{ "id": 4293564, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD JONES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones", "decision_date": "2009-12-24", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201408\u20141311", "first_page": "651", "last_page": "664", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 651" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4289007 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4288955 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272590 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604511 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581, 582" }, { "page": "599" }, { "page": "600", "parenthetical": "a charge is a fine, despite its label, if it \"does not seek to compensate the state for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625265 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607139 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283847 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113-14" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/388/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277956 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "147-48" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4290695 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" }, { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706313 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 928, "char_count": 32747, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.7352269463203143e-07, "percentile": 0.8314563899285248 }, "sha256": "ea2e21673551fa19f1dffe849b6138bb7228e3419ebac03cf7dfdb0bb470944c", "simhash": "1:0bfbbc20e6b49c30", "word_count": 5442 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:15:46.302641+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD JONES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Ronald Jones was convicted of a Cl\u00e1ss 3 felony theft of more than $300 and less than $10,000 of property (720 ILCS 5/16\u2014 1(a)(1) (West 2008)), following a bench trial. After hearing factors in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced defendant to five years of incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant raises five issues on appeal and requests that this court: (1) correct the mittimus to appropriately reflect the time defendant spent in custody prior to sentencing; (2) vacate the $20 preliminary examination fee (55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008)); (3) reduce the amount of the fine imposed pursuant to the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (725 ILCS 240/10 (West 2008)) from $20 to $4; (4) vacate the $10 arrestee\u2019s medical costs assessment (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)); and (5) grant $5 of credit against defendant\u2019s fines for each day spent in custody prior to sentencing (725 ILCS 5/110\u201414 (West 2008)).\nWe affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County with the following modifications to the mittimus and to the fines, fees, and costs order: (1) the clerk should amend the mittimus to reflect 212 days of presentencing credit for time served; (2) we affirm the assessment of the preliminary examination fee (55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008)); (3) the clerk should amend the fines, fees, and costs order to reflect a $4 Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fee (725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2008)); (4) we affirm the assessment of the $10 Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund fine (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)); and (5) defendant\u2019s $30 Children\u2019s Advocacy Center fine should be offset by defendant\u2019s presentence credit for time served. This order reduces defendant\u2019s total amount owed to $539 (725 ILCS 5/110\u2014 14(a) (West 2008)).\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant does not raise any challenge to the validity of his conviction or sentence on appeal. Therefore, we state briefly the facts underlying his conviction.\nAt trial, Chicago police officer Gregory Unizycki testified that on the morning of October 8, 2007, a woman flagged his squad car near a garbage sorting facility in Chicago\u2019s Garfield Park neighborhood. At the woman\u2019s direction, Officer Unizycki drove through an open gate in the fence surrounding the property and approached a van parked near a vacant building. Numerous \u201cno trespassing\u201d signs were posted along the outside of the fence. Officer Unizycki testified that he observed Christopher Brown, Andre Hopkins, and defendant holding metal piping and loading it into the van. At this time, the van contained some 40 to 50 pieces of metal pipes similar to those Officer Unizycki observed being held by defendant. When Officer Unizycki asked the men what they were doing, defendant responded that he knew that they should not be at the sorting facility, but that they were just trying to make some money.\nBrian Sleman, the manager of the sorting facility, testified that he was approached by Chicago police officers on the morning of October 8, 2007, and asked to identify the metal pipes in the back of the van. Mr. Sleman identified the pipes as the same kind that were used in the vacant building near which the van was parked. Mr. Sleman also testified that he did not recognize the van and that defendant did not have permission to be on the premises or to park the van on the property. In addition, Mr. Sleman testified that the pipes were damaged as a result of having been pulled from the vacant building. The damage was so great that the pipes were unusable and could only be sold as scrap. The parties stipulated that a receipt would show that Mr. Sleman later received $536.80 in payment from third parties for the pipes recovered from the van.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf and denied that he removed the metal pipes from the vacant building in the sorting facility. Instead, defendant testified that a neighborhood woman had paid defendant and two friends to remove scrap metal from her property, which defendant was dumping at the sorting facility when Officer Unizycki arrived. Defendant also testified that he did not observe any \u201cno trespassing\u201d signs around the perimeter of the sorting facility.\nThe trial court found defendant\u2019s testimony not credible and found him guilty of Class 3 felony theft of more than $300 and less than $10,000 of property (720 ILCS 5/16\u20141(a)(1) (West 2008)). Defendant\u2019s May 7, 2008, sentencing order reflects that he is entitled to presentencing credit of 183 days to apply to his 5-year sentence. Defendant\u2019s sentence also included various fines, fees, and costs, which totaled $585. The fines, fees, and costs order included a $20 preliminary hearing fee (55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008)); a $20 Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fee (725 ILCS 240/10(c)(1) (West 2008)); a $10 Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund fee (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)); and a $30 Children\u2019s Advocacy Center fine (55 ILCS 5/5\u20141101(f\u20145) (West 2008)). This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, defendant does not contest the trial court\u2019s determination of guilt and argues only that we should correct the mittimus to reflect accurately his presentencing time served and vacate and offset certain fines and fees imposed by the trial court. All of the issues raised on appeal involve questions of statutory interpretation, which this court reviews de novo. People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79, 82 (2008).\n1. Presentence Credit for Time Served\nDefendant asks that we correct the mittimus to reflect accurately the amount of time served before sentencing, arguing that the trial court erroneously entered 183 days of credit for time served, when defendant was entitled to credit for 213 days. In its appellate brief, the State concedes the error but argues that defendant is entitled to credit for only 212 days because the date of sentencing should not be included in the credit. Thus, the parties\u2019 dispute concerns only one day of credit.\nThe record indicates, and both parties agree, that defendant was arrested on October 8, 2007, and sentenced on May 7, 2008, when the mittimus was issued. Therefore, defendant is entitled to 212 days\u2019 presentencing credit if the day of sentencing is not included or 213 days\u2019 credit if it is. 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20147 (West 2006). At issue in this case is whether defendant may receive both presentencing and postsentencing credit for the same day, because on the day of sentencing defendant was incarcerated both presentencing and postsentencing. The wording of the statute does not explicitly state whether or not a defendant may receive both presentencing and postsentencing credit for the sentencing day.\nSection 5\u20148\u20147 of the Unified Code of Corrections states in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) A sentence of imprisonment shall commence on the date on which the offender is received by the Department [of Corrections] or the institution at which the sentence is to be served.\n(b) The offender shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the minimum period of imprisonment for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed[.]\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20147 (West 2006).\nIn an exhaustive opinion, the first division of this district has recently explored this issue in great detail. People v. Williams, 394 Ill. App. 3d 480 (2009). The Fourth District has repeatedly held that a defendant is not entitled to presentencing credit for the day of sentencing. See Williams, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 481 (citing Fourth District cases denying defendants presentencing credit for the day of sentencing). However, other districts, including the First District, have held that a defendant may receive presentencing credit for the day of sentencing. See Williams, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 482 (citing cases granting defendant presentence credit for the day of sentencing). After reviewing numerous appellate court cases discussing whether a defendant could receive presentencing credit for the day of sentencing, the Williams court identified two competing rationales underlying the divergent strands of cases:\n\u201cThe cases that include the day of sentencing in the presentencing credit apparently follow the undisputed rule that a portion of a day spent in custody adds a day of credit by implicitly acknowledging that a defendant in custody spends a portion of the sentencing day in custody prior to sentencing. The cases excluding the day of sentencing from the credit seek to prevent a defendant from receiving double credit: one day under section 5\u20148\u20147 for the portion of the sentencing day spent in presentencing detention and one day under section 3\u20146\u20143 for the portion of the same day spent after issuance of the mittimus commences the prison sentence in the Department\u2019s legal (if not physical) custody.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Williams, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 483.\nThe Williams court found the concern over double crediting a defendant more persuasive and held that the defendant in that case was not entitled to presentencing credit for the day of sentencing. Williams, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 483.\nWe follow the precedent set by this district in Williams and find that defendant was not entitled to presentencing credit for the date of sentencing. In addition, the fact that the Unified Code of Corrections demarcates two separate periods for calculating defendant\u2019s sentencing credit suggests that a defendant should not receive credit twice for a single day. In the statute quoted above, subsection (a) delineates the postsentencing credit, while subsection (b) delineates the presentencing credit. 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20147 (West 2006). The fact that the two separate subsections set out two different time periods suggests a legislative intent that a defendant should not receive credit twice for the same day.\nTherefore, we order the mittimus corrected to reflect 212 days of presentencing credit for time served.\n2. Preliminary Examination Fee\nDefendant also asks that we vacate the $20 preliminary examination fee imposed by the trial court. Section 4\u20142002.1(a) of the Counties Code reads, in relevant part: \u201cState\u2019s attorneys shall be entitled to the following fees: *** For preliminary examinations for each defendant held to bail or recognizance, $20.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008). Although defendant concedes, and the record reflects, that a bail hearing was held, defendant argues that the bail hearing was not a \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d within the meaning of section 4\u20142002.1(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008)); and therefore defendant should not be charged the $20 preliminary examination fee. The term \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d is \u201cnot defined in the Counties Code.\u201d People v. Ellison, 383 Ill. App. 3d 146, 147 (2008).\nTwo different divisions of the First District Appellate Court have recently considered what constitutes a \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d under this provision of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008)) and have reached opposite conclusions.\nIn People v. Ellison, the fourth division of this district held that, \u201cas used in section 4\u20142002.1(a), a \u2018preliminary examination\u2019 means the proceedings at which a trial court examines relevant factors for the purpose of determining whether or not to hold defendant on bail or recognizance.\u201d Ellison, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 147; 55 ILCS 5/4\u2014 2002.1(a) (West 2008). The Ellison court declined to read \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d as a synonym for a probable cause hearing under the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/100\u20141 et seq. (West 2008)), because, first, to do so would essentially read the words \u201cheld to bail or recognizance\u201d out of the statute. Ellison, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 147-48. \u201cThe well-established principles of statutory construction mandate that all language used in a statute be given effect and that no word, clause or sentence be rendered meaningless ***.\u201d Ellison, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 147. Second, the court observed that had the legislature intended to equate \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d in the Counties Code with a probable cause hearing in the Code of Criminal Procedure, it would have done so, \u201cparticularly in light of the [Counties Code\u2019s] reference to another code to define a different term.\u201d Ellison, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 148.\nWhen the third division of this district addressed the same issue in People v. Brown, 388 Ill. App. 3d 104 (2009), that court declined to follow Ellison and instead chose to read the Counties Code\u2019s \u201cprehminary examination\u201d term (55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008)) in light of the Code of Criminal Procedure\u2019s description of a preliminary hearing (725 ILCS 5/109\u20141(b) (West 2008)). The Brown court first looked to Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, which defined a \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d as a term of art synonymous with a \u201cpreliminary hearing,\u201d which, in turn, was defined as a hearing \u201c \u2018to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute an accused person.\u2019 \u201d Brown, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 113, quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1199 (7th ed. 1999). However, a preliminary examination and a preliminary hearing cannot be synonymous under Illinois law, because the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/109\u20143(e) (West 2008)) explicitly refers to a \u201cprehminary hearing or examination.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Since we must construe a statute such that \u201cno word, clause or sentence be rendered meaningless, superfluous or insignificant,\u201d we cannot read \u201chearing\u201d and \u201cexamination\u201d as synonymous. Ellison, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 147.\nInstead, we must construe these terms as referring to separate events. Section 109\u20141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which details the actions a judge must take following a defendant\u2019s arrest, supports this analysis. Section 109\u20141(b) states, in relevant part: \u201cThe judge shall: *** (3) Schedule a preliminary hearing in appropriate cases; and (4) Admit the defendant to bail in accordance with the provisions of Article 110 of this Code.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/109\u20141(b)(3), (b)(4) (West 2008). Subsection (3) of section 109\u20141(b) instructs the judge to \u201c[sjchedule a preliminary hearing in appropriate cases,\u201d indicating that the preliminary hearing shall occur at a future date. 725 ILCS 5/109\u20141(b)(3) (West 2008). Yet, subsection (4) instructs the judge to \u201c[ajdmit the defendant to bail\u201d in the present tense, indicating that the bail hearing occurs immediately, and at a different time from the preliminary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/109\u20141(b)(4) (West 2008). Therefore, a preliminary hearing and a bail hearing cannot be the same event. Because section 4\u20142002.1(a) of the Counties Code states \u201cpreliminary examination for each defendant held to bail or recognizance\u201d and because section 109\u20141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that a hail examination is separate from a preliminary hearing, a preliminary examination under section 4\u20142002.1(a) of the Counties Code cannot be synonymous with a preliminary hearing under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008); 725 ILCS 5/109\u20141 (West 2008).\nThe Brown court then stated that section 109\u20143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly defines a \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d as a probable cause hearing. Brown, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 113-14, citing 725 ILCS 5/109\u20143(a) (West 2008). However, the statute does not state that this subsection defines the term, as the Brown court claims.\nThe Brown court held, based on the language of sections 109\u20143 and 109\u20143.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that \u201ca determination regarding \u2018whether or not to hold a defendant on bail or recognizance\u2019 \u201d (Ellison\u2019s definition of \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d under the Counties Code) is distinct from a \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Brown, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 114, quoting 725 ILCS 5/109\u20143 (West 2006). Because it held that a preliminary examination was equivalent to a probable cause hearing, the court determined that the defendant, who had received an indictment instead of a probable cause hearing, would not he liable for the $20 preliminary hearing fee. Brown, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 114. Brown stated that \u201ccontrary to the holding in Ellison, any explanation for the fees due for \u2018preliminary examinations\u2019 necessarily requires us to examine the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which is the relevant statute from which those proceedings are specifically derived.\u201d 388 Ill. App. 3d at 113. We see nothing in the Counties Code that necessarily requires us to examine the Code of Criminal Procedure for a definition of \u201cpreliminary examination.\u201d Even when we look to the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 109\u20143 indicates that a preliminary examination is not synonymous with a preliminary hearing, the exact opposite of the conclusion reached in Brown. See 725 ILCS 5/109\u20143 (West 2008).\nAccordingly, we decline to adopt the reasoning of Brown and instead follow the reasoning of Ellison in defining a preliminary examination under the Counties Code as \u201cthe proceedings at which a trial court examines relevant factors for the purpose of determining whether or not to hold defendant on bail or recognizance.\u201d Ellison, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 147. In interpreting a statute, a reviewing court must \u201cascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent\u201d and \u201cthe best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.\u201d People v. Pack, 224 Ill. 2d 144, 147 (2007). In the case at bar, we must consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute at issue: section 4\u20142002.1(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008)). If we were to follow the Brown court and hold that a preliminary examination was synonymous with a probable cause hearing, we would be reading the words \u201cheld to bail or recognizance\u201d out of the statute, because a probable cause hearing does not involve a determination of whether a defendant should be \u201cheld to bail or recognizance.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008). Accordingly, we find that the trial court rightly imposed the $20 preliminary hearing fee pursuant to section 4\u20142002.1(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008)).\n3. Violent Crimes Assistance Act Fine\nDefendant next argues that the trial court improperly assessed the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fine when it imposed a $20 fine pursuant to section 10(c)(2) of the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act. 725 ILCS 240/10(c) (West 2008). We agree. The statute dictates, in pertinent part:\n\u201c(b) *** [T]here shall be an additional penalty collected from each defendant upon conviction of any felony or upon conviction of or disposition of supervision for any misdemeanor *** an additional penalty of $4 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed. ***\n(c) When any person is convicted in Illinois on or after August 28, 1986, of an offense listed below, or placed on supervision for such an offense on or after September 18, 1986, and no other fine is imposed, the following penalty shall be collected by the Circuit Court Clerk:\n(2) $20, for any other felony or misdemeanor, excluding any conservation offense.\nSuch charge shall not be subject to the provisions of [s]ection 110\u201414 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 [(725 ILCS 5/110\u201414)].\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 240/10 (West 2008).\nTherefore, if the trial court assessed another \u201cfine\u201d against defendant in addition to the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund f\u00edne, subsection (b) of the statute should apply, not subsection (c). As discussed in sections 1 and 4 of this opinion, the preliminary examination fee and the Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund fee were fees, not \u201cfines.\u201d\nHowever, the trial court also assessed defendant a $30 Children\u2019s Advocacy Center charge (55 ILCS 5/5\u20141101(f\u20145) (West 2008)). Although the statute terms this charge a \u201cfee\u201d (55 ILCS 5/5\u2014 1101(f\u20145) (West 2008)), we find that the charge is a fine under the reasoning of our supreme court\u2019s recent decision in People v. Graves, 235 Ill. 2d 244 (2009). As the supreme court explained in Graves, a fee that \u201c \u2018seeks to recoup expenses incurred by the state,\u2019 \u201d while a fine is \u201c \u2018 \u201cpunitive in nature\u201d \u2019 \u201d and is also \u201c \u2018 \u201ca pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Graves, 235 Ill. 2d at 250, quoting People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 581, 582 (2006). Even if the statute terms a charge a fee rather than a fine, that label is not determinative. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 599. In the case at bar, the statute, entitled \u201cAdditional fees to finance court system,\u201d states, in relevant part: \u201cIn each county in which a Children\u2019s Advocacy Center provides services, the county board may adopt a mandatory fee of between $5 and $30 to be paid by the defendant on a judgment of guilty ***.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5\u20141101(f\u20145) (West 2008). Although the statute terms the charge a fee, rather than a fine, the fact that the charge is mandatory for convicted defendants, and does not reimburse the state for expenses incurred while prosecuting the defendant, indicates that the Children\u2019s Advocacy Center charge is a fine rather than a fee. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 600 (a charge is a fine, despite its label, if it \u201cdoes not seek to compensate the state for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant\u201d).\nIn addition, the appellate court recently held in People v. Price, 375 Ill. App. 3d 684 (2007), that a fee is more appropriately characterized as a fine where there was \u201cno relevant connection\u201d between the offense committed by the defendant and the public endeavor funded by the fee. Price, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 700. In the instant case, there was no relevant connection between defendant\u2019s theft of scrap metal pipes and children\u2019s advocacy or juvenile justice. This lack of relevant connection between the defendant\u2019s offense and the fee charged also indicates that the Children\u2019s Advocacy Center charge is a fine rather than a fee.\nBecause the trial court assessed a fine against defendant in addition to the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fine, subsection (b) of the statute applies. 725 ILCS 240/10 (West 2008). Therefore, defendant should be charged a fine of only $4. 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2008). Accordingly, we vacate the $20 fine and order the clerk to amend the assessment of defendant\u2019s fees and costs to include a $4 fee pursuant to section 10(b) of the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2008)).\n4. Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund Assessment\nDefendant further argues that we should vacate the $10 Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund assessment pursuant to section 17 the County Jail Act (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)), because the record provides no evidence indicating that defendant suffered any injury during his arrest or that Cook County incurred any medical expenses relating to defendant. The State agrees that we should vacate this charge. We disagree.\nThe statute reads, in pertinent part:\n\u201cAn arresting authority shall be responsible for any incurred medical expenses relating to the arrestee until such time as the arrestee is placed in the custody of the sheriff. However, the arresting authority shall not be so responsible if the arrest was made pursuant to a request by the sheriff. When medical or hospital services are required by any person held in custody, the county or arresting authority shall be entitled to obtain reimbursement from the Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund to the extent moneys are available from the Fund. To the extent that the person is reasonably able to pay for that care, including reimbursement from any insurance program or from other medical benefit programs available to the person, he or she shall reimburse the county.\nThe county shall be entitled to a $10 fee for each conviction or order of supervision for a criminal violation, other than a petty offense or business offense. The fee shall be taxed as costs to be collected from the defendant, if possible, upon conviction or entry of an order of supervision. The fee shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine.\nAll such fees collected shall be deposited by the county in a fund to be established and known as the Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be used solely for reimbursement of costs for medical expenses relating to the arrestee while he or she is in the custody of the sheriff and administration of the Fund.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006).\nBoth parties argue in their briefs that the plain language of the statute indicates that where the county does not incur costs for medical expenses while a defendant is under arrest, the defendant should not be subject to the $10 fee. We disagree.\nFirst, the statute does not place any conditions on the county\u2019s right to the fee. The statute clearly states: \u201cThe county shall be entitled to a $10 fee for each conviction or order of supervision for a criminal violation, other than a petty offense or business offense.\u201d 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006). The statute does not state that the county shall only be entitled to a $10 fee so long as the county incurs costs for medical expenses for the care of the defendant. By excluding defendants convicted of \u201ca petty offense or business offense\u201d (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)), the legislature demonstrated that it was capable of drawing exceptions to the broad statement that the county is entitled to a fee from each conviction, and the legislature did not choose to exclude the convictions of defendants who did not incur medical expenses from the reach of the statute.\nFurthermore, the last sentence quoted above indicates that the moneys in the fund may be used for something other than medical expenses incurred by the arrestee. The statute states: \u201cMoneys in the Fund shall be used solely for reimbursement of costs for medical expenses relating to the arrestee while he or she is in the custody of the sheriff and administration of the Fund.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006). Therefore, the county may use the $10 fee charged to defendant for reimbursement of either costs for medical expenses incurred by the defendant while under arrest or costs for administration of the fund. In essence, the fund functioned as a health insurance policy for the defendant while incarcerated, and thus he received a benefit even though he required no medical services. Although defendant in the instant case incurred no medical expenses while under arrest, the county may still use the $10 fee to pay for the administration of the Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund.\nA split in the appellate districts has recently emerged on the question of whether a convicted defendant should be assessed the $10 fee if he did not incur any medical expenses while under arrest. In People v. Cleveland, 393 Ill. App. 3d 700 (2009), the first division of this district determined that under the plain language of the statute, the defendant could not be charged the Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund assessment because he did not undergo treatment for any injury suffered during his arrest. Cleveland, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 714. For the reasons stated above, we decline to follow the Cleveland court\u2019s analysis.\nIn contrast, the Second District in People v. Evangelista, 393 Ill. App. 3d 395 (2009), construed section 17 of the County Jail Act (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)) as creating an insurance fund that would cover the medical expenses incurred by all arrestees, not just the expenses of a particular defendant. Evangelista, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 400. The Evangelista court read the word \u201carrestee\u201d to mean all arrestees, and not just one defendant. Evangelista, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 400, citing 5 ILCS 70/1.03 (West 2006) (\u201cWords importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things\u201d). This reasoning unnecessarily stretches the language of section 17. The statute refers to medical expenses relating to \u201cthe arrestee,\u201d which indicates a particular individual rather than a class of arrestees. 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006). The Evangelista court\u2019s interpretation of section 17 is unnecessary in light of the statutory language allowing the county to use defendant\u2019s assessment to recover costs for administration of the fund. 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006). For the reasons stated above, while we decline to follow the Second District\u2019s stated reasoning, we agree both: (1) that the Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund assessment should apply to defendants who do not incur medical costs while under arrest; and (2) that the fund functions, in essence, as an insurance fund.\nAccordingly, we affirm the $10 Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund assessment.\n5. $5-Per-Day Credit\nDefendant also argues that he is entitled to a $5-per-day credit against his fines for time served prior to sentencing. 725 ILCS 5/110\u2014 14(a) (West 2008). We agree. Section 110\u201414(a) states in full:\n\u201cAny person incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against whom a fine is levied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit of $5 for each day so incarcerated upon application of the defendant. However, in no case shall the amount so allowed or credited exceed the amount of the fine.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/110\u201414(a) (West 2008).\nSection 110\u20144 defines what is and what is not a bailable offense. 725 ILCS 5/110\u20144 (West 2008). The statute states that \u201c[a]ll persons shall be bailable before conviction,\u201d unless an exception listed in the statute applies. 725 ILCS 5/110\u20144(a) (West 2008). Because none of the exceptions listed in section 110\u20144 prevent a person charged with theft, as was defendant, from receiving bail, defendant therefore is eligible for the $5-per-day credit. 725 ILCS 5/110\u20144 (West 2008). Because defendant has accumulated 212 days worth of presentencing credit, defendant may apply up to $1,060 of credit against his fines. This credit applies only against a \u201cfine,\u201d not a fee. 725 ILCS 5/110\u2014 14(a) (West 2008).\nDefendant has only one fine against which he can apply his credit: the $30 Children\u2019s Advocacy Center charge. 55 ILCS 5/5\u20141101(f\u20145) (West 2008). For the reasons stated above in section 3 of this opinion, the Children\u2019s Advocacy Center charge is appropriately characterized as a fine rather than a fee. Defendant\u2019s preliminary hearing fee is a fee, not a fine, and therefore cannot be offset by the credit. In addition, defendant\u2019s Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund fee is a fee, not a fine, and also cannot be offset by the credit. Finally, defendant\u2019s Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fine is not eligible for reduction. 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2008). Section 10(b) of the Violent Crime Victims Assistant Act states, in pertinent part: \u201cSuch additional penalty shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction made in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing.\u201d 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2008).\nWe therefore order that the $30 Children\u2019s Advocacy Center fine be offset by defendant\u2019s presentencing credit.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County with the following modifications to the mittimus and to the fines, fees, and costs order: (1) the clerk should amend the mittimus to reflect 212 days of presentencing credit for time served; (2) we affirm the assessment of the $20 preliminary examination fee (55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008)); (3) the clerk should amend the fines, fees, and costs order to reflect a $4 Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fee (725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2008)); (4) we affirm the assessment of the $10 Arrestee\u2019s Medical Costs Fund fine (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)); and (5) defendant\u2019s $30 Children\u2019s Advocacy Center fine should be offset by defendant\u2019s presentence credit for time served. This order reduces defendant\u2019s total amount owed to $539 (725 ILCS 5/110\u201414(a) (West 2008)).\nAffirmed; mittimus and fines, fees, and costs order modified.\nCAHILL, EJ., and J. GORDON, J., concur.\nAlthough the statute uses the term \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d (55 ILCS 5/4\u20142002.1(a) (West 2008)), the fines, fees, and costs order completed by the trial court states \u201cPreliminary Hearing\u2014State\u2019s Attorney\u201455 ILCS 5/4\u2014 2002.1(a).\u201d When referring to the fee itself, we will use the term \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d in order to be consistent with the statute.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia Unsinn and David T. Harris, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Mary E Needham, and Robin Murphy, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD JONES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201408\u20141311\nOpinion filed December 24, 2009.\nPatricia Unsinn and David T. Harris, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Mary E Needham, and Robin Murphy, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0651-01", "first_page_order": 667, "last_page_order": 680 }