents at issue here; (6) that, even if the presumption did apply, the trial court did not abuse its discretion; and (7) that the Decorum Order was not an abuse of discretion.\nAffirmed.\nJ. GORDON and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.\nthough the emergency motion was filed only by the Sun-Times and the Tribune, the Associated Press must have joined the motion shortly after its filing, since an order dated April 24, 2008, refers to the motion as the motion of all three media intervenors.\nThe State\u2019s appellate brief states that proceedings were held \u201cin open court\u201d on April 22, when the media intervenors filed their motion to intervene and to obtain access. The record on appeal does not contain the transcript from the open April 22 proceeding.\nEarlier in the oral argument, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney had described the trial court\u2019s statement, as follows: \u201cThe court made a statement in that [April 11] hearing that this is closed due to the impact that it could have on the jury.\u201d\nIn their appellate brief, the media intervenors alleged that the lawyers for the State and the defendant met with the trial judge in chambers and without a court reporter, on several dates prior to trial. Defendant Kelly stated in his \u201cObjections\u201d that these meetings were merely \u201ccase management conferences\u201d and that, with the exception of the proceedings now at issue, all \u201carguments, rulings and hearings on pretrial motions have occurred in open court.\u201d\nIn Cianci, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that a declaratory action was superior to intervention, because the media\u2019s rights could be \u201cfully adjudicated\u201d in a declaratory action \u201cwithout interfering with or interrupting the criminal proceeding in any way.\u201d Cianci, 496 A.2d at 146. However, a civil court\u2019s order of closure or disclosure will directly interfere with the criminal trial.\nEven though Rules 301, 304 and 307 were all amended effective February 1, 1994 (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 304, 307) and even though the petitions for access in Reynolds were all filed after that date, the Reynolds opinion cited an earlier version of the rules. 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 304, 307.\nIn addition, the State in the case at bar concedes in its brief to this court that \u201cit is true that press access to criminal proceedings is generally a question of a public nature.\u201d\nIn a footnote, our supreme court observed in Skolnick that at least one commentator had stated that the abuse of discretion standard applied to common law claims, but not to first amendment claims. However, our supreme court apparently rejected this position when it held, under both a first amendment and common law analysis, that the trial court \u201cabused its discretion.\u201d Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 232 n.2, 233, citing D. Lee, Sealed Documents, Closed Hearings, and the Public\u2019s Right to Know, 81 B.J. 456, 457-58 (1993).\nThis court has previously defined the term \u201cinjunction,\u201d in Rule 307(a), as a prohibitive, equitable remedy that forbids a party from doing some act that he or she is threatening or attempting to commit. Pelo, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 779, quoting Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 698, quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 705 (5th ed. 1983).\nIn 1991, the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional Nevada\u2019s trial publicity rule. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (plurality opinion). After the Gentile opinion, the American Bar Association and a number of states redrafted their trial publicity rules. A. Bernabe-Riefkohl, Silence Is Golden: The New Illinois Rules on Attorney Extrajudicial Speech, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 323, 326 (2002). The Illinois Supreme Court adopted in 1999 the version, which is quoted below. 188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6. A group of Illinois state prosecutors then challenged the rule in federal court, claiming that it violated the first amendment. Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963, 964 (2001). The federal district court dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to show \u201can immediate threat of injury.\u201d Devine, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 968. The federal court also found that Rule 3.6 \u201cmay be fairly interpreted in a manner that complies with the First Amendment.\u201d Devine, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 969.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Damon E. Dunn and Neil M. Rosenbaum, both of Funkhouser Vergosen Liebman & Dunn Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.", "Anita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter D. Fischer, and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT KELLY, Defendant (Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., et al., Intervenors-Appellants).\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201408\u20141728\nOpinion filed December 11, 2009.\nDamon E. Dunn and Neil M. Rosenbaum, both of Funkhouser Vergosen Liebman & Dunn Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.\nAnita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter D. Fischer, and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0232-01", "first_page_order": 248, "last_page_order": 286 }