{ "id": 4294451, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHAUNCEY PERRY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Perry", "decision_date": "2010-01-27", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201408\u20140797", "first_page": "358", "last_page": "362", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 358" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "761 F.2d 975", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 29462 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "982", "parenthetical": "\"a lock inside a sock [becomes] a bludgeon\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/761/0975-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3309497 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 N.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "119", "parenthetical": "after consulting Black's Law Dictionary, holding that a heavy metal chain wrapped with tape satisfied the definition of both \"bludgeon\" and \"blackjack\"" }, { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Ill. App. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2468777 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/6/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "847 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262670 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "897 N.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "386 Ill. App. 3d 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4281052 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/386/0635-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 499, "char_count": 9591, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.3230182531877341 }, "sha256": "b0dc5d8f598a7b4f8be05d0d423d34855797cce13b2150a095b32e2078d6a7b1", "simhash": "1:21e49629f2989797", "word_count": 1592 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:15:46.302641+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHAUNCEY PERRY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE POPE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn July 2008, the State charged defendant, Chauncey Perry, with aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(b)(1), (e)(1) (West 2006)), and unlawful use of weapons by a felon, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/24\u20141.1(b), (e) (West 2006)). Defendant was an inmate in the Department of Corrections at the time of the July 2006 incident. While the information calls the charge \u201cUnlawful Use of Weapons by Felons,\u201d defendant was actually charged with \u201cUnlawful Possession of a Weapon by a Person in a Penal Institution of the Department of Corrections,\u201d pursuant to section 24\u20141.1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24\u20141.1(b) (West 2006)). Defendant possessed a metal padlock inside a knotted sock and swung this improvised weapon into the face of another inmate.\nIn October 2008, a jury was empaneled. After several witnesses had testified for the prosecution, the State moved to admit its exhibits, including the lock and the sock described above. Defense counsel objected on the basis the object did not constitute a \u201cbludgeon\u201d within the meaning of the unlawful-use-of-weapons statute. 720 ILCS 5/24\u2014 1(a)(1) (West 2006). The trial court dismissed the unlawful-use-of-weapons count for failure to state an offense. The court held no reasonable jury could find the padlock in a sock was a \u201cbludgeon\u201d as charged in the information and prohibited by statute (720 ILCS 5/24\u20141(a)(1) (West 2006)). The court permitted the State to amend the aggravated-battery charge to delete the word \u201cbludgeon\u201d following \u201ca deadly weapon.\u201d The jury heard the evidence and convicted defendant of aggravated battery. In December 2008, the court sentenced defendant to six years and six months\u2019 imprisonment on the aggravated-battery conviction.\nThe State appeals, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the unlawful-use-of-weapons count because the padlock in a sock is a \u201cbludgeon\u201d within the meaning of the statute. In addition, the State argues if the padlock in a sock is not a bludgeon, rather than dismissal, the State should have been allowed to amend the information.\nNo challenge is made to defendant\u2019s aggravated-battery conviction. We reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment dismissing the unlawful-use-of-weapons count and remand the case with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn July 13, 2006, defendant was confined in the Western Illinois Correctional Center Clayton work camp. While standing in line to be served food, defendant swung a sock containing a padlock and deliberately struck the inmate behind him in the face. The padlock had been issued to defendant by the Department of Corrections for the purpose of securing his belongings. Defendant testified he had been carrying the sock containing a padlock, for the purpose of protection, for approximately one week before the incident. A knot was tied in the sock to keep the padlock inside.\nAs stated, the State charged defendant with aggravated battery and unlawful use of weapons by a person in the custody of a Department of Corrections facility. The information referred to the weapon as a bludgeon, a statutorily prohibited weapon (720 ILCS 5/24\u20141(a)(1) (West 2006)). After presenting several witnesses in an October 2008 jury trial, the State attempted to introduce the sock and padlock into evidence. Defense counsel objected, arguing the sock-and-padlock combination was not a bludgeon under the statute upon which the charge was brought. The trial court held no reasonable jury could find the padlock in a sock was a \u201cbludgeon\u201d and dismissed the unlawful-use-of-weapons count for failure to state an offense. The court denied the State\u2019s motion for an interlocutory appeal. The jury convicted defendant of aggravated battery, and the court sentenced him as stated.\nThis appeal followed.\nII ANALYSIS\nA. Standard of Review\nThe trial court held as a matter of law that defendant\u2019s padlock in a sock was not a bludgeon. We review questions of law de novo. Naleway v. Agnich, 386 Ill. App. 3d 635, 647, 897 N.E.2d 902, 915 (2008).\nB. Trial Court\u2019s Determination: Lock in Sock Not a Bludgeon\nIn attempting to determine if the padlock in a sock was a bludgeon, the trial court consulted the Oxford English Dictionary, the Random House Dictionary, and the New Collegiate Dictionary before noting, \u201c[t]he common definition of bludgeon is a short stick or club.\u201d The court then attempted to assess the intent of the legislature. The primary objective when interpreting a statutory term is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Kohl, 364 Ill. App. 3d 495, 499, 847 N.E.2d 150, 154 (2006).\nThe trial court found the legislature restricted the unlawful-use-of-weapons offense to those weapons specifically listed in the statute without including \u201ccatch-all\u201d language such as \u201cother dangerous weapons.\u201d The court further found the common definition of \u201cbludgeon\u201d to be a short stick or club. The court noted a sock is not rigid or stick-like and therefore not a bludgeon. The court allowed the State to proceed on count II, the aggravated-batteiy charge, because, although not a bludgeon, the lock in the sock could be found by a jury to be a deadly weapon. The trial court reasoned if the legislature had wanted additional expansive language added to the unlawful-use-of-weapons statute, it could have expressly included it in subsection (a)(1) of section 24\u20141 (720 ILCS 5/24\u20141 (West 2006)). Therefore, to convict defendant under the unlawful-use-of-weapons statute, the padlock in a sock must literally be a bludgeon, not merely something similar to a bludgeon or a \u201cdangerous weapon of like character.\u201d\nC. Trial Court\u2019s Definition Is Too Narrow\nWe look to the dictionary as well. Instead of bludgeon, we first turn to the definition of \u201cblackjack.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines a \u201cblackjack\u201d in several ways, including as \u201c[a] short bludgeon consisting of a heavy head, as of metal, on an elastic shaft or with a flexible handle.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 154 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, a blackjack meeting this specification is a bludgeon. Not all bludgeons are blackjacks, but all blackjacks consisting of a heavy head, as of metal, on an elastic shaft or with a flexible handle are bludgeons. In essence, a blackjack is a specialty type of bludgeon. The common definition of \u201cbludgeon\u201d simply does not specifically list this subset of bludgeons. Even Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cbludgeon\u201d in the general sense as \u201c[a] heavy club or stick used as a weapon, commonly weighted in one end by metal.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 157 (5th ed. 1979).\nNo decisive cases in Illinois establish exactly what constitutes a bludgeon. People v. Collins, 6 Ill. App. 3d 616, 619, 286 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1972). However, under Illinois law a bludgeon need not take the form of a club or stick. Collins, 6 Ill. App. 3d at 619, 286 N.E.2d at 119 (after consulting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, holding that a heavy metal chain wrapped with tape satisfied the definition of both \u201cbludgeon\u201d and \u201cblackjack\u201d).\nRecognizing that a bludgeon may take the form of a blackjack, in addition to the more common form of a club or stick, we next consider whether a reasonable jury could find the padlock in a sock to be a bludgeon. The padlock in the end of the sock could be considered a heavy head, especially since it is made of metal. The sock could also be interpreted to be an elastic shaft or flexible handle. A reasonable jury could find defendant\u2019s padlock in a sock to be a bludgeon in the form of a blackjack. Such a finding would be supported by the fact that the padlock-and-sock combination had no legitimate use other than as a weapon. See Collins, 6 Ill. App. 3d at 619, 286 N.E.2d at 119; People v. Tate, 68 Ill. App. 3d 881, 882-83, 386 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1979). The sock could not be worn with a padlock in the toe, and the padlock could not be used for locking up defendant\u2019s belongings while tied up in the sock. We note that a prisoner employing a lock in a sock as a bludgeon is not a new phenomenon. See Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 982 (4th Cir. 1985) (\u201ca lock inside a sock [becomes] a bludgeon\u201d).\nSince a reasonable jury could find the padlock in a sock to be a bludgeon, the trial court erred in dismissing the unlawful-use-of-weapons count (720 ILCS 5/24\u20141.1(b) (West 2006)).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment dismissing the unlawful-use-of-weapons count and remand for trial on that count. If defendant should be convicted, defense counsel may make any arguments deemed appropriate regarding merger of the Class 3 aggravated-battery conviction with any Class 1 sentence imposed on count I. To avoid confusion, the name of the charge in count I should conform to the substance of the charge, i.e., \u201cUnlawful Possession of a Weapon by a Person in the Custody of a Department of Corrections Facility.\u201d We affirm the conviction and sentence for aggravated battery, without prejudice to any merger argument and the trial court\u2019s ruling thereon.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.\nMYERSCOUGH, EJ., and KNECHT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE POPE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jonathan H. Barnard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, Gary R. Peterson, and Amber Gray, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHAUNCEY PERRY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201408\u20140797\nOpinion filed January 27, 2010.\nJonathan H. Barnard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Gary R. Peterson, and Amber Gray, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0358-01", "first_page_order": 374, "last_page_order": 378 }