{ "id": 4296020, "name": "RENAE LAWSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHMITT BOULDER HILL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Lawson v. Schmitt Boulder Hill, Inc.", "decision_date": "2010-01-22", "docket_number": "Nos. 2\u201409\u20140026, 2\u201409\u20140244 cons.", "first_page": "127", "last_page": "135", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "398 Ill. App. 3d 127" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 905", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5110079 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0905-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5433468 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567377 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" }, { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5101245 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209156 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" }, { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140172 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381892 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2604284 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5215861 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/229/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 960", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336115 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "970" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0960-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602359 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703617 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777542 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273487 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 850", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283996 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "855" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/388/0850-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 1091", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5766878 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1094" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/1091-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 1171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637079 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/1171-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461978 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4261298 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0523-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 909, "char_count": 19022, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.856319230494445e-08, "percentile": 0.30522088353413657 }, "sha256": "03da63e4e9e2e268ebd697288e64ada74372731b516c4975dd364263e42ea0d1", "simhash": "1:2ba955075b7e50d5", "word_count": 3044 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:17.302697+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BOWMAN and SCHOSTOK, JJ, concur." ], "parties": [ "RENAE LAWSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHMITT BOULDER HILL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Renae Lawson, filed a two-count complaint in the circuit court of Kendall County against defendants, Schmitt Boulder Hill, Inc. (Schmitt), and McDonald\u2019s Corporation (McDonald\u2019s). Plaintiff alleged that on December 18, 2005, she was a part-time employee at a restaurant owned by Schmitt and operated under a franchise agreement with McDonald\u2019s. She further alleged that just before 6 a.m. on that date she parked her car in the side area of the restaurant\u2019s parking lot. Before she was able to enter the restaurant she was robbed, abducted, and assaulted. She alleged that the attack and her resultant injuries were proximately caused by defendants\u2019 negligence. McDonald\u2019s moved to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2008)), arguing that it owed no duty to plaintiff. Schmitt moved to dismiss under the same provision, arguing that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2008)) barred plaintiff from suing Schmitt for negligence. The trial court entered separate orders, granting both motions to dismiss. Plaintiff timely filed separate notices of appeal from the two orders and we consolidated the appeals. We affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs claim against Schmitt, but we reverse the dismissal of the claim against McDonald\u2019s.\nWith respect to plaintiffs claim against McDonald\u2019s, her complaint includes the following pertinent allegations:\n\u201c04. At least since January 1, 2005 McDonalds [sic] has published standards for franchises [sic] such as Schmitt in the areas of lighting of the parking lots and procedures and disciplines [sic] for security of employees and patrons of Schmitt\u2019s restaurant^]\n05. McDonalds [sic] monitors and enforces compliance with said standards by dispatching McDonald\u2019s security persons to Schmidt [sic] on a regular basis during the year to confirm compliance with McDonald\u2019s said standards[.]\u201d\nIn support of its motion to dismiss, McDonald\u2019s submitted an affidavit from one of its employees who averred that McDonald\u2019s did not own or operate the restaurant and had no right to control the restaurant\u2019s day-to-day operations or to hire, discharge, or discipline the restaurant\u2019s employees. The employee further averred that McDonald\u2019s did not pay utilities for the restaurant, did not \u201cmanufacture, process or prepare any product for sale\u201d at the restaurant, did not supply any product to the restaurant, and did not file a tax return for the restaurant.\nPlaintiff submitted a counteraffidavit averring that a representative of McDonald\u2019s visited the restaurant and spoke with the restaurant\u2019s managers \u201cabout compliance with the various rules and regulations which McDonald\u2019s requires its store franchises to follow and obey.\u201d According to plaintiff\u2019s affidavit, McDonald\u2019s issued a \u201cShift Manual\u201d that described security requirements and made reference to an \u201cO&T Manual\u201d that plaintiff expected to obtain in discovery.\nIn response to a request to admit served by Schmitt, plaintiff admitted that on December 18, 2005, she was scheduled to start work at 6 a.m.\nIn case No. 2 \u2014 09\u20140026, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting McDonald\u2019s a dismissal under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9). Such a motion admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint, but asserts some affirmative matter as a defense. Corcoran-Hakala v. Dowd, 362 Ill. App. 3d 523, 525 (2005). \u201cThe phrase \u2018affirmative matter\u2019 refers to something in the nature of a defense that negates the cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.\u201d In re Estate of Schlenker, 209 Ill. 2d 456, 461 (2004). More broadly, affirmative matters include \u201cany defense other than a negation of the essential allegations of the plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action.\u201d Travis v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., 335 Ill. App. 3d 1171, 1174 (2002). Thus, although the defendant may challenge the plaintiffs legal conclusions, all well-pleaded facts and the inferences arising from those facts must be taken as true for purposes of a motion under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9). In re Marriage of Diaz, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1094 (2006).\nSignificantly, it is the defendant\u2019s burden to prove the affirmative matter defeating the plaintiffs claim. Daniels v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 388 Ill. App. 3d 850, 855 (2009). The defendant bears the initial burden of presenting the affirmative matter (Reilly v. Wyeth, 377 Ill. App. 3d 20, 36 (2007)), and unless the grounds for the motion appear on the face of the pleading being challenged, the motion must be supported by affidavit. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a) (West 2008). If the defendant meets its burden, \u201cthe burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the defense is \u2018unfounded or requires the resolution of an essential element of material fact before it is proven.\u2019 \u201d Reilly, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 36, quoting Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116 (1993). Generally speaking, the trial court\u2019s decision is reviewed de novo. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 579 (2006).\nHere plaintiffs complaint against McDonald\u2019s sounds in negligence. A complaint seeking recovery for negligence \u201cmust allege facts that establish the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that breach.\u201d Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 430 (2006). The affirmative matter asserted by McDonald\u2019s to defeat plaintiffs claim is that McDonald\u2019s owed plaintiff no duty of care. The existence of a duty is a question of law, not of fact (Marshall, 222 Ill. 2d at 430), so it may be decided on a motion under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (see Lang v. Silva, 306 Ill. App. 3d 960, 970 (1999); Wood v. Village of Grayslake, 229 Ill. App. 3d 343, 349 (1992)). To meet its initial burden, McDonald\u2019s was obliged to show from the face of the complaint or by means of an affidavit that it owed no duty of care to plaintiff. If McDonald\u2019s met that burden, plaintiff would then be required to show that the \u201cno duty\u201d defense was unfounded or that proof of the defense would require resolution of an \u201c \u2018essential element of material fact.\u2019 \u201d Reilly, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 36, quoting Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d at 116. However, for the reasons discussed below, we conclude that McDonald\u2019s failed to meet its initial burden. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting its motion to dismiss.\nOn several occasions, courts have considered whether franchisors may be held liable in negligence for failing to exercise due care to protect their franchisees\u2019 workers from harm caused by the criminal acts of others. In Martin v. McDonald\u2019s Corp., 213 Ill. App. 3d 487 (1991), McDonald\u2019s appealed from a judgment entered following a trial. The plaintiffs were (1) two workers who were assaulted when a restaurant owned by a McDonald\u2019s franchisee was robbed and (2) the parents of another worker, who was murdered during the robbery. McDonald\u2019s asserted, as it does now, that it had no duty to protect the workers, because they were employed not by McDonald\u2019s but by its franchisee. McDonald\u2019s contended that it had no special relationship with the victims that would give rise to a duty of care. The Martin court upheld the judgment, reasoning that McDonald\u2019s had voluntarily assumed a duty to the victims. The court noted that, although the law did not impose a duty on McDonald\u2019s to protect the employees of its franchisees from harm, McDonald\u2019s had recognized the threat of armed robberies and the importance of security in restaurants. McDonald\u2019s had formed a department or unit to deal with security problems and prepared a \u201cbible\u201d for restaurant security operations. McDonald\u2019s employed a regional security manager who served as the franchisee\u2019s security supervisor, and he \u201cundertook not only the obligation to check for security problems, but also to communicate to the store management what the security policies were and to \u2018followup\u2019 to be certain that the problems had been corrected and the \u2018recommended\u2019 security procedures \u2018followed.\u2019 \u201d Martin, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 491.\nLike Martin, Decker v. Domino\u2019s Pizza, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d 521 (1994), was an appeal by the defendant from a judgment entered following a trial on the merits. In Decker, a worker at a store owned by one of the defendant\u2019s franchisees was seriously injured during a robbery. The court upheld the verdict under a voluntary-undertaking theory of liability because the defendant \u2014 the franchisor \u2014 formed a committee to study security issues, adopted a cash management system involving the use of time-delay safes in franchisees\u2019 stores, produced literature regarding robbery prevention, employed a franchise consultant to ensure compliance with the franchisor\u2019s standards (including robbery prevention) and to make sure that management trainees were properly trained in safety and security, and maintained a security hotline.\nIn contrast, in Castro v. Brown\u2019s Chicken & Pasta, Inc., 314 Ill. App. 3d 542 (2000), the court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant on negligence claims. Those claims were filed by the administrators of the estates of two of the victims in a mass murder that occurred at a restaurant in Palatine that was owned and operated by one of the defendant\u2019s franchisees. The Castro court noted that deposition testimony by the defendant\u2019s employees established that security measures were left to the discretion of individual franchisees; the defendant did not mandate that any security procedures be followed, did not supply franchisees with any written materials concerning security issues, and did not employ security personnel for its franchisees. Castro, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 550. Moreover, the record established that routine quality inspections conducted by the defendant were limited to matters of food safety and accident prevention; the inspections did not relate to crime prevention. Castro, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 550. The Castro court carefully distinguished Martin and Decker, noting that unlike the defendants in those cases, the defendant in Castro \u201cdid not implement mandatory security measures to be followed by the franchisee, it did not follow up to make sure that security recommendations were followed, it did not provide security for the Palatine restaurant or engage in routine security checks, and it did not set up a security hotline or a committee to review security measures.\u201d Castro, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 552.\nSimilarly, in Chelkova v. Southland Corp., 331 Ill. App. 3d 716 (2002), the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the basis that it owed no duty to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, an employee at a convenience store owned and operated by one of the defendant\u2019s franchisees, was sexually assaulted while working alone at the store during a late-night shift. The record established that the defendant offered the services of field consultants to address security matters, prepared a robbery prevention kit, provided training to franchisees concerning rape and robbery prevention, and paid for a security system provided by an outside vendor. However, the record established that franchisees were not required to follow the defendant\u2019s recommendations and that the security system paid for by the defendant was optional. The Chelkova court distinguished Decker on the basis that the defendant in that case \u201ctook affirmative action to ensure compliance with its security standards,\u201d whereas the defendant in Chelkova permitted the franchisee to run the business as it saw fit. Chelkova, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 724. The Chelkova court found Martin to be distinguishable for similar reasons, noting that \u201cMcDonald\u2019s clearly undertook to implement and enforce security measures at the store in question.\u201d Chelkova, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 725.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint specifically alleges that McDonald\u2019s \u201cfranchises its name, trademark, procedures and discipline on Schmitt,\u201d that McDonald\u2019s has \u201cpublished standards for franchises *** in the areas of lighting of the parking lots and procedures and disciplines [sic] for security of employees and patrons of Schmitt\u2019s restaurants,\u201d and that McDonald\u2019s \u201cmonitors and enforces compliance with said standards by dispatching McDonald\u2019s security persons to Schimdt [sic] on a regular basis during the year to confirm compliance with McDonald\u2019s said standards.\u201d These allegations, which must be taken as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss, establish that, unlike the defendants in Castro and Chelkova, McDonald\u2019s mandated compliance with security procedures. Martin, Decker, Castro, and Chelkova illustrate that whether a franchisor maintains mandatory security procedures is a crucial factor in determining whether the franchisor has voluntarily undertaken a duty of care toward a franchisee\u2019s employees. Given the procedural posture of the case, it is unnecessary to decide whether these allegations are sufficient in themselves to establish a duty. McDonald\u2019s had the initial burden to affirmatively show that, notwithstanding the well-pleaded allegations of plaintiffs complaint, it did not undertake a duty of care. McDonald\u2019s failed to meet that burden. Its affidavit indicates that it lacks authority to control the day-to-day operations of Schmitt\u2019s restaurant or to hire, discharge, or discipline Schmitt\u2019s employees, but none of the pertinent cases suggest that such authority is a prerequisite to the recognition of a duty. Other averments in the affidavit \u2014 e.g., that McDonald\u2019s supplies no products to Schmitt and does not file a tax return for Schmitt\u2019s restaurant \u2014 are even less to the point. Notably absent from the affidavit are any averments touching on the types of factors that were deemed significant in Martin and Decker. The affidavit does not indicate whether McDonald\u2019s produced a security \u201cbible,\u201d whether it maintained any security committees, or whether any McDonald\u2019s employees served as security supervisors for its franchisees\u2019 operations.\nBecause McDonald\u2019s did not meet its initial burden of showing that it owed no duty to plaintiff, the trial court erred in granting its motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9).\nIn case No. 2 \u2014 09\u20140244, plaintiff contends that section 5(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2008)) does not bar her from maintaining a civil action against her employer, Schmitt. Section 5(a) provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[n]o common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer *** for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2008). This provision \u201cbars a common law action by an employee against an employer and his agents where the accidental injury (1) arose out of and (2) in the course of employment.\u201d Handzel v. Kane-Miller Corp., 244 Ill. App. 3d 244, 246 (1993). \u201c[Ijnjuries sustained on an employer\u2019s premises within a reasonable time before and after work are generally deemed to arise in the course of the employment.\u201d Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 129 Ill. 2d 52, 57 (1989). Plaintiffs injuries occurred in the course of her employment because she was abducted in her employer\u2019s parking lot shortly before beginning her shift. Accordingly, the dispositive question is whether her injuries \u201carose out of\u2019 plaintiffs employment.\nOur supreme court has stated:\n\u201cFor an injury to \u2018arise out of the employment its origin must be in some risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment so as to create a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. [Citations.] Typically, an injury arises out of one\u2019s employment if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was performing acts he was instructed to perform by his employer, acts which he had a common law or statutory duty to perform, or acts which the employee might reasonably be expected to perform incident to his assigned duties. [Citation.]\u201d Caterpillar Tractor Co., 129 Ill. 2d at 58.\nIt has also been observed:\n\u201cWhen *** an injury to an employee takes place in an area that is the usual route to the employer\u2019s premises, and the route is attendant with a special risk or hazard, the hazard becomes part of the employment. Special hazards or risks encountered as a result of using a usual access route satisfy the \u2018arising out of requirement of the Act.\u201d Litchfield Healthcare Center v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 349 Ill. App. 3d 486, 491 (2004).\nThe claimant in Litchfield tripped on an uneven sidewalk while walking to her workplace \u2014 a residential health care facility \u2014 from the parking lot where it had been suggested that she park her car. The lot was also used by visitors to the facility. The Litchfield court concluded that the claimant\u2019s injuries arose out of her employment. Here, plaintiff alleges a lack of proper lighting and security in her employer\u2019s parking lot. Surely, this was as much a \u201cspecial hazard\u201d as the uneven sidewalk in Litchfield, and, pursuant to Litchfield, it became a hazard of her employment. As in Litchfield, it makes no difference that customers of Schmitt\u2019s restaurant might use the same parking lot and might face the same hazard. Plaintiffs employment exposed her to the hazard \u201cto a degree beyond that to which the general public would be subjected.\u201d Litchfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 491. Because plaintiffs alleged injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, she may not bring a common-law action against her employer.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Kendall County dismissing plaintiff\u2019s claim against Schmitt. We reverse the order of the circuit court of Kendall County dismissing plaintiff\u2019s claim against McDonald\u2019s, and we remand for further proceedings.\nNo. 2 \u2014 09\u20140026, Reversed and remanded.\nNo. 2 \u2014 09\u20140244, Affirmed.\nBOWMAN and SCHOSTOK, JJ, concur.\nSchmitt is misnamed in the complaint as \u201cSchmitt-Orchard LLC.\u201d\nWhere the plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial, the trial court deciding a section 2 \u2014 619 motion may, at its option, resolve factual disputes. If the court does so, its findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. A.F.P. Enterprises, Inc. v. Crescent Pork, Inc., 243 Ill. App. 3d 905, 912-13 (1993).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "William B. Thompson, of Hillsboro, Texas, for appellant.", "Patrick H. Norris, of Law Offices of Lauren K. Meachum, and Hugh C. O\u2019Donnell and Elaine C. Davenport, both of Sanchez, Daniels & Hoffman LLEJ both of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RENAE LAWSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHMITT BOULDER HILL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNos. 2\u201409\u20140026, 2\u201409\u20140244 cons.\nOpinion filed January 22, 2010.\nWilliam B. Thompson, of Hillsboro, Texas, for appellant.\nPatrick H. Norris, of Law Offices of Lauren K. Meachum, and Hugh C. O\u2019Donnell and Elaine C. Davenport, both of Sanchez, Daniels & Hoffman LLEJ both of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0127-01", "first_page_order": 143, "last_page_order": 151 }