{ "id": 4300177, "name": "FRANCES SHEFFLER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co.", "decision_date": "2010-02-26", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20140849", "first_page": "51", "last_page": "77", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 51" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. 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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Frances Sheffler, Mark Resnik, and Debra Sloan, individually and on behalf of Jason Sloan, appeal the dismissal of their complaint, framed as a class action, against defendant, Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd), a public utility, and the trial court\u2019s denial of their motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint, also framed as a class action.\nOn August 23, 2007, the Chicago area was affected by severe storm systems, resulting in the loss of electrical power to many ComEd customers, including plaintiffs. Following the storms, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking legal and equitable relief against ComEd. The operative third amended complaint, which was dismissed in its entirety with prejudice, contained five counts as a class action. Count I, entitled \u201cNegligence,\u201d alleges that ComEd negligently failed to prevent the power outages, failed to provide adequate warning to plaintiffs and those similarly situated prior to the power outages, and failed to timely restore power to plaintiffs and the purported class following the power outages. Count II, entitled \u201cPublic Utilities Act,\u201d alleges the existence of a statutory duty and a violation of that duty. Specifically, count II of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that ComEd violated sections 8 \u2014 101, 8 \u2014 401, and 16 \u2014 125(e) and (f) of the Illinois Public Utilities Act (Act) (220 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2006)), as well as Illinois Commerce Commission Rule 411.100. Count III, entitled \u201cBreach of Contract Implied in Law/Fact,\u201d alleges that ComEd accepted payment for and impliedly agreed to provide plaintiffs and the purported class with \u201cadequate, efficient and reliable electric services,\u201d and failed to do so. Count IV( entitled \u201cInjunction,\u201d sought to enjoin ComEd \u201cfrom its practice of refusing to have in place infrastructure and planning, that, by design, cannot prevent controllable interruptions of power,\u201d and \u201ccannot permit ComEd to timely respond\u201d to a power interruption. Count y entitled \u201cIllinois Consumer Fraud Act,\u201d alleges that ComEd engaged in unfair business practices by \u201cpay[ing] its managers and employees bonuses or compensation to spend less on repair for the benefit of [ComEd\u2019s] Illinois customers.\u201d\nThe complaint\u2019s prayer for relief requests class-action certification for \u201c[a]ny and all persons and entities located in the State of Illinois that suffered damages as a result of electric power outages or interruptions for August 23, 2007, through the date of judgment.\u201d The complaint alleges that plaintiffs and purported class members suffered \u201cpersonal injuries], property damage and other financial damages, including loss of use of property, and costs of repair or replacement of property as a result of the sudden and dangerous power outages or interruptions.\u201d The complaint further alleges that plaintiffs \u201csustained at least the following damages as a result of ComEd\u2019s acts and conduct: spoiled food, water damage to walls, furniture, fixtures, appliances, furnace and water heaters, and medical and electrical equipment.\u201d As relief, the complaint seeks legal and injunctive relief, attorney fees and costs, and any other relief the circuit court finds proper. As part of the injunctive relief sought, the complaint seeks to \u201cenjoin[ ] ComEd and its agents, employees, and all persons acting in concert or cooperation with [ComEd] *** from its practice of refusing to have in place infrastructure and planning, that, by design, cannot prevent controllable interruptions of power,\u201d and \u201ccannot permit ComEd to timely respond to a power interruption.\u201d\nComEd filed a motion under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2006)) to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Relying on Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198 (1999), the trial court dismissed the complaint, with prejudice, concluding that the complaint failed to sufficiently state a cause of action. In Spagnolo, our Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint seeking a sweeping mandatory injunction to correct allegedly deplorable conditions at a school, finding that the \u201cplaintiffs allege merely that the defendants have violated \u2018common law duties,\u2019 without specifying what those duties are or what acts or omissions of the defendants breached those duties.\u201d Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d at 233. Further, the court found that the issue raised in the plaintiffs complaint was a nonjusticiable political question and the redress sought by the plaintiffs was appropriately addressed by the Illinois legislature. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d at 205. Likening the current case to Spagnolo, the trial court specifically found that the complaint in the case at bar sought relief \u201cfor systematic defects in the provision of the electrical services or in the repair of those services once an outage occurs,\u201d which the trial court determined were of \u201cthe type of broad-based allegations and claims that cannot survive as a matter of law.\u201d The trial court concluded that \u201cthe bottom line is that *** plaintiffs\u2019 allegations go to the way [ComEd] provides services and the adequacy of its response when those services fail,\u201d and that \u201cthe law [does not] provide relief for the kinds of claims that are stated\u201d in plaintiffs\u2019 complaint.\nPlaintiffs sought leave to file a fourth amended complaint to remove their allegations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, and to seek only a damages claim, which the trial court denied. Plaintiffs timely appeal the dismissal of their class-action complaint and the denial of their motion for leave to file a fourth amended class-action complaint. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nPlaintiff Sheffler is a resident of Glenview, Illinois, plaintiff Resnik of Wilmette, Illinois, and plaintiff Debra Sloan, who sues individually and on behalf of her son, Jason Sloan, of Des Plaines, Illinois. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that \u201con or about August 23, 2007, and thereafter, ComEd failed to provide, and timely restore power to the plaintiffs and other customers in Illinois including Cook County.\u201d The complaint further alleges that \u201cthe storm of August 2007 precipitated an interruption in excess of 30,000 ComEd customers, including plaintiffs and ComEd did not restore their power within 24 hours.\u201d The complaint seeks the appointment of plaintiffs as representatives of a statewide class of similarly situated ComEd customers.\nThe complaint contains additional allegations concerning the Sloan plaintiffs. Jason Sloan requires a ventilator to breathe and has life-support equipment at home, where he lives with his mother, Debra Sloan. The Sloan residence lost power during the August 23, 2007, storm. The complaint alleges that Debra Sloan telephoned a ComEd customer service representative for assistance and that she received \u201ccurt treatment\u201d on the telephone. As a result of the power outage, Debra connected Jason\u2019s ventilator to a \u201ctemporary generator,\u201d contained within their residence\u2019s basement. Shortly after connecting Jason\u2019s ventilator to the \u201ctemporary generator,\u201d the Sloan\u2019s basement flooded and Debra Sloan\u2019s back-up efforts to restore power to Jason\u2019s ventilator were unsuccessful. Unable to learn when her home\u2019s electric power would be restored, Debra moved her son to an undisclosed location that apparently had electrical power.\nThe Sloan residence appeared on a list known as the \u201cLife Support Registry\u201d (registry) that ComEd maintains under the Illinois Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 204 (West 2006)), due to the presence of life support equipment within the residence. Section 8 \u2014 204 of the Act requires \u201c[e]very public utility company which furnishes electricity to residential customers [to] *** maintain a registry of those individuals who are dependent on an electrically operated respirator, dialysis machine or any other electrically operated life-support equipment.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 204 (West 2006). The complaint alleges that ComEd refused to use the registry to assign the Sloan residence priority in restoring electrical power. Further, the complaint alleges that \u201cComEd rushed to restore power of certain VIPs,\u201d rather than give priority to those customers on the life-support equipment registry.\nAs noted, the trial court proceedings in the case at bar involved four filed complaints and one proposed fourth amended complaint. The procedural history leading to the operative third amended complaint and the proposed fourth amended complaint is as follows.\nOn August 28, 2007, five days after the August 23, 2007, storms, plaintiffs Sheffler and Resnik filed a putative class-action complaint against ComEd alleging a violation of the Act and breach of an \u201cimplied contract.\u201d Two weeks later, plaintiffs moved for and obtained leave to file an amended complaint.\nOn September 19, 2007, plaintiffs filed an \u201camended class action complaint.\u201d The amended complaint added the Sloan plaintiffs, repeated the original complaint\u2019s counts and added allegations concerning ComEd\u2019s life-support equipment registry. The amended complaint sought class-action certification for \u201c[a]ny and all persons registered on [the registry] from August 23, 2007, through the date of judgment,\u201d and sought injunctive relief with respect to an unspecified obligation concerning the life-support registry, and a declaratory judgment finding that ComEd should use the registry in assigning priority in restoring power following an outage.\nThe amended complaint alleged that the registry mandated that households appearing on the registry receive priority for power restoration following power outages. Attached to the amended complaint is a June 14, 2007, letter from ComEd addressed to Debra Sloan stating as follows: \u201cThe addition of your account to the Life Support Registry *** [d]oes not guarantee uninterrupted electrical services [and] does not provide priority restoration of your electric service when an interruption occurs.\u201d The amended complaint sought a temporary restraining order or alternatively a preliminary injunction restraining or directing ComEd:\n\u201cfrom refusing to respond on a priority or individual basis to restore electric power or to offer assistance to persons registered in their Life Support Registry; to give persons registered in their Life Support Registry priority in restoring power after an outage; to provide persons registered in their Life Support Registry regular and frequent updates and warning as to when it is anticipated that power will be restored, if at all; and/or to clearly and conspicuously inform persons registered in their Life Support Registry what assistance [ComEd] will provide and will not provide in the event of an outage for purposes of restoring electricity.\u201d\nIn opposition to plaintiffs\u2019 request for an injunction, ComEd submitted the affidavits of Timothy McGuire, vice president of construction and maintenance for ComEd, and Phyllis Batson, vice president of customer contact for ComEd. The affidavits asserted that the highest priority for restoration of electrical power following a power outage goes to critical institutions such as hospitals, police and fire departments, and urgent care centers. According to the affidavits, the following priority is given to municipal water pumping facilities, senior citizen facilities, and high-rise buildings. The affidavits asserted that the life-support equipment registry cannot mandate priority in power restoration as persons requiring the use of life-support equipment are distributed throughout ComEd\u2019s service territory.\nOn September 19, 2007, the trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 injunction request. The trial court found that the relief sought was a request for the trial court to assume the role of the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission or ICC). The trial court stated, \u201cI don\u2019t know how I would order ComEd to do that which you propose to do *** I mean, that\u2019s what the [Commission] does.\u201d\nComEd filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2006)). On November 8, 2007, after hearing argument from all parties, the trial court found that plaintiffs\u2019 allegations concerning the life-support equipment registry failed to state a cause of action and dismissed those claims with prejudice. The trial court permitted plaintiffs to include the registry-related allegations in a second amended complaint, but only to preserve those allegations for appellate review.\nThe trial court dismissed the remainder of plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint without prejudice, finding that plaintiffs had not set forth sufficient facts alleging a specific duty that ComEd breached and that plaintiffs were damaged by any such breach. The trial court granted plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint to correct any defects in their complaint.\nPlaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, again framed as a class action, on December 6, 2007, once more seeking class-action certification of a statewide class. In their second amended complaint, the plaintiffs added a new count claiming negligence, and realleged the counts claiming ComEd\u2019s violation of the Act, ComEd\u2019s breach of an implied contract, and the allegations concerning the life-support equipment registry.\nComEd then moved to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2006)). On June 16, 2008, the trial court granted ComEd\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiffs failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations to state a cause of action. The trial court again dismissed the registry-related counts, without leave to replead, but allowed plaintiffs leave to amend the remaining counts.\nOn August 4, 2008, plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint, again seeking class-action certification for a statewide class of ComEd customers who suffered damages as a result of electrical power outages or interruptions from August 23, 2007, through the date of judgment. As noted, plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint contains five counts. Count I asserts negligence, count II asserts violation of the Act, count III asserts breach of an implied contract, count IV seeks injunctive relief, and count V asserts violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2006)).\nOn August 5, 2008, plaintiffs filed a second motion for an emergency temporary restraining order. According to the motion, the Sloan plaintiffs lost power in the evening of August 4, 2008, and in the early morning of August 5, 2008. The plaintiffs sought an order to have the Sloan residence\u2019s power immediately restored. The trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order, finding that it had no authority to regulate ComEd.\nComEd then filed a combined section 2 \u2014 619.1 motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619.1 (West 2006)), seeking dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint under both section 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code. Section 2 \u2014 619.1 of the Code provides:\n\u201cMotions with respect to pleadings under Section 2 \u2014 615 [735 ILCS 5/2- \u2014 615], motions for involuntary dismissal or other relief under Section 2 \u2014 619 [735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619], and motions for summary judgment under Section 2 \u2014 1005 [735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005] may be filed together as a single motion in any combination. A combined motion, however, shall be in parts. Each part shall be limited to and shall specify that it is made under one of [the aforementioned sections]. Each part shall also clearly show the points or grounds relied upon under the Section upon which it is based.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619.1 (West 2006).\nIn its motion, ComEd argued that plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint, which was substantially similar to those already dismissed by the trial court. Further, ComEd argued that plaintiffs sought sweeping relief related to ComEd\u2019s operation, and that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of ComEd.\nOn December 16, 2008, after hearing argument from all parties, the trial court granted ComEd\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint in its entirety with prejudice, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2006)). The trial court determined:\n\u201cThere still would have to be some additional factual allegations that would show what actions [ComEd] took or did not take vis-avis these individual plaintiffs in order to establish their injury and that there would have to be additional allegations in addition to show that the injuries \u2014 what injuries \u2014 specific injuries these particular plaintiffs sustained.\n* * *\nBut apart from that *** it seems to the court that what is actually at issue here is that what this lawsuit is about and what the plaintiffs\u2019 theory of the case is that they are actually seeking relief based on systematic defects in the provision of the electrical services or repair of those services once an outage occurs. And in the court\u2019s view, these are the type of broad-based allegations and claims that can\u2019t survive as a matter of law *** I\u2019ve read the complaint, and I\u2019ve read it now several times in its prior forms, the allegations at their core are very much like the allegations in the Lewis E. v. Spagnolo case.\n* * *\nThe complaint is really looking for relief that whether it\u2019s characterized as damages relief or there is a count for injunctive and declaratory relief or an action under the Consumer Fraud Act, the bottom line is that the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations go to the way [ComEd] provides services and the adequacy of its response when those services fail for whatever multitude of reasons may exist. I don\u2019t think the law provides a relief for the kinds of claims stated, therefore, as I have indicated, I think the complaint fails as a matter of law.\u201d\nSince the trial court dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2006)), it never reached ComEd\u2019s contentions regarding dismissal under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2006)); specifically, the trial court never reached ComEd\u2019s contention that the Commission, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over plaintiffs\u2019 claims.\nAs noted, plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint for the fourth time solely to seek a damages claim. The trial court ordered briefing regarding whether plaintiffs should be afforded leave to amend. Plaintiffs offered their proposed fourth amended complaint on the day of oral argument pertaining to plaintiffs\u2019 motion for leave to amend their complaint. The proposed fourth amended complaint contained only one count alleging that ComEd violated section 16\u2014 125 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 125 (West 2006)). Addressing section 16 \u2014 125 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 125 (West 2006)), the trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint finding, \u201c[I]n looking at this particular provision (referring to 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 125 (West 2006)), it seems to me clear that what the legislature has done is provide a remedy for broad based power outages sought through the [Commission].\u201d\nThis timely appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nA motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2006)) is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Iseberg v. Gross, 366 Ill. App. 3d 857, 860 (2006). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the complaint, we regard all well-pled facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs. Iseberg, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 860. We construe the complaint liberally and dismiss only when it appears that plaintiffs cannot recover under any set of facts. Iseberg, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 861. For this reason, as a general rule, leave to amend is freely granted. Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 72 Ill. 2d 179 (1978). The standard of review from the granting of a section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss is de novo. Flournoy v. Ameritech, 351 Ill. App. 3d 583, 586 (2004), citing Krilich v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 334 Ill. App. 3d 563 (2002).\nThe determination of whether to grant a motion to amend pleadings rests within the discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court\u2019s decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Cangemi v. Advocate South Suburban Hospital, 364 Ill. App. 3d 446, 467 (2006).\n1. The Public Utility Act\u2019s Regulatory Scheme\nBefore proceeding to the parties\u2019 arguments on appeal, we summarize the regulatory scheme set forth by the Illinois Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2006)). ComEd, being a public utility is governed by the Act. 220 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105(a) (West 2006) (defining \u201cpublic utility\u201d). Section 1 \u2014 102 of the Act sets forth the Illinois legislature\u2019s \u201cFindings and Intent\u201d in enacting the Act. That section provides:\n\u201cThe General Assembly finds that the health, welfare and prosperity of all Illinois citizens require the provision of adequate, efficient, reliable, environmentally safe and least-cost public utility services at prices which accurately reflect the long-term cost of such services and which are equitable to all citizens. It is therefore declared to be the policy of the State that public utilities shall continue to be regulated effectively and comprehensively. It is further declared that the goals and objectives of such regulation shall be to ensure[:]\n(a) Efficiency:\n* * *\n(b) Environmental Quality:\n* * *\n(c) Reliability:\n* * *\n(d) Equity: the fair treatment of consumers and investors ***.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 102 (West 2006).\nThe Commission was statutorily created to exercise general supervision over all Illinois public utilities in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 220 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101 (West 2006); AlhambraGrantfork Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 358 Ill. App. 3d 818, 823 (2005) (Illinois Commerce Commission is a creation of the Illinois legislature and possesses the authority and power necessary to supervise all Illinois public utilities and to administer the regulatory laws under the Act). The Commission derives its power and authority solely from the statute creating it, and it may not, by its own acts, extend its jurisdiction. Peoples Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 142 Ill. App. 3d 917, 923 (1986), citing Regional Transportation Authority v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 118 Ill. App. 3d 685, 694 (1983); Ace Ambulance & Oxygen Service Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 17, 19 (1979). The Commission\u2019s jurisdiction must be found, if at all, in the Commission\u2019s power to regulate public utilities. Peoples Energy Corp., 142 Ill. App. 3d at 924.\nThe Act specifically provides that the Commission \u201cshall have general supervision of all public utilities\u201d including \u201cthe manner in which their plants, equipment and other property *** are managed, conducted and operated, not only with respect to the adequacy, security and accommodation afforded by their service but also with respect to their compliance with this Act and any other law, with the orders of the Commission and with the charter and franchise requirements.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 101 (West 2006). Further, authority to order improvements to a public utility\u2019s facilities is vested with the Commission in section 8 \u2014 503 of the Act. 220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 503 (West 2006).\nThe very purpose of the Act is to maintain control over the operation of utilities so as to prevent them from exacting unjust, unreasonable, and discriminatory rates. Bloom Township High School v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 309 Ill. App. 3d 163, 175 (1999). The theory behind the regulation of public utilities is the protection of the public and the assurance of adequate service while, at the same time, securing for the utility a fair opportunity to generate a reasonable return. Bloom Township High School, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 175, citing Village of Monsanto v. Touchette, 63 Ill. App. 2d 390, 400 (1965); see also Local 777 v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 45 Ill. 2d 527, 535 (1970) (\u201cBecause unrestrained competition prior to adoption of the Act had often resulted in the financial failure of many utilities, the Act adopted a policy of regulated monopoly to assure that utilities would be able to earn a reasonable rate of return on their investment and thus would be able to provide the required service\u201d). The Commission exists to maintain a balance between the rates charged by utilities and the services they perform. Bloom Township High School, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 175, citing Village of Apple River v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 18 Ill. 2d 518, 523 (1960).\nIn order to effectuate the above stated principles, the Act requires public utilities such as ComEd to file tariffs with the Commission. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 55 (2004), citing 220 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 102 (West 1994). A tariff is a public document setting forth services being offered; rates and charges with respect to services; and governing rules, regulations, and practices relating to those services. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 55 (2004), citing North River Insurance Co. v. Jones, 275 Ill. App. 3d 175, 185 (1995). A tariff is usually drafted by the regulated utility, but when duly filed with the Commission, it binds both the utility and the customer and governs their relationship. Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 55, citing Danisco Ingredients USA, Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 267 Kan. 760, 765, 986 P.2d 377, 381 (1999). Once the Commission approves a tariff, it \u201cis a law, not a contract, and has the force and effect of a statute.\u201d Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 55, citing Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. v. Sankey Brothers, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 3d 435, 439 (1978), aff\u2019d, 78 Ill. 2d 56 (1979).\nTariff provisions, such as ComEd\u2019s tariff, are usually referred to as liability limitations. Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 57, citing In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 247 (1994) (Miller, J., specially concurring); Danisco Ingredients USA, Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 267 Kan. 760, 768, 986 P.2d 377, 383 (1999). Liability limitations reflect the status of public utilities as regulated monopolies whose operations are subject to extensive restrictions; the requirements of uniform, nondiscriminatory rates; and the goal of universal service, achieved through the preservation of utility prices that virtually all customers can afford. Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 57, citing Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 249 (Miller, J., specially concurring). The underlying theory of liability limitations is that, because a public utility is strictly regulated, its liability should be defined and limited so that it may be able to provide service at reasonable rates. Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 57. A reasonable rate is in part dependent on a rule limiting liability. Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 57, citing Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 244-46; Danisco, 267 Kan. at 769, 986 P.2d at 384. \u201cThe goal is \u2018to secure reasonable and just rates for all without undue preference or advantage to any. Since that end is attainable only by adherence to the approved rate, based upon an authorized classification, that rate \u201crepresents the whole duty and the whole liability of the company.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 57, quoting Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252, 259, 72 L. Ed. 555, 565, 48 S. Ct. 234, 235 (1928), quoting Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Brothers & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 572, 65 L. Ed. 1094, 1097, 41 S. Ct. 584, 586 (1921).\n2. Civil Actions Against Illinois Public Utilities\nDespite the foregoing regulatory scheme generally vesting the Commission with oversight of Illinois public utilities and the limitations upon Illinois public utilities\u2019 liability, suits against public utilities may be pursued in the Illinois court system. Sections 9 \u2014 252 and 5 \u2014 201 of the Act define the Commission and the courts\u2019 jurisdiction over claims against Illinois public utilities.\nSection 9 \u2014 252 of the Act provides:\n\u201cWhen complaint is made to the Commission concerning any rate or other charge of any public utility and the Commission finds, after a hearing, that the public utility has charged an excessive or unjustly discriminatory amount for its product, commodity or service, the Commission may order that the public utility make due reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest at the legal rate from the date of payment of such excessive or unjustly discriminatory amount.\n* * *\nAll complaints for the recovery of damages shall be filed with the Commission within 2 years from the time the produce, commodity or service as to which complaint is made was furnished or performed, and a petition for the enforcement of an order of the Commission for the payment of money shall be filed in the proper court within one year from the date of the order, except that if an appeal is taken from the order of the Commission, the time from the taking of the appeal until its final adjudication shall be excluded in computing the one year allowed for filing the complaint to enforce such order.\nThe remedy provided in this section shall be cumulative, and in addition to any other remedy or remedies in this Act provided in case of failure of a public utility to obey a rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 252 (West 2006).\nThis section has been construed to vest the Commission with exclusive jurisdiction over claims that rates are excessive or unjustly discriminatory. Village of Deerfield v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 399 Ill. App. 3d 84 (2009), citing Village of Roselle v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1104 (2006); Village of Evergreen Park v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 810, 813 (1998).\nConversely, section 5 \u2014 201 of the Act places within the jurisdiction of the circuit court matters not pertaining to excessive or unjustly discriminatory rates, over which the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction. Village of Deerfield, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 87, citing Village of Roselle, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1109. Section 5 \u2014 201 of the Act states:\n\u201cIn case any public utility shall do, cause to be done or permit to be done any act, matter or thing prohibited, forbidden or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter or thing required to be done either by any provisions of this Act or any rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission, issued under authority of this Act, the public utility shall be liable to the persons or corporations affected thereby for all loss, damages or injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom, and if the court shall find that the act or omission was wilful, the court may in addition to the actual damages, award damages for the sake of example and by the way of punishment. An action to recover for such loss, damage or injury may be brought in the circuit court by any person or corporation.\nIn every case of a recovery of damages by any person or corporation under the provisions of this Section, the plaintiff shall he entitled to a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee to be fixed by the court, which fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 201 (West 2006).\nThe foregoing provisions establish the general principle that the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction is nonexclusive. Wernikoff v. RCN Telecom Services of Illinois, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 89, 94 (2003). In accordance with section 9 \u2014 252 of the Act, the Commission has original jurisdiction over complaints of excessive rates or overcharges by public utilities; and courts have jurisdiction over those matters only on administrative review. Village of Evergreen Park v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 810, 813 (1998), citing Chicago ex rel. Thrasher v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 159 Ill. App. 3d 1076 (1987); Citizens Utilities Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 157 Ill. App. 3d 201 (1987); Gowdey v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 37 Ill. App. 3d 140 (1976). \u201c \u2018The evident intent and purpose of the legislature in providing a method by which reparation may be recovered and in requiring that an application therefor shall be first made to the commission precludes an action at law for such reparation until the commission has heard a claim therefor.\u2019 \u201d Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 813, quoting Terminal R.R. Ass\u2019n v. Public Utilities Comm\u2019n, 304 Ill. 312, 317 (1922).\nIn Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d 810 (1998), the plaintiff municipality filed a lawsuit against ComEd seeking monetary and equitable relief alleging that ComEd had wrongfully collected money for lighting equipment and services that were not provided. Specifically, the plaintiff municipality alleged that ComEd had charged it for electricity provided to street lights that no longer existed, and the plaintiff municipality sought reimbursement of the monies paid to ComEd for those charges. Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 812. Pursuant to ComEd\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion (see 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2006)), the trial court dismissed the plaintiff municipality\u2019s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the Commission had exclusive original jurisdiction over claims for refunds or overcharges. On appeal, the plaintiff municipality argued that its complaint alleged that ComEd breached its contract with the plaintiff municipality for charging for services not provided in ComEd\u2019s tariff, and that the breach of contract claim was properly filed in the circuit court. In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff municipality\u2019s complaint, this court found that the \u201cfact that the plaintiff labels its action a breach of contract action is not dispositive nor does it transform plaintiff\u2019s action into a civil action for damages.\u201d Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 816-17. The essence of the plaintiff municipality\u2019s claim was that ComEd \u201ccharged too much for the service it provided,\u201d and that claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 818.\nAs noted, contrary to section 9 \u2014 252 of the Act, section 5 \u2014 201 of the Act places within the jurisdiction of the circuit court matters not pertaining to excessive or unjustly discriminatory rates, over which the Commission has original jurisdiction. Village of Roselle, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1109.\nWith this framework defining the jurisdiction of the Commission over Illinois public utilities in mind, we proceed to the issues presented by this appeal.\n3. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Dismissing Plaintiffs\u2019 Complaint\nThe allegations contained in and the relief sought by plaintiffs\u2019 complaint can be divided into two categories. A major portion of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint makes allegations concerning the inadequacy of ComEd\u2019s infrastructure and ComEd\u2019s responses to power outages when they occur and requests injunctive relief directing ComEd\u2019s conduct in the future. The remainder of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that plaintiffs were damaged by ComEd\u2019s conduct and seeks legal redress in the form of money damages. We first address the propriety of the trial court\u2019s order dismissing those portions of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint seeking injunctive relief.\na. Injunctive Relief\nAs noted, plaintiffs third amended complaint sought to enjoin ComEd \u201cfrom its practice of refusing to have in place infrastructure and planning, that, by design, cannot prevent controllable interruptions of power,\u201d and \u201ccannot permit ComEd to timely respond\u201d to a power interruption.\nThe complaint\u2019s most specific allegations concerning injunctive relief pertain to the Sloan plaintiffs. As noted, Jason Sloan, who lives with his mother, Debra Sloan, requires a ventilator to breathe. The Sloan residence lost power during the August 23, 2007, storm. The complaint alleges that Debra Sloan attempted to receive assistance from a ComEd customer service representative and that she received \u201ccurt treatment\u201d on the phone. As a result of the power outage, Debra connected Jason\u2019s ventilator to a \u201ctemporary generator,\u201d contained in their residence\u2019s basement; however, the back-up efforts to supply power to Jason\u2019s ventilator failed after the Sloan residence\u2019s basement flooded. Unable to learn when her home\u2019s electric power would be restored, Debra moved her son to an undisclosed location that apparently had electrical power.\nAs noted, the Sloan residence appeared on the life-support equipment registry that ComEd maintains under section 8 \u2014 204 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 204 (West 2006)), due to the presence of life-support equipment within the residence. Section 8 \u2014 204 of the Act requires \u201c[ejvery public utility company which furnishes electricity to residential customers [to] *** maintain a registry of those individuals who are dependent on an electrically operated respirator, dialysis machine or any other electrically operated life-support equipment.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 204 (West 2006). The complaint alleges that ComEd refused to use the registry to assign the Sloan residence priority in restoring electrical power, and further alleges that \u201cComEd rushed to restore power of certain VIPs,\u201d rather than give priority to those customers on the life-support equipment registry. As noted, plaintiffs twice sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.\nThe trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 injunction requests, and upon ComEd\u2019s motion to dismiss, dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 claims pertaining to ComEd\u2019s life-support equipment registry with prejudice. The trial court found that the relief sought was a request for the trial court to assume the role of the Commission as the regulator of public utilities.\nOn appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court\u2019s reasoning in dismissing their claims for injunctive relief was faulty. Plaintiffs concede that a complaint seeking an adjudication of ComEd\u2019s level of service and response to an outage when one occurs would properly lie with the Commission. However, plaintiffs contend that the complaint does not seek an \u201cadjudication of the proper level of [ComEd\u2019s] service.\u201d We do not find plaintiffs\u2019 argument persuasive.\nThe third amended complaint in the case at bar clearly seeks an adjudication of ComEd\u2019s level of service and its response to a power outage when an outage occurs. The complaint seeks an order enjoining ComEd \u201cfrom its practice of refusing to have in place infrastructure and planning\u201d that cannot permit ComEd to properly prevent \u201ccontrollable\u201d interruptions of power and cannot permit ComEd to timely respond to a power interruption when an interruption occurs. Further, the complaint seeks an order directing ComEd to use the life-support equipment registry in assigning priority for power restoration when an outage occurs. Such determinations are properly made by the Commission, not by the courts.\nAs noted, the Act provides that the Commission \u201cshall have general supervision of all public utilities\u201d including \u201cthe manner in which their plants, equipment and other property *** are managed, conducted and operated, not only with respect to the adequacy, security and accommodation afforded by their service but also with respect to their compliance with this Act and any other law, with the orders of the Commission and with the charter and franchise requirements.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 101 (West 2006). Further, authority to order improvements to a public utility\u2019s facilities is vested with the Commission in section 8 \u2014 503 of the Act. 220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 503 (West 2006).\nMoreover, although the Act requires \u201c[e]very public utility company which furnishes electricity to residential customers [to] *** maintain a registry of those individuals who are dependent on an electrically operated respirator, dialysis machine or any other electrically operated life-support equipment\u201d (220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 204 (West 2006)), the Act does not dictate that ComEd use the registry to assign priority to such households in its power restoration efforts or how to implement such power restoration efforts.\nAs noted, plaintiffs alleged that Debra Sloan received \u201ccurt\u201d treatment on the telephone from a ComEd service representative when she attempted to receive assistance from ComEd and that ComEd \u201crushed to restore\u201d the power of certain \u201cVIPs\u201d rather than assign priority to those customers who are listed on the life-support equipment registry. Although plaintiffs\u2019 allegations concerning ComEd\u2019s reaction to the Sloan plaintiffs\u2019 request for assistance are shocking, and if true, deplorable, the determination of whether ComEd should and indeed whether it is practically feasible for ComEd to assign priority of power restoration to those listed on the life-support equipment registry is properly addressed by the Commission, not the trial court.\nEven if the trial court was a proper forum for the plaintiffs\u2019 claims seeking injunctive relief directing ComEd to use the life-support equipment registry in assigning priority in restoring power after an outage, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 complaint under Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198 (1999). In Spagnolo, our Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a request for a sweeping mandatory injunction to correct allegedly deplorable conditions at a school because the allegations were based on vague and unspecified duties and sought protection for injuries that had not occurred and may never occur. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d at 235. In affirming the dismissal, the court found that the \u201cplaintiffs allege merely that the defendants have violated \u2018common law duties,\u2019 without specifying what those duties are or what acts or omissions of the defendants breached those duties.\u201d Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d at 233. Furthermore, the court ruled it could not issue the injunction the plaintiffs sought since the plaintiffs \u201cha[d] not provided any basis for us to grant them relief for injuries which have not occurred, and which may never occur.\u201d Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d at 235.\nPlaintiffs here similarly seek injunctive relief that seeks to prevent some unspecified injuries or damages to them that have not occurred and which may never occur. See Getter v. Brownstone Condominium Ass\u2019n, 82 Ill. App. 3d 334, 337 (1980) (recognizing the impossibility of enjoining future negligence).\nBased upon the foregoing, the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claims for injunctive relief, including those claims pertaining to the life-support equipment registry with prejudice.\nb. Legal Relief\nAs noted, the remainder of plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint alleges that plaintiffs were damaged by ComEd\u2019s conduct and seeks legal redress in the form of money damages.\nThe third amended complaint alleges that plaintiffs \u201csustained at least the following damages as a result of ComEd\u2019s acts and conduct: spoiled food, water damage to walls, furniture, fixtures, appliances, furnace and water heaters, and medical and electrical equipment.\u201d\nThe initial question we must address is whether the relief plaintiffs seek implicates rates. This is because the Commission has \u201cexclusive jurisdiction over complaints of excessive rates or overcharges by public utilities! ] and courts have jurisdiction over those matters only on administrative review.\u201d Village of Evergreen Park v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 810, 813 (1998); City of Chicago ex rel. Thrasher v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 159 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1079-80 (1987).\nAs noted, because the trial court dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2006)), it never reached ComEd\u2019s contentions under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2006)). Plaintiffs\u2019 argue that since the trial court never ruled on these contentions, it would be error for this court to do so. However, as a reviewing court we may uphold a trial court\u2019s dismissal on any basis found in the record regardless of the propriety of the trial court\u2019s reasoning. Village of Roselle v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1110 (2006), citing People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 191 (2004); Bell v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Ill. 2d 135, 148 (1985); Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Safway Steel Products, Inc., 355 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11 n.7 (2004).\nSection 2 \u2014 619(a)(1) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(1) (West 2006)) specifically allows for dismissal where the trial court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. Such a motion admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint for purposes of the motion but interposes an affirmative defense, in this instance the court\u2019s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as barring the lawsuit from going forward. Cain v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 26 Ill. App. 3d 574 (1975). A motion to dismiss by reason of the court\u2019s lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any stage of a proceeding. Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 99 Ill. App. 3d 462 (1981).\nAs a result, we must determine whether plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint pertains to rates. In determining whether an action falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission, courts have consistently focused on the nature of the relief sought rather than the basis for seeking relief. Flourney v. Ameritech, 351 Ill. App. 3d 583, 585 (2004), citing Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d 810; Thrasher, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1076. If the plaintiffs action is for reparations, the Commission has jurisdiction. However, if the action is for civil damages, then the trial court may hear the case. Flourney, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 585, citing Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d 810; Thrasher, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1076.\nA claim is for reparations when the essence of the claim is that a utility has charged too much for a service. Flourney, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 585, citing Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d 810; Thrasher, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1076. In contrast, a claim is for civil damages when the essence of the claim is not that the utility has excessively charged, but rather that the utility has done something else to wrong the plaintiff. Flourney, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 585, citing Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d 810; Thrasher, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1076.\nThe term \u201crate\u201d is defined by the Act to include: \u201cevery individual or joint rate, fare, toll, charge, rental or other compensation of any public utility *** and any rule, regulation, charge, practice or contract relating thereto.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 116 (West 2006). The Commission\u2019s jurisdiction has been interpreted broadly since section 9 \u2014 252 refers to rates or \u201cother charge of any public utility\u201d (220 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 252 (West 2006)). Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 813, citing Sutherland v. Illinois Bell, 254 Ill. App. 3d 983 (1993); Klopp v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 671 (1977); Malloy v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 12 Ill. App. 3d 483 (1973).\nWe find that plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pertains to rates because the third amended complaint concerns claims that ComEd provided inadequate or unreliable electrical services to plaintiffs. In essence, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that ComEd\u2019s level of service and restoration efforts following a power outage are substandard. Specifically, the complaint alleges that \u201con or about August 23, 2007, and thereafter, ComEd failed to provide, and timely restore power to the plaintiffs and other customers in Illinois including Cook County.\u201d The complaint further alleges that ComEd failed to implement an \u201cadequate manpower planning process\u201d to effectively restore electric power to its customers.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 claims directly relate to the Commission\u2019s rate-setting functions for electrical power services. Fundamentally, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that ComEd should provide its customers a greater level of service. These claims raise the regulatory question of how ComEd should recover the costs of raising the level of service it provides. The questions of how ComEd should effectuate an improvement in service and whether ComEd\u2019s customers should pay more for the electrical services provided by ComEd fall squarely within the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction over rates and a utility\u2019s practices and contracts related to rates. See Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 813 (Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over rate reparation claims); 220 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 116 (West 2006) (defining \u201crates\u201d broadly to include practices and contracts relating to rates).\nFurther, ComEd\u2019s filed tariff specifically states that when \u201clarger, more, or different\u201d services or facilities are requested, the Commission must determine whether the improvements would be \u201creasonably and technically feasible\u201d without having a significant adverse impact on the reliability and efficiency of ComEd\u2019s overall system. Ill. Com. Comm\u2019n No. 10, Orig. Sheet No. 20.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 prayer for relief pertaining to damages is predicated on allegations that ComEd is not providing adequate service under the Act. If allowed to proceed in the trial court, these claims would place the trial court in the position of assessing what constitutes adequate service, and whether ComEd has fulfilled its responsibility of providing adequate services. That type of determination is the core of the Commission\u2019s regulatory function and is within its jurisdiction pertaining to \u201crates.\u201d\nWe also find that plaintiffs\u2019 claims for damages cannot proceed in the courts by our Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s holding in In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233 (1994). Illinois Bell Switching Station arose after a telephone switching station caught fire, allegedly due to the negligent or willful failure of the defendant telephone utility to take adequate fire-prevention measures. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 236. The fire left the plaintiffs without telephone services for approximately a month. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 236. Following the fire, the plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to recover for the damages they incurred from their loss of telephone services. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 236.\nThe plaintiffs\u2019 complaint in Illinois Bell Switching Station alleged violations of the Act (220 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1992)) and sought a declaratory judgment that a provision in the defendant telephone utility\u2019s tariff did not bar their claims. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant telephone utility violated sections 8 \u2014 101 and 8 \u2014 401 of the Act, as well as several Commission rules. The defendant telephone utility argued that its filed tariff defined the limits of its liability for interruptions in service.\nIn Illinois Bell Switching Station, like the instant case, the plaintiffs sought to bring action against the defendant utility under section 5 \u2014 201 of the Act. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 238-39. Section 5 \u2014 201 of the Act in effect at the time of Illinois Bell Switching Station, which is identical to the version currently in effect, provided as follows:\n\u201c \u2018In case any public utility shall do, cause to be done or permit to be done any act, matter or thing prohibited, forbidden or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter or thing required to be done either by any provisions of this Act or any rule, regulation, order or decision of the [Illinois Commerce] Commission, issued under authority of this Act, the public utility shall be liable to the persons or corporations affected thereby for all loss, damages or injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom, and if the court shall find that the act or omission was wilful, the court may in addition to the actual damages, award damages for the sake of example and by the way of punishment.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 239, quoting 220 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 201 (West 1992).\nReiterating its holding in Barthel v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 74 Ill. 2d 213 (1978), our Illinois Supreme Court first rejected the plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the word \u201call\u201d in section 5 \u2014 201 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 201 (West 1992)) meant any \u201closs, damage or injury whatsoever that can be traced to a utility\u2019s negligent or wilful violation of the Act or Commission rules.\u201d Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 239, citing Barthel v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 74 Ill. 2d 213 (1978). In Barthel, the plaintiffs sued for personal injuries and wrongful death resulting from a collision between a car and one of the defendant\u2019s freight trains. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 239, citing Barthel, 74 Ill. 2d 213. The Barthel plaintiffs sued under section 5 \u2014 201 (then section 73) of the Act, alleging violations by the defendant of various regulations relating to the safety of railroad crossings. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 239, citing Barthel, 74 Ill. 2d 213. The Barthel plaintiffs argued that when the Illinois legislature stated that a utility violating the Act \u201cshall be liable\u201d for \u201call loss, damages or injury,\u201d the utility\u2019s liability was conclusively demonstrated. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 239-40, citing Barthel, 74 Ill. 2d 213. In Barthel, the plaintiffs sought the abrogation of the common law defense of contributory negligence. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 240, citing Barthel, 74 Ill. 2d 213.\nIn rejecting the plaintiffs\u2019 argument, the Barthel court noted that the Act is in derogation of the common law, and therefore the tort principles limiting the plaintiffs\u2019 claims under the Act would not be deemed abrogated unless \u201cit appears that the intent of the statute\u201d is to do so. Barthel, 74 Ill. 2d at 221. Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed in favor of persons sought to be subjected to their operation. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 240. The courts will read nothing into such statutes by intendment or implication. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 240, citing Barthel, 74 Ill. 2d at 220. The Barthel court held that the common law defense of contributory negligence was available, despite the Act\u2019s provision of liability for \u201call *** damages\u201d resulting from a violation of the Act. Barthel, 74 Ill. 2d at 220.\nHaving found that the Illinois legislature did not provide for limitless recovery under section 5 \u2014 201 of the Act, the court in Illinois Bell Switching Station went on to consider whether the defendant telephone utility\u2019s tariff barred the plaintiffs\u2019 lawsuit. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 241.\nThe tariff on file with the Commission at the time of the fire in Illinois Bell Switching Station listed among the defendant telephone utility\u2019s general \u201cregulations\u201d a service interruption liability exclusion. That exclusion provided:\n\u201c \u2018The liability of the Company for damages arising out of mistakes, omissions, interruptions, delays, errors or defects in transmission occurring in the course of furnishing service *** shall in no event exceed an amount equivalent to the proportionate charge to the customer for the period of service during which such mistake, omission, interruption, delay, error or defect in transmission occurs. No other liability shall in any case attach to the Company.\u2019 \u201d Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 242, citing Illinois Bell Telephone Company Tariff, Ill. Com. Comm\u2019n, No. 5, pt. 1, \u00a75, par. 3.1.\nThe Illinois Bell Switching Station plaintiffs argued that the tariff should not bar their claims because the tariff was against public policy and conflicted with provisions of the Act. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 242-43.\nIn holding that the tariff controlled in that case, our Illinois Supreme Court found no duty on which to base the plaintiffs\u2019 claims. The court initially noted that the defendant telephone utility was nowhere charged with the duty to provide completely uninterrupted service. Rather, its duty was to provide adequate, efficient, and reliable service, which is not tantamount to infallible service. Temporary disruptions may occur without reducing the defendant telephone utility\u2019s service to a level less than adequate, efficient, or reliable. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 243. Further, the court held that the exculpatory language in the telephone utility\u2019s tariff properly limited claims from disruption of service to a rebate of the costs for the missed service and concluded that the tariffs provision, which limited Bell\u2019s liability in the event of a service disruption, was not contrary to the Act. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 243-44.\nTurning to the facts of the instant case, at the time of the August 2007 storms, ComEd\u2019s tariff, on file with the Commission, provided in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe Company shall not be responsible in damages for any failure to supply electricity, or for interruption, or reversal of the supply, if such failure, interruption, or reversal is without willful default or negligence on its part, not for interruptions, by under frequency relays or otherwise, to preserve the integrity of the Company\u2019s system or interconnected systems.\nThe Customer will be entitled to a reduction in charges for service equal to the Monthly Customer Charge for any billing month in which service to the customer is interrupted for a period of 12 consecutive hours or more due to any of the following conditions: (i) Company equipment malfunction not caused by weather; (ii) Commonwealth Edison employee or its contractor error; (iii) accident involving Commonwealth Edison employee or its contractor; (iv) damage to company equipment caused by Commonwealth Edison employee or its contractor; or (v) overloaded Company distribution equipment not caused by Customer negligence. If the duration of any service interruption resulting from any of the causes referred to in items (i) through (v) is equal to or exceeds 24 consecutive hours, or if there is more than one such service interrupted of Monthly Customer Charge for such billing month multiplied by the number of increments of 12 consecutive hours of interruption in excess of the first 12 consecutive hours.\u201d Ill. Com. Comm\u2019n No. 4, 10th Revised Sheet No. 56.\nLike Illinois Bell Switching Station, the plaintiffs\u2019 claims in the instant case are barred by ComEd\u2019s tariff. This result is well rooted in Illinois law. ComEd\u2019s tariff is required by the Act and plays an integral role in allowing ComEd to meet the expectations of the Illinois legislature. See Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d at 244. ComEd is required to file a tariff in order to meet the legislature\u2019s dictate that it provide cost-effective service. ComEd has done so, and the Illinois legislature has approved the limitation of liability applicable to this case.\nBased upon the foregoing, the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 complaint in its entirety.\n4. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion for\nLeave to Amend\nWe finally come to the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for leave to amend their complaint for a fourth time. As noted, plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to solely seek a damages claim. The trial court ordered briefing regarding whether plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend. Plaintiffs offered their proposed fourth amended complaint on the day of oral argument pertaining to plaintiffs\u2019 motion for leave to amend. The proposed amended complaint contained only one count alleging that ComEd violated section 16 \u2014 125 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 125 (West 2006)). Addressing section 16 \u2014 125 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 125 (West 2006)), the trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion for leave to file an amended complaint finding, \u201c[I]n looking at this particular provision (referring to 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 125 (West 2006)), it seems to me clear that what the legislature has done is provide a remedy for broad based power outages sought through the [Commission].\u201d\nWhether to grant a motion to amend pleadings rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court\u2019s decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Cangemi v. Advocate South Suburban Hospital, 364 Ill. App. 3d 446, 467 (2006), citing Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 467 (1992). The relevant factors to be considered in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion are:\n\u201c \u2018(1) whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; (2) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment is timely; and (4) whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified.\u2019 \u201d Cangemi, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 467, citing Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 273 (1992), citing Kupianen v. Graham, 107 Ill. App. 3d 373, 377 (1982).\nA proposed amendment must meet all four Loyola Academy factors; however, \u201c \u2018if [a] proposed amendment does not state a cognizable claim, and thus, fails the first factor, courts of review will often not proceed with further analysis.\u2019 \u201d Cangemi, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 467, quoting Hayes Mechanical, Inc. v. First Industrial, L.P., 351 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (2004).\nIn the case at bar, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for leave to amend for the fourth time because the proposed amended complaint fails to meet the first of the Loyola Academy factors. As noted, section 16 \u2014 125 of the Act provides, in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) To assure the reliable delivery of electricity to all customers in this State *** the Commission shall *** adopt rules and regulations for assessing and assuring the reliability of the transmission and distribution systems and facilities that are under the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction.\n(b) These rules and regulations shall require each electric utility *** subject to the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction *** to adopt and implement procedures for restoring transmission and distribution services to customers after transmission or distribution outages\n* * *\n(e) In the event that more than 30,000 customers of an electric utility are subjected to a continuous power interruption of 4 hours or more *** the utility shall be responsible for compensating customers affected by that interruption *** for all actual damages, which shall not include consequential damages, suffered as a result of the power interruption. *** A waiver of the requirements of this subsection may be granted by the Commission in instances in which the utility can show that the power interruption was a result of any one or more of the following causes:\n(1) Unpreventable damage due to weather events or conditions.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 125 (West 2006).\nOur review of section 16 \u2014 125 of the Act leads us to the conclusion that the legislature intended for the Commission to have jurisdiction over the damages remedies under the section. 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 \u25a0 125 (West 2006). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). Statutes should be interpreted as a whole, meaning different sections of the same statute should be considered in reference to one another so that they are given harmonious effect. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504. One section of a statute should not be interpreted in a way that renders another section of the same statute irrelevant. Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 185-86 (2006). If the statute\u2019s plain meaning is ambiguous, then courts may examine external sources, such as the legislative history or the statute\u2019s administrative regulations. People ex rel. Department of Public Aid v. Smith, 212 Ill. 2d 389, 400 (2004); Lauer v. American Family Life Insurance Co., 199 Ill. 2d 384, 388 (2002).\nSection 16 \u2014 125(e) provides a series of specific circumstances under which, in the event of a single power interruption that affects more than 30,000 customers, an affected customer that lost power may be entitled to actual damages, unless the outage was caused by certain types of factors, including unpreventable damage due to weather. According to section 16 \u2014 125(e), the Commission can grant a waiver of the damages remedy to a public utility if such factors are present. 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 125(e) (West 2006).\nSection 16 \u2014 125(h), in turn, vests jurisdiction in the Commission for actions to pursue remedies under section 16 \u2014 125(e), and directs that complaints be filed with the Commission under section 10 \u2014 109 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 109 (West 2006)). Section 16 \u2014 125(h) currently reads:\n\u201c(h) Remedies provided for under this Section may be sought exclusively through the [Commission] as provided under Section 10 \u2014 109 of this Act.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 125(h) (West 2006).\nBased upon the foregoing, the Commission has jurisdiction over the damages remedy provided for by section 16 \u2014 125 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 125 (West 2006)), and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion to amend their complaint for the fourth time to seek a damages claim under section 16 \u2014 125(e) of the Act.\n5. Village of Deerfield v. Commonwealth Edison Co.\nSubsequent to the parties\u2019 filing of their briefs to this court, the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court decided the case of Village of Deerfield v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 399 Ill. App. 3d 84 (2009). In that case, the Village of Deerfield filed a complaint containing three counts against ComEd. Count I of the village\u2019s complaint, entitled \u201cBreach of Contract,\u201d alleged that chronic electrical outages occurred within the village as a result of various breaches of ComEd\u2019s duties under a \u201cFranchise Agreement.\u201d Count II of the village\u2019s complaint, entitled \u201cCivil Damages for Violation of Public Utilities Act,\u201d alleged that ComEd violated several of its duties under the Act. Count III of the village\u2019s complaint sought class-action certification for all customers located within the village who suffered damages such as \u201cspoiled food, purchase of electric generators to deal with [ComEd\u2019s] unreliable service, property damage, temporary housing, [and] extra municipal and policing services.\u201d The trial court dismissed the village\u2019s complaint with prejudice determining that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over the village\u2019s claims.\nOn appeal, the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and remanded to the trial court finding that the village\u2019s complaint did not allege excessive or discriminatory rates, but alleged deficient performance by ComEd, which the village attacked through a number of theories, i.e., contract, tort, violation of the Act. Village of Deerfield, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 91. However, the court determined that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, upon remand the trial court should stay the trial proceedings and refer the controversy to the Commission. Village of Deerfield, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 94-95 (the doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that a court, despite having subject matter jurisdiction over a matter, should, in certain circumstances, stay a judicial proceeding pending referral of a controversy, or some portion of it, to an administrative agency have expertise in the area; such circumstances are when an agency possesses specialized expertise that would aid in the resolution of a controversy or when a need exists for uniform administrative standards).\nWe decline to follow the Second District\u2019s analysis reversing and remanding to the trial court to stay the proceedings pending referral to the Commission under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. We do so because we have already found that the complaint in the instant case implicates rates, which lies within the jurisdiction of the Commission. The complaint in the case at bar seeks relief that intimately impacts the legislature\u2019s rate-setting function. As noted, in accordance with section 9 \u2014 252 of the Act, the Commission has original jurisdiction over complaints of excessive rates or overcharges by public utilities, and courts have jurisdiction over those matters only on administrative review. Village of Evergreen Park, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 813. The plaintiffs in the case at bar should file a complaint with the Commission as proscribed by the Act if they choose to do so. If plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the result reached in the Commission, they then can file for administrative review in accordance with this state\u2019s administrative review laws.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL, EJ., and McBRIDE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Larry D. Drury and lian Chorowsky, both of Larry D. Drury, Ltd., and John H. Alexander, of John H. Alexander & Associates, LLC, both of Chicago, for appellants.", "John J. Hamill, Erinn L. Wehrman, and Sean C. Herring, all of Jenner & Block, LLP of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FRANCES SHEFFLER et al., Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20140849\nOpinion filed February 26, 2010.\nLarry D. Drury and lian Chorowsky, both of Larry D. Drury, Ltd., and John H. Alexander, of John H. Alexander & Associates, LLC, both of Chicago, for appellants.\nJohn J. Hamill, Erinn L. Wehrman, and Sean C. Herring, all of Jenner & Block, LLP of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0051-01", "first_page_order": 67, "last_page_order": 93 }