{ "id": 4296381, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rodriguez", "decision_date": "2009-07-24", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20142282", "first_page": "436", "last_page": "451", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "398 Ill. App. 3d 436" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "96 L. Ed. 288", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 U.S. 246", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 641097 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" }, { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/342/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3280554 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498411 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705778 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604994 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" }, { "page": "133-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 N.W2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11127605 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/622/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ariz. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1460876 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "709" }, { "page": "372" }, { "page": "710" }, { "page": "372" }, { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/178/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 9277521, 9277557 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/801/0170-01", "/ne2d/801/0170-02" ] }, { "cite": "693 N.W.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9021059 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" }, { "page": "776" }, { "page": "776" }, { "page": "776" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/693/0773-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006 WI App. 92", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "WI App", "case_ids": [ 8401417 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b620" }, { "page": "\u00b620" }, { "page": "\u00b620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/292/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3123048 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42-43" }, { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781320 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" }, { "page": "269-70" }, { "page": "270" }, { "page": "270" }, { "page": "270" }, { "page": "271" }, { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2961642 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "courts have no legal power to correct what amounts to errors in judgment by the legislative body" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3177929 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575-76", "parenthetical": "courts have no legal power to correct what amounts to errors in judgment by the legislative body" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820", "parenthetical": "defendant convicted pursuant to what is now section 11 - 501(a)(4) when his ingestion of \"Tylenol 3 with codeine\" rendered him \"incapable of safely driving\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 915", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511378 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "921", "parenthetical": "defendant convicted pursuant to what is now section 11 - 501(a)(4) when his ingestion of \"Tylenol 3 with codeine\" rendered him \"incapable of safely driving\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0915-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1298, "char_count": 39688, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14456730875043294 }, "sha256": "2ceb48fea6a75c09ade4a324f3a40a8acecf3b4d0457d8e2fc5cf214cd7515a7", "simhash": "1:1c9b19331b97f6d9", "word_count": 6628 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:17.302697+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "O\u2019MALLEY, EJ., concurs." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Francisco Rodriguez was found guilty of driving a vehicle with a controlled substance in his urine in violation of section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(6) (West 2004)) and sentenced to 24 months\u2019 supervision. On appeal, defendant contends the State did not meet its burden of proof because it failed to introduce evidence that the controlled substance found in his urine was ingested unlawfully. We affirm.\nChicago fire department paramedic John Abramski testified that on November 21, 2005, at about 2:15 a.m., he went to North Milwaukee Avenue where a passenger truck had rolled on its side. Defendant was in the truck with his foot pinned under the brake pedal. Abramski observed that the truck keys were in the ignition but the engine was not running. He also noticed \u201cnumerous\u201d alcohol containers in the truck.\nDefendant was freed from the truck and taken by ambulance to Illinois Masonic Hospital for trauma treatment. Abramski treated defendant in the ambulance and noticed throughout his interaction with defendant that defendant\u2019s eyes were red and glassy, his speech was slurred, he was unsteady, he had uncoordinated movements, and he smelled strongly of alcohol.\nJacqueline Jackson, an emergency room nurse at Illinois Masonic Hospital, testified that when defendant arrived at the hospital, he was taken to a trauma room for a \u201chead-to-toe\u201d evaluation. Jackson testified that defendant smelled of alcohol. Defendant\u2019s blood was drawn and a urine specimen was taken. The toxicology results from the specimen were known within 30 to 60 minutes and were positive for metabolites of cocaine.\nThe court found defendant guilty of violating section 11\u2014 501(a)(6), based upon the report of cocaine metabolites in his urine. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(6) (West 2004). Section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) provides that a person may not drive a vehicle while \u201cthere is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the person\u2019s *** urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of *** a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(6) (West 2004), citing 720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2004).\nOn appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Although he is not challenging the presence of cocaine metabolites in his urine, he contends the State failed its burden of proof because his use was not shown to be unlawful. Defendant contends in order to meet this burden the State must show there was no accepted medical use for the cocaine in his urine. He bases this argument in part upon section 205 of the Controlled Substances Act, which provides:\n\u201cThe Department shall issue a rule scheduling a substance in Schedule II if it finds that:\n(1) the substance has high potential for abuse;\n(2) the substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, or currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions; and\n(3) the abuse of the substance may lead to severe psychological or physiological dependence.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/205 (West 2004).\nIn supplemental briefs ordered after oral arguments, defendant has further supported this argument with materials which indicate that cocaine has some medical use in the detection of Horner Syndrome, a degenerative eye disease, and that cocaine can be used as an anesthetic. He adds that, \u201c[bjecause cocaine\u2019s medical use is more confined, to certain surgeries and/or disease testing, it will not be prescribed in the same manner as codeine \u2014 instead, it will be administered by the treating doctor directly in his office or in the surgical theater.\u201d Contrary to defendant\u2019s arguments, we find that the burden of proof in this case was met when the State established that defendant was in control of a vehicle and the hospital lab results from his urine sample were positive for cocaine metabolites.\nOur reasoning begins with the statute at issue and the legislative intent behind it. Section 11 \u2014 501 of the Vehicle Code prohibits driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501 (West 2004). As pointed out above, section 11\u2014 501(a)(6) provides that a person may not drive a vehicle while \u201cthere is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the person\u2019s *** urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of *** a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(6) (West 2004), citing 720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2004). The other provisions of section 11 \u2014 501(a) prohibit driving a vehicle either while having a blood or breath alcohol concentration (BAG) of 0.08 or greater, or while \u201cunder the influence\u201d of drugs, alcohol, intoxicating compounds, or a combination thereof. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(1) through (a)(6) (West 2004). Accordingly, section 11\u2014 501(a)(6) is \u201cone of a set of traffic regulations *** intended to protect the public against motorists who drive under the influence of substances that may impair safe driving.\u201d People v. Gassman, 251 Ill. App. 3d 681, 690 (1993).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Fate, 159 Ill. 2d 267 (1994), upheld the constitutionality of section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) (then codified as section 11 \u2014 501(a)(5)), finding that it properly created a per se offense without any element of impairment. Fate, 159 Ill. 2d at 269. The court acknowledged:\n\u201cAt the lowest levels of drug ingestion, no one is impaired. At the highest levels, all are impaired. In the vast middle range, however, the tolerance for drugs varies from person to person and from drug to drug. In this range, depending on the drug and depending on the person, some will be impaired and some will not be impaired at all. The same is also true for alcohol, itself a drug.\u201d Fate, 159 Ill. 2d at 269-70.\nTherefore, an absolute \u201cprohibition against driving with any amount of a controlled substance in one\u2019s system was considered necessary because \u2018there is no standard that one can come up with by which, unlike alcohol in the bloodstream, one can determine whether one is driving under the influence.\u2019 \u201d Fate, 159 Ill. 2d at 270, quoting 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 25, 1989, at 23 (statement of Senator Barkhausen).\nThe Fate court noted that it had previously \u201cadopted the legal fiction of \u2018presumed impairment\u2019 for persons driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.10 or above *** in spite of the fact that certain people can operate a motor vehicle without noticeable impairment at and above that level of alcohol in their systems.\u201d Fate, 159 Ill. 2d at 270, citing People v. Ziltz, 98 Ill. 2d 38 (1983). The supreme court concluded that this \u201crationale *** applies with equal force to the case at hand.\u201d Fate, 159 Ill. 2d at 270.\nCourts in other jurisdictions reviewing legislation similar to section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) have also noted that, while it is possible to determine the amount of alcohol that causes impairment, there is no agreement as to the quantity of a controlled substance needed to cause impairment. State v. Gardner, 2006 WI App. 92, \u00b620, 292 Wis. 2d 682, \u00b620, 715 N.W.2d 720, \u00b620; State v. Comried, 693 N.W.2d 773 (Iowa 2005); Bennett v. State, 801 N.E.2d 170, 176 (Ind. App. 2003); State v. Phillips, 178 Ariz. 368, 873 P.2d 706 (App. 1994).\nIn Comried, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a statute similar to section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6). Comried, 693 N.W2d at 774. The Comried court stated that a statute prohibiting drivers from \u201coperating motor vehicles with controlled substances in their bodies, whether or not they are under the influence\u201d was proper, finding that the Iowa \u201clegislature could reasonably have imposed such a ban because the effects of drugs, as contrasted to the effects of alcohol, can vary greatly among those who use them.\u201d Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 776. Comried also discussed favorably a decision of Iowa\u2019s appellate court affirming a license revocation \u201cbased on driving with controlled substances in the body.\u201d Comried, 693 N.W2d at 776, citing Loder v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 622 N.W2d 513, 516 (Iowa App. 2000). That case noted the difficulty in relating the amount of drugs in the body to driving impairment:\n\u201c \u2018Unlike the blood alcohol concentration test used to measure alcohol impairment there is no similar test to measure marijuana impairment. There is, though, as was used here, a test to measure the use of marijuana, a drug illegal in the State of Iowa, in a person\u2019s body. There being no reliable indicator of impairment, the legislature could rationally decide that the public is best protected by prohibiting one from driving who has a measurable amount of marijuana metabolites.\u2019 \u201d Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 776, quoting Loder, 622 N.W.2d at 516.\nIn Phillips, the Arizona Appellate Court considered an equal protection challenge to legislation similar to section 11 \u2014 501(b)(6) and found that the statute created an unqualified ban on driving with any proscribed substance in the body. Phillips, 178 Ariz. at 371, 873 P.2d at 709. In finding the prohibition permissible under the State\u2019s police power, it found that \u201cthe legislature was reasonable in determining that there is no level of illicit drug use which can be acceptably combined with driving a vehicle; the established potential for lethal consequences is too great.\u201d Phillips, 178 Ariz. at 372, 873 P.2d at 710. The court also observed:\n\u201c[UJnlike the blood alcohol concentration test used to measure alcohol impairment, there is no useful indicator of impairment from such drugs because they are fundamentally different from alcohol. Essentially, there can be no meaningful quantification because of the dangers inherent in the drugs themselves and in the lack of potency predictability. The defendant has not presented any evidence to the contrary.\u201d Phillips, 178 Ariz. at 372, 873 P.2d at 710.\nLike these other statutes, section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) is designed to ban driving a vehicle with any amount of an unlawfully ingested controlled substance in a person\u2019s breath, blood or urine. This brings us to the key issue: the meaning of the term \u201cunlawful\u201d in section 11\u2014 501(a)(6). Because the statute at issue expressly refers to \u201cthe unlawful use or consumption of *** a controlled substance listed in the Controlled Substances Act,\u201d we must look to the Controlled Substances Act (the Act) for the answer. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(6) (West 2004), citing 720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2004). Before doing so, we outline several general principles regarding statutory construction.\n\u201cUnder the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with the same subject will be considered with reference to one another to give them harmonious effect.\u201d People v. McCarthy, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 133 (2006). \u201cThe doctrine is also applicable to different sections of the same statute, and is consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that all the provisions of a statute must be viewed as a whole.\u201d McCarthy, 223 Ill. 2d at 133-34. \u201c[All words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be construed in isolation.\u201d Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502, 514 (2007). \u201cEach word, clause and sentence of the statute, if possible, must be given reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous.\u201d Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 514. \u201cIn determining the General Assembly\u2019s intent, we may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the goals to be achieved.\u201d Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 514.\nUnder the Act, cocaine is a Schedule II controlled substance. 720 ILCS 570/206(b)(4) (West 2004). The Act provides that, \u201c[ejxcept as otherwise authorized by this Act, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to possess a controlled *** substance.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2004).\nThe language, \u201c[ejxcept as otherwise authorized by this Act,\u201d refers to exceptions and exemptions within the Act. For example, the Act provides that a \u201cpractitioner, in good faith, may dispense a Schedule II controlled substance.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/312(a) (West 2004). \u201cGood faith\u201d and \u201cpractitioner\u201d are both defined terms in the Act. 720 ILCS 570/102(u), (kk) (West 2004). The Act includes an exemption authorizing lawful possession by an \u201cultimate user *** pursuant to a lawful prescription of a practitioner.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/302(c)(3) (West 2004).\nHowever, the Act also provides that \u201c[ijt is not necessary for the State to negate any exemption or exception in this Act in any complaint, information, indictment or other pleading or in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this Act. The burden of proof of any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/506 (West 2004). Thus, a defendant charged with possession of a controlled substance must produce evidence that his possession was pursuant to a prescription, which then places the burden on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Kolichman, 218 Ill. App. 3d 132, 144 (1991).\nIn enacting the Act, the legislature \u201crecogniz[edj the rising incidence in the abuse of drugs *** and its resultant damage\u201d to society and therefore implemented \u201ca system of control over the distribution and use of controlled substances.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/100 (West 2004). The intent of the Act was, in relevant part, to:\n\u201c(1) limit access of such substances only to those persons who have demonstrated an appropriate sense of responsibility and have a lawful and legitimate reason to possess them; (2) deter the unlawful and destructive abuse of controlled substances; (3) penalize most heavily the illicit traffickers or profiteers of controlled substances ***; [and] (4) acknowledge the functional and consequential differences between the various types of controlled substances.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/100 (West 2004).\nHowever, it was \u201cnot the intent of the [Act] to treat the unlawful user or occasional petty distributor of controlled substances with the same severity as the large-scale, unlawful purveyors and traffickers of controlled substances.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 570/100 (West 2004).\nWhen the aforementioned provisions of the Act are read together in light of the intent of the Act, it is clear that possession of a controlled substance is unlawful per se. In other words, the knowing possession of a controlled substance such as cocaine is, by itself, a violation of the law. We conclude that the word \u201cunlawful\u201d in section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6), with its express reference to the Act, has the same meaning: the use or consumption of any amount of a controlled substance while driving a motor vehicle is unlawful per se. With regard to controlled substances, the word \u201cunlawful\u201d describes the forbidden conduct of possession under the Act and use or consumption under section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6). Under the Controlled Substances Act, it is not the absence of an accepted medical use that makes it unlawful to possess cocaine, but the language of section 402 which provides that \u201cit is unlawful for any person to knowingly possess a controlled *** substance.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2004). Thus, we conclude that the State does not have to establish the use was unlawful but it does have to establish use or consumption of a controlled substance. To be clear, we hold that unlawfulness is not a separate element of the offense.\nWe base this conclusion on the legislature\u2019s intent to prohibit individuals from driving automobiles after the use or consumption of any amount of these \u201cunlawful\u201d controlled substances. The legislature did so because it is dangerous for persons to be driving cars while using any amount of an illegal or unlawful controlled substance and there is no level of unlawful controlled substance use that can be acceptably combined with driving a vehicle. The use or consumption of cocaine is similar to possession of heroin, LSD, PCP or methamphetamine: an unlawful act in and of itself.\nAs stated earlier, our supreme court in Fate held that section 11\u2014 501(a)(6) creates an absolute bar against driving a motor vehicle following the illegal ingestion of any cannabis or controlled substance. In reaching that conclusion, the Fate court stated:\n\u201cThis is without regard to physical impairment. Given the vast number of contraband drugs, the difficulties in measuring the concentration of these drugs with precision from blood and urine samples and, finally, the variation in impairment from drug to drug and from person to person, we believe that the statute constitutes a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State in the interest of safe streets and highways.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Fate, 159 Ill. 2d at 271.\nWhen the supreme court referred to cannabis and controlled substances as contraband drugs, we believe it was referring to the illegal or unlawful nature of certain drugs. The word \u201ccontraband\u201d refers to \u201cany property which is unlawful to produce or possess.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 291 (5th ed. 1979). The knowing possession of contraband drugs or controlled substances, including cocaine, is unlawful per se.\nThis is not to suggest that the State does not have a burden of proof in this case. Instead, the burden of proof is similar to that in possession cases. \u201cIn order to convict an individual of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance and that he or she also had immediate and exclusive possession or control of the narcotics.\u201d People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2005). The State must necessarily prove that the substance recovered from the defendant was, in fact, a controlled substance. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 466.\nThe key difference is that, while knowledge is an element of the State\u2019s case for possession under the Act, it is axiomatic that \u201ca defendant\u2019s intent, knowledge, or motive is immaterial to the question of guilt\u201d in motor vehicles offenses. People v. Teschner, 76 Ill. App. 3d 124, 125 (1979). The only intent necessary for a violation of the Vehicle Code is commission of the prohibited act. Teschner, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 125. This absolute liability exists because the proper regulation of traffic and traffic accidents requires it.\n\u201cThis is especially so in the case of driving while intoxicated. To require a mental state would raise the possibility of an involuntary intoxication defense. While involuntary intoxication is a proper defense to most crimes [citation], to allow such a defense to a charge of driving while intoxicated would result in the inadequate protection of [the] public from the dangers of intoxicated drivers.\u201d Teschner, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 126.\nTeschner derived this rationale from Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 96 L. Ed. 288, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952), where the United States Supreme Court stated that many violations of traffic and other public welfare offenses\n\u201c \u2018[r]esult in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. While such offenses do not threaten the security of the state in the manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted. In this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element.\u2019 \u201d Teschner, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 126, quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256, 96 L. Ed. at 296-97, 72 S. Ct. at 246.\nThe burden of proof under Vehicle Code section 11 \u2014 501(a) was squarely addressed in Ziltz, where our supreme court upheld the constitutionality of section 11 \u2014 501(a)(1), prohibiting driving with a BAG above a specified level (then 0.10) against a challenge that the statute \u201cdoes away with all necessity for the State to show impairment.\u201d Ziltz, 98 Ill. 2d at 42-43; 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(1) (West 2004). The Ziltz court found that the \u201cState must establish that the defendant was in exclusive control of the vehicle and had a level of alcohol in excess of 0.10% in his blood.\u201d Ziltz, 98 Ill. 2d at 43. As noted above, the legislative presumption of impairment under section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) recognized by the supreme court in Fate is similar to the presumptive impairment of a person with a BAG of 0.08 or greater under section 11 \u2014 501(a)(1) that the court recognized in Ziltz. Fate, 159 Ill. 2d at 270. The State\u2019s burden of proof under section 11\u2014 501(a)(6) is similar as well: that the defendant was in exclusive control over a vehicle and had a controlled substance in his breath, blood, or urine.\nContrary to the dissent\u2019s suggestion, we do not conclude unlawfulness is an element of the offense. What we conclude is that the State must show the use or consumption of a controlled substance was in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. This is done so by establishing cocaine use. The word \u201cunlawful\u201d means in violation of the Controlled Substances Act.\nAlthough the dissent suggests that a person who is taking Ritalin pursuant to a valid prescription is barred from driving a vehicle, we disagree. It is not unlawful under section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) to drive a motor vehicle while taking Ritalin pursuant to a valid medical prescription. Likewise, it is not unlawful in Illinois to take medications pursuant to a valid medical prescription. That does not mean, however, that simply because someone has a medical prescription for a controlled substance he or she can always operate a motor vehicle safely while taking that medication. Therefore, it is unlawful to drive or be in physical control of any motor vehicle and be under the influence of alcohol or any other drug or substance to a degree that renders that person incapable of driving safely.\nUnder our reading of these statutes, section 11 \u2014 501(b) does not bar the use of prescription medications. Section 11 \u2014 501(b) was meant to address voluntary intoxication as a defense to charges under section 11 \u2014 501(a)(1) through (a)(6). For example, because someone is legally allowed to enter a tavern and voluntarily consume several alcoholic drinks, Illinois law does not permit that person to drive a vehicle if he is under the influence of alcohol or has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater in his blood as a result of that consumption. As another example, if that same person has voluntarily consumed an amount of codeine pursuant to a valid prescription but the use of codeine renders that person incapable of driving safely, section 11 \u2014 501(b) precludes that same person from raising a defense to the charge of driving under the influence that he was legally entitled to use codeine. Additionally, if a person ingests cocaine or heroin or PCF he cannot drive a vehicle after doing so. Section 11 \u2014 501(b) does not prohibit people from using medications pursuant to valid prescriptions. What it does prohibit is the defense of voluntary intoxication through alcohol or drugs or other substances as a defense to any one of the charges listed in section 11 \u2014 501(a)(1) through (a)(6).\nTo the extent that the dissent suggests that the State must disprove the absence of an accepted medical use, or the absence of a valid prescription, this is not explained. There is no authority for either of these propositions. How either could become the State\u2019s burden is unclear. Moreover, it has never been a requirement under the Controlled Substances Act for the State to disprove an accepted medical use for a controlled substance, nor has it been the State\u2019s burden to show the absence of a valid medical prescription to establish a violation of the Controlled Substances Act.\nUnder our decision today if the use was somehow exempted or excepted as to amount to lawful conduct, we adhere to the view that an exception would be an affirmative defense the defendant would have to raise, which we point out was not done in this case. We also must point out that we have not found nor has the defendant directed us to any case in which a defendant challenged a cocaine possession charge based upon lawful use through a valid medical prescription. Accepted medical use does not, in our opinion, amount to lawful use.\nThe dissent does not discuss how or where this confidential medical information would come from or how the police or State as the charging body could arrest anyone for driving a vehicle after the use or consumption of an otherwise illegal substance such as cocaine before first establishing that no valid prescription accounted for the substance\u2019s presence in a defendant\u2019s urine. The legislature never intended such a result.\nFinally, reading sections 11 \u2014 501(a)(1) through (a)(6), 11 \u2014 501(b) and the Controlled Substances Act as we do allows for all the statutes to be read harmoniously and at the same time effectuate the salutary purposes of section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6).\nHaving determined that the State\u2019s burden of proof was met, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MALLEY, EJ., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" }, { "text": "JUSTICE JOSEPH GORDON,\ndissenting:\nThe single issue that triggers my dissent is whether the State bears the burden under section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) of the Vehicle Code (hereinafter the Code) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(6) (West 2004)) to prove that the controlled substances listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter the Act) (720 ILCS 570/206 (West 2004)), in this instance the cocaine traces found in defendant\u2019s blood and urine, were not legally ingested. If so, we must then determine whether the burden has been satisfied. I submit that it does and it was not. The majority appears to agree that the State bears the burden of proof to establish unlawful use, but contends that the State satisfies that burden solely by proving merely that the substance found was cocaine, whose use is unlawful per se. I disagree.\nThe majority urges that section 11 \u2014 501 of the Code must read in pari materia with the Act, which provides that, \u201cexcept as otherwise authorized by the Act, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly possess\u201d any of the controlled substances (720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2004)) unless exempted under various provisions of the Act including section 312, which exempts certain drugs that are medically prescribed (720 ILCS 570/312 (West 2004)). As pointed out by the majority, under the Act proof of such exempt status must be borne by the possessor pursuant to section 506 of the Act (720 ILCS 570/506 (West 2004)), which provides that \u201cthe burden of proof of any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWhile such construction may well be desirable since the exempt use through medical prescription is more readily proven by the defendant rather than the State, this result is not reachable as the section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) of the Code is currently drafted.\nSection 11 \u2014 501(a) enumerates six offenses that a person is prohibited from committing while driving a motor vehicle. Namely, a person shall not drive or be in physical control of any vehicle within this State while:\n\u201c(1) the alcohol concentration in the person\u2019s blood or breath is 0.08 or more based on the definition of blood and breath units in Section 11 \u2014 501.2;\n(2) under the influence of alcohol;\n(3) under the influence of any intoxicating compound or combination of intoxicating compounds to a degree that renders the person incapable of driving safely;\n(4) under the influence of any other drug or combination of drugs to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving;\n(5) under the combined influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving; or\n(6) there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the person\u2019s breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of *** a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(1) through (a)(6) (West 2004).\nIf the term \u201cunlawful\u201d under the Code must be construed in pari materia with the Act, the use of the term \u201cunlawful use\u201d in section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) would be redundant under the construction proposed by the majority. It would have been sufficient simply to state that \u201ca\u201d person may not drive a vehicle if there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the person or urine resulting from the use or consumption of any drug listed in the Act. Since use of such drug would be unlawful per se as the majority reasons, then there would be no need to identify such use or consumption as \u201cunlawful.\u201d\nHowever, if the term \u201cunlawful use\u201d in section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) is specifically designed to exempt use of such Schedule II drugs when they are medically authorized, then proof of the lack of medical authorization or other factors giving rise to this exemption becomes integral to establish the element of unlawful use.\nAs noted, the majority does not appear to dispute that \u201cunlawful use\u201d is an element of the offense that the State must establish. Rather the majority contends that this element merely requires the use of a scheduled substance alone, without necessitating proof by the State that its use was unauthorized. Given this construction, namely, that the element of \u201cunlawful use\u201d is satisfied by simply proving use without necessitating proof that it was not legally authorized so as to be exempted, legal authorization would not provide any defense under the Code. Such defense is specifically disallowed by section 11 \u2014 501(b), which states \u201c[t]he fact that any person charged with violating this Section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol, other drug or drugs *** shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating of this Section.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(b) (West 2004).\nAs shall be more fully elaborated, under the majority\u2019s analysis, the term \u201cunlawful\u201d as an element of the offense refers only to the mere use of a controlled substance without requiring proof by the State that the use was not exempted. This analysis would make section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) subject to the provision of section 11 \u2014 501(b) of the Code as is the case with regard to the other provisions of section 11\u2014 501(a), namely, sections 11 \u2014 501(a)(1) through (a)(5), a result that would be anomalous and undoubtedly unintended by the legislature. Section 11 \u2014 501(b) is understandably applicable to all prohibited uses encompassed within sections 11 \u2014 501(a)(1) through 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) since each of those provisions requires that the driver be under the influence of the substance, either actually or presumptively, as in section 11 \u2014 501(a)(1), which looks to quantity of consumption (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(1) (West 2004)). It is the impairment, not the unlawfulness, that triggers the violation under sections 11 \u2014 501(a)(1) through 11 \u2014 501(a)(5). Such a result, however, would be incompatible with respect to section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6), which does not require impairment, either actual or presumptive, particularly since section 501(a)(6) would encompass all drugs listed under Schedule II (720 ILCS 570/206 (West 2004)), which would include drugs such as Ritalin, which is in wide medical use. Yet, the majority\u2019s interpretation of \u201cunlawful use\u201d as deployed under section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) would result in prohibiting the use of any substance encompassed under the Act, whether such substance is medically prescribed or not, from ever driving so long as any trace of such use remains in one\u2019s blood or urine. In effect, any medically prescribed user of benign Schedule II drugs such as Ritalin would never be able to drive since the mere presence of the drug would violate section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) whether or not the use of the drug was medically authorized and section 11 \u2014 501(b) would preclude the interpolation of such medical authorization as a defense\nThis result, however, would be averted if the term \u201cunlawful use\u201d in section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) were given its natural meaning that such use was legally unauthorized. If proof of the lack of authorization were an element of the offense and necessary to establish a prima facie charge under section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6), the result of section 11 \u2014 501(b) and section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) would be compatible. As noted, section 11 \u2014 501(b) prevents a defendant from alleging that he was legally entitled to use the drug as a defense of \u201cviolating this Section.\u201d Accordingly, by its very terms, section 11 \u2014 501(b) would not be applicable to section 11\u2014 501(a)(6) since section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) would not be violated in the first instance unless the use were unauthorized. Thus, a medical authorization would be a defense since with such authorization there could be no unlawful use of drugs in the first instance.\nThis result is in full harmony with the underlying rationale of section 11 \u2014 501(b), namely, that where the driver is impaired he should not be driving whether the source of his impairment is legal or not. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(1) through (a)(5) (West 2004). If the use of cocaine actually caused impairment, it would be subsumed under section 11 \u2014 501(a)(4) (prohibiting driving while under the influence of any drug) and fully subject to section 11 \u2014 501(b). See People v. Shelton, 303 Ill. App. 3d 915, 921, 708 N.E.2d 815, 820 (1999) (defendant convicted pursuant to what is now section 11 \u2014 501(a)(4) when his ingestion of \u201cTylenol 3 with codeine\u201d rendered him \u201cincapable of safely driving\u201d). But if not impaired, then he would fall within section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6), which would require proof that said use was unauthorized. If the presence of cocaine in his urine was the result of a lawful exempted use, which did not render him impaired, then there would be no offense committed under the Code. Thus, when there is no impairment, legality of use would protect against the offense notwithstanding section 11 \u2014 501(b), since the provisions of section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6) would \u201cnot have been violated\u201d so as to trigger the applicability of section 11 \u2014 501(b).\nThe State has contended that even if the State had the burden of proving unauthorized use under section 11 \u2014 501(a)(6), it satisfied the burden because cocaine does not have any authorized use in Illinois. This issue was not addressed in the original briefs filed by either side. Upon request of this court, both parties submitted supplemental briefs addressing the issue of lawful uses of cocaine in Illinois. Pursuant thereto, defendant submitted material which enumerated various medical uses for cocaine that are generally accepted in the medical field, which the State neither sought to strike nor challenged. These medically accepted uses include a local anesthetic (Physician\u2019s Desk Reference 2966 (59th ed. 2005)), and a confirmatory test in diagnosing Horner\u2019s Syndrome (see D. Jacobson, Duration of Positive Urine for Cocaine Metabolite After Ophthalmic Administration, 131 Am. J. of Ophthalmology 691, 742-47 (June 2001)).\nHaving established without dispute that there are legitimate, albeit limited, medical uses for cocaine recognized in the medical field, we must determine whether such limited medical uses are lawful in Illinois. Section 312 of the Act states, in pertinent part, that, \u201c[a] practitioner, in good faith, may dispense a Schedule II controlled substance, which is a narcotic drug listed in Section 206 of this Act *** to any person upon a written prescription of any prescriben\u201d 720 ILCS 570/312(a) (West 2004). As indicated previously, cocaine is a Schedule II drug listed in section 206 of the Act. 720 ILCS 570/206(b) (4) (West 2004). It is not listed in Schedule I for which there is no currently accepted medical use (720 ILCS 570/203 (West 2004)). Accordingly, a practitioner can, under limited circumstances, prescribe substances that contain cocaine in Illinois, and it therefore follows that a person can lawfully ingest cocaine in Illinois if it has been lawfully prescribed to that person. Thus, cocaine could conceivably be present in a person\u2019s urine as a result of a lawful use pursuant to a valid prescription.\nThe State argues, however, that section 206 must be read in pari materia with the entire Act, and as such, section 402 of the Act makes it illegal for any person to knowingly possess cocaine, and therefore a practitioner cannot prescribe any substance that contains cocaine to a person. Section 402 reads, in pertinent part: \u201cExcept as otherwise authorized by this Act, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to possess a controlled or counterfeit substance\u201d or controlled substance analog. 720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2004). The State\u2019s argument is that because it is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess cocaine, regardless of its legality, then it follows that a doctor cannot dispense such cocaine to any person, a conclusion with which I disagree.\nIn construing the statute, the State reads the phrase \u201c[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by this Act\u201d out of section 402. However, section 312(g) of the Act must also be read with section 402. 720 ILCS 570/ 312(g) (West 2004). Section 312(g) states in pertinent part that a \u201cperson to whom or for whose use any controlled substance has been prescribed or dispensed by a practitioner *** may lawfully possess such substance only in the container in which it was delivered to him by the person dispensing such substance.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/312(g) (West 2004). As such, a person may lawfully possess cocaine if it is in the container in which it was lawfully prescribed to him under section 312 of the Act. Therefore, State\u2019s reliance on section 402 to prove there is no lawful use of cocaine in Illinois is misplaced.\nThe State may with good reason contend that this construction imposes excess hardship upon the State to establish unauthorized use and would therefore seek to shift that burden to the defendant as is the case under the Act. However, we are compelled to interpret a statute as drafted even if not well thought out. See Chirikos v. Yellow Cab Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 569, 575-76, 410 N.E.2d 61, 66 (1980) (courts have no legal power to correct what amounts to errors in judgment by the legislative body); see generally 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes \u00a7121 (2001) (\u201cGenerally, courts will not undertake correction of legislative mistakes in statutes notwithstanding the fact that the court may be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the legislature intended to enact something very different from that which it did enact. However, there is authority for the rule that clerical mistakes should be disregarded or corrected, and that manifest or obvious mistakes may be corrected. These rules prevail where no specific provision of the statute is abrogated by the correction\u201d). Clearly, the corrections which the analysis of the majority attempts to achieve are not clerical but must, therefore, be undertaken legislatively rather than judicially.\nAccordingly, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE JOSEPH GORDON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia Unsinn, Stephanie L. Horten, and Robert Hirschhorn, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Noah Montague, and Angela Z. Ordway, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20142282\nOpinion filed July 24, 2009.\nRehearing denied March 8, 2010.\nGORDON, JOSEPH, J., dissenting.\nPatricia Unsinn, Stephanie L. Horten, and Robert Hirschhorn, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Noah Montague, and Angela Z. Ordway, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0436-01", "first_page_order": 452, "last_page_order": 467 }