{ "id": 4300791, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRELL HAMMONDS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hammonds", "decision_date": "2010-02-11", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201408\u20140194", "first_page": "927", "last_page": "965", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 927" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4290396 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148-55", "parenthetical": "not a single cite to Glasper" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "152-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4294102 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/397/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4288852 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 Ill. App. 3d 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4287737 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/392/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4293017 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/396/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736047 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463141 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3282880 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "\"The remarks by the prosecutor, while improper, do not amount to substantial prejudice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4292439 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Toomin, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/396/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 869", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4292521 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Toomin, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/396/0869-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 1151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277541 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/1151-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 954", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274306 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/0954-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273667 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "Wolfson, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183262 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3949362 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" }, { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778576 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 476988 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209973 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453255 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224772 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302618 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224818 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128, 132" }, { "page": "128, 132", "parenthetical": "\"we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion\" by permitting certain prosecutorial remarks in closing" }, { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610581 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4286528 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839-40" }, { "page": "840", "parenthetical": "\"In any event, like the Johnson court, we leave the resolution of this issue to another day, as our conclusion would be the same applying either standard\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4280308 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 Ill. App. 3d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4288407 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/392/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3626929 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1020", "parenthetical": "holding that \"defendant's failure to testify eliminates a circuit court's refusal to rule as a reviewable issue\"" }, { "page": "1007" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/381/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "granting petition for leave to appeal in People v. Averett, 381 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1020 (2008) (holding that \"defendant's failure to testify eliminates a circuit court's refusal to rule as a reviewable issue\")" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621356 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" }, { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2467881 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" }, { "page": "795" }, { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268002 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351274 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164-68", "parenthetical": "citing cases where the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that a Doyle violation amounted to harmless error" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181032 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619", "parenthetical": "United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution's use of a defendant's post -Miranda silence for impeachment purposes is generally a due process violation" }, { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution's use of a defendant's post -Miranda silence for impeachment purposes is generally a due process violation" }, { "page": "2245", "parenthetical": "United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution's use of a defendant's post -Miranda silence for impeachment purposes is generally a due process violation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623714 ], "weight": 19, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "199-200" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "\"once a defendant ma[de] a request, the decision to question the venire\" became \"a requirement\"" }, { "page": "199" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "198" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "Burke, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J." }, { "page": "196" }, { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "Burke, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J." }, { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "\"citizens sworn as jurors\" are presumed to follow \"the jury instructions given to them\"" }, { "page": "202-03" }, { "page": "204" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant cannot complain that the State made reference to evidence in closing which defendant helped elicit\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4294117 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "\"The holding in Glasper also compels us to reject defendant's argument that Rule 403(b)(4) errors are automatically reversible\"" }, { "page": "99-100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/397/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4292986 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "\"considering Glasper, we hold that the trial court in this case did not commit plain error under either prong of the rule\"" }, { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/396/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4292294 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "new opinion entered after the original opinion was vacated by the Illinois Supreme Court" }, { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "based upon Glasper, appellate court found that the trial court's failure to question the venire about the Zehr principles \"did not render the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair\"" }, { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/396/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4292811 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/396/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4291139 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48", "parenthetical": "same quote in both opinions" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "the offense occurred in 2004" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/395/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 944", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4291712 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "955" }, { "page": "955" }, { "page": "945", "parenthetical": "the offense occurred on June 3, 2006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/0944-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4291787 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "\"Jury selection commenced on June 11, 2007\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/395/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4290899 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "570", "parenthetical": "\"defendant's trial occurred in July 2007\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4289993 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "269", "parenthetical": "the offense occurred on September 28, 2006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4286392 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "\"We cannot hold that the failure to follow a supreme court rule standing alone becomes a per se plain error\"" }, { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "vacated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4279721 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "\"the error was harmless because (1) all four Zehr principles were addressed to each juror at some point during voir dire, and (2) the evidence presented at trial against defendant was overwhelming\"" }, { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "trial began on May 7, 2007" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284170 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5, 9", "parenthetical": "error was so \"fundamental,\" that reversal was required under the second prong of the plain-error analysis" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The appellate court is directed to reconsider its judgment in light of People v. Glasper *** to determine if a different result is warranted\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 926", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4291451 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "937" }, { "page": "938" }, { "page": "938" }, { "page": "938", "parenthetical": "3d Dist. 2009" }, { "page": "927", "parenthetical": "trial began October 22, 2007" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/395/0926-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 917", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3215484 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0917-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302613 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274847 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "10-11" }, { "page": "10-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623855 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39-42", "parenthetical": "absent \"exceptional circumstances,\" the plain-error doctrine will be applied even though the trial court failed to follow a statutorily mandated procedure" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147596 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" }, { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121968 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" }, { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260188 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266640 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4278636 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275831 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "109-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 Ill. App. 3d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4280976 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" }, { "page": "160-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/386/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284663 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" }, { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152531 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" }, { "page": "476-78" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273931 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198894 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477035 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906742 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203, 206", "parenthetical": "a police radio dispatch about an \"armed robbery in progress\" was admissible,' where the issue at trial was whether defendant had committed the robbery, not whether a robbery had occurred" }, { "page": "203, 206", "parenthetical": "a police radio dispatch about an \"armed robbery in progress\" was admissible to explain \"the reason and manner in which the police conducted their investigation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352901 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598-99" }, { "page": "600-01", "parenthetical": "however, we held that the error was harmless" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026066 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" }, { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 1080", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5458108 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1086" }, { "page": "1086-87", "parenthetical": "we reversed on grounds of both hearsay and ineffective assistance of counsel" }, { "page": "1088-89", "parenthetical": "the hearsay was used as substantive evidence to prove \"the very essence of the dispute: whether the defendant was the man who possessed the gun\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/1080-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3874985 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "\"we may affirm the circuit court on any basis supported by the record\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 Ill. App. 3d 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4288555 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "\"[i]n a plain error analysis, 'the first step' for a reviewing court is to determine whether any error at all occurred\"" }, { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/392/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704197 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "562-63" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "562-63" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "562-63" }, { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451309 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 1095", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284342 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1106" }, { "page": "1106" }, { "page": "1106", "parenthetical": "applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to a trial court's ruling that a statement was hearsay and that it did not qualify under an exception" }, { "page": "1105-06" }, { "page": "1105" }, { "page": "1106" }, { "page": "1106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/1095-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275958 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "discussing the differences between \"[hjearsay analysis and sixth amendment analysis\"" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449-50" }, { "page": "450", "parenthetical": "applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to a trial court's ruling that a hearsay statement was admissible as an exception" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352874 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" }, { "page": "430-31" }, { "page": "424, 427" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "430-31" }, { "page": "427, 431" }, { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284237 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/388/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352952 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "\"it is not necessary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue\" by failing to offer case citation or other support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444731 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "\"A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with relevant authority cited\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059981 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "\"point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore forfeited\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265503 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "by failing to offer supporting legal authority or \"any reasoned argument,\" plaintiffs waived consideration of their argument" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706554 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706284 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "65" }, { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0053-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2144, "char_count": 97751, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.802392909771088e-08, "percentile": 0.49636774190309935 }, "sha256": "563fcb57c936fa72ba52ecb315992193799ccf67d995cb02e2a2d6bba7afbb70", "simhash": "1:bfaf44c63b49d475", "word_count": 16220 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:29.923092+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRELL HAMMONDS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn August 29, 2007, defendant Terrell Hammonds was convicted by a jury of delivering a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2006)). On December 10, 2007, the trial court sentenced defendant to seven years\u2019 imprisonment and denied defendant\u2019s post-trial motion. On this direct appeal, defendant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a new trial, due to five alleged errors. Defendant claims that the trial court erred: (1) by giving the third paragraph of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 17.05A (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th), which specified that a drug \u201cdelivery\u201d did not require a transfer of money or consideration; (2) by allowing police officers to testify, over defendant\u2019s hearsay objection, about radio messages received from other officers, who were also trial witnesses; (3) by failing to ask potential jurors whether they understood and accepted certain principles of law listed in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007); and (4) by refusing to rule, until after defendant testified, on defendant\u2019s motion concerning the admissibility of defendant\u2019s prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Defendant also claims that (5) prosecutorial misconduct during the State\u2019s rebuttal closing denied defendant a fair trial. After considering carefully each of defendant\u2019s alleged errors, we find that a new trial is not warranted.\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant\u2019s two-day trial commenced on August 28, 2007, with jury selection and culminated in a guilty verdict on August 29, 2007.\n1. Voir Dire\nFollowing the swearing in of the pool of potential jurors, the trial court informed the venire of certain principles of law, namely: (1) that a defendant is presumed innocent; (2) that he is not required to offer any evidence in his own behalf; and (3) that he must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the trial court did not inform the potential jurors of a fourth principle of law, namely, (4) that a defendant\u2019s failure to testify in his own behalf cannot be held against him. The trial court also failed to ask the prospective jurors whether they understood and accepted these four principles of law.\nWith respect to these principles of law, the trial court stated, in pertinent part:\n\u201cUnder the law, a defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charge against him. This presumption remains with him throughout every stage of the trial and during the deliberation on a verdict. It is not overcome from [sic] unless from all of the evidence in this you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.\nThe State has the burden of proving the guilty [sic] of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. And this burden remains on the State throughout the case. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence nor is he required to present any evidence on his own behalf. He may rely on the presumption of innocence. You are the judges of the facts in this case ***.\u201d\nThe trial court did later inform the jury of all four principles of law during the jury instructions after the close of evidence.\n2. Evidence at Trial\nAfter jury selection and opening statements, the State presented its evidence. Defendant did not testify or call witnesses. On this appeal, defendant did not claim that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him. Nonetheless, we will still describe in detail the State\u2019s evidence at trial, since we will need to decide whether this evidence was overwhelming and whether the effect of any alleged error was rendered harmless by overwhelming evidence.\nAt trial, the State called four witnesses in its case-in-chief. Three witnesses were Chicago police officers, Marco DiPranco, Boonserm Srisuth, and Detective William Smith, who were members of the undercover narcotics investigation team that arrested defendant. The remaining witness was Paula Bosco Szum, a chemist with the Illinois State Police crime laboratory, who analyzed the evidence recovered after defendant\u2019s arrest.\nThe first officer to testify, Officer Srisuth, stated that he was part of a nine-person narcotics investigation team. In the late morning of November 11, 2006, he and other members of his team arrived in the neighborhood of Lamon Avenue and Thomas Street in Chicago, Illinois. Srisuth explained that, when his team anticipates making a controlled buy, the duties of the officers are divided among an \u201cenforcement officer, [a] surveillance officer and [a] buy officer.\u201d On this particular day, Srisuth was the buy officer, and thus he wore civilian clothes and drove an unmarked vehicle. The second witness, Officer DiPranco, was the surveillance officer; and Detective Smith, one of the enforcement officers, was the fourth witness to testify at trial.\nOfficer Srisuth testified that he responded to a radio transmission from the surveillance officer, Officer DiPranco. At that point in the testimony, defendant objected on hearsay grounds. Over defendant\u2019s hearsay objection, Srisuth testified that he heard DiFranco state over the radio that \u201ca male black wearing a black skullcap, black jacket, black sweatpants with a white stripe and white gym shoes *** was selling drugs\u201d in the vicinity of 1057 North Lamon Avenue.\nOfficer Srisuth testified that, at approximately 11:14 a.m., he drove northbound on Lamon Avenue toward 1057 North Lamon Avenue and observed defendant, who was the only person present in the area matching DiFranco\u2019s description. Srisuth parked his unmarked vehicle on Lamon Avenue, and defendant approached Srisuth\u2019s passenger window. Srisuth asked defendant if he had any \u201crocks,\u201d which Srisuth testified was \u201cstreet terminology for crack cocaine.\u201d Srisuth testified that defendant asked him how many he wanted, to which Srisuth responded that he wanted only one. Srisuth testified that defendant removed a small, green-tinted ziplock bag from his mouth. Srisuth testified that the bag contained a white, rock-like substance. Defendant gave Srisuth the bag, and Srisuth gave defendant a prerecorded $10 bill.\nOfficer Srisuth testified that, after the transaction was complete, he left the area and radioed the other officers that \u201ca positive narcotics transaction\u201d had occurred. He also provided the other officers with a physical description of defendant, including defendant\u2019s clothing and location. Srisuth testified that the surveillance officer later instructed him to drive by the vicinity of 1031 North Lamon. At that location, Srisuth observed defendant \u201cbeing detained by the enforcement officer\u201d and Srisuth identified defendant as \u201cthe individual that sold [Srisuth] the narcotics.\u201d\nThe State\u2019s second witness was Officer DiFranco, the surveillance officer. He testified that, at approximately 11:10 a.m. on November 11, 2006, he established a surveillance position on North Lamon Avenue, where he had observed defendant loitering on the corner. DiFranco explained that as a surveillance officer, it was his responsibility to \u201cmonitor\u201d the location and to keep the team informed. DiFranco testified that, on the day in question, he had \u201cconverted [himself] into a utility worker\u201d and that he was driving an undercover vehicle. From his surveillance position, which was approximately \u201ctwo-and-a-half car lengths\u201d from defendant, he observed an unknown male approach defendant and hold a brief conversation with him. Defendant then pulled a small item from his mouth and gave it to the unknown male. DiFranco observed the unknown male hand defendant money and leave the area. Based on his experience, DiFranco suspected that a narcotics sale had just occurred.\nOfficer DiFranco testified that he radioed the other officers on his team and informed them of what he had observed. Specifically, DiFranco testified that in his radio transmission, he described defendant as \u201ca male black wearing a black skullcap, a black jacket, black sweatpants with a white stripe, and white gym shoes\u201d and he informed the team of defendant\u2019s location. DiFranco testified that, in response to this radio call, Officer Srisuth arrived in \u201cless than a minute.\u201d DiFranco observed Srisuth approach in an unmarked vehicle, which Srisuth \u201ccurbed\u201d near 1057 Lamon Avenue. At that moment, DiFranco was positioned approximately \u201ctwo-and-a-half car lengths\u201d behind Srisuth\u2019s vehicle, and there were no other vehicles between his and Srisuth\u2019s vehicles. He testified that nothing blocked his view of either Officer Srisuth or defendant.\nOfficer DiFranco testified that, after Srisuth stopped his vehicle, DiFranco observed defendant approach the passenger side of the undercover vehicle. DiFranco observed defendant and Srisuth hold a brief conversation, after which defendant retrieved a small item from his mouth and handed it to the buy officer. DiFranco testified that, during the exchange, a \u201clate model Grand Am *** curbed right in front of [DiFranco] and behind the [buy] officer.\u201d DiFranco then observed Srisuth\u2019s vehicle drive away, and he informed his team by radio that a narcotics transaction had occurred.\nOfficer DiFranco testified that he \u201cstayed in constant surveillance\u201d of defendant after Srisuth\u2019s vehicle departed. Defendant next approached the driver\u2019s side of the white Grand Am. DiFranco observed defendant and the driver of the Grand Am hold a brief conversation, after which defendant pulled a small item from his mouth and handed it to the driver. DiFranco testified that defendant reached into his left pants pocket and \u201cpulled out an unknown amount of United States currency which he was holding.\u201d Defendant was \u201cflipping them back, and he then pull[ed] out an unknown amount of denomination, USC [sic] currency, and he tender[ed] it to the white male driver.\u201d DiFranco testified that the driver then handed defendant \u201can unknown amount\u201d of United States currency and that the Grand Am departed.\nOfficer DiFranco testifed that, after the Grand Am\u2019s departure, defendant started walking south on Lamon Avenue. DiFranco informed his team by radio of defendant\u2019s location while maintaining constant surveillance of defendant. DiFranco then observed the enforcement officers, Detective Smith and Officer Pentimone, arrive and exit their vehicle. After the enforcement officers detained defendant, DiFranco informed the rest of the team by radio of the detention. DiFranco also instructed \u201cthe buy officer to drive around the immediate area\u201d in order \u201cto see if that was the actual seller.\u201d Officer DiFranco observed Officer Srisuth drive by four or five minutes later, and DiFranco heard Srisuth inform the team by radio that defendant was the person who had sold drugs to Srisuth. Immediately after DiFranco testified about Srisuth\u2019s radio confirmation, the defense objected and the objection was overruled.\nOfficer DiFranco testified that the enforcement officers arrested defendant and conducted a search of defendant. DiFranco observed that the officers reached into defendant\u2019s left pants pocket and retrieved a bundle of United States currency.\nThe State\u2019s third witness was Paula Bosco Szum, a chemist with the Illinois State Police crime laboratory. The chemist was qualified as an expert in \u201cthe field of forensic chemistry and the analysis of narcotics\u201d without objection from the defense. She testified that she analyzed evidence recovered in the case at bar and that the item tested positive for the presence of cocaine and weighed one-tenth of a gram.\nThe State\u2019s fourth witness was Detective Smith, one of the enforcement officers who participated in defendant\u2019s arrest. Smith testified that, as an enforcement officer in an undercover operation, he was dressed in civilian clothes and drove an unmarked vehicle. Smith explained that, after the buy officer completes a narcotics purchase, the enforcement officer is notified and provided with a description of the seller. It is the role of the enforcement officer to detain the seller and place him into custody.\nDetective Smith testified that, on November 11, 2006, he was working with his partner, Officer Jerry Pentimone, when he received a radio transmission from the buy officer, Officer Srisuth. At this point in the testimony, the defense made a hearsay objection, which was overruled. Over the defense\u2019s objection, Smith testified to the contents of the radio transmission. Smith testified that Srisuth stated that he had completed a controlled purchase of narcotics and that Srisuth provided a description of the seller\u2019s physical appearance and clothing.\nDetective Smith next testified that he received a radio transmission from the surveillance officer, Officer DiFranco. The defense objected again on hearsay grounds, and the objection was overruled. Detective Smith testified that, in the radio transmission, DiFranco confirmed that the buy officer had completed a transaction and that DiFranco further stated that the seller had completed a second transaction and had started to walk southbound on Lamon.\nDetective Smith testified that, after receiving a description by radio from both the buy officer and the surveillance officer, he proceeded to the area of 1031 North Lamon and observed a person matching this description. Officer Pentimone, who was driving, stopped their vehicle, and both officers exited and approached. Detective Smith then announced that they were police officers, and they detained defendant. After detaining defendant, Smith testified that he received a radio transmission from the surveillance officer, Officer DiFranco. At this point in the testimony, the defense objected, and the objection was overruled. Smith then testified to the contents of the radio transmission, which was a confirmation from DiFranco that they had detained the \u201cright\u201d individual.\nDetective Smith further testified that he observed the buy officer, Officer Srisuth, drive by. Without defense objection, Smith testified that Srisuth radioed \u201cconfirming that [they did] have the right gentleman stopped.\u201d Smith\u2019s partner, Officer Pentimone, then performed a search of defendant and recovered $140 in United States currency from defendant\u2019s left front pants pocket. The money was in \u201cdifferent denominations, twenties, tens, fives and some singles.\u201d The officers looked for, but did not recover, the recorded $10 bill that was used in the undercover purchase. They also did not find any drugs present on defendant\u2019s person.\n3. Jury Instructions\nAfter the detective\u2019s testimony, the jury was excused from the room and the trial court held a conference on jury instructions. Defense counsel stated that there was only one jury instruction in dispute. The prosecutor requested the first and third paragraphs of IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, and the defense objected.\nIPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A provides in its entirety:\n\u201c17.05A Definition of Deliver\n[1] The word \u2018deliver\u2019 means to transfer possession or to attempt to transfer possession.\n[2] The word \u2018deliver\u2019 includes a constructive transfer of possession which occurs without an actual physical transfer. When the conduct or declarations of the person who has the right to exercise control over a thing is such as to effectively relinquish the right of control to another person, so that the other person is then in constructive possession, there has been a delivery.\n[3] A delivery may occur with or without the transfer or exchange of money, or with or without the transfer or exchange of other consideration.\u201d\nThe prosecutor explained to the trial court that she did not ask for paragraph 2, \u201cbecause this [was] not a constructive transfer situation.\u201d\nIn his objection, the defense relied on the committee note accompanying the instruction. This note states that \u201c[generally\u201d when \u201cthe delivery in question was an actual physical transfer of possession, no definition of the term need be given to the jury,\u201d since \u201c[t]he term, in this sense, is commonly understood by [the jury].\u201d IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, Committee Note, at 308. However, the note also stated that \u201c[p]aragraph (3) may be given when the Court believes it would help the jury understand the issues.\u201d IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, Committee Note, at 308.\nRelying on the committee note, defense counsel explained her objection, as follows:\n\u201cDEFENSE COUNSEL: If you look at the committee notes, your Honor, for 17.05A, it states that when an offense involves a delivery and the evidence indicates that the delivery in question was an actual, physical transfer of possession, no definition of the term may be given to the jury. The term in this sense is commonly understood by the layman. That would be the basis of our objection to the entire instruction.\u201d\nAfter listening to defense counsel, the trial court then ruled in defendant\u2019s favor, stating:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Okay.\nIt\u2019s out. It\u2019s out. Subject to the jury asking for a definition of delivery.\u201d\nEven though the trial court had just ruled, the prosecutor interjected:\n\u201cPROSECUTOR: But, Judge, if I can just say this?\nThe committee notes say it need not, which to me is not \u2014 my understanding of that is that it is not necessary if it\u2019s not being asked for. I\u2019m asking for it for a couple of reasons.\nFirst, I think the term deliver can be subject \u2014 I think it\u2019s a little confusing, the term deliver, where this just simplifies it. It just means a transfer of possession.\nAdditionally, Paragraph 3, the State is asking for it because it is entirely relevant in this case because the [prerecorded $10 bill was] not recovered. What this tells the jury, we don\u2019t need the [prerecorded $10 bill] because a delivery takes place regardless of an exchange of consideration, regardless of any money being exchanged or recovered. And I think that is absolutely relevant in this case.\nThey can ask for this as a clarification, but there is \u2014 there has been \u2014 this entire trial has been replete. Every single witness was questioned about [this prerecorded $10 bill], making it as though it\u2019s entirely necessary for the delivery to take place and that\u2019s why we are asking for this instruction.\u201d\nIn response, the trial court reviewed the committee note, particularly the section that provided the court with discretion about whether to give paragraph 3, and the trial court held, with respect to paragraph 3, \u201c[t]hat\u2019s all that needs [sic] be given.\u201d To clarify, the prosecutor asked if she should \u201ctake out [paragraphs] one and two and just do [paragraph] three\u201d and the trial court agreed. Thus, the trial court reversed its prior ruling and stated that paragraph 3 will be \u201cgiven over defendant\u2019s objection.\u201d\n4. Closing Argument\nAfter the jury instruction conference, the State moved its exhibits into evidence, and both the State and the defense rested. The parties then proceeded to closing arguments.\nIn her closing argument, defense counsel challenged the police investigation, noting that the recorded $10 bill was not recovered and that the police chose not to submit the drug evidence for fingerprint or DNA testing.\nDefense counsel discussed the missing $10 bill at length, stating:\n\u201cYou don\u2019t have any [recorded] money. You heard us talk extensively all day about [recorded] money. [Recorded] money helps corroborate that they have the right individual in custody, the individual that supposedly was involved in that transaction.\nYou do not have any [recorded] money recovered off [defendant], and you have a lame hypothesis or excuse, I\u2019m not sure what it is, of where that may have gone, in that he gave money to someone in a car.\nNow, that is preposterous. He gave money to someone in a car before that person ever gave any money. That doesn\u2019t make any sense. He gave money to someone in a car who easily could have been stopped by the Chicago Police Department.\nThis person wasn\u2019t even stopped. You don\u2019t know whether this person had [recorded] money on them.\u201d\nIn its rebuttal argument, the State responded:\n\u201cCounsel has talked to you about that. There are no [recorded funds] recovered in this case. You\u2019re going to receive the law from the judge. What he\u2019s going to tell you speaks directly to these [recorded funds].\nFor the offense of delivery to occur, you will receive an instruction that says a delivery may occur with or without the transfer or exchange of money, or with or without the transfer or exchange of other consideration.\nYou\u2019re not going to get an instruction that says you can\u2019t find this defendant guilty because there weren\u2019t [recorded funds] recovered, or there wasn\u2019t money recovered. It\u2019s not necessary.\nOur law does not even require that the money be given or that money be taken or recovered. That\u2019s not the law. It doesn\u2019t matter. It doesn\u2019t matter.\u201d\nFollowing closing arguments and jury deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2006)).\n5. Posttrial Motion and Sentencing\nOn September 27, 2007, defendant filed a motion for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The motion alleged general grounds such as lack of due process and failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The one specific allegation was that the trial court erred by giving a jury instruction requested by the State, over defense objection.\nOn December 10, 2007, defendant filed an amended posttrial motion, which added the allegation that \u201c[t]he Court erred by allowing Chicago police officers to testify to the content of their radio transmissions, thereby allowing the jury to hear impermissible hearsay evidence, and the [S]tate to bolster their case.\u201d\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. After arguments in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced defendant to 7 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections with a credit of 395 days. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s posttrial motion. This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred: (1) by giving the third paragraph of IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, which specified that a drug \u201cdelivery\u201d did not require a transfer of money or consideration; (2) by allowing police officers to testify, over the defense\u2019s hearsay objection, about radio messages received from other officers, who were also trial witnesses; (3) by failing to ask potential jurors whether they understood and accepted the principles listed in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007); and (4) by refusing to rule, until after defendant testified, on defendant\u2019s motion concerning the admissibility of defendant\u2019s prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Defendant also claims that (5) prosecutorial misconduct in the State\u2019s rebuttal closing denied defendant a fair trial.\n1. Jury Instruction Defining \u201cDelivery\u201d\nOn appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred by giving the third paragraph of IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, which specifies that a drug \u201cdelivery\u201d does not require a transfer of money or consideration.\nThe User\u2019s Guide to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions explains that \u201c[e]ach offense has at least two instructions: (1) a definitional instruction, and (2) a corresponding issues instruction.\u201d IPI Criminal 4th, User\u2019s Guide, at vii. In addition, the IPI Criminal 4th provides other types of instructions, such as those that \u201cdefine a particular word or term.\u201d IPI Criminal 4th, User\u2019s Guide, at vii. It is this latter type of instruction, which defines a particular word or term, that is at issue in the case at bar.\nThe instruction at issue, IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, provides a three-paragraph definition of the word \u201cdeliver.\u201d In the case at bar, the trial court gave only the third paragraph of the three-paragraph instruction. Both the State and the defense agree on appeal that the trial court was correct in not providing paragraphs 1 and 2. However, the defense argues that the trial court erred in providing even paragraph 3.\nIPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A is already quoted above, in its entirety, in the Background section of this opinion. As quoted earlier, the third paragraph states: \u201cA delivery may occur with or without the transfer or exchange of money, or with or without the transfer or exchange of other consideration.\u201d IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A.\nGenerally, a reviewing court will review jury instructions only for an abuse of discretion. People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 66 (2008). Although there must be some evidence in the record to justify giving a particular instruction, the decision whether or not to give it is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d at 65. The trial court has the discretion to decide whether the evidence in the record raises a particular issue and whether an instruction on that issue should be given. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d at 65. \u201cAlthough jury instructions are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, our standard of review is de novo when the question is whether the applicable law was accurately conveyed.\u201d Barth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Ill. 2d 163, 170 (2008).\nThe defense claims, first, that this instruction was inapplicable to the evidence since, as the committee note states, \u201cthe delivery in question was an actual physical transfer of possession, no definition of the term need be given to the jury.\u201d IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, Committee Notes, at 308. The defense claims, second, that even if the committee note provided the trial court with the discretion to give paragraph 3, providing the paragraph minimized the State\u2019s burden of proof, by giving the jury the impression that the State did not have to prove a purchase.\nThe defense does not cite any case law to support its first argument that the committee note prohibited the trial court from providing paragraph 3. Roiser v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 367 Ill. App. 3d 559, 568 (2006) (by failing to offer supporting legal authority or \u201cany reasoned argument,\u201d plaintiffs waived consideration of their argument); People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005) (\u201cpoint raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore forfeited\u201d); In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 517 (2004) (\u201cA reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with relevant authority cited\u201d); Ferguson v. Bill Berger Associates, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d 61, 78 (1998) (\u201cit is not necessary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue\u201d by failing to offer case citation or other support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires); 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7) (argument in appellate brief must be supported by citation to legal authority and factual record).\nThis is not surprising, since the defense\u2019s argument misreads the note. The note states that, in the case of an \u201cactual physical transfer,\u201d no definition \u201cneed be given.\u201d The American Heritage Dictionary states that, as a verb, the word \u201cneed\u201d means \u201c[t]o be under the necessity of or the obligation to.\u201d American Heritage Dictionary 835 (2d Coll. ed. 1985). In its detailed \u201cUsage\u201d section following the word \u201cneed,\u201d the dictionary explains that \u201c \u2018you needn\u2019t come\u2019 means \u2018you are under no obligation to come.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) American Heritage Dictionary 835 (2d Coll. ed. 1985). Thus, the negative form, which is used in the note, means that, while the trial court was under \u201cno obligation\u201d to give the instruction, it was not prohibited either. American Heritage Dictionary 835 (2d Coll. ed. 1985).\nIf there was any doubt that the committee note provided the trial court with the discretion to give paragraph 3, that doubt was erased by the note\u2019s subsequent comment that \u201c[pjaragraph [3] may be given when the Court believes it would help the jury understand the issues.\u201d IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, Committee Note, at 308. Thus, the decision of whether to provide paragraph 3 was left to the sound discretion of the trial court, as are most decisions regarding whether to provide certain jury instructions. E.g., Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d at 65.\nThe defense\u2019s second argument misconstrues the law, and almost underscores the need for the instruction. The defense argues that the issue for the jury to resolve was whether a drug purchase took place, and thus the instruction minimized the State\u2019s burden of proof.\nHowever, the State did not have to prove that a purchase took place. The indictment accused defendant of \u201cunlawfully and knowingly possessing] with intent to deliver *** less than 1 gram of a substance\u201d containing cocaine, \u201cin violation of Chapter 720, Act 570, Section 401(D).\u201d To prove a charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State must prove three elements: (1) the defendant\u2019s knowledge of the presence of narcotics; (2) the defendant\u2019s immediate possession or control of the narcotics; and (3) the defendant\u2019s intent to deliver the narcotics. People v. Sanchez, 388 Ill. App. 3d 467, 473 (2009); People v. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d 421, 429 (1998). Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act provides that \u201cit is unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2006). In contrast to what the defense argues, the statute does not require a sale or purchase as an element of the offense.\nThe Act defines the words \u201cdeliver\u201d and \u201cdelivery\u201d as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Deliver\u2019 or \u2018delivery\u2019 means the actual, constructive or attempted transfer of possession of a controlled substance, with or without consideration, whether or not there is an agency relationship.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/102(h) (West 2006).\nThe words \u201cwith or without consideration\u201d in the above definition make clear that a sale or purchase is not required for a \u201cdelivery.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/102(h) (West 2006). Thus, the words of the Act that define both the offense and the word \u201cdelivery\u201d leave no doubt that a sale or purchase was not part of the State\u2019s burden of proof.\nThe defense claims in its appellate brief that the purpose of paragraph 3 is \u201cto clarify that a delivery can occur between friends, as a gift, or in other nontraditional transfers of contraband.\u201d The defense makes this argument without any case support or other authority. The State could have just as easily argued that the purpose of this paragraph is to clarify that a delivery can occur with or without recovery of the transferred consideration. The purpose of paragraph 3, of course, is to track the language of the Act, which provides that a delivery occurs upon \u201cthe actual, constructive or attempted transfer of possession of a controlled substance, with or without consideration.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/102(h) (West 2006). Thus, the State is not required to prove a transfer of consideration in any case, whether the delivery occurs between best friends or complete strangers.\nFor these reasons, we hold that the trial court was not prohibited from providing paragraph 3 of the jury instruction, in a case of actual physical transfer, and that the instruction\u2019s accurate statement of the law did not minimize the State\u2019s burden of proof. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by providing paragraph 3.\n2. Police Radio Messages\nOn appeal, the defense claims that the trial court erred by allowing police officers to testify, over the defense\u2019s hearsay objection, about the contents of radio messages received from other officers.\nThe officers, who were the declarants of the radio messages, were all witnesses at trial; they testified about the content of their own statements and were subject to cross-examination about them. Thus, the defendant has not raised on appeal any claims concerning his sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. U.S. Const., amend. VI; People v. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d 441, 449 (2007) (discussing the differences between \u201c[hjearsay analysis and sixth amendment analysis\u201d).\nDefendant\u2019s claim on appeal concerns solely an alleged violation of the rule against hearsay. Hearsay is a statement that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, made by the declarant at a time when he or she was not testifying at trial. People v. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1106 (2009); Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 449; Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). The rule against hearsay generally prevents the admission of hearsay statements in evidence at trial. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 449. However, the rule has many exceptions. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 449. In considering a hearsay objection, a court must decide, first, whether the statement is, in fact, hearsay. E.g., Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 1106. If the statement is hearsay, the court must decide, second, if it is still admissible under one of the many exceptions. E.g., Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 449-50.\nAn appellate court will apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to these two decisions by the trial court. The trial court has discretion in deciding whether statements were, in fact, hearsay and, if they were, whether they were still admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 1106 (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to a trial court\u2019s ruling that a statement was hearsay and that it did not qualify under an exception); Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 450 (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to a trial court\u2019s ruling that a hearsay statement was admissible as an exception). Hearsay rulings by a trial court are similar to other evidentiary rulings, which are generally reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 1105-06. A trial court\u2019s decision is considered an abuse of discretion only when the decision is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 1105.\nDefendant\u2019s objection is not to the admission of the information contained in the radio messages, but to the recounting of the messages by the officers who heard them. On appeal, defendant does not object to the testimony by police officers concerning the content of the radio messages that they voiced, but rather objects only to the corroborating testimony by the officers who heard the messages.\nOn appeal, defendant notes seven places in the trial testimony where receiving officers testified about the content of radio messages that they had heard. The seven messages are summarized in the following chart. In the chart, Officer Srisuth is identified as the \u201cBuy Officer,\u201d Officer Di Franco is identified as the \u201cSurveillance Officer,\u201d and Detective Smith is identified as the \u201cEnforcement Officer.\u201d\nSummary of Radio Messages:\nTestifying Witness Declarant Timing of Message Substance of Radio Message\n1. Buy Officer Surveillance Officer Prior to controlled buy. Description and location of seller.\n2. Enforcement Officer Buy Officer After controlled buy. Confirmation of controlled buy; description and location of seller.\n3. Surveillance Officer Buy Officer After controlled buy. Confirmation of controlled buy.\n4. Enforcement Officer Surveillance Officer After controlled buy. Confirmation of controlled buy; observation of a subsequent transaction; location of seller.\n5. Enforcement Officer Surveillance Officer After detention. Confirmation that correct individual detained.\n6. Enforcement Officer Buy Officer After detention. Confirmation that correct individual detained.\n7. Surveillance Officer Buy Officer After detention. Confirmation that correct individual detained.\nFor two of the seven statements listed above, defense counsel failed to object at trial. The statements that occurred without objection were statements (3) and (6), above. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a \u201cdefendant must both specifically object at trial and raise the specific issue again in a posttrial motion to preserve any alleged error for review.\u201d People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005); People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564 (2007). When a defendant has failed to preserve an error for review, we may still review for plain error. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 562-63; 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a) (\u201cPlain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court\u201d). Since the defendant did raise this issue in his postrial motion, the plain-error doctrine applies only to statements (3) and (6), but not to the other statements.\n\u201c[T]he plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threaten[s] to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.\u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. However, before we reach the issue of plain error, we must first determine whether any error occurred at all. People v. Walker, 392 Ill. App. 3d 277, 294 (2009) (\u201c[i]n a plain error analysis, \u2018the first step\u2019 for a reviewing court is to determine whether any error at all occurred\u201d). Since we find, for the reasons discussed below, that no error occurred, we do not need to perform a plain-error analysis.\nIn the case at bar, the trial court overruled defendant\u2019s hearsay objections without identifying the basis of its ruling. Thus the trial court did not specifically find whether the testimony was hearsay or, if it was, what exception applied. Since we may affirm a trial court\u2019s ruling on any basis supported in the record, we will examine first whether the testimony was, in fact, hearsay. People v. Dinelli, 217 Ill. 2d 387, 403 (2005) (\u201cwe may affirm the circuit court on any basis supported by the record\u201d).\nA statement offered for some reason other than for the truth of the matter asserted is generally admissible because it is not hearsay. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 1106. For example, if a statement is offered to prove its effect on the listener\u2019s state of mind, or to show why the listener subsequently acted as he or she did, then the statement is not hearsay. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 1106. Therefore, if a statement is offered, not for the truth of the matter asserted in its contents, but to explain the actions or steps that a police officer subsequently took during the course of an investigation, then the statement is not hearsay. People v. Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1086 (1st Dist. 2004); People v. Edgecombe, 317 Ill. App. 3d 615, 627 (2000); People v. Warlick, 302 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598-99 (1st Dist. 1998).\nDefendant cites several successful hearsay challenges to police radio messages, where this court held that the trial court had erred by admitting the messages. For example, in Jura, the trial court erred by admitting testimony by three officers, in a gun possession case, that a police radio broadcast had provided the location and description of a person with a gun and that defendant\u2019s location and description matched it. Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1086-87 (we reversed on grounds of both hearsay and ineffective assistance of counsel). In Edgecombe, the trial court erred in admitting an officer\u2019s testimony about a radio call that a vehicle\u2019s occupants had fled after a vehicle stop; that the police apprehended one occupant (who later became the defendant); and that the vehicle matched the description of the getaway vehicle in an armed robbery. Edgecombe, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 627 (we reversed and remanded on other grounds). In Warlick, the trial court erred in admitting an officer\u2019s testimony that he had received a radio call about \u201ca burglary in progress,\u201d when the sole defense at trial was that defendant had been seeking shelter, not to burglarize. Warlick, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 600-01 (however, we held that the error was harmless). Compare with People v. Townsend, 275 Ill. App. 3d 200, 203, 206 (1st Dist. 1995) (a police radio dispatch about an \u201carmed robbery in progress\u201d was admissible,' where the issue at trial was whether defendant had committed the robbery, not whether a robbery had occurred).\nHowever Jura, Edgecombe, and Warlick differ from the case at bar because, in these cases, (1) the declarant did not testify; (2) the only evidence of the contents of the message was the testimony of the receiving officer; and (3) the testimony thus affected defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. By contrast, in the case at bar, (1) the declarant did testify and was subject to cross-examination; (2) the events described in the radio messages were received into evidence from the officers who had witnessed the events firsthand; and (3) the sixth amendment is not at issue.\nDespite these differences, defendant\u2019s cited cases are close enough in substance to shed some light on our issue. In all three cases, we found that the State was using the investigative procedure as a means to place substantive information in front of the jury. Edgecombe, 317 III. App. 3d at 627 (\u201c[t]he State may not use the limited investigatory procedure exception to place into evidence the substance of any out-of-court statement\u201d); Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1088-89 (the hearsay was used as substantive evidence to prove \u201cthe very essence of the dispute: whether the defendant was the man who possessed the gun\u201d); War-lick, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 600-01 (\u201ca serious issue in the case was whether a burglary in fact was taking place\u201d and the unidentified declarant in the radio call stated that a \u201cburglary [was] in progress\u201d).\nBy contrast, in the case at bar, the State was not using the investigative procedure as a means to place substantive information in front of the jury. The State used the declarants themselves as the means of placing in front of the jury what they had personally done and observed. The purpose of having other officers recount what they heard over the radio was to explain why the receiving officers then took the actions that they did. For example, the buy officer needed to explain that he was prompted to approach this individual at this location by information received from the surveillance officer. The enforcement officer needed to explain that it was the confirmation of a controlled buy from both the buy and surveillance officers that led to his detention of the individual described. The three officers and trial witnesses were acting in unison, almost like the arm and legs of one organism, linked at its nerve center by the radio calls. Their actions and reactions only make sense when viewed in relation to one another. Thus, the radio calls had the nonhearsay purpose of establishing their effect on the listener, rather than being admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. The matters asserted were admitted for their truth through the individuals who were showing what they had actually observed or how they acted in the manner that they did.\nThe case at bar is more factually similar to Rivas than the cases cited by defendant. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 430-31. The Rivas case, like the case at bar, involved a controlled buy where defendant was subsequently charged with drug delivery. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 424, 427. The Rivas case, like the case at bar, concerned testimony by an enforcement officer about the contents of a radio call from a surveillance officer, which led the enforcement officer to arrest the defendant. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 431. In Rivas, we held that the trial court did not err by admitting the enforcement officer\u2019s testimony that he made the arrest after receiving a radio call from the surveillance officer that the suspect had driven to a location, carried a package into an office, and was driving away. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 430-31. In Rivas, as in the case at bar, the surveillance officer testified at trial, and the statement was needed to explain why the enforcement officer subsequently acted to arrest the suspect. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 427, 431. In Rivas, as in the case at bar, we found no error. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 431. See also Townsend, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 203, 206 (a police radio dispatch about an \u201carmed robbery in progress\u201d was admissible to explain \u201cthe reason and manner in which the police conducted their investigation\u201d).\nFor these reasons, we find that, under the circumstances of this case, the statements were not hearsay and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting them. Even if we found an abuse of discretion, any error was harmless, for the reasons explained below, in section 3(g) of this opinion.\n3. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b)\nDefendant seeks a new trial because the trial court failed to question potential jurors about their understanding and acceptance of certain principles of law, as required by the amended Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007) (2007 version).\nAlthough supreme court rules are not statutes, they have \u201c \u2018the force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.\u2019 \u201d Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2002), quoting Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995). When we review issues concerning the interpretation of a supreme court rule, we apply a de novo standard of review. People v. Reed, 376 Ill. App. 3d 121, 125 (2007).\na. History of Rule 431(b): The Four Questions\nThe rule at issue, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b), is a codification of the Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s holding in People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 477 (1984). In Zehr, our supreme court held that a trial court erred during voir dire when it refused the defense counsel\u2019s request to ask potential jurors about four fundamental principles of law. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 476-78. In Zehr, our supreme court held that it is \u201cessential to the qualification of jurors in a criminal case *** that they know\u201d these four fundamental principles: (1) that defendant is presumed innocent; (2) that defendant was not required to produce any evidence on his own; (3) that defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) that defendant\u2019s failure to testify on his own behalf could not be held against him. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477. These four principles are now commonly known as the \u201cZehr principles.\u201d People v. Jocko, 389 Ill. App. 3d 247, 259 (2009); People v. Martinez, 386 Ill. App. 3d 153, 158 (2008); People v. Gilbert, 379 Ill. App. 3d 106, 109 (2008); People v. Yarbor, 383 Ill. App. 3d 676, 681 (2008).\nTo ensure compliance with its 1984 Zehr decision, our supreme court amended Rule 431 twice, first in 1997 and then again 10 years later in 2007. In 1997, the supreme court amended Rule 431 to provide that, if requested by defendant, the trial court must ask potential jurors whether they understood and accepted the Zehr principles. 177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments, at lxxix. According to the accompanying committee notes, the 1997 amendment sought to \u201cend the practice where the judge makes a broad statement of the applicable law followed by a general question concerning the juror\u2019s willingness to follow the law.\u201d 177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments, at lxxix.\nThe 1997 version of Supreme Court Rule 431(b) stated, in full:\n\u201c(b) If requested by the defendant, the court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the defendant\u2019s failure to testify cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant\u2019s failure to testify when the defendant objects.\nThe court\u2019s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the principles set out in this section.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 177 Ill. 2d R. 431(b) (1997 version).\nThis court has held that the 1997 version of Rule 431(b), as quoted above, did not require the trial court to ask about the Zehr principles, unless defense counsel asked the trial court to do so. Jocko, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 260; Gilbert, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 109-10, citing People v. Williams, 368 Ill. App. 3d 616, 623 (2006), and People v. Foreman, 361 Ill. App. 3d 136, 146 (2005); Martinez, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 160-61.\nIn 2007, our supreme court amended the rule again. The 2007 amendment deleted the first five words: \u201cIf requested by the defendant.\u201d Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007). This deletion had the effect of requiring the trial court to ask about the four Zehr principles whether or not the defendant had made the request.\nThe 2007 version of Rule 431(b), which is still in effect, states:\n\u201cThe court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the defendant\u2019s failure to testify cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant\u2019s failure to testify when the defendant objects.\nThe court\u2019s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the principles set out in this section.\u201d Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007).\nb. The Trial Court\u2019s Error\nThere is no question that, in the case at bar, the trial court erred. The 2007 version applied to the case at bar, and the trial court failed to implement the changed version. Since defendant\u2019s trial began on August 28, 2007, and since the 2007 version of Rule 431(b) took effect several months earlier on May 1, 2007, the 2007 version applied to the case at bar. Although the new version applied, the trial court failed to ask potential jurors during voir dire whether they understood and accepted the Zehr principles, as the 2007 version required.\nThere is no dispute between the parties that the trial court erred when it failed to question the potential jurors about the four Zehr principles listed in Rule 431(b). The dispute between the parties is: whether this error was so fundamental to the integrity of the justice system that it requires automatic reversal; or whether we may affirm if we find that the error was harmless, in the context of defendant\u2019s trial and the evidence presented against him.\nc. Plain-Error Doctrine\nSince defendant did not object at trial or raise this issue in his posttrial motion, we review the issue under the plain-error doctrine.\nAs noted above, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a \u201cdefendant must both specifically object at trial and raise the specific issue again in a posttrial motion to preserve any alleged error for review.\u201d Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 470; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564. When a defendant has failed to preserve an error for review, we may still review for plain error. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 562-63; 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a) (\u201cPlain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court\u201d). In the case at bar, defendant did not object at trial or raise this issue in his posttrial motion. Defendant\u2019s appellate brief conceded that \u201cdefense counsel did not object to the defendant\u2019s failure to comply with Rule 431(b).\u201d\nHowever, defendant claims that he did not waive the issue for appeal, because: (1) requiring defense counsel to object would negate the effect of the 2007 amendment, which obligated the trial court to ask the four questions sua sponte; and (2) the waiver rules are relaxed when the objection is directed to the trial judge\u2019s conduct. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that \u201c[application of the waiver rule *** is less rigid where the basis for the objection is the circuit judge\u2019s conduct.\u201d People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 343 (1998); People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996).\nFirst, requiring defense counsel to object to preserve the error for appeal would not negate the mandatory nature of the 2007 amendment. Trial judges are presumed to follow the law, and we assume that the mandatory nature of the 2007 amendment will be followed. In addition, we apply the plain-error doctrine to other situations where actions are mandatory, and we have not been presented with a reason to carve out an exception for this issue alone. E.g., People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 39-42 (2009) (absent \u201cexceptional circumstances,\u201d the plain-error doctrine will be applied even though the trial court failed to follow a statutorily mandated procedure).\nSecond, the typical reason for relaxing the waiver rule does not apply to this case. \u201cThe reason for relaxing the waiver rule is that the objection would have fallen on deaf ears.\u201d People v. Davis, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1, 10 (2007). For example, our supreme court relaxed the waiver rule when the trial judge refused to consider mitigating evidence at the defendant\u2019s death penalty hearing (Davis, 185 Ill. 2d at 343) or refused to allow defense counsel to participate in formulating a response to a jury\u2019s note (Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 85) or spontaneously informed the venire at defendant\u2019s second death penalty hearing that a prior jury had imposed the death penalty (People v. Woolley, 205 Ill. 2d 296, 301-02 (2002)). Similarly, we relaxed the waiver rule when the trial judge interrupted the defendant\u2019s testimony to offer unsolicited advice about his decision to testify. People v. Vaughn, 354 Ill. App. 3d 917, 920-21 (1st Dist. 2004).\nIn the case at bar, there was no reason to find that an objection would have fallen on deaf ears. Quite the contrary is true, considering that the questions were mandatory. Defendant\u2019s failure to object at trial robbed the trial court of the opportunity to correct the error, and defendant\u2019s failure to object in a posttrial motion deprived a reviewing court of any factual findings which the trial court might have made concerning the credibility of the witnesses and their contribution to the weight of the evidence against defendant and, thus, the possible harmlessness of the error. Davis, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 10-11. \u201cSince there is no reason to think that a request from counsel would have fallen on deaf ears, the relaxed waiver rule does not apply in this case. As a result, this court will review for plain error only.\u201d Davis, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 10-11.\nRecently, the Third District of this court considered this same waiver issue and reached the same conclusion that we do, holding: \u201cAlthough our supreme court elected to place the duty squarely on the shoulders of the court to comply with the directive contained in the current Supreme Court Rule 431(b), the amended rule does not alleviate *** counsel for the defense of an obligation to object when a trial judge inadvertently overlooks the applicability of Rule 431(b).\u201d People v. Russell, 395 Ill. App. 3d 926, 937 (2009). Thus, we now proceed with plain-error review.\nAs noted above, \u201cthe plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threaten[s] to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.\u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. With a plain-error analysis, \u201cit is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.\u201d Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471.\nIn the case at bar, defendant claims that the error was so serious that it \u201cchallenged the integrity of the judicial process,\u201d and thus reversal is required under the second prong, and that reversal is also required under the first prong due to the closeness of the evidence. The State claims that the error was not fundamental, and thus reversal is not required under the second prong, and that reversal is also not required under the first prong, since the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the error was not so fundamental as to require reversal under the first prong of the plain-error analysis.\nd. Prior Appellate Court Opinions\nA number of appellate panels before us have already ruled on the question of whether the failure to ask the four Zehr questions rises to the level of a fundamental error. There were four opinions filed between approximately Thanksgiving and Christmas 2009, alone. According to the Shepard\u2019s service, one opinion was \u201csubmitted\u201d on May 6, 2009, \u201cfiled\u201d on November 24, 2009, \u201camended\u201d on December 4, 2009, and \u201cfiled\u201d again on December 7, 2009. The following summary is complete only as of Christmas 2009.\nOn September 30, 2009, our supreme court vacated four of the appellate opinions. People v. Alexander, 233 Ill. 2d 565 (2009); People v. Anderson, 233 Ill. 2d 565 (2009); People v. Stump, 233 Ill. 2d 592 (2009); People v. Matchem, 233 Ill. 2d 583 (2009). One of the four vacated opinions had found that the error was fundamental, and the remaining three had found that it was not. Compare People v. Anderson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5, 9 (1st Dist. 2009) (error was so \u201cfundamental,\u201d that reversal was required under the second prong of the plain-error analysis), with People v. Stump, 385 Ill. App. 3d 515, 522 (4th Dist. 2008) (\u201cthe error was harmless because (1) all four Zehr principles were addressed to each juror at some point during voir dire, and (2) the evidence presented at trial against defendant was overwhelming\u201d), and People v. Alexander, 391 Ill. App. 3d 419, 433 (3d Dist. 2009) (\u201cWe cannot hold that the failure to follow a supreme court rule standing alone becomes a per se plain error\u201d). See also People v. Matchem, No. 4\u201408\u20140554 (April 9, 2009) (simply followed Stump). Thus, our supreme court vacated opinions on both sides of the issue.\nAlthough several opinions on this issue were not vacated, most of the intact opinions were based on the First District\u2019s opinion in Anderson, which was vacated. The intact opinions include, in chronological order: (1) People v. Graham, 393 Ill. App. 3d 268 (1st Dist. 2009); (2) People v. Wilmington, 394 Ill. App. 3d 567 (1st Dist. 2009); (3) People v. Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d 465 (2d Dist. 2009); (4) People v. Arredondo, 394 Ill. App. 3d 944 (1st Dist. 2009); (5) People v. Madrid, 395 Ill. App. 3d 38 (1st Dist. 2009); (6) People v. Blanton, 396 Ill. App. 3d 230 (4th Dist. 2009); and (7) People v. Russell, 395 Ill. App. 3d 926 (3d Dist. 2009); (8) People v. Alexander, 396 Ill. App. 3d 563 (3d Dist. 2009) (new opinion entered after the original opinion was vacated by the Illinois Supreme Court) (Alexander II); (9) People v. Amerman, 396 Ill. App. 3d 586 (3d Dist. 2009); and (10) People v. Magallanes, 397 Ill. App. 3d 72 (1st Dist. 2009).\nFor the first six opinions, their foundation is the now-vacated Anderson. Graham\u2019s three-justice panel included two of the same panel members as the vacated Anderson, including Anderson\u2019s authoring justice. Not surprisingly, Graham simply adopted Anderson, holding: \u201cOur supreme court has yet to construe the 2007 version of Rule 431(b) at issue in this case. Until that time, we shall continue to follow Anderson ***.\u201d Graham, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 276. In Wilmington, the First District\u2019s next opinion on the subject, we found our prior opinions in Anderson and Graham \u201cmore soundly reasoned\u201d than the decisions by other districts in Stump and Alexander, also now vacated. Wilmington, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 575. In Blair, the Second District decided to join \u201cthe trend of authority\u201d established by us in cases such as Anderson and Graham. Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 481. In Arredondo and Madrid, two First District cases decided on the same day, we held that we \u201ccontinue[d] to adhere to the well-reasoned decisions in Anderson and Graham.\u201d Arredondo, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 955; Madrid, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 48 (same quote in both opinions).\nThe sixth opinion, Blanton, was first filed on June 17, 2009, and then withdrawn, and then refiled on November 10, 2009, without reference to the vacated opinions, but with the same result. Although the refiled Blanton opinion eliminated all explicit citations to Ander son, it still relied on opinions that were built on Anderson, namely, the five opinions discussed above: (1) Graham, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 276; (2) Wilmington, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 575; (3) Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 471; (4) Arredondo, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 955; (5) Madrid, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 47. See Blanton, 396 Ill. App. 3d 230. Thus, even seemingly intact appellate opinions fell like a house of cards after our supreme court removed the bottom one, namely, Anderson.\nOf the 10 intact appellate opinions listed above, only the most recent ones, which are the last four listed, are not based on Anderson. Russell, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 938. For example, in reaching its holding, the Third District in Russell did not cite Anderson or any of the opinions based on Anderson or any of the other vacated opinions. Russell, 395 Ill. App. 3d 926. Relying almost exclusively on Glasper, the Third District in Russell held that the error was not a per se violation requiring \u201cautomatic reversal.\u201d Russell, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 938.\nThe other three most recent appellate opinions, analyzing Glasper, also agree with Russell that this type of error is not a per se violation. Accord People v. Magallanes, 397 Ill. App. 3d 72, 98 (1st Dist. 2009) (\u201cThe holding in Glasper also compels us to reject defendant\u2019s argument that Rule 403(b)(4) errors are automatically reversible\u201d); People v. Amerman, 396 Ill. App. 3d 586, 595 (3d Dist. 2009) (\u201cconsidering Glasper, we hold that the trial court in this case did not commit plain error under either prong of the rule\u201d); People v. Alexander, 396 Ill. App. 3d 563, 577 (3d Dist. 2009) (based upon Glasper, appellate court found that the trial court\u2019s failure to question the venire about the Zehr principles \u201cdid not render the defendant\u2019s trial fundamentally unfair\u201d).\nThe supreme court\u2019s September 30 order had the effect of leaving us with only a few points of intact authority: (1) our supreme court\u2019s recent decision in People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173 (2009); (2) the 2007 amendment itself; and (3) the four most recent appellate decisions discussing Glasper, which have all held that this type of error is not a per se violation. People v. Magallanes, 397 Ill. App. 3d 72, 99-100 (1st Dist. 2009); People v. Amerman, 396 Ill. App. 3d 586, 591 (3d Dist. 2009); People v. Alexander, 396 Ill. App. 3d 563, 573 (3d Dist. 2009); Russell, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 938 (3d Dist. 2009).\nWhen our supreme court vacated four of the appellate opinions on this issue, it directed the appellate court \u201cto reconsider its judgment in light of People v. Glasper,\u201d and we will do just that. E.g., People v. Alexander, 233 Ill. 2d 565 (2009) (\u201cThe appellate court is directed to reconsider its judgment in light of People v. Glasper *** to determine if a different result is warranted\u201d).\ne. Supreme Court\u2019s Decision in Glasper\nIn Glasper, the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with an issue which is almost identical to the issue that we face here: what to do with a trial court\u2019s failure to ask a question required by Supreme Court Rule 431(b). Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 189. In Glasper, our supreme court answered that question by holding that the failure was not a fundamental error and that a harmless error analysis applied. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 199-200. Following the precedent set by our supreme court, we reach the same holding.\nIn Glasper, the rule at issue was the 1997 version of Rule 431(b), which required the trial court to ask about the Zehr principles only if the defense counsel requested an inquiry. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 187. In Glasper, the defense counsel did make the request, making the result the same as it is in the case at bar, namely, that the trial court was required to ask. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 189 (\u201conce a defendant ma[de] a request, the decision to question the venire\u201d became \u201ca requirement\u201d).\nFaced with the failure to ask a required question, our supreme court held that this error did \u201cnot rise to the level of structural error.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 199. Our supreme court \u201cdecline[d] to find that a violation of Rule 431(b) is per se reversible.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 200. Instead our supreme court held that the error did \u201cnot require automatic reversal\u201d and that it was \u201camenable to harmless error review.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 200. In support of its holding, our supreme court observed the questioning set forth in Rule 431(b) was \u201cnot uniformly required in other state and federal jurisdictions.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 198.\nOf course, Glasper is not completely identical to our case. Glasper concerned the 1997 version of the rule, and our supreme court was careful to limit its holding to the version of the rule at that point in time. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 200. Even with this difference in mind, we find that Glasper dictates the holding in the case at bar. The 2007 amendment merely increased what fell under the scope of mandatory, and our supreme court in Glasper already answered what happens when there is a violation of what is mandatory under the rule and what happens is a harmless error analysis. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 199-200.\nThis conclusion is consistent not only with Glasper, but also with other supreme court precedent. As our supreme court stated in Glasper, \u201c[i]t would be inconsistent for this court to hold that a trial court\u2019s failure to question a venire regarding a defendant\u2019s decision not to testify in violation of Rule 431(b) requires automatic reversal, when we have repeatedly held that automatic reversal is not required when a prosecutor mentions a defendant\u2019s post-Miranda silence and commits a Doyle violation.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 198, discussing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 98, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976) (United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution\u2019s use of a defendant\u2019s post -Miranda silence for impeachment purposes is generally a due process violation). See People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 164-68 (2001) (citing cases where the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that a Doyle violation amounted to harmless error).\nThus, Glasper and other supreme court precedent compel us to find that the error was not a fundamental or structural error.\nf. 2007 Amendment\nOur conclusion is supported not only by Glasper and by other supreme court precedent, but also by the 2007 amendment itself.\nIn Glasper, the dissent claimed that the majority opinion \u201crenders this court\u2019s 2007 amendment of Rule 431(b) nonsensical.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 230 (Burke, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.). In other words, there was no point in changing the rule from discretionary to mandatory if its violation will usually be found to be harmless error. Since the trial court will provide the same information to the jury at the end of trial, the jury instructions will contribute to a harmless error finding. Cf. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 201 (\u201ccitizens sworn as jurors\u201d are presumed to follow \u201cthe jury instructions given to them\u201d). In addition, the majority in Glasper held that Rule 431(b)(4) questioning was not \u201cindispensable to a fair trial.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 196. If a failure to ask will be found to be harmless error in most cases, then one could argue that the change from discretionary to mandatory was without any real effect. Since we must interpret all rules to have effect, a lack of effect would render the amendment \u201cnonsensical.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 230 (Burke, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.).\nFirst and foremost, the reason why the change has a real or substantive effect is that trial judges are presumed to follow the law. If we presume that jurors will follow jury instructions, we must also presume that trial courts will follow supreme court rules. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 201 (\u201ccitizens sworn as jurors\u201d are presumed to follow \u201cthe jury instructions given to them\u201d). The effect of the 2007 amendment was to change the inquiry from discretionary unless defense counsel requested it to mandatory at all times. This change took the impetus for the questions from defense counsel alone and placed it \u201csquarely on the shoulders\u201d of all the attorneys in the courtroom: the trial judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel. Russell, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 937 (effect of the 2007 amendment was to \u201cplace the duty squarely on the shoulders of the court\u201d to inquire, and to encourage both counsel to object). Now the trial judge has the responsibility to ask, and the prosecutor has an incentive to see that the judge does.\nIn most of the appellate cases discussed above, the trial court\u2019s error occurred in the months immediately after the 2007 amendment. For example, in the now-vacated Anderson, we observed that the new rule \u201cwent into effect on May 1, 2007,\u201d and jury selection began just \u201cthree weeks later, on May 21, 2007.\u201d Anderson, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 2. In the now-vacated Stump, the jury trial began just six days after the new rule took effect. Stump, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 517 (trial began on May 7, 2007). See also Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 466 (\u201cJury selection commenced on June 11, 2007\u201d); Wilmington, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 570 (\u201cdefendant\u2019s trial occurred in July 2007\u201d); Alexander, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 421 (vacated) (\u201cdefendant\u2019s trial began on October 1, 2007\u201d); Russell, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 927 (trial began October 22, 2007). The rule had stayed the same for a decade, and these early months marked an adjustment period, which is unlikely to be repeated.\nSecond, prosecutors now have an incentive to remind trial judges who forget. A prosecution of a crime is the culmination of a lot of hard work. For example, in the case at bar, three police officers placed themselves at risk on the street to clear a neighborhood of a crack dealer. No prosecutor wants to see an otherwise valid conviction tossed out because the trial court neglected to ask the four questions. As the Third District observed in Russell, \u201call parties and the judge must take care to insure\u201d that the questions are now asked; and the incentive for the prosecutors is \u201cequally serious\u201d to the incentive for the defense counsel. Russell, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 938.\nThird, a harmless error analysis is not toothless. On appeal, once the defendant establishes that an error was made, an appellate court is likely to reverse, unless the appellate record demonstrates that the evidence was \u201coverwhelming\u201d and the error was \u201charmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 202-03. Previously, if defense counsel neglected to ask at trial and the issue was appealed, an appellate court would find that there was no error at all and never even proceed to a harmless error analysis. The difference is that, now, an appellate court is likely to reverse the conviction, if the evidence is not \u201coverwhelming.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 202-03.\nFor these reasons, we find that applying harmless error analysis to a violation of the 2007 amendment does not rob the amendment of its intended effect.\ng. Harmless Error Analysis\nIn Glasper, our supreme court concluded that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,\u201d because \u201c[t]he evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt is overwhelming.\u2019\u2019 Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 202-03. We reach the same conclusion here.\nIn the case at bar, the jury found defendant guilty of the delivery of a controlled substance. The evidence supporting the conviction was overwhelming. An undercover police officer testified that he purchased crack cocaine from defendant. A surveillance officer witnessed the undercover purchase, as well as two more additional transactions in the same location, where defendant exchanged small items for cash. A forensic chemist confirmed that the item purchased during the undercover buy was cocaine. No witnesses testified for the defense. Although the recorded $10 bill used in the undercover purchase was not recovered from defendant, the surveillance officer testified that he observed defendant pull out an unknown amount of money from a wad of bills and hand it to a subsequent purchaser, when defendant was apparently making change.\nIn his argument against a harmless error finding, defendant stated in his appellate brief only that \u201c[t]he evidence in this case turned on the credibility of the officers, and was thus close.\u201d However, defendant\u2019s brief offered no explanation of how the police officers\u2019 credibility had been discredited. Defendant cited in his support two cases: People v. Evans, 369 Ill. App. 3d 366 (4th Dist. 2006), and People v. Wilson, 199 Ill. App. 3d 792 (1st Dist. 1990). In both cases, the appellate court found the evidence closely balanced, where the conviction had forced the jurors to pick one competing witness over another. In Evans, the appellate court found that \u201cthe verdict was based primarily on a credibility determination of the competing theories testified to by the parties\u2019 respective experts.\u201d Evans, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 376. In Wilson, the court found that the verdict \u201crested on the jury\u2019s determination of the relative credibility of the victim\u201d and a witness who had \u201ctestified that the victim had a motive to lie about the assault.\u201d Wilson, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 795. By contrast, in the case at bar, no competing witnesses testified at trial, and thus the jury was not asked to determine \u201crelative credibility.\u201d Wilson, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 795. In the case at bar, the jurors were merely asked to assess the testimony of two police officers, who fully corroborated each other and whose testimony was not called into question by a competing witness, cross-examination or other evidence. The need for this assessment did not make the evidence \u201cclosely balanced.\u201d Evans, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 376; Wilson, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 795.\nFor the reasons discussed above, we find that reversal is not required under either prong of the plain-error doctrine. First, the error was not \u201cso closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant.\u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. Second, the error was \u201cnot so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.\u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471.\n4. Refusal to Rule on Defendant\u2019s Motion\nFourth, defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to rule, until after defendant testified, on defendant\u2019s motion concerning the admissibility of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes. For the reasons discussed below, we find that defendant failed to preserve his objection to the trial court\u2019s refusal to rule.\nPrior to trial, both the State and the defense filed motions concerning the admission of defendant\u2019s prior convictions if he testified. The trial court stated that it \u201cwould reserve ruling on this matter until the defendant has testified.\u201d On appeal, defendant claims that, without knowing how the trial court would rule, he decided not to testify.\nDefendant acknowledges on appeal that the Illinois Supreme Court recently addressed this same issue in People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62 (2009), and that in Patrick, our supreme court held that a defendant who does not testify does not have the \u201cright to appellate review of this issue.\u201d Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 79. Our supreme court clearly stated that \u201cdefendants must take the risk and present the testimony for the issue to be reviewable.\u201d Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 79. However, defendant\u2019s counsel asks us to find that our supreme court\u2019s holding is \u201cerroneous.\u201d Obviously, defense counsel knows that a holding by our supreme court is binding on this court. Presumably, the defense presents this argument in order to preserve it, since our supreme court granted certiorari in a case where a defendant filed a similar motion but did not testify. People v. Averett, 231 Ill. 2d 671 (2009) (granting petition for leave to appeal in People v. Averett, 381 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1020 (2008) (holding that \u201cdefendant\u2019s failure to testify eliminates a circuit court\u2019s refusal to rule as a reviewable issue\u201d)). As the defense is well aware, we must reject this argument, until and if such time that the supreme court rules differently.\n5. State\u2019s Rebuttal Closing\nFifth, defendant claims that prosecutorial misconduct during the State\u2019s rebuttal closing denied defendant a fair trial. For the reasons stated below, we find that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in the State\u2019s rebuttal closing argument when she responded to remarks made during the defense closing.\na. Plain-Error Review\nDefendant failed to object to this issue both at trial and in his posttrial motion. At trial, defendant did not object once during either the State\u2019s initial closing argument or the State\u2019s rebuttal closing argument. In defendant\u2019s posttrial motion, defendant objected both to the jury instruction defining a delivery and to the admission of the police radio messages on hearsay grounds, but he did not raise any objections to the State\u2019s closing arguments.\nAs we already discussed above, to preserve an alleged trial error for appellate review, a defendant must both: (1) specifically object at trial; and (2) raise the specific issue again in a posttrial motion. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 470; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564. However, even when a defendant failed to preserve an error for review, an appellate court may still review for plain error. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 562-63; 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). The plain-error doctrine permits an appellate court to reverse on the basis of unpreserved error if either: (1) the error was \u201cclear or obvious\u201d and the evidence at trial was so closely balanced that this error could have tipped the scales against the defendant; or (2) the unpreserved error was \u201cso serious\u201d that it challenged the integrity of the judicial process and the fairness of defendant\u2019s trial. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. Before a reviewing court analyzes the two prongs of the plain-error doctrine, our first step is to determine whether any error occurred at all. Walker, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 294. For the reasons discussed below, we find that no error occurred.\nb. Standard of Review\nIt is not clear whether the appropriate standard of review for this issue is de novo or abuse of discretion. This court has previously made this same observation in both People v. Phillips, 392 Ill. App. 3d 243, 274-75 (2009), and People v. Johnson, 385 Ill. App. 3d 585, 603 (2008). The Second District recently agreed with our observation that the standard of review for closing remarks is an unsettled issue. People v. Robinson, 391 Ill. App. 3d 822, 839-40 (2009).\nThe confusion stems from an apparent conflict between two supreme court cases: People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 121 (2007), and People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 128, 132 (2000). In Wheeler, our supreme court held: \u201cWhether statements made by a prosecutor at closing argument were so egregious that they warrant a new trial is a legal issue this court reviews de novo.\u201d Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 121. However, the supreme court in Wheeler cited with approval Blue, in which the supreme court had previously applied an abuse-of-discretion standard. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 121. In Blue and numerous other cases, our supreme court had held that the substance and style of closing argument is within the trial court\u2019s discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 128, 132 (\u201cwe conclude that the trial court abused its discretion\u201d by permitting certain prosecutorial remarks in closing); People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 128 (2001); People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 488 (2000); People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 583 (2000); People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 145 (1998); People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 295 (1995). Our supreme court had reasoned: \u201cBecause the trial court is in a better position than a reviewing court to determine the prejudicial effect of any remarks, the scope of closing argument is within the trial court\u2019s discretion.\u201d People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441 (1993). Following Blue and other supreme court cases like it, this court had consistently applied an abuse-of-discretion standard. People v. Tolliver, 347 Ill. App. 3d 203, 224 (2004); People v. Abadia, 328 Ill. App. 3d 669, 678 (2001).\nSince Wheeler, appellate courts have been divided regarding the appropriate standard of review. The first and third divisions of the First District have applied an abuse-of-discretion standard, while the Third and Fourth Districts and the Fifth Division of the First District have applied a de novo standard of review. Compare People v. Love, 377 Ill. App. 3d 306, 313 (1st Dist. 1st Div. 2007) (Wolfson, J.), and People v. Averett, 381 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1007 (1st Dist. 3d Div. 2008), (Quinn, J.), with People v. McCoy, 378 Ill. App. 3d 954, 964 (3d Dist. 2008), People v. Palmer, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1151, 1160 (4th Dist. 2008), People v. Ramos, 396 Ill. App. 3d 869 (1st Dist. 5th Div. 2009) (Toomin, J.), and People v. Vargas, 396 Ill. App. 3d 465 (1st Dist. 5th Div. 2009) (Toomin, J.).\nHowever, we do not need to resolve the issue of the appropriate standard of review at this time, because our holding in this case would be the same under either standard. This is the same approach that we took in both Phillips and Johnson and the same approach taken by the Second District in its recent Robinson opinion. Phillips, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 275; Johnson, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 585; Robinson, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 840 (\u201cIn any event, like the Johnson court, we leave the resolution of this issue to another day, as our conclusion would be the same applying either standard\u201d).\nc. Substantial Prejudice\nA State\u2019s closing will lead to reversal only if the prosecutor\u2019s remarks created \u201csubstantial prejudice.\u201d Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123; Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 64; People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281, 332 (1992) (\u201cThe remarks by the prosecutor, while improper, do not amount to substantial prejudice\u201d). Substantial prejudice occurs \u201cif the improper remarks constituted a material factor in a defendant\u2019s conviction.\u201d Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123.\nWhen reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, a reviewing court will consider the entire closing arguments of both the prosecutor and the defense attorney in order to place the remarks in context. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 122; People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 113 (2003); People v. Tolliver, 347 Ill. App. 3d 203, 224 (2004). A prosecutor has wide latitude during closing argument. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123; Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 127. \u201cIn closing, the prosecutor may comment on the evidence and any fair, reasonable inferences it yields.\u201d People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2005).\n\u201cStatements will not be held improper if they were provoked or invited by the defense counsel\u2019s argument.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 204. For example, in Glasper, defendant argued that the prosecutor had \u201cshifted the burden of proof to defendant\u201d when, in response to defendant\u2019s claim of a coerced confession, the prosecutor had stated in rebuttal closing: \u201c \u2018Where\u2019s the evidence of that?\u2019 \u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 212. Our supreme court held that the comment \u201cdid not shift the burden of proof to defendant,\u201d but that it merely \u201cpointed out that no evidence existed in this case to support defendant\u2019s theory\u201d and that it was \u201cinvited by defense counsel\u2019s argument.\u201d Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 212.\nSimilarly, in the case at bar, we find, for the reasons discussed below, that the prosecutor\u2019s comments in the rebuttal closing did not shift the burden of proof and were invited by the defense counsel\u2019s argument. Although we have reviewed the closing arguments in their entirety, we provide in this opinion only the remarks made by defense counsel to which the prosecutor responded, as well as the remarks by the prosecutor that defendant claims on appeal were objectionable.\nd. Contested Remarks\nOn appeal, defendant complains about three sets of remarks made by the prosecutor during the State\u2019s rebuttal closing, alleging that: (i) one set shifted the burden of proof to defendant by implying that he should have requested scientific testing: (ii) a second set minimized the State\u2019s burden of proof; and (iii) a third set bolstered the credibility of the police witnesses by invoking their authority as police officers.\ni. Scientific Testing\nIn closing argument, defense counsel discussed, at length, the lack of DNA and fingerprint testing, stating:\n\u201cThe Chicago Police Department chose *** not to request any fingerprint evidence in this case. They chose not to request DNA evidence in this case, and they\u2019re the ones who are in custody of the supposed evidence.\nDon\u2019t let the State try and shift that burden on us. We don\u2019t have custody of that evidence. They have custody of that evidence. And three days later, the person in the crime lab has custody of the evidence and is handling it without gloves because no requests have been made.\nYou don\u2019t have to accept that. You don\u2019t have to say that\u2019s okay. They didn\u2019t do a good enough job as far as that\u2019s concerned.\nAnd it\u2019s up to you to tell them that that is not acceptable.\u201d\nOn appeal, defendant challenges the following remarks which the prosecutor made in response. The State confirmed that defendant did not have a burden in this case, but noted that defense counsel had elicited testimony from the State\u2019s forensic expert that requests for DNA or fingerprint testing may be submitted by the police, the State, or the defense. Specifically, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cAnd you heard from ISR the Illinois State Police Crime Lab, Miss Paula Bosco Szum. She as well, thousands of narcotics she\u2019s personally been given to analyze and she specified to you in what situations DNA or fingerprints is [sic] requested of those thousands of times.\nWhat she said matched exactly what the officer said. Counsel is correct. The defendant bears absolutely no burden in this case. But she asked the question of Miss Szum to describe those circumstances.\nWhat was Ms. Szum\u2019s answer? Sometimes, it\u2019s from the police of those two or three times, the State or the Defense.\u201d\nAfter defense counsel argued in its closing \u201c[d]on\u2019t let the State try and shift that burden on us,\u201d the State was almost forced to respond with a denial. The State\u2019s response included drawing the jury\u2019s attention to testimony that the defense had elicited on cross-examination. During direct examination, the State had asked its forensic expert if both the State and the defense could request DNA or fingerprint testing. Instead of objecting to the question, the defense made the strategic decision to explore the topic on cross-examination, eliciting that a defense request had occurred only once during the career of that witness. On appeal, the defendant cannot be heard to complain now about either an argument that he invited or testimony that he elicited. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 205 (\u201cDefendant cannot complain that the State made reference to evidence in closing which defendant helped elicit\u201d).\nii. Burden of Proof\nDefense counsel ended her argument by discussing the State\u2019s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense argued:\n\u201cLet\u2019s talk about reasonable doubt. No [recorded] funds. That\u2019s a reasonable doubt. No drugs recovered on [defendant]. That\u2019s a reasonable doubt. No video equipment used in this case. That\u2019s a reasonable doubt. No audio equipment used in this case. That\u2019s a reasonable doubt.\nThe circumstances of how this identification was constructed. That\u2019s a reasonable doubt. No DNA evidence. That\u2019s a reasonable doubt.\u201d\nOn appeal, defendant challenges the following remarks which the prosecutor made in response:\n\u201c[The defense] bear[s] no burden and let me say to you, ladies and gentleman, this burden, it\u2019s not an impossible burden.\nIt\u2019s not something made up just for [defendant]. It is the same burden in every criminal case across the nation, our nation. People are convicted and tried everyday under the same burden. It\u2019s not impossible. It\u2019s not impossible.\u201d\nThe above remarks were invited by defense\u2019s remarks that the absence of any possible technological tool (DNA testing, video recording, etc.) created a reasonable doubt. The reference to convictions occurring \u201cevery day\u201d was not a reference that we condone; however, its impact was lessened by the State\u2019s immediately following comment that the State\u2019s burden was just short of \u201cimpossible.\u201d Obviously, we on the appellate panel cannot know the tone with which this remark was delivered. We know only that it was neither objected to by the defense counsel who heard it nor cautioned by the trial court, which also heard it. From the cold and silent transcript, we cannot find reversible error from these words.\niii. Police Credibility\nConcerning the police officers\u2019 credibility, defense counsel argued in closing:\n\u201cLet\u2019s talk about the circumstances of the undercover police officer.\nThis person, as he described, he\u2019s talking to for three to five seconds. Bam, that\u2019s it, and you\u2019re going to buy that they gave this detailed description of what this individual looked like?\nYou know how they know what [defendant] was wearing? [Defendant] was arrested. ***\nOf course, [defendant] is going to get identified during this drive by identification because he\u2019s the only individual that is standing there in the custody of two Chicago police officers.\u201d\nDefense counsel accused the police officers of \u201ca lazy job of doing their police work.\u201d\nIn the State\u2019s rebuttal closing, the prosecutor responded:\n\u201cWe are not hiding anything from you, ladies and gentlemen. They want you to believe that these officers are, that they are just lazy and trying to pin cases on this defendant. But why? That\u2019s what you need to ask yourself.\nThey basically want you to believe that these officers are here risking their careers individually and collectively. Why? For him? For less than a gram of cocaine? Does that make any sense to anyone?\u201d\nWithout any evidence in the record of police fraud or misconduct, defense counsel argued in her closing that the police misidentified or framed her client in order to make an arrest. In rebuttal, the State responded: \u201cWhy?\u201d In light of the defense\u2019s remarks, the State\u2019s response was not inappropriate, and thus no error occurred.\nThe remarks, quoted above, certainly did not rise to the level of plain error. Even if the remarks constituted error, they were harmless, in light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant, which was already discussed in subsection (3) (g) of this opinion.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction. We find, first, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving the jury the third paragraph of IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, which clarified that a drug delivery could occur without the transfer of money or other consideration. Second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing police officers to testify about radio messages received from other police officers, who were also trial witnesses. Third, the trial court did err by failing to ask potential jurors whether they understood and accepted the four legal principles listed in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b); however, the error was harmless. Fourth, defendant failed to preserve his objection to the trial court\u2019s refusal to rule, until after defendant testified, on his motion concerning the admissibility of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Fifth, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in the State\u2019s rebuttal closing argument, when she responded to remarks made during the defense closing.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL, EJ., and J. GORDON, J, concur.\nThe trial court stated \u201coverruled\u201d immediately after defense counsel stated \u201cobjection.\u201d Thus, defense counsel did not state the basis for the objection. However, we presume from the context of the record that the basis was hearsay.\nThis opinion omits descriptions of the chain of custody since the defense raised no challenge to it, either at trial or on this appeal.\nThe witness had begun to answer the question when the defense counsel stated \u201cobjection.\u201d After the objection, the witness continued answering. Then the trial court interrupted the witness\u2019s answer to say \u201coverruled,\u201d and the witness finished his answer. As a result, defense counsel did not have an opportunity to state the basis for his objection; however, we presume from the context of the record that the basis was hearsay.\nIn his appellate reply brief, the defendant states that he \u201chas never challenged that this [paragraph 3] was an incorrect statement of law.\u201d\nIn his posttrial motion, defendant raised boilerplate claims such as a denial of due process and equal protection, and the State\u2019s failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The claims specific to defendant\u2019s case were that the trial court \u201cerred in giving instructions on behalf of the State over the Defendant\u2019s objection\u201d and \u201cerred by allowing Chicago Police Officers to testify to the content of their radio transmissions, thereby allowing the jury to hear impermissible hearsay evidence.\u201d\nSeveral appellate court opinions that cite Rule 431(b) are not included in our summary because they concern different questions. People v. Belknap, 396 Ill. App. 3d 183 (2009); People v. Vargas, 396 Ill. App. 3d 465 (2009). First, although Belknap was decided on the basis of Rule 431(b), it did not consider whether the failure to ask the four Zehr questions was a fundamental or structural error, requiring automatic reversal. Instead, the Belknap court reversed under the first prong of the plain-error doctrine, after finding that the trial court\u2019s failure to ask was error and that the evidence was closely balanced. The Belknap court did not discuss the second prong of the plain-error doctrine, and thus it never considered whether the failure to inquire about the four Zehr principles challenged the integrity of the judicial process. Second, Vargas did not concern a failure to inquire but rather concerned the form that a proper inquiry should take. Third, our summary also does not include appellate court opinions that discussed either the prior version of Rule 431(b) or whether the 2007 amendment has retroactive application. E.g., People v. Schmidt, 392 Ill. App. 3d 689, 710 (2009); People v. Braboy, 393 Ill. App. 3d 100, 109 (2009).\nThe concurrence and dissent in People v. Moore, decided two days before Christmas 2009, discuss Glasper, but not on a Ze/ir-related topic. For this reason, the Moore opinion is not included in our summary. People v. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d 555 (2009).\nIn addition to vacating the four opinions on September 30, 2009, our supreme court also vacated six orders from the Fourth District that were not published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. People v. Bui, No. 4 \u2014 07\u20140651 (February 23, 2009); People v. Dillard, No. 4\u201407\u20140977 (January 21, 2009); People v. Harris, No. 4\u201407\u20140821 (February 3, 2009); People v. Roberson, No. 4\u201407\u20140864 (February 18, 2009); People v. Williams, 4 \u2014 08\u20140576 (May 18, 2009); People v. Wright, No. 4 \u2014 07\u20140894 (September 26, 2008).\nFor the reasons discussed in footnote 8, People v. Owens, 394 Ill. App. 3d 147 (2009), is not included in our list.\nWe do not include Owens in our list because, even though it was decided months after Glasper, it did not discuss or make any reference at all to this controlling supreme court opinion. Owens, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 148-55 (not a single cite to Glasper). In addition, the Fourth District in Owens took a hybrid approach. It affirmed its prior opinion in Stump (later vacated), which had applied a harmless error analysis. However, it held that, on \u201cthe record here,\u201d the failure to inquire about the four Zehr principles challenged the integrity of the judicial process. Owens, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 153. Thus, Owens did not hold either (1) that the failure to inquire was a per se violation requiring automatic reversal or (2) that harmless error analysis always applied. Owens, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 152-54.\nSeveral of the opinions stated the offense date but not the trial date. Arredondo, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 945 (the offense occurred on June 3, 2006); Graham, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 269 (the offense occurred on September 28, 2006); Madrid, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 39 (the offense occurred in 2004).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, and Scott Main, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Douglas Harvath, and Joseph Alexander, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRELL HAMMONDS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201408\u20140194\nOpinion filed February 11, 2010.\nRehearing denied May 17, 2010.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, and Scott Main, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Douglas Harvath, and Joseph Alexander, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0927-01", "first_page_order": 943, "last_page_order": 981 }