{ "id": 4299795, "name": "CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD T. BERTUCCI, LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellants (Lourdes Rodriguez, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "Continental Casualty Co. v. Donald T. Bertucci, Ltd.", "decision_date": "2010-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20140502", "first_page": "775", "last_page": "790", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 775" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" }, { "page": "748" }, { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083920 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" }, { "page": "157" }, { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "905 N.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908", "parenthetical": "all the provisions of a contract, rather than its isolated parts, should be read together to interpret the parties' intent" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283782 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749", "parenthetical": "all the provisions of a contract, rather than its isolated parts, should be read together to interpret the parties' intent" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1212" }, { "page": "1212" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "888 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277921 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" }, { "page": "756" }, { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62-63", "parenthetical": "when an exclusionary clause is relied upon to deny coverage, it must be clear and free from doubt, and construed liberally in favor of the insured and strongly against the insurer" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159528 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "when an exclusionary clause is relied upon to deny coverage, it must be clear and free from doubt, and construed liberally in favor of the insured and strongly against the insurer" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "943 S.W.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11916485 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "indicating a cause of action for legal malpractice arises out of an attorney's bad legal advice or improper representation of a client" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/943/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "839 F.2d 979", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10546737 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "985" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/839/0979-01" ] }, { "cite": "792 N.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Mass. App. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass. App. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 65658 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" }, { "page": "646" }, { "page": "646-47" }, { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass-app-ct/58/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 F.3d 512", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 219691 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515", "parenthetical": "concluding professional services are \"activities that distinguish a particular occupation from other occupations - as evidenced by the need for specialized learning or training - and from the ordinary activities of life and business\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/142/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Neb. 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5226113 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13", "parenthetical": "indicating the \"widely accepted\" standard when determining whether a particular act is a professional service is to look to the act itself, not the title or character of the party performing it" }, { "page": "872", "parenthetical": "indicating the \"widely accepted\" standard when determining whether a particular act is a professional service is to look to the act itself, not the title or character of the party performing it" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/183/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "982 S.W.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11784889 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" }, { "page": "476-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/982/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 F. Supp. 2d 505", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9241200 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512-13", "parenthetical": "where real estate closing documents misrepresented amount of attorney fees to be paid to law firm, characterizing the firm's fee-setting and billing practices as legal work or advice would not conceal true nature of claim, court found no coverage" }, { "page": "510-11" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "512" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/316/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "923 F. Supp. 681", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7788757 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683-84", "parenthetical": "where attorney allegedly failed to give client correct percentage of settlement, court disregarded assorted legal theories pled by client, focused on nature of claim, which was retention of excessive legal fees, and found claim was not covered" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/923/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Idaho 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 11924095 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832" }, { "page": "809" }, { "page": "832" }, { "page": "809" }, { "page": "832" }, { "page": "809" }, { "page": "833" }, { "page": "810" }, { "page": "833" }, { "page": "810" }, { "page": "833" }, { "page": "810" }, { "page": "833-34" }, { "page": "810-11" }, { "page": "832" }, { "page": "809" }, { "page": "832" }, { "page": "809" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/127/0830-01" ] }, { "cite": "851 N.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" }, { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 997", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263530 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1001" }, { "page": "1001" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0997-01" ] }, { "cite": "865 N.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398-99" }, { "page": "398-99", "parenthetical": "in order to construe intent at the time of contracting, a court reads the policy as a whole, giving effect to every provision, and taking into account the type of insurance, the nature of the risks undertaken, and the overall purpose of the policy" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4270070 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151-52" }, { "page": "151-52" }, { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "163" }, { "page": "163" }, { "page": "163" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Cal. App. 4th 1612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 4790766 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1615" }, { "page": "1618" }, { "page": "1618" }, { "page": "1617-18" }, { "page": "1619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/47/1612-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 992", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3739893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "former client entitled to prejudgment interest on settlement proceeds" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159564 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "former client entitled to prejudgment interest on settlement proceeds" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "lawyer suspended one year for failure to report his unprivileged knowledge of an attorney's conversion of client's settlement funds" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555467 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "lawyer suspended one year for failure to report his unprivileged knowledge of an attorney's conversion of client's settlement funds" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "904 N.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo" }, { "page": "75-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4280208 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo" }, { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "909 N.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "construction of insurance policy is reviewed de novo" }, { "page": "385" }, { "page": "385" }, { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "where intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery were repled in negligence terms in attempt to trigger coverage, court disregarded plaintiffs labeling and found facts alleged were inconsistent with negligence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4286763 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509-10", "parenthetical": "construction of insurance policy is reviewed de novo" }, { "page": "510" }, { "page": "510" }, { "page": "510-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188258 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0023-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1509, "char_count": 42259, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1215601258327438e-07, "percentile": 0.5735861434392507 }, "sha256": "ba1064adc527168b73a19234d975a5e52e3e289ee5f5d09dd843cdf9779c154f", "simhash": "1:ab5c7dd623c31ccb", "word_count": 6705 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:29.923092+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD T. BERTUCCI, LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellants (Lourdes Rodriguez, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an insurance coverage dispute involving a lawyer\u2019s professional liability policy and allegations that counsel retained an excessive amount of attorney fees from the settlement proceeds of a medical malpractice action. The lawyer has been sued in state court and named in attorney disciplinary proceedings. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court of Cook County found the insurer owed no duty to defend or cover the lawsuit, but owed coverage in the disciplinary action. Both sides appeal.\nThe construction of an insurance contract and a determination of the rights and obligations of the contracting parties are questions of law and suitable for resolution by summary judgment. Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 118 Ill. 2d 23, 58, 514 N.E.2d 150, 166 (1987). We address the trial court\u2019s determinations de novo. Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 391 Ill. App. 3d 505, 509-10, 909 N.E.2d 379, 385 (2009) (construction of insurance policy is reviewed de novo); City of Collinsville v. Illinois Municipal League Risk Management Ass\u2019n, 385 Ill. App. 3d 224, 229, 904 N.E.2d 70, 75 (2008) (entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo).\nIn order to determine whether the insurer has a duty to defend the insured, we consider the allegations of the underlying pleadings and compare those allegations to the relevant provisions of the insurance contract. Pekin Insurance Co., 391 Ill. App. 3d at 510, 909 N.E.2d at 385. If the facts alleged in the underlying complaint fall within or potentially within the policy\u2019s coverage, the insurer is duty bound to defend. Pekin Insurance Co., 391 Ill. App. 3d at 510, 909 N.E.2d at 385. The threshold a complaint must meet to present a claim for potential coverage and raise a duty to defend is minimal, and any doubts are to be resolved in favor of the insured. City of Collinsville, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 230, 904 N.E.2d at 75-76.\nOn May 11, 2007, Continental Casualty Company (Continental Casualty), the plaintiff in this insurance coverage dispute, issued a $2 million lawyers professional liability policy to Chicago attorney Donald T. Bertucci and his solo law practice on a claims-made-and-reported basis. The written contract tendered for our consideration specifies that all words and phrases appearing in bold font are defined in the contract. The \u201cINSURING AGREEMENT\u201d of the policy indicates there is \u201cCoverage\u201d for \u201call sums in excess of the [$5,000] deductible that the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages and claim expenses because of a claim that is both first made against the Insured and reported in writing to the Company during the policy period by reason of any act or omission in the performance of legal services by the Insured.\u201d\nThe policy defines \u201cClaim\u201d as \u201ca demand received by the Insured for money or services arising out of an act or omission, including personal injury, in the rendering of or failure to render legal services.\u201d \u201cLegal services\u201d are \u201cthose services performed by an Insured for others as a lawyer, arbitrator, mediator, title agent or as a notary public.\u201d \u201cDamages\u201d are limited to \u201cjudgments, awards and settlements\u201d and do not include \u201clegal fees, costs and expenses *** charged by the Insured *** and injuries that are a consequence of any of the foregoing.\u201d \u201cClaim expenses\u201d consist of \u201cfees charged by attorneys designated by the Company or by the Insured with the Company\u2019s written consent\u201d and \u201call other reasonable and necessary fees, costs and expenses resulting from the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of a claim if incurred by the Company, or by the Insured with the written consent of the Company.\u201d\nThe section of the contract concerning the policy\u2019s limits of liability and deductible, indicates \u201c[ajlthough not [considered] Damages,\u201d the company will make \u201cSupplementary payments\u201d \u201cup to $10,000.00 for any Insured and in the aggregate for attorney fees and other reasonable costs, expenses, or fees *** resulting from a Disciplinary Proceeding *** arising out of an act or omission in the rendering of legal services by such Insured.\u201d Again, \u201clegal services\u201d consist of \u201cthose services performed by an Insured for others as a lawyer, arbitrator, mediator, title agent or as a notary public.\u201d Further, \u201cIn the event of a determination of No Liability of the Insured against whom the Disciplinary Proceeding has been brought, the Company shall reimburse such Insured for Disciplinary Fees, including those in excess of the $10,000 cap set forth above, up to $100,000.\u201d\nA few weeks after purchasing the policy, Bertucci requested defense and coverage of a lawsuit filed against him by a woman he represented in a medical malpractice case that settled in 2002 for $2.25 million, Rodriguez v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center, No. 97\u2014 L \u2014 16741. Bertucci characterized the suit against him, Rodriguez v. Bertucci, No. 07 \u2014 L\u201406247, as a claim for damages as defined by the insuring agreement. He subsequently requested defense and coverage of related proceedings being conducted by the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC), Donald Thomas Bertucci, in relation to Lourdes Rodriguez, No. 07 \u2014 Cl\u20142293.\nAccording to the verified pleading filed in state court and correspondence sent to the disciplinary agency, Bertucci\u2019s former client, Lourdes Rodriguez, is a native Spanish speaker with little formal education, who returned to Mexico while her medical malpractice suit was pending. She did not take issue with Bertucci\u2019s handling of her claim or with the settlement figure he secured. But based on Bertucci\u2019s retention of $750,000 of the proceeds and subsequent representation about his right to retain them, Rodriguez brought claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and violation of the Illinois statute which limits contingent legal fees in medical malpractice actions, section 2 \u2014 1114 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1114 (West 1996). The statute, which took effect in 1985, limits the total contingent fee for a plaintiff\u2019s attorney or attorneys in a medical malpractice action to 33.33% of the first $150,000 of the sum recovered, 25% of the next $850,000, and 20% of any amount over $1 million. 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1114(a) (West 1996). The statute also provides that, \u201c[i]n special circumstances, where an attorney performs extraordinary services involving more than usual participation in time and effort the attorney may apply to the court for approval of additional compensation.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1114(c) (West 1996). Rodriguez alleged that the fee statute and her written agreement with Bertucci executed on December 23, 1996, limited his compensation to no more than $512,500, and that he had taken an additional $237,500 without getting her consent and the court\u2019s approval. Furthermore, he had given her an amended settlement statement in which he \u201crepresented and implied\u201d that he had obtained judicial approval for the enhanced fees. She began to uncover his misconduct when she returned to Chicago in approximately June 2006 for further medical treatment and was advised by the medical provider that she still owed money for her previous care \u2014 services which Bertucci told her had been satisfied from the settlement proceeds. She telephoned Bertucci, and when his initial reaction was to use profanity and exclaim \u201cwhat are you doing in Chicago?\u201d she became suspicious and reviewed her records. She further alleged that she retained new attorneys who telephoned and corresponded with Bertucci several times in April and May 2007, but Bertucci did not explain the discrepancy or return the unauthorized fees to Rodriguez. Her new attorneys sent a letter to the ARDC which referenced their mandatory duties to report attorney misconduct, outlined Rodriguez\u2019s concerns, and indicated they had been in communication with Bertucci but had not received a satisfactory response. See In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 79 (1988) (lawyer suspended one year for failure to report his unprivileged knowledge of an attorney\u2019s conversion of client\u2019s settlement funds). A few days after counsel notified the ARDC, Rodriguez asked the agency to investigate the matter and substitute her name as the complainant. The state court action was filed after that, seeking the unauthorized fees, interest accruing as of the settlement on February 12, 2002, her new legal expenses, and in the four equitable counts, punitive damages. See 815 ILCS 205/2 (West 1998) (authorizing equitable award of 5% prejudgment interest); see also Krantz v. Chessick, 282 Ill. App. 3d 322, 668 N.E.2d 77 (1996) (former client entitled to prejudgment interest on settlement proceeds).\nContinental Casualty denied coverage for the two proceedings. It then filed this action to obtain a judicial declaration of the parties\u2019 rights and obligations under the policy, Bertucci counterclaimed, and as summarized above, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court ruled in part for Continental Casualty and in part for Bertucci. The court ruled there was no coverage for the civil action because it did not seek \u201cdamages\u201d as that term was defined in the policy; however, the ARDC investigation was a \u201cDisciplinary Proceeding *** arising out of an act or omission in the rendering of legal services\u201d which triggered the policy\u2019s \u201cSupplementary payments\u201d obligation of up to $10,000 for attorney fees and other expenses, and additional reimbursement up to $100,000 upon Bertucci\u2019s vindication.\n\u20221 In pursuit of coverage for the civil action, appellant Bertucci raises two contentions. He first argues that Continental Casualty prevailed in the trial court by mischaracterizing the former client\u2019s lawsuit as a fee dispute, which is outside the scope of coverage. He contends his professional liability coverage was triggered because Rodriguez alleged he committed an error or omission while representing her, when despite having her authorization to retain $750,000 of her settlement proceeds, he failed to comply with the statutory requirement that he also obtain court approval for retaining enhanced fees for providing extraordinary services in a medical malpractice action. See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1114(c) (West 1996). He also contends that settling a malpractice matter, paying outstanding liens, and distributing the remaining settlement funds to the client is a traditional, customary, and ordinary function \u201cperformed by an Insured for others as a lawyer,\u201d and, therefore, was the rendering of \u201cLegal services\u201d within the meaning of the policy. He further contends that Continental Casualty Co. v. Law Offices of Melvin James Kaplan, 345 Ill. App. 3d 34, 801 N.E.2d 992 (2003), an Illinois case involving the same insurer and identical contract language, is factually similar, but the circuit court erroneously rejected it and chose to rely on a California case which is distinguishable, Tana v. Professionals Prototype I Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 4th 1612, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (1996).\nContinental Casualty responds that the court ruled correctly that there is no coverage for the Rodriguez civil action because the insuring agreement covers \u201cdamages\u201d but the suit concerns \u201clegal fees\u201d and \u201cinjuries that are a consequence [thereof],\u201d which are outside the scope of the policy. The insurer also emphasizes that coverage is limited to \u201can act or omission in the performance of legal services by the Insured,\u201d which are defined as \u201cthose services performed by an Insured for others as a lawyer,\u201d and that Bertucci\u2019s retention of excessive fees was in no one\u2019s interest but his own and had nothing to do with the practice of law.\nInsurance contracts are subject to the same rules of construction as are applicable to other types of contracts. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Gateway Construction Co., 372 Ill. App. 3d 148, 151, 865 N.E.2d 395, 398 (2007). When construing a contract, the court\u2019s primary objective is to ascertain the true intent of the parties as expressed in their written agreement. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 372 Ill. App. 3d at 151, 865 N.E.2d at 398. Accordingly, the court reads the contract as a whole, giving effect to every provision and taking into account the type of insurance, the nature of the risks undertaken, and the overall purpose of the policy. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 372 Ill. App. 3d at 151-52, 865 N.E.2d at 398-99. Terms used are given their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning, unless the contract indicates in some way that particular definitions are used to replace that meaning. See, e.g., Sims v. Allstate Insurance Co., 365 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1001, 851 N.E.2d 701, 704 (2006). Definite and clear provisions, upon which the risk and premium calculations of the insurer were based, must be enforced as stated, unimpaired by ill-considered or unreasonable interpretation. Sims, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 1001, 851 N.E.2d at 704.\nThe complaint and plain, unambiguous language of the policy lead us to find that the insurer\u2019s interpretation of the coverage is the only reasonable one. The first numbered paragraph in Bertucci\u2019s professional liability contract contains the \u201cINSURING AGREEMENT.\u201d An insuring agreement is \u201c[a] provision of an insurance policy *** reciting the risk assumed by the insurer and establishing the scope of the coverage.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 811 (7th ed. 1999). This particular insuring agreement expressly limits the scope of coverage to legal proceedings which allege both covered \u201cdamages\u201d and \u201can act or omission in the performance of legal services.\u201d The state court action does not meet either requirement for coverage.\n\u201cDamages\u201d are defined in the policy as \u201cjudgments, awards and settlements\u201d and they \u201cdo not include\u201d \u201clegal fees *** charged by the Insured, no matter whether claimed as restitution of specific funds, forfeiture, financial loss, set-off or otherwise, and injuries that are a consequence of any of the foregoing.\u201d Rodriguez\u2019s legal action indisputably seeks (1) restitution for legal fees which Bertucci improperly charged against her settlement proceeds from the medical malpractice case and (2) consequential expenses for his impropriety, including statutory interest and her new attorney fees, as well as punitive damages. Therefore, the Rodriguez action alleges only non-covered, direct and consequential injuries from the excessive legal fees Bertucci charged against her assets; it does not allege \u201cdamages\u201d within the meaning of the policy.\nOur opinion is influenced by California, Idaho, and Massachusetts cases which analyze similar attorney-client disputes and conclude the injuries are not the type covered by the attorney\u2019s professional liability insurance.\nThe client in Tana filed a complaint alleging his San Francisco attorney misrepresented or failed to explain a fee-splitting agreement in litigation with an entity known as Kikkoman and expected unconscionably high bonuses from his $7.6 million settlement proceeds. Tana, 4H Cal. App. 4th at 1617-18, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163. Faced with competing claims to the $7.6 million, the Kikkoman defendant deposited the money with the court. Tana, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1615, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161. The client sued for declaratory relief and indemnification, compensatory damages, attorney fees, and punitive damages from his former attorney. Tana, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1618, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163. The attorney\u2019s professional liability insurer declined to defend him, in part because the only damages the client sought pertained to the legal fees. Tana, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1618, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163. Interpreting the same contract language at issue here, the court agreed, reasoning:\n\u201cA commonsense reading of the complaint reveals that it was entirely a fee dispute, not a malpractice claim. [The client] did not complain of anything [the attorney] did or failed to do in representing him in the Kikkoman litigation. *** [The client alleged acts or omissions with respect to attorney fees only. All of the damages the client sought were either the return of or reduction of attorney fees, or were in some way a consequence of those fees.]\nEven if [the client] might have been seeking [compensatory damages and attorney fees, which are] more than just a reduction in his attorney\u2019s fee liability, [the attorney arguing for coverage] cannot avoid the inevitable conclusion that such damages are \u2018injuries\u2019 caused by (i.e., \u2018a consequence of) a dispute over legal fees. Fee disputes do not become covered damages merely because the damages are called \u2018compensatory\u2019 or are sought under a claim of \u2018negligence\u2019 or \u2018breach of fiduciary duty.\u2019 [Citation.] Reading the complaint as a whole, it is clear the relief [the client] seeks is limited to a judicial resolution of the fee dispute, indemnity from payment of fees, and damages and costs associated with the controversy.\u201d Tana, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1617-18, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163.\nAccordingly, the California court found there was no possibility of coverage and therefore no duty to defend. Tana, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164.\nBertucci attempts to distinguish Tana by arguing Rodriguez is essentially alleging she was injured by his failure to comply with the Illinois statute regarding enhanced fees. He contends that in contrast to Tana, his client complains that he \u201cfailed in the litigation to obtain a court order at the termination of litigation approving his enhanced fee.\u201d In reality, however, Tana\u2019s client complained that counsel \u201cfailed\u201d at the same point in the litigation, following the successful negotiation and funding of the settlement, by claiming entitlement to an excessive portion of the settlement dollars. Bertucci also contends that because Rodriguez refers to the statute, her suit is really about an error or omission in his representation of her as a client, rather than a disagreement about his compensation. Continental Casualty correctly points out, however, that the cited statute concerns legal fees only and has nothing to do with client representation in a medical malpractice action. The statute is entitled \u201cContingent fees for attorneys in medical malpractice actions.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1114 (West 1996). In its entirety, the statute provides:\n\u201cContingent fees for attorneys in medical malpractice actions, (a) In all medical malpractice actions the total contingent fee for plaintiffs attorney or attorneys shall not exceed the following amounts:\n33Vs% of the first $150,000 of the sum recovered;\n25% of the next $850,000 of the sum recovered; and\n20% of any amount recovered over $1,000,000 of the sum recovered.\n(b) For purposes of determining any lump sum contingent fee, any future damages recoverable by the plaintiff in periodic installments shall be reduced to a lump sum value.\n(c) The court may review contingent fee agreements for fairness. In special circumstances, where an attorney performs extraordinary services involving more than usual participation in time and effort the attorney may apply to the court for approval of additional compensation.\n(d) As used in this Section, \u2018contingent fee basis\u2019 includes any fee arrangement under which the compensation is to be determined in whole or in part on the result obtained.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1114 (West 1996).\nAllegations of Bertucci\u2019s violation of a statute dealing exclusively with legal fees are allegations about \u201clegal fees *** paid or incurred or charged by the Insured\u201d or \u201cinjuries that are a \u2018consequence of\u2019 [legal fees paid or incurred or charged by the Insured].\u201d Under a reasonable construction of the policy and complaint, the injuries alleged are not \u201cdamages\u201d within the scope of the insuring agreement.\nLike Bertucci, the personal injury attorney named in the Idaho case Continental Casualty Co v. Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 832, 907 P.2d 807, 809 (1995), successfully negotiated a settlement for his clients, following the near drowning of their son. However, the $393,000 settlement proceeds were divided in such a manner that only $216,930 was attributed to the personal injury claim addressed by their fee agreement. Brady, 127 Idaho at 832, 907 P.2d at 809. The remaining $176,070 was for a different claim and arguably belonged entirely to the clients, until, the day after the settlement, when the attorney persuaded them to enter into a second fee agreement entitling him to $122,500 of the $176,070. Brady, 127 Idaho at 832, 907 P.2d at 809. Upon reflection, the clients filed a five-count lawsuit in Idaho state court, alleging the second fee agreement was unenforceable, amounted to breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Idaho Consumer Frotection Act, and also warranted punitive damages. Brady, 127 Idaho at 833, 907 P.2d at 810. The attorney seeking coverage argued the complaint went beyond a mere fee dispute, because it addressed the consumer protection statute and his fiduciary duty, in addition to the claims directly concerning the enforceability or actual terms of the second fee contract. Brady, 127 Idaho at 833, 907 P.2d at 810. He also argued that because, under his reading of the original fee agreement, the clients were entitled to only a portion of the $122,000 they were claiming in damages as a return of fees, the excess must represent damages beyond a return of fees. Brady, 127 Idaho at 833, 907 P.2d at 810. The court rejected this argument, stating:\n\u201cIf the party is requesting a \u2018return of fees,\u2019 it is immaterial what the actual theory of recovery is since the [lawyer\u2019s professional liability] policy flatly excludes \u2018all claims\u2019 for the return of fees. [Citation.] Furthermore, whether the [clients] are actually entitled to recover $122,000 is not the issue. The issue is simply whether this amount represents fees paid to [the attorney].\n[Ultimately], all of the factual allegations in the complaint center on a dispute over attorney fees, and the $122,000 sum requested as damages is tied directly to that fee dispute. ***\nIn short, with the exception of the claim for punitive damages [which is excluded from coverage under the policy], the Duvalls\u2019 complaint simply does not support a claim for any damages unrelated to the return of fees.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Brady, 127 Idaho at 833-34, 907 P.2d at 810-11.\nThe language excluding the \u201c \u2018return of fees\u2019 \u201d in Brady appeared in the policy\u2019s exclusions section, instead of in the insuring agreement. Brady, 127 Idaho at 832, 907 P.2d at 809. The effect of the language is the same, however, regardless of where it appears in the insurance contract. Continental Casualty has also correctly noted that the Brady exclusion was narrower and only excluded \u201c \u2018return of fees\u2019 \u201d from coverage (Brady, 127 Idaho at 832, 907 P.2d at 809), in contrast to the broader language at issue here, which precludes coverage for \u201clegal fees *** charged by the Insured\u201d and \u201cinjuries which are a consequence thereof.\u201d\nLike the courts in Tana and Brady, we compare the language of the policy with the facts alleged in the complaint, rather than examine whether the client has pled any particular theory of relief such as the attorney\u2019s breach of a legal duty, violation of a statute, or disregard for an equitable duty. Pekin Insurance Co., 391 Ill. App. 3d at 510-11, 909 N.E.2d at 385 (where intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery were repled in negligence terms in attempt to trigger coverage, court disregarded plaintiffs labeling and found facts alleged were inconsistent with negligence); Norman Shabel, P.C. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 923 F. Supp. 681, 683-84 (D.N.J. 1996) (where attorney allegedly failed to give client correct percentage of settlement, court disregarded assorted legal theories pled by client, focused on nature of claim, which was retention of excessive legal fees, and found claim was not covered); Gregg & Valby, L.L.P. v. Great American Insurance Co., 316 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512-13 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (where real estate closing documents misrepresented amount of attorney fees to be paid to law firm, characterizing the firm\u2019s fee-setting and billing practices as legal work or advice would not conceal true nature of claim, court found no coverage). Upon doing so, we conclude that Rodriguez\u2019s lawsuit is a fee dispute and does not allege \u201cdamages\u201d within the meaning of the policy Bertucci obtained from Continental Casualty Company.\nThe Rodriguez lawsuit not only fails to allege covered \u201cdamages,\u201d it also fails to allege \u201can act or omission in the performance of legal services by the Insured\u201d within the meaning of the insuring agreement. According to the policy\u2019s definitions section, legal services are \u201cthose services performed by an Insured for others as a lawyer, arbitrator, title agent or as a notary public.\u201d Bertucci\u2019s retention of money cannot be construed as the provision of any type of service for another person and is a business practice independent of the lawyer-client relationship.\nIn Gregg & Valby, a Texas court rejected the contention that a law firm\u2019s misconduct with respect to its fees was client services. Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d 505. The legal malpractice policy at issue covered \u201cProfessional services,\u201d which were defined as \u201c \u2018services you perform for a client in your capacity as: (a) a lawyer; (b) a mediator or arbitrator; (c) a notary public; or (d) as an administrator, conservator, executor, guardian trustee, receiver, or in any similar capacity.\u2019 \u201d Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 510-11. Practically speaking, this definition is identical to the definition operating here. The Houston firm was hired to draft forms for two mortgage lenders to use at real estate closings. Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 511. The prepared forms indicated the firm would receive a $175 document preparation fee, but the firm had allegedly agreed to share the collected fees with the mortgage lenders, in violation of federal laws prohibiting fee-splitting and kickbacks in real estate settlements involving federal funds and requiring truth in lending. Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 511. The firm was named in two class-action lawsuits and sought defense and coverage from its legal malpractice insurer, arguing that the alleged wrongdoing occurred early on when the lawyers drafted the forms and advised the mortgage lenders on the legality of the fee-sharing arrangement. Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 512. The court rejected the contention that the suits concerned legal work or advice, pointing out that \u201cthe home buyers did not complain about the amount of the \u2018Document Preparation Fee,\u2019 nor its existence, but only what happened to that fee after it was paid at closing.\u201d Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 513.\nAfter boiling the allegations down to the facts and determining they concerned the law firm\u2019s fee-setting and billing practices only, the court considered whether the actions were \u201cprofessional services\u201d triggering coverage under the policy. Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 513. The court consulted considerable authority and concluded professional services within the context of insurance contracts were only \u201c \u2018those acts which use the inherent skills typified by that profession, not all acts associated with the profession.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 513, quoting Atlantic Lloyd\u2019s Insurance Co. of Texas v. Susman Godfrey, L.L.P., 982 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. App. 1998). See also Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 183 Neb. 12, 13, 157 N.W.2d 870, 872 (1968) (indicating the \u201cwidely accepted\u201d standard when determining whether a particular act is a professional service is to look to the act itself, not the title or character of the party performing it); Medical Records Associates, Inc. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 142 F.3d 512, 515 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding professional services are \u201cactivities that distinguish a particular occupation from other occupations \u2014 as evidenced by the need for specialized learning or training \u2014 and from the ordinary activities of life and business\u201d). The Texas court found no indication that the Houston law firm\u2019s billing or fee-setting required legal skill or knowledge, or was specific to the legal profession. Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 513. Instead, setting a price and billing the client were \u201cmerely administrative tasks inherent to all businesses.\u201d Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 514.\n\u201cWhen determining whether a particular act is a \u2018professional service,\u2019 the court \u2018must look not to the title or character of the party performing the act, but the act itself.\u2019 [Citation.] Thus, even tasks performed by lawyers are not considered \u2018professional services\u2019 if they are ordinary activities that can be completed by those lacking legal knowledge and skill.\u201d Gregg & Valby, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 513, citing Atlantic Lloyd\u2019s, 982 S.W2d at 476-77.\nThe billing/professional services dichotomy also appears in Reliance National Insurance Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 58 Mass. App. 645, 792 N.E.2d 145 (2003), a Massachusetts case involving an attorney who billed his client for legal services that were never performed. The client did not realize the discrepancy until it had overpaid $833,409. Reliance National, 58 Mass. App. at 646, 792 N.E.2d at 146. It sued for an accounting and to recover the legal fees and its consequential legal fees and costs. Reliance National, 58 Mass. App. at 646, 792 N.E.2d at 146. The lawyer\u2019s professional liability policy covered claims \u201c \u2018caused by any act, error, or omission of the insured ... which arise[s] out of the rendering or failure to render professional services for others in the insured\u2019s capacity as a lawyer.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Reliance National, 58 Mass. App. at 646-47, 792 N.E.2d at 147. Predictably, the Massachusetts court found that billing a client for legal services did not implicate the legal malpractice policy:\n\u201c[Professional acts or services require] specialized knowledge and skill that is acquired through rigorous intellectual training. [Citation.] The setting for the intellectual training is often an academic one, as in architectural school, engineering school, law school, or medical school.\nAgainst those criteria we decide that the billing function of a lawyer is not a professional service. Billing for legal services does not draw on special learning acquired through rigorous intellectual training. We are not aware that courses in billing clients appear in law school curricula. The billing function is largely ministerial. There are elements of experience and judgment in billing for legal services, but the same goes for pricing shoes. As billing is not a professional service, it does not come with the coverage of a professional liability insurance policy ***.\u201d Reliance National, 58 Mass. App. at 648, 792 N.E.2d at 148.\nIt has also been observed:\n\u201cThe professional aspect of a law practice obviously involves the rendering of legal advice to and advocacy on behalf of clients for which the attorney is held to certain minimum professional and ethical standards. [This is distinct from the] *** commercial aspect [of a law practice, which] involves the setting up and running of a business, i.e., securing office space, hiring staff, paying bills and collecting on accounts receivable ***.\u201d Harad v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 839 F.2d 979, 985 (3d Cir. 1988).\nSee also Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer, 943 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex. App. 1995) (indicating a cause of action for legal malpractice arises out of an attorney\u2019s bad legal advice or improper representation of a client).\nTurning again to the allegations ag\u00e1inst Bertucci, it is apparent that Rodriguez\u2019s claims concern ordinary, nonlegal services rather than \u201can act or omission in the performance of legal services by the Insured\u201d within the meaning of the insuring agreement. Moreover, as we suggested above, we do not find that Bertucci\u2019s actions were \u201cperformed by an Insured for others as a lawyer.\u201d In our assessment, to construe the policy to cover Bertucci\u2019s retention of an excessive amount of attorney fees would expand the insurance coverage beyond what was reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting. In bargaining for professional liability insurance coverage, Bertucci could legitimately expect that he would be covered for acts or omissions in the course of representing his clients but would not be covered with respect to fee arrangements and other business disputes. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 372 Ill. App. 3d at 151-52, 865 N.E.2d at 398-99 (in order to construe intent at the time of contracting, a court reads the policy as a whole, giving effect to every provision, and taking into account the type of insurance, the nature of the risks undertaken, and the overall purpose of the policy).\nMoreover, we find the case Bertucci relies upon readily distinguishable in that the alleged negligence in Kaplan arose during the core representation of the client, when a bankruptcy lawyer failed to obtain judicial discharge of his client\u2019s prepetition debts, namely, the attorney fees the client owed for legal services rendered prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Kaplan, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 37, 801 N.E.2d at 994. In that case, the claim against the lawyer clearly arose from an act or omission in the rendering of legal services and was alleged to be a consequence of negligence in performing those services. In that case, counsel was retained to do a job and was sued for failing to do it properly. In contrast, it is alleged in Rodriguez v. Bertucci, No. 07\u2014 L \u2014 06247, that Bertucci was retained to file and litigate a case on Rodriguez\u2019s behalf and that he effectively performed those services. Rodriguez has not made any accusations about the legal services Bertucci rendered: she has not criticized his preparation or timely filing of the medical malpractice pleading, she has not questioned his discovery efforts, she has not challenged his choice of experts, she has not taken issue with his case management, and she has not disputed the negotiation efforts that ultimately brought the case to a successful conclusion. While in Kaplan the claim arose because the lawyer incorrectly performed the task he was hired to perform in the bankruptcy court, the claim in the lawsuit at issue arose only after the lawyer correctly completed the task he was hired to perform. Thus, we reject Bertucci\u2019s contention that there is no meaningful distinction between the Kaplan dispute and the lawsuit pending against Bertucci in the circuit court of Cook County.\nBertucci\u2019s second main argument regarding the Rodriguez action is that the policy\u2019s dishonesty exclusion contains an exception that is a stand-alone grant of coverage to attorneys like himself who are defending accusations of a \u201cdishonest, fraudulent, criminal, or malicious act or omission.\u201d He pled this theory in count II of his counterclaim and unsuccessfully argued for summary judgment. He cites the following policy language:\n\u201cIV EXCLUSIONS This policy does not apply:\nA. to any claim based on or arising out of any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission by an Insured except that this exclusion shall not apply to personal injury. The Company shall provide the Insured with a defense of such claim unless or until the dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission has been determined by any trial verdict, court ruling, regulatory ruling or legal admission, whether appealed or not. Such defense will not waive any of the Company\u2019s rights under this policy. Criminal proceedings are not covered under this Policy regardless of the allegations made against the Insured!.]\u201d\nHe contends that at least three of the five counts in Rodriguez\u2019s pleading include allegations that are potentially within this coverage and trigger the insurer\u2019s duty to defend. More specifically, the conversion count includes the allegation, \u201c32. Bertucci\u2019s actions were outrageous and constitute malice and oppression against Rodriguez.\u201d The breach of fiduciary duty count alleges, \u201c27. Bertucci breached *** [the attorney-client duty by] paying himself the Unauthorized Fees without prior court approval or the approval of Rodriguez\u201d and \u201c28. *** by overreaching and taking advantage of his position.\u201d In addition, the fraud count alleges, \u201c25. By preparing and delivering the Amended Settlement Statement to Rodriguez with the amount of THIRTY-THREE AND ONE-THIRD PERCENT (33Vs%) presented as the correct attorney\u2019s fee, Bertucci [falsely] represented and implied that he had obtained a court\u2019s authority to the additional fees and was entitled to [the] additional fees.\u201d Bertucci concludes that if there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the dishonesty exception, it must be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer. See Continental Casualty Co. v. McDowell & Colantoni, Ltd., 282 Ill. App. 3d 236, 241, 668 N.E.2d 59, 62-63 (1996) (when an exclusionary clause is relied upon to deny coverage, it must be clear and free from doubt, and construed liberally in favor of the insured and strongly against the insurer).\nBertucci\u2019s argument fails because an exception to an exclusion does not create coverage or provide an additional basis for coverage, it only preserves coverage granted in the insuring agreement. Stoneridge Development Co. v. Essex Insurance Co., 382 Ill. App. 3d 731, 756, 888 N.E.2d 633, 656 (2008). When the allegations do not fall within the scope of the insuring agreement, some courts are unwilling to even consider the applicability of any exclusions. Stoneridge Development Co., 382 Ill. App. 3d at 756, 888 N.E.2d at 656. We nonetheless consider it in light of the overriding principle to construe the policy as a whole (Stoneridge Development Co., 382 Ill. App. 3d at 756, 888 N.E.2d at 656, citing Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (1992)), but have little sympathy for the proposition. The argument gives inordinate emphasis to an isolated portion of one sentence, contrary to the principle that policy provisions are read in light of other relevant provisions and the contract as a whole. Founders Insurance Co. v. Mu\u00f1oz, 389 Ill. App. 3d 744, 749, 905 N.E.2d 902, 908 (2009) (all the provisions of a contract, rather than its isolated parts, should be read together to interpret the parties\u2019 intent); Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108, 607 N.E.2d at 1212. A policy must not be interpreted in a manner that renders provisions of the contract meaningless. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 372 Ill. App. 3d at 152, 865 N.E.2d at 399. The fact that Bertucci has suggested a creative possibility or that Continental Casualty Company disagrees with him does not mean the contract is ambiguous. Young v. Allstate Insurance Co., 351 Ill. App. 3d 151, 157, 812 N.E.2d 741, 748 (2004). The relevant inquiry is whether the contract\u2019s provisions are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Young, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 157, 812 N.E.2d at 748. We will not distort the policy and create ambiguity where none exists. Young, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 157, 812 N.E.2d at 748. Bertucci\u2019s alternate interpretation is not reasonable. This contract\u2019s insuring agreement and the quoted exclusion expressly limit coverage to a \u201cclaim,\u201d claims are expressly defined in the policy as \u201cact[s] or omission[s] *** in the rendering of or failure to render legal services,\u201d and we have already rejected the notion that Bertucci\u2019s alleged conduct involved \u201clegal services.\u201d\nFor these reasons, we find that there was no possibility of coverage for the Rodriguez civil action and we affirm the circuit court ruling to that effect.\nOn cross-appeal, Continental Casualty Company challenges the circuit court\u2019s determination that the ARDC proceeding triggered the policy\u2019s supplementary payments provision. Bertucci pled this theory in count III of his counterclaim. The supplementary payments provision expressly limits coverage to a \u201cDisciplinary Proceeding *** arising out of an act or omission in the rendering of legal services by such Insured.\u201d The insurer argues that, like the civil case, the ARDC proceeding is not based on any wrongful acts committed in the performance of \u201clegal services.\u201d Bertucci responds that the complaint before the ARDC, the sole body charged with the investigating and prosecuting claims against Illinois attorneys arising out of the representation of a client in a legal matter, is a \u201cDisciplinary Proceeding\u201d that arises from his practice of law, and is within the scope of the supplementary payments provision.\nWe again find the insurer\u2019s construction of the policy to be the only reasonable construction. As discussed above, this insuring agreement, which is the portion of the policy \u201creciting the risk assumed by the insurer or establishing the scope of the coverage\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 811 (7th ed. 1999)) precludes coverage for Bertucci\u2019s retention of excessive attorney fees from Rodriguez\u2019s settlement proceeds. The supplementary payments provision must be read within the context of this insuring agreement. In fact, the supplementary payments provision reiterates that coverage is limited to \u201clegal services,\u201d which we know must be services that draw upon Bertucci\u2019s specialized knowledge and skill as a lawyer and are provided for others. Accordingly, we conclude the ARDC proceeding does not come within the terms of the policy and that Continental Casualty Company was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on count III of Bertucci\u2019s counterclaim. The circuit court\u2019s ruling with respect to the supplementary payments provision is reversed.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nCAHILL, EJ., and J. GORDON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael E Connelly and Corey P. O\u2019Dell, both of Connelly Roberts & McGivney LLC, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Regina A. Ripley, of Clausen Miller, EC., and Richard A. Simpson, of Wiley Rein LLP both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD T. BERTUCCI, LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellants (Lourdes Rodriguez, Defendant).\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20140502\nOpinion filed March 19, 2010.\nMichael E Connelly and Corey P. O\u2019Dell, both of Connelly Roberts & McGivney LLC, of Chicago, for appellants.\nRegina A. Ripley, of Clausen Miller, EC., and Richard A. Simpson, of Wiley Rein LLP both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0775-01", "first_page_order": 791, "last_page_order": 806 }