{ "id": 4293596, "name": "SAGE INFORMATION SERVICES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DAVID HENDERSON, Grundy County Supervisor of Assessments, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Sage Information Services v. Henderson", "decision_date": "2010-01-29", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201409\u20140175", "first_page": "1060", "last_page": "1066", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 1060" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284240 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5291574 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/66/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2866042 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "910 N.E.2d 1180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1187" }, { "page": "1187" }, { "page": "1189" }, { "page": "1187" }, { "page": "1189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 1023", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4285465 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1032-33" }, { "page": "1032-33" }, { "page": "1035" }, { "page": "1033" }, { "page": "1035" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599792 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "781 N.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442056 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "888 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "\"It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that when there is a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision, either in the same or in another act, that both relate to the same subject, the specific provision controls and should be applied\"" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277813 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "910 N.E.2d 1180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1189" }, { "page": "1189" }, { "page": "1189" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 1023", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4285465 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1035" }, { "page": "1035" }, { "page": "1035" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/1023-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 649, "char_count": 15840, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14444104656294635 }, "sha256": "e5c995464f9c49ae609f14ed97363f65b399a0ce40539884bde9c3541b39f872", "simhash": "1:31a69886a2cd94d5", "word_count": 2561 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:15:46.302641+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SAGE INFORMATION SERVICES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DAVID HENDERSON, Grundy County Supervisor of Assessments, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McDADE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the circuit court of Grundy County pursuant to section 11 of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (Act) (5 ILCS 140/11(a) (West 2006)). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619(a)(9) (West 2006)) on the grounds plaintiffs\u2019 complaint is barred by section 9\u201420 of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/9\u201420 (West 2006)). The circuit court of Grundy County ruled that section 9\u201420 of the Code controls, found that plaintiffs\u2019 complaint is therefore barred by a controlling statute \u201cavoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim\u201d (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2006)), and granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nPlaintiffs, Sage Information Services and Roger W. Hurlbert, submitted a request to defendant, David Henderson, Grundy County supervisor of assessments, pursuant to the Act, seeking the real property assessments for Grundy County. Plaintiffs\u2019 request asked defendant to deliver the data in electronic form. Defendant responded the data was available for a fee of $2,456.70 based on a fee of 10 cents per assessment per parcel of land, and the existence of 24,567 parcels in Grundy County.\nPlaintiffs asked defendant to reconsider because they construed the fee as a denial of their request under the Act. 5 ILCS 140/6(c) (West 2006) (\u201cThe purposeful imposition of a fee not consistent with subsections (6) (a) and (b) of this Act shall be considered a denial of access to public records for the purposes of judicial review\u201d); 5 ILCS 140/10 (West 2006) (\u201c[a]ny person denied access to inspect or copy any public record may appeal the denial by sending a written notice of appeal to the head of the public body\u201d). Defendant responded to plaintiffs\u2019 request to reconsider the fee by referring plaintiffs to section 14\u201430 of the Code, which provides that assessment officers may charge a fee of up to 35 cents per legal-sized page for providing information to parties contesting property assessments.\nPlaintiffs filed a complaint for injunctive relief. Defendant responded that section 9\u201420 of the Code addresses property report card requests and permits charging a \u201creasonable\u201d fee that, unlike requests under the Act, is not limited by the actual cost of compliance. The trial court ordered the parties to address the reasonableness of defendant\u2019s fee. The parties entered a stipulation of facts. Defendant asserted that section 14\u201430 of the Code, in addition to section 9\u201420, was controlling, and explained the calculation of its fee. Following arguments, the court ruled that section 14\u201430 does not apply because it does not apply to requests for data in electronic form. The court found that section 9\u201420 of the Code controlled plaintiffs\u2019 request, that the Code permitted a reasonable fee beyond actual cost, and that defendant\u2019s fee was reasonable under the Code.\nANALYSIS\nPlaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(9) because the reasonableness of defendant\u2019s fee for the requested information presents a question of fact ill-suited to resolution by a motion to dismiss. Although plaintiffs dispute the applicability of the Code to their request, they assert that defendant\u2019s fee is unreasonable under any applicable statute. Plaintiffs further contend that defendant bore the burden to prove the reasonableness of the fee and that defendant failed to satisfy his burden in this case.\nPlaintiffs argue that the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/1/1001 et seq. (West 2006)) applies because it is specific to plaintiffs\u2019 request. See McCready v. Secretary of State, 382 Ill. App. 3d 789, 795, 888 N.E.2d 702, 707 (2008) (\u201cIt is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that when there is a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision, either in the same or in another act, that both relate to the same subject, the specific provision controls and should be applied\u201d). They contend that the Code \u201cfailed to contemplate electronic production of such records\u201d and, consequently, \u201cdoes not establish an electronic fee counterpart for the fee it explicitly establishes as proper for production of paper copies.\u201d Therefore, plaintiffs conclude, as it relates to their specific request for data in electronic form, the Code \u201cis not as specific as the Counties Code\u2019s instruction that fees not exceed 110% of the actual cost of [electronic] copying.\u201d\nSubsection (b) of section 5\u20141106.1 of the Counties Code defines \u201celectronic data in bulk form\u201d and \u201celectronic data in compiled form,\u201d in relevant part, as \u201crecords to which the public has free Internet access.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 55 ILCS 5/5\u20141106.1(b) (West 2006). The statutory language makes clear that \u201celectronic data in bulk form\u201d or \u201celectronic data in compiled form\u201d exists only if the county provides free Internet access to the records. The trial court found that the Counties Code does not apply to plaintiffs\u2019 request because \u201c[defendant does not provide [I]nternet access to the public records at issue.\u201d Plaintiffs never assert that the records they sought from defendant are \u201conline public records\u201d as required by the Counties Code. Plaintiffs admit the Counties Code applies only \u201cif a county maintains public records online.\u201d Based on the trial coui't\u2019s findings of fact we hold that as a matter of law the Counties Code does not apply to the data plaintiffs sought.\nUnder the Act, fees for providing public information are capped at the actual cost of reproduction of the information, \u201cunless otherwise provided by State statute.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/6(a) (West 2006). Thus, the issue is \u201cwhat other statute, if any, provides an alternative to the [Act\u2019s] default rule?\u201d The trial court found that the Code provides that alternative. We agree. Plaintiffs argue that, nonetheless, the trial court erred in determining that defendant\u2019s fee is reasonable under the Code. Plaintiffs assert that the Code and the Act must be read in pari materia because they pertain to the same subject and reading the two statutes in pari materia requires the court to construe their reference to reasonable fees in harmony. Thus, a \u201creasonable fee\u201d under the Code should, plaintiffs argue, be interpreted to relate to the actual cost of reproduction as required by section 6(a) of the Act.\nThe legislature expressed a clear intent that a reasonable fee under the Code should not be construed to have the same meaning as a reasonable fee under the Act. Section 6(a) of the Act reads as follows:\n\u201c(a) Each public body may charge fees reasonably calculated to reimburse its actual cost for reproducing and certifying public records and for the use, by any person, of the equipment of the public body to copy records. Such fees shall exclude the costs of any search for and review of the record, and shall not exceed the actual cost of reproduction and certification, unless otherwise provided by State statute. Such fees shall be imposed according to a standard scale of fees, established and made public by the body imposing them.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 140/6(a) (West 2006).\nSection 6(a) of the Act expresses the legislature\u2019s intent that the Act\u2019s fee provisions do not apply when another statute provides for the dissemination of public information. This court reached the same conclusion in McCready, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 796, 888 N.E.2d at 708, wherein it held that \u201c[s]ection 2\u2014123 of the Vehicle Code [(625 ILCS 5/2\u2014123 (West 2004))] directly regulates vehicle title searches, while the [Act] regulates searches of public records generally. Thus, section 2\u2014123 of the Vehicle Code, not the [Act], controls plaintiffs requests.\u201d McCready, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 796, 888 N.E.2d at 708, citing Knolls Condominium Ass\u2019n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459, 781 N.E.2d 261, 267 (2002); Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 195, 595 N.E.2d 561, 563 (1992).\nThis court noted that the Act and the Vehicle Code contain several conflicting provisions, including that the Vehicle Code imposes a $5 fee for all searches, while the Act imposes fees based on the actual cost of reproducing and certifying records. Although the Vehicle Code contained a specific fee while the statute at issue here does not, McCready is instructive in that at no time did this court attempt to construe the fee provision in the Vehicle Code in pari materia with the Act. McCready, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 796, 888 N.E.2d at 708. This court simply found that \u201csection 2\u2014123 of the Vehicle Code, not the [Act], controls plaintiffs requests.\u201d McCready, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 796, 888 N.E.2d at 708. This court went on to hold that, because the plaintiffs complaint did not allege a violation of the Vehicle Code, the trial court properly dismissed those counts of the plaintiffs complaint based on the Vehicle Code. McCready, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 796, 888 N.E.2d at 708.\nIn this case, the Code does provide for fees for reproduction of records. Therefore, under McCready, the \u201creasonable fee\u201d provision in the Code controls plaintiffs\u2019 request and the fee provision in the Act does not apply. See Sage Information Services v. King, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1032-33, 910 N.E.2d 1180, 1187 (2009) (\u201cunder section 9\u201420 of the Property Tax Code, the \u2018reasonable fee\u2019 assessed by the Board encompasses the electronic dissemination of the property assessments on the property record cards that Sage seeks. Accordingly, *** the cost provision of section 9\u201420 *** applies to the subject matter of this case, over the actual-cost provision of section 6(a) of the [Act]\u201d).\nThe Code precludes the legal effect of plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action under the Act because the Code controls the public dissemination of the information plaintiffs sought. See Sage Information Services, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1032-33, 910 N.E.2d at 1187. The trial court ordered the parties \u201cto address the cost and reasonable fee for the computer-generated data,\u201d based on its finding that the Code permits a reasonable fee for computer-generated data. The court\u2019s order demonstrates its understanding that the Code, not the Act, controls plaintiffs\u2019 request. The trial court did not require proof of any additional facts to prove that the Code controls plaintiffs\u2019 request. Nor, apparently, did plaintiffs urge the existence of additional facts specifically to contradict the applicability of the Code to their request. Therefore, once the court determined that the Code controls, it should have simply granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the grounds the Code precludes the legal effect of plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action under the Act.\nWe reject the Second District\u2019s holding that, in this situation, \u201c[t]he question of the reasonableness of the *** fee is a substantial factual dispute.\u201d Sage Information Services, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 910 N.E.2d at 1189. Notably, that holding by the Second District contradicts its earlier, explicit statement that \u201c \u2018 \u201c[i]t is a fundamental rule, with no exceptions, that a party must recover, if at all, on and according to the case [it] has made for [itself] by [its] pleadings.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Sage Information Services, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1033, 910 N.E.2d at 1187, quoting Newton v. Aitken, 260 Ill. App. 3d 717, 718 (1994), quoting Broberg v. Mann, 66 Ill. App. 2d 134, 137-38 (1965). Despite its recognition of the foregoing rule, \u201cwith no exceptions,\u201d the court went on to find that \u201c[although Sage alleged that the fee exceeded the actual cost of copying, in violation of the [Act], the complaint essentially raised an allegation regarding the reasonableness of the charge [under the Code].\u201d (Emphasis added.) Sage Information Services, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 910 N.E.2d at 1189.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint did not attempt to state a cause of action under the Code. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint only sought the dissemination of public information under the Act. The Code controls the dissemination of the information plaintiffs sought. \u201c[W]e review the trial court\u2019s judgment, not its reasoning.\u201d Forsberg v. Edward Hospital & Health Services, 389 Ill. App. 3d 434, 440 (2009). The trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(9).\nCONCLUSION\nThe circuit court of Grundy County\u2019s order dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 complaint is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCHMIDT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McDADE" }, { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI concur with the majority\u2019s conclusion that the Property Tax Code controls plaintiffs\u2019 request for property assessment records from defendant. However, I dissent from the majority\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint and its refusal to address the reasonableness of defendant\u2019s fees under the Code.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleged that (1) plaintiffs submitted a request to defendant pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, (2) defendant replied to the request by demanding that plaintiffs pay $2,456.70 as a \u201ccopying charge,\u201d and (3) defendant refused to reconsider the copying charge. Plaintiffs sought an order compelling defendant to release the requested information at a cost \u201cnot to exceed the actual cost of reproduction as contemplated by law.\u201d\nAlthough plaintiffs\u2019 complaint references the Act, \u201cthe complaint essentially raised an allegation regarding the reasonableness of [defendant\u2019s] charge.\u201d Sage Information Services v. King, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1035, 910 N.E.2d 1180, 1189 (2009). The Code, which applies to plaintiffs\u2019 record request, explicitly requires that all fees charged be \u201creasonable.\u201d 35 ILCS 200/9\u201420 (West 2006). Thus, the majority erred in refusing to examine the reasonableness of defendant\u2019s fees.\nUnlike the majority, I would review the trial court\u2019s finding that the fees in this case were reasonable and find that the question of reasonableness of the $2,456.70 fee is \u201ca substantial factual dispute.\u201d King, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 910 N.E.2d at 1189. Summary judgment should not have been granted.\nIn this case, plaintiffs compared the $2,456.70 fee defendant charged for reproducing the property tax records with the fees charged by other counties ($0 to $80) for similar record requests. In an attempt to justify his fees, defendant comes up with a complicated formula: he divides the total budget for his office by the total number of parcels, multiplies that number by a meaningless percentage, and then divides the result in half to reach $2,456.70. This perplexing and confusing explanation of defendant\u2019s fees fails to establish that they were reasonable.\nBecause I believe the trial court decided a controverted material issue of fact, I would reverse and remand. See King, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 910 N.E.2d at 1189. On remand, defendant would have to present evidence of (1) the amount of time and labor defendant and/or his staff spent on plaintiffs\u2019 request, (2) the novelty and difficulty of responding to plaintiffs\u2019 request, (3) the skill required to respond to plaintiffs\u2019 request, (4) the fee customarily charged by similarly situated counties for similar requests, (5) any time limitations imposed by plaintiffs, and (6) defendant\u2019s actual out-of-pocket costs associated \u25a0with the request. Only after obtaining such information can the trial court properly determine if defendant\u2019s fees are reasonable.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Esther J. Seitz and Donald M. Craven (argued), both of Donald M. Craven, EC., of Springfield, for appellants.", "Sheldon R. Sobol, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morris (Susan O. Bates (argued), Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SAGE INFORMATION SERVICES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DAVID HENDERSON, Grundy County Supervisor of Assessments, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201409\u20140175\nOpinion filed January 29, 2010.\nRehearing denied March 12, 2010.\nEsther J. Seitz and Donald M. Craven (argued), both of Donald M. Craven, EC., of Springfield, for appellants.\nSheldon R. Sobol, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morris (Susan O. Bates (argued), Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1060-01", "first_page_order": 1076, "last_page_order": 1082 }