{ "id": 4299774, "name": "ITALIA FOODS, INC., Indiv. and as the Representative of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SUN TOURS, INC., d/b/a Hobbit Travel, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Italia Foods, Inc. v. Sun Tours, Inc.", "decision_date": "2010-02-24", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201408\u20141148", "first_page": "1038", "last_page": "1073", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 1038" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "268 A.D.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 146016 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "adopting \"acknowledgment\" approach and rejecting \"opt-in\" approach on the bases of supremacy-clause considerations, the statute's framework, and its legislative history" }, { "page": "372", "parenthetical": "adopting \"acknowledgment\" approach and rejecting \"opt-in\" approach on the bases of supremacy-clause considerations, the statute's framework, and its legislative history" }, { "page": "177-78" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/268/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 F.3d 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 939809 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/436/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 F.3d 1112", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3762684 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1118" }, { "page": "1120", "parenthetical": "holding that TCPA claims are not assignable under Colorado law because they are in the nature of personal-injury privacy claims and declining to address whether TCPA claims are unassignable because they are penal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/476/1112-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 F.3d 446", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1241128 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450-51" }, { "page": "450-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/427/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 F.3d 1146", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7653229 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/106/1146-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 F.3d 898", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1318681, 1318694 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/140/0898-02", "/f3d/140/0898-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 F.3d 1287", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1235630 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/136/1287-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 F.3d 513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1567059 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/156/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 F.3d 432", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1567056 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/156/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 F.3d 911", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11474903 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/204/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 F.3d 939", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9190270 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "943", "parenthetical": "TCPA protects company's property rights in that it avoids consumption of the recipient's ink and paper" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/392/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 F.3d 631", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 8972912 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639", "parenthetical": "\"Junk faxes cause some economic damage\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/407/0631-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3516545 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "\"it has long been recognized that corporations generally possess the power to assign choses in action, provided the assignments are made for a legitimate corporate purpose and violate no express restrictions in the corporate charter\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 F. Supp. 2d 739", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5605032 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" }, { "page": "743" }, { "page": "743" }, { "page": "743" }, { "page": "743" }, { "page": "743-44" }, { "page": "743-44" }, { "page": "743-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/521/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 P.3d 1198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 8393782 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1200-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/178/1198-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 F. Supp. 2d 836", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9104693 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/269/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 F. App'x 201", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. App'x", "case_ids": [ 919748 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-appx/157/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 F. 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Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3153415 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/432/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "869 N.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 Mass. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 3817191 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/449/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 F.3d 1303", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3859097 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1311", "parenthetical": "citing cases and noting that TCPA's statutory damages provision is not punitive" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/545/1303-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ohio App. 3d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3855757 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/182/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083629 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625191 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" }, { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604683 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "379" }, { "page": "365-68" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3176934 ], "year": 1897, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117", "parenthetical": "in reviewing common law, noting that personal-injury actions are not assignable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/171/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 10901465 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "\"The general rule is that the right to collect a penalty is a personal right which is not assignable\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/658/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705711 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6209106 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844" }, { "page": "704" }, { "page": "2782" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7328792 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" }, { "page": "742" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/374/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "855 So. 2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9090671 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647-48", "parenthetical": "rejecting \"opt-in\" approach; adopting \"acknowledgment\" approach on the bases of supremacy clause, statute's language, and legislative history" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/855/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "808 N.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779-81", "parenthetical": "rejecting \"opt-in\" approach; adopting \"acknowledgment\" approach on the bases of supremacy-clause principles, statute's language and legislative history, and other courts' decisions; declining to address whether states may \"opt-out\"" }, { "page": "780-81" }, { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "411 Mass. 754", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 3898481 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755-59", "parenthetical": "rejecting \"opt-in\" approach; adopting \"acknowledgment\" approach on the bases of supremacy-clause principles, statute's language and legislative history, and other courts' decisions; declining to address whether states may \"opt-out\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/411/0754-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 P.3d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 8899673 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354-55", "parenthetical": "relying on statute's legislative history and language and interpreting the \"acknowledgment\" approach as avoiding the constitutional problems of the \"opt-in\" and \"opt-out\" approaches" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354", "parenthetical": "further noting that early cases failed to address this constitutional issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/121/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 A.D.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 202744 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849", "parenthetical": "citing International Science and noting the absence of any state statute declining to exercise jurisdiction over TCPA claims" }, { "page": "800-01", "parenthetical": "citing International Science and noting the absence of any state statute declining to exercise jurisdiction over TCPA claims" }, { "page": "849" }, { "page": "799" }, { "page": "849" }, { "page": "800-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/266/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ga. App. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 126646 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365-66", "parenthetical": "finding no clear authority, construing TCPA to provide a remedy for Georgia citizens, finding International Science persuasive, and determining that Georgia law did not expressly prohibit private TCPA actions" }, { "page": "470-71", "parenthetical": "finding no clear authority, construing TCPA to provide a remedy for Georgia citizens, finding International Science persuasive, and determining that Georgia law did not expressly prohibit private TCPA actions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/245/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.J. Super. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 186114 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "following International Science and rejecting \"opt-in\" arguments" }, { "page": "598", "parenthetical": "following International Science and rejecting \"opt-in\" arguments" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/343/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.W.3d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 9408757 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910", "parenthetical": "following International Science and rejecting \"opt-in\" approach" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/79/0907-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 3d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "relying on International Science, noting that the \"opt-in\" approach has been criticized and is the minority view, and noting that California had not prohibited TCPA actions in state court" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Cal. App. 4th 886", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 648706 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895", "parenthetical": "relying on International Science, noting that the \"opt-in\" approach has been criticized and is the minority view, and noting that California had not prohibited TCPA actions in state court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/110/0886-01" ] }, { "cite": "878 So. 2d 1158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9194369 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1164", "parenthetical": "considering only \"opt-out\" and \"opt-in\" approaches and adopting \"opt-out\" approach on the basis of supremacy-clause principles" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/878/1158-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Nev. 929", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 8389061 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "932", "parenthetical": "adopting \"opt-out\" approach on the basis of supremacy-clause considerations" }, { "page": "1160", "parenthetical": "adopting \"opt-out\" approach on the basis of supremacy-clause considerations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/121/0929-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 U.S. 386", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 353999 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" }, { "page": "972" }, { "page": "814-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/330/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C. \u00a71331", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2009 OK 37", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "OK", "case_ids": [ 6997039 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b613" }, { "page": "1205" }, { "page": "\u00b6112" }, { "page": "1204" }, { "page": "\u00b6112, 19" }, { "page": "1201, 1207" }, { "page": "\u00b612" }, { "page": "1204" }, { "page": "\u00b613" }, { "page": "1205" }, { "page": "\u00b614" }, { "page": "1205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/212/1199-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 F. Supp. 2d 789", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9215888 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" }, { "page": "798" }, { "page": "798" }, { "page": "799" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/329/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444598 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3617266 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607037 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463072 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060212 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" }, { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 F.3d 507", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11887830 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "hereinafter Houston Cellular" }, { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/131/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "956 A.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8208618 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" }, { "page": "676-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/956/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 U.S.C. \u00a7201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Stat. 2394", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "556 U.S. 729", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3653240 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735-36" }, { "page": "928", "parenthetical": "presumption of concurrent jurisdiction is defeated in only two narrow circumstances: when Congress expressly ousts state courts of jurisdiction and when a state court refuses jurisdiction on the basis of a neutral state rule of court administration" }, { "page": "2114", "parenthetical": "presumption of concurrent jurisdiction is defeated in only two narrow circumstances: when Congress expressly ousts state courts of jurisdiction and when a state court refuses jurisdiction on the basis of a neutral state rule of court administration" }, { "page": "735-36" }, { "page": "928" }, { "page": "2114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/556/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 U.S. 455", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11332379 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" }, { "page": "795" }, { "page": "894" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/493/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 Md. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2186214 ], "weight": 24, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "715" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "706-07" }, { "page": "11", "parenthetical": "relying on statute's language, legislative history, and supremacy-clause considerations, and other states' decisions" }, { "page": "710-11" }, { "page": "13-14" }, { "page": "715" }, { "page": "15-16" }, { "page": "714" }, { "page": "15-16" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "713-14" }, { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "further noting that, in many states, state supreme courts do not have constitutional authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure" }, { "page": "710-11" }, { "page": "13-14" }, { "page": "715-16" }, { "page": "16-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/382/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 U.S. 473", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722966 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478", "parenthetical": "\"In considering the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular federal claim, the Court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction\"" }, { "page": "791", "parenthetical": "\"In considering the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular federal claim, the Court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction\"" }, { "page": "2875", "parenthetical": "\"In considering the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular federal claim, the Court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction\"" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "791" }, { "page": "2875" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "791" }, { "page": "2875" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "791" }, { "page": "2875" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "791" }, { "page": "2875" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/453/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 356", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12123304 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "2438" }, { "page": "372" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "372" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "369-72" }, { "page": "348-51" }, { "page": "367-72" }, { "page": "347-51" }, { "page": "374" }, { "page": "352" }, { "page": "374-75" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821397 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "224", "parenthetical": "\"[tjhis court has held that a cause of action cannot be assigned if such assignment violates public policy, even if such an action would otherwise survive the death of the owner\"" }, { "page": "224" }, { "page": "225" }, { "page": "225" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "226-27" }, { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "only torts for personal injuries and actions for other wrongs of a personal nature are unassignable" }, { "page": "224-25" }, { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 538", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716351 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.W.3d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 8990544 ], "weight": 25, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "hereinafter Chair King" }, { "page": "710" }, { "page": "714" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "712" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "715" }, { "page": "715-16" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716-17", "parenthetical": "proviso \"indicates deliberate deference to an area of uniquely state concern\"" }, { "page": "717" }, { "page": "718" }, { "page": "718" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "715" }, { "page": "715-16" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/184/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3011220 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" }, { "page": "738" }, { "page": "739", "parenthetical": "holding that section 14 - 6 of the Eavesdropping Act, which lists three civil remedies available for violations thereunder - injunctive relief and actual and punitive damages - is not a statutory penalty" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C. \u00a71658", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 U.S.C. \u00a7227", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 25, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)(B)" }, { "page": "(b)(1)" }, { "page": "(f)(l)" }, { "page": "(f)(2)" }, { "page": "(f)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(l)(C)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)(B)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(f)(l)" }, { "page": "(c)(5)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(l)(A)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2341, "char_count": 90872, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14470071421152353 }, "sha256": "6d7b59169b4e188a6608795a5741ca3f3a3323be35c44eb4cb84f342c125b1bf", "simhash": "1:bb4af184630425a6", "word_count": 14384 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:29.923092+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ITALIA FOODS, INC., Indiv. and as the Representative of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SUN TOURS, INC., d/b/a Hobbit Travel, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JORGENSEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nI. INTRODUCTION\nIn this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308), we are asked to answer three certified questions:\n\u201c(1) Does the language and purpose of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act [(TCPA) (47 U.S.C. \u00a7227 (2000))] require that the Illinois General Assembly enact enabling legislation before private TCPA claims can be brought and enforced in Illinois state courts?\n(2) Are the TCPA claims alleged in this case \u2018statutory penalties\u2019 under Illinois law?\nAnd if so:\n(a) Are those claims assignable under Illinois law?\n(b) Does Illinois\u2019 two[-]year statutory penalty limitations period [(735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 2002))] apply to such claims, as opposed to [the federal four-year limitations period for civil actions (28 U.S.C. \u00a71658 (2000))]?\n(3) If the claim is not assignable, then should absent class members\u2019 putative claims against defendants be treated as tolled when no class representative with proper standing represented the putative class for a 27-month period?\u201d\nWe answer the first certified question in the negative. Specifically, the Illinois General Assembly need not enact enabling legislation before private TCPA claims can be brought and enforced in Illinois state courts. As to the second certified question, we modify the first two parts of the question and conclude that TCPA claims are remedial and assignable and, alternatively, that (whether or not they are remedial) they are assignable because they do not constitute personal-injury actions. Further, we conclude that we need not answer subsection (b) of the second certified question (concerning the appropriate statute of limitations). Finally, because we conclude that the TCPA claims are assignable, we do not address the third certified question.\nII. BACKGROUND\nOn June 13, 2003, in a class action complaint, Eclipse Manufacturing Company, an Illinois corporation, sued Sun Tours, d/b/a Hobbit Travel, a travel agency, alleging that, in July and August 2002, Hobbit Travel sent Eclipse four unsolicited one-page faxes advertising discounted travel offers. Eclipse further alleged that Hobbit Travel\u2019s actions violated the TCPA and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2002)) and constituted common-law conversion. As to the TCPA claim, Eclipse sought statutory and punitive damages, an injunction, and attorney fees. Eclipse subsequently amended its complaint, adding Hobbit Travel\u2019s president, Paul Grosso, as a defendant.\nOn April 5, 2007, Hobbit Travel moved to dismiss Eclipse\u2019s amended complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the TCPA claim was not cognizable in Illinois because the operative language of the TCPA\u2014 namely, that state court TCPA actions must be \u201cotherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State\u201d (47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) (2000))\u2014 required the Illinois General Assembly to affirmatively opt in to the TCPA\u2019s enforcement scheme, which it had not done. On July 26, 2007, the trial court denied Hobbit Travel\u2019s motion as to the TCPA claim, finding that TCPA claims may be brought in Illinois courts.\nOn August 30, 2007, Robert Hinman, Eclipse\u2019s president and owner, was substituted in for Eclipse as plaintiff by filing a second amended complaint. Hinman alleged that the same four faxes were transmitted to him and not to Eclipse. He further alleged that, on November 30, 2005, several years after receiving Hobbit Travel\u2019s faxes, he sold Eclipse\u2019s stock to a third party, but expressly retained the right to pursue this TCPA action by virtue of an assignment of that claim (from Eclipse to Hinman).\nOn October 1, 2007, defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint. They challenged Eclipse\u2019s assignment of its TCPA claim to Hinman, arguing that the claim was not assignable because it constituted a statutory penalty. Defendants argued that the TCPA\u2019s fixed award of $500 per violation (47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3)(B) (2000)) made the claim a statutory penalty under the test this court set forth in McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Levine, 108 Ill. App. 3d 732, 738 (1982). Defendants thus asserted that Eclipse\u2019s assignment of the TCPA claim to Hinman was invalid because the majority rule provides that claims under penal statutes are not assignable. They also argued that Hinman\u2019s claims were time-barred because they were brought over five years after each of the four faxes was allegedly received (in July and August 2002).\nOn January 31, 2008, Italia Foods, Inc., sought leave to substitute in for Hinman and file a third amended complaint, asserting that it had received over 25 faxes from defendants. Over Hobbit Travel\u2019s objection, the trial court granted Italia Foods\u2019 motion and subsequently allowed Hobbit Travel to file a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint, incorporating its arguments concerning Hinman\u2019s invalid assignment from Eclipse.\nIn the third amended complaint, dated February 28, 2008, Italia Foods alleged that Hobbit Travel sent it 28 unsolicited one-page faxes from June 24, 2005, through April 17, 2007, advertising discount travel deals. Italia Foods further alleged that Hobbit Travel\u2019s actions violated the TCPA and Fraud Act and constituted common-law conversion. As to the TCPA claim, Italia Foods sought $500 in statutory damages for each violation, an injunction, and costs.\nHobbit Travel moved to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619 (West 2002)) portions of Italia Foods\u2019 complaint, arguing that: (1) TCPA claims are not cognizable in Illinois courts for the reasons set forth in Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. 2006) (hereinafter Chair King); (2) the limitations period for TCPA claims should be measured from the filing of Italia Foods\u2019 third amended complaint on February 28, 2008, and not from Eclipse\u2019s original complaint (filed June 13, 2003); (3) the applicable limitations period for TCPA claims is two years (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 2002)), as opposed to four years (28 U.S.C. \u00a71658 (2000)) as argued by Italia Foods; and (4) the limitations period was not tolled during the 27-month period from November 30, 2005 (when Eclipse lost standing to bring its claims), to February 28, 2008 (when Italia Foods filed its complaint), as neither Eclipse nor Hinman had standing during this time.\nIn response, Italia Foods invoked the class tolling rule announced in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. State, 414 U.S. 538, 38 L. Ed. 2d 713, 94 S. Ct. 756 (1974), arguing that it preserved the otherwise stale claims of putative class members back to June 13, 1999, four years before Eclipse\u2019s original complaint. Hobbit Travel replied that the putative class\u2019s claims could not be tolled under American Pipe due to the time that lapsed before Italia Foods replaced Hinman as the named plaintiff. According to Hobbit Travel, Eclipse could not have validly assigned its TCPA claim to Hinman under Illinois law, because such a claim constituted a statutory penalty; therefore, a 27-month gap (November 30, 2005, when Eclipse purported to assign its claims to Hinman, to February 28, 2008, when Italia Foods replaced Hinman as the named plaintiff) existed during which no named plaintiff with proper standing represented the putative class.\nOn August 26, 2008, the trial court denied Hobbit Travel\u2019s motion to dismiss Italia Foods\u2019 TCPA claim. The court rejected Hobbit Travel\u2019s Chair King argument that TCPA claims are not cognizable in Illinois state courts. It further found that Eclipse\u2019s TCPA claim was assignable to Hinman under Kleinwort Benson North America, Inc. v. Quantum Financial Services, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 214 (1998), which had allowed a company to assign a punitive damages claim to its shareholders. The court further found that the TCPA is not a penal statute and that TCPA claims are subject to the federal four-year statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. \u00a71658 (2000)). Finally, the court found that the American Pipe tolling doctrine applied and that the class\u2019s claims related back to June 13, 1999.\nOn November 20, 2008, the court granted Hobbit Travel\u2019s motion to make Rule 308 findings, and, on December 2, 2008, it entered an order certifying three questions. Hobbit Travel petitioned for leave to appeal to this court, and, on February 25, 2009, we allowed the appeal as to the three certified questions.\nIII. ANALYSIS\nA. Jurisdiction of Illinois Courts Over TCPA Claims\nThe first certified question asks: \u201cDoes the language and purpose of the federal [TCPA] require that the Illinois General Assembly enact enabling legislation before private TCPA claims can be brought and enforced in Illinois state courts?\u201d Defendants urge us to answer \u201cyes\u201d to this question and order that Italia Foods\u2019 TCPA claim be dismissed with prejudice because it is undisputed that the General Assembly never passed legislation authorizing TCPA suits in this state. Before addressing the parties\u2019 specific arguments, we first provide an overview of some constitutional considerations and the statute.\n1. Supremacy Clause\nThe supremacy clause provides: \u201cThis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof *** shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.\u201d U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.\n\u201cFederal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress has determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened or that state courts might provide a more convenient forum \u2014 although both might well be true \u2014 but because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws \u2018the supreme Law of the Land,\u2019 and charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their regular modes of procedure.\u201d Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332, 347, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2438 (1990).\nThere is a presumption, therefore, that federal causes of action are enforceable in state courts. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478, 69 L. Ed. 2d 784, 791, 101 S. Ct. 2870, 2875 (1981) (\u201cIn considering the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular federal claim, the Court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction\u201d); see also R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors\u2019 Alert, Inc., 382 Md. 689, 715, 857 A.2d 1, 16 (2004) (\u201cTypically, when Congress creates a civil cause of action, it authorizes federal trial courts to entertain the cause of action. It sometimes expressly grants concurrent jurisdiction to state trial courts. When Congress is silent concerning state court jurisdiction over federal causes of action, there is a \u2018deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction,\u2019 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459, 110 S. Ct. 792, 795, 107 L. Ed. 2d 887, 894 (1990)\u201d).\nOnly in limited cases may a state discriminate against federal causes of action, because, where it does so, the state\u2019s law generally violates the supremacy clause. R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 715, 857 A.2d at 16. \u201cCongress, however, may confine jurisdiction to the federal courts either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.\u201d Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 791, 101 S. Ct. at 2875; cf. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735-36, 173 L. Ed. 2d 920, 928, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009) (presumption of concurrent jurisdiction is defeated in only two narrow circumstances: when Congress expressly ousts state courts of jurisdiction and when a state court refuses jurisdiction on the basis of a neutral state rule of court administration). Generally, a state may apply to the federal cause of action a neutral rule of court administration, unless that rule is preempted by federal law. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 351, 110 S. Ct. at 2440-41; see also Haywood, 556 U.S. at 735-36, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 928, 129 S. Ct. at 2114, quoting Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 458, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 894, 110 S. Ct. at 795 (\u201c[Ojnly a neutral jurisdictional rule will be deemed a \u2018valid excuse\u2019 for departing from the default assumption that \u2018state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States\u2019 \u201d).\n2. TCPA\nThe TCPA was enacted in 1991 (Pub. L. No. 102 \u2014 243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991)) and it amended Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. \u00a7201 et seq. (1994)), principally by adding a new section (47 U.S.C. \u00a7227 (1994)). The statute places restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the home and restricts certain uses of facsimile machines and automatic dialers. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(1) (2000). The TCPA \u201cseeks to address the increased use of automated telephone equipment to make telephone calls in bulk and fax unsolicited advertisements that cross state lines and fall outside the regulatory jurisdiction of individual states.\u201d Portuguese American Leadership Council of the United States, Inc. v. Investors\u2019 Alert, Inc., 956 A.2d 671, 674 (D.C. 2008).\nThe statute contains some \u201cunusual\u201d features. Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1997) (hereinafter Houston Cellular). The TCPA \u201ccreates a federal private right of action, but *** confers exclusive jurisdiction on state courts to entertain it.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 710. The statute also contains a federal enforcement component that authorizes state Attorneys General to bring civil actions in federal court on behalf of their state residents to obtain injunctive relief against unauthorized telephone calls and facsimiles and to recover monetary damages. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(f)(l) (2000). The TCPA provides that the federal district courts have \u201cexclusive jurisdiction\u201d over actions brought by state Attorneys General. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(f)(2) (2000). The statute also authorizes the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to intervene as of right in any state Attorney General\u2019s action. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(f)(3) (2000).\nAs relevant here, the TCPA prohibits the \u201cuse [of] any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine.\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(l)(C) (2000). The statute\u2019s first private right of action, which targets the misuse of fax machines, prerecorded message technology, or automatic dialing machines, is contained in section 227(b)(3):\n\u201cA person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State\u2014\n(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation,\n(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or\n(C) both such actions.\nIf the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) (2000).\nThe first certified question concerns the congressional intent underlying the foregoing emphasized language and its relationship with state law. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005). The best indicator of the legislature\u2019s intent is the language in the statute, which must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning. King, 215 Ill. 2d at 26. In addition to the statutory language, courts may consider the purpose behind the law and the evils sought to be remedied, as well as the consequences that would result from construing the law one way or the other. Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill. 2d 480, 487 (2004). Where a statute is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute will be deemed ambiguous. General Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Vehicle Review Board, 224 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2007). In such cases, courts may consider extrinsic aids to construction, such as legislative history. County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill. 2d 593, 604 (2008). Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review. Harrisonville Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 212 Ill. 2d 237, 247 (2004).\nWe conclude that the phrase \u201cif otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State\u201d is ambiguous, as it is unclear what, if any, state action is required before private actions may commence in state courts. Indeed, three general interpretations of the TCPA\u2019s \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language have emerged: (1) the \u201copt-out\u201d approach; (2) the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach; and (3) the \u201copt-in\u201d approach. Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Personal Communications, L.P., 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (M.D. La. 2004). We conclude below that the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach is the correct framework to analyze the TCPA\u2019s private right of action.\na. \u201cOpt-out\u201d Approach\nThe \u201copt-out\u201d approach interprets the TCPA\u2019s \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language to authorize private TCPA suits in state courts without affirmative state action. MLC Mortgage Corp. v. Sun America Mortgage Co., 2009 OK 37, \u00b613, 212 P.3d 1199, 1205. However, the theory allows states to legislatively decline to address such suits. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 714. The courts adopting the \u201copt-out\u201d approach generally base their reasoning on language in the Fourth Circuit\u2019s decision in International Science.\nThe International Science court addressed three issues. First, it was presented with the question whether the permissive language of the TCPA\u2019s private-action provision at issue here \u2014 that a private action \u201cmay\u201d be brought in state courts \u2014 does not make state court jurisdiction exclusive. The Fourth Circuit held that Congress did not intend to grant jurisdiction over private actions to federal courts, where it mentioned only state courts in the provision. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1152. The court relied on the fact that federal courts require specific grants of jurisdiction; that the statute specifically provides that private actions may be brought in state courts and that actions by the states must be brought in federal courts; that Congress explicitly provided for concurrent jurisdiction in other sections of the Communications Act; and that the TCPA\u2019s legislative history\u2019s reference to small-claims courts supports a conclusion that the claims are best resolved in state courts. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1151-53. The second issue the court addressed involved whether the general federal-question jurisdictional statute (28 U.S.C. \u00a71331 (1994)) confers on federal courts jurisdiction over private actions. The court held that it does not, because the \u201cparticularized congressional intent manifested in 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) governs, not the general proposition announced in \u00a71331.\u201d International Science, 106 F.3d at 1155. Third, the International Science court addressed whether finding exclusive state jurisdiction raised constitutional questions, specifically: (1) whether it would result in a violation of the equal protection clause; and (2) whether it would infringe on the states\u2019 tenth amendment rights to govern without interference from the federal government. As to equal protection, the court stated, in response to an argument that the \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d proviso violates equal protection because it allows a private cause of action only where a state has no statutory prohibition against unsolicited fax transmissions and, therefore, citizens of states that have no prohibition would not have the benefit of the federal statute:\n\u201cThe clause in 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) \u2018if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State\u2019 does not condition the substantive right to be free from unsolicited faxes on state approval. Indeed, that substantive right is enforceable by state attorneys general or the [FCC] irrespective of the availability of a private [right of] action in state court. Rather, the clause recognizes that states may refuse to exercise jurisdiction authorized by the statute.\u201d (Emphases added.) International Science, 106 F.3d at 1156.\nThe court noted that, to the extent the existence of a private right of action varied between the states, state and federal governments could still enforce the same substantive rights in federal court, and this inequality was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest:\n\u201c[C]ongress understandably avoided opening federal courts to the millions of potential private TCPA claims by authorizing private actions only in state courts, presumably in the small claims courts. Similarly concerned over the potential impact of private actions on the administration of state courts, Congress included a provision to allow the states to prohibit private TCPA actions in their courts. *** With those interests in mind and recognizing that other enforcement mechanisms are available in the TCPA, we believe Congress acted rationally in *** allowing states to close [their courts] to the millions of private actions that could be filed if only a small portion of each year\u2019s 6.57 billion telemarketing transmissions were illegal under the TCPA.\u201d International Science, 106 F.3d at 1157.\nAddressing the tenth amendment, the court held that Congress did not overstep the amendment when it enacted the TCPA, because it explicitly recognized the \u201cstates\u2019 power to reject enforcement in their courts of the federally created right.\u201d International Science, 106 F.3d at 1157. The court acknowledged that, in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394, 91 L. Ed. 967, 972, 67 S. Ct. 810, 814-15 (1947), the Supreme Court held that the supremacy clause precludes state courts from refusing to enforce federal claims. However, the court also noted that Testa\u2019s holding was limited to federal enactments that provide for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, which is not the case with the TCPA, which provides for exclusive state jurisdiction. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1157-58. For this reason, the court declined to extend Testa to the TCPA, noting that adopting an \u201copt-out\u201d approach would avoid the constitutional issue left undecided by Testa\u2014 whether the TCPA violates the tenth amendment by coercing states to enforce federal law: \u201cCongress enacted the TCPA to assist states where they lacked jurisdiction; it empowered states themselves to enforce the TCPA in federal court; it authorized private enforcement exclusively in state courts; and it recognized state power to reject Congress\u2019 authorization.\u201d International Science, 106 F.3d at 1158.\nBy this court\u2019s count, seven states\u2019 courts appear to have concluded that the \u201copt-out\u201d approach is the correct framework. See Edwards v. Direct Access, LLC, 121 Nev. 929, 932, 124 P.3d 1158, 1160 (2005) (adopting \u201copt-out\u201d approach on the basis of supremacy-clause considerations); Lary v. Flasch Business Consulting, 878 So. 2d 1158, 1164 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (considering only \u201copt-out\u201d and \u201copt-in\u201d approaches and adopting \u201copt-out\u201d approach on the basis of supremacy-clause principles); Kaufman v. ACS Systems, Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 886, 895, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 304 (2003) (relying on International Science, noting that the \u201copt-in\u201d approach has been criticized and is the minority view, and noting that California had not prohibited TCPA actions in state court); Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 907, 910 (Mo. 2002) (following International Science and rejecting \u201copt-in\u201d approach); Zelma v. Market U.S.A., 343 N.J. Super. 356, 366, 778 A.2d 591, 598 (App. Div. 2001) (following International Science and rejecting \u201copt-in\u201d arguments); Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 245 Ga. App. 363, 365-66, 537 S.E.2d 468, 470-71 (2000) (finding no clear authority, construing TCPA to provide a remedy for Georgia citizens, finding International Science persuasive, and determining that Georgia law did not expressly prohibit private TCPA actions); Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle, 266 A.D.2d 848, 849, 698 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800-01 (1999) (citing International Science and noting the absence of any state statute declining to exercise jurisdiction over TCPA claims).\nOne court has commented that the International Science court \u201cneglected to realize that allowing states to \u2018opt-out\u2019 could create a different constitutional issue, namely[,] whether Congress can give a state authority to arbitrarily close its courts to a federal remedy. It is this constitutional consideration which forms the basis of the \u2018acknowledgment\u2019 approach.\u201d Accounting Outsourcing, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 798.\nb. \u201cAcknowledgment\u201d Approach\nThe \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach requires \u201cno enabling legislation for parties to assert private TCPA claims.\u201d MLC Mortgage Corp., 2009 OK 37, \u00b6112, 212 P.3d 1199, 1204. Courts adopting this approach, of which there are seven, interpret the TCPA\u2019s \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d clause as merely acknowledging \u201cthe principle that states have the right to structure their own court systems and that state courts are not obligated to change their procedural rules to accommodate TCPA claims.\u201d Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 268 A.D.2d 174, 179, 710 N.Y.S.2d 368, 372 (2000) (adopting \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach and rejecting \u201copt-in\u201d approach on the bases of supremacy-clause considerations, the statute\u2019s framework, and its legislative history); see also MLC Mortgage Corp., 2009 OK 37, \u00b6112, 19, 212 P.3d 1199, 1201, 1207 (adopting \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach on the bases that the legislature previously recognized that an analogous state-law claim may be criminally prosecuted and that the Oklahoma Constitution guarantees Oklahoma citizens open access to the judicial system and allocates \u201cunlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise restricted to the district courts\u201d); Portuguese American Leadership Council of the United States, Inc., 956 A.2d at 677-80 & n.8 (noting default rule that federal laws are enforceable in state courts unless there is an explicit statutory directive and adopting \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach by relying on statute\u2019s language, which the court read to refer to neutral laws and rules governing each state\u2019s court system, in addition to the statute\u2019s purpose, legislative history, and FCC interpretation; also concluding that it need not decide whether District of Columbia is free to \u201copt out\u201d); Consumer Crusade, Inc. v. Affordable Health Care Solutions, Inc., 121 P.3d 350, 354-55 (Colo. App. 2005) (relying on statute\u2019s legislative history and language and interpreting the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach as avoiding the constitutional problems of the \u201copt-in\u201d and \u201copt-out\u201d approaches); R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 706-07, 857 A.2d at 11 (relying on statute\u2019s language, legislative history, and supremacy-clause considerations, and other states\u2019 decisions); Mulhern v. MacLeod, 411 Mass. 754, 755-59, 808 N.E.2d 778, 779-81 (2004) (rejecting \u201copt-in\u201d approach; adopting \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach on the bases of supremacy-clause principles, statute\u2019s language and legislative history, and other courts\u2019 decisions; declining to address whether states may \u201copt-out\u201d); Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So. 2d 644, 647-48 (Fla. App. 2003) (rejecting \u201copt-in\u201d approach; adopting \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach on the bases of supremacy clause, statute\u2019s language, and legislative history).\n\u201cUnder [the \u2018acknowledgment\u2019] view, no state can refuse to entertain a private TCEA action, but a state is not compelled to adopt special procedural rules for such actions.\u201d MLC Mortgage Corp., 2009 OK 37, \u00b612, 212 P.3d 1199, 1204. Advocates of this interpretation base their opinions on the supremacy clause and the TCEA\u2019s legislative history. Accounting Outsourcing, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 798. As to the supremacy clause, they conclude that permitting states to \u201copt-in\u201d or \u201copt-out\u201d would violate the supremacy clause\u2019s language making federal law the supreme law of the land and charging state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce federal law pursuant to their regular modes of procedure. Schulman, 268 A.D.2d at 177-78, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 371. \u201c[F]ederal law must take state courts \u2018as it finds them,\u2019 because the states \u2018have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.\u2019 [Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 351, 110 S. Ct. at 2441]. Thus, a state may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a federal claim by applying a neutral rule of judicial administration. [Citation.]\u201d Consumer Crusade, 121 B3d at 353.\nAs to the TCPA\u2019s legislative history, proponents of the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d theory point to South Carolina Senator Ernest Bollings\u2019 comments to Congress before the bill\u2019s passage, concerning the private right of action:\n\u201c \u2018The substitute bill contains a private right-of-action provision that will make it easier for consumers to recover damages from receiving these computerized calls. The provision would allow consumers to bring an action in State court against any entity that violates the bill. The bill does not, because of constitutional constraints, dictate to the States which court in each State shall be the proper venue for such an action, as this is a matter for State legislators to determine. Nevertheless, it is my hope that States will make it as easy as possible for consumers to bring such actions, preferably in small claims court. The consumer outrage at receiving these calls is clear. Unless Congress makes it easier for consumers to obtain damages from those who violate this bill, these abuses will undoubtedly continue.\nSmall claims court or a similar court would allow the consumer to appear before the court without an attorney. The amount of damages in this legislation is set to be fair to both the consumer and the telemarketer. However, it would defeat the purposes of the bill if the attorneys\u2019 costs to consumers of bringing an action were greater than the potential damages. I thus expect that the States will act reasonably in permitting their citizens to go to court to enforce this bill.\u2019 \u201d R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 710-11, 857 A.2d at 13-14, quoting 137 Cong. Rec. 30821-22 (1991) (statements of Senator Bollings).\nAdvocates of the theory \u201cargue that the \u2018if otherwise permitted\u2019 language means that states are permitted to determine which of their courts will hear TCPA claims, not whether their state will be open to such claims.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Accounting Outsourcing, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 799. Some courts also read an expression of congressional intent in the statute\u2019s framework, wherein the states are given exclusive jurisdiction over private suits and federal courts are limited to civil actions brought by state Attorneys General or the FCC. Schulman, 268 A.D.2d at 178, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 371.\nc. \u201cOpt-in\u201d Approach\nThe \u201copt-in\u201d approach, which defendants urge us to adopt, concludes that Congress intended to deprive state courts of jurisdiction over private TCPA claims. It interprets the statute\u2019s \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language as indicating that the TCPA does not create an immediately enforceable right. Under this approach, actions may be maintained in state courts only upon a legislative action or court rule \u201copting-in\u201d to exercise jurisdiction over such actions. MLC Mortgage Corp., 2009 OK 37, \u00b613, 212 P.3d 1199, 1205. Only one state \u2014 Texas\u2014 has adopted the \u201copt-in\u201d theory.\nIn Chair King, the Texas Supreme Court held that unsolicited faxes sent before the enactment of a state statute permitting a private right of action for TCPA violations were not actionable under the TCPA in Texas state courts. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 708. The court held that the TCPA\u2019s plain, unambiguous language, its purpose, and its historical context warranted adoption of the \u201copt-in\u201d approach. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 711.\nThe court reviewed the three general approaches to interpreting the statutory language. The court rejected the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach, finding no support for it in the statutory language or the legislative history. As to the statutory language, the court noted that the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach risks violating the supremacy clause because it fails to give effect to all of the language in the statute:\n\u201cHad the TCPA simply provided that \u2018[a] person or entity may ... bring ... an action based on a [TCPA] violation,\u2019 the states\u2019 constitutional obligation under the Supremacy Clause to entertain such claims would be irrefutable. But Congress chose to qualify the private TCPA right of action it created by including the proviso \u2018if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State.\u2019 [Citation.] Failure to give effect to the statutory proviso would itself run the risk of violating the Supremacy Clause by refusing to apply the federal right as written.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 712.\nThe court also found the \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language \u201cdoubly redundant\u201d under the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 713. It explained that:\n\u201cState district courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have adjudicative power over federal statutory private damage claims unless Congress specifically decides otherwise, so there would be no reason for Congress to import that general principle into the statutory proviso when it does not do so in other federal statutes. [Citation.] Nevertheless, Congress did choose to acknowledge this general principle elsewhere in the TCPA by stating that suit may be brought \u2018in an appropriate court of that State.\u2019 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3). Interpreting the \u2018if otherwise permitted\u2019 provision to have the same meaning \u2018would be redundant and risk rendering the words meaningless.\u2019 [Houston Cellular], 135 S.W.3d at 382.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 713.\nAs to the provision\u2019s reference to rules of court (\u201cif otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State\u201d (emphasis added) (47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) (2000)), the court dismissed the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach proponents\u2019 arguments that the phrase evidenced Congress\u2019s acknowledgment of states\u2019 rights to independently administer their court systems and evidenced a lack of intent to require affirmative state legislative action before a party could bring a private TCPA claim in state court, noting that such a reading would render as surplusage the \u201c \u2018if otherwise permitted by the laws *** of a State\u2019 \u201d language. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 713, quoting 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) (2000).\nReviewing Senator Hollings\u2019 comments when he introduced the substitute bill containing the private right of action, the court concluded that the speech does not compel adoption of the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d theory. In its assessment of the legislative history, the court first noted that there could be no certainty that the senator\u2019s understanding of the private right of action reflected the entire Congress\u2019s view. Next, it noted that, even if Senator Hollings\u2019 remarks accurately captured the congressional intent, his comments could also support the \u201copt-in\u201d approach:\n\u201cBy stating his expectation that \u2018the States will act reasonably in permitting their citizens to go to court to enforce this bill,\u2019 Senator Hollings implies that states must act in an affirmative manner before the TCPA private damage claim is cognizable in state court. In sum, we believe that Senator Hollings\u2019s remarks are of limited interpretive value.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W3d at 713.\nTurning to the \u201copt-out\u201d approach, the Texas Supreme Court dismissed proponents\u2019 arguments that the approach sufficiently considered supremacy-clause and inefficiency issues. The court dismissed supremacy-clause concerns by noting that \u201cgiving effect to the [\u2018if otherwise\u2019] proviso that Congress created cannot run afoul of the supremacy clause. Having concluded that Congress intended the statutory proviso to have some conditional effect, be it \u2018opt-out\u2019 or \u2018opt-in,\u2019 we fail to see how supremacy clause concerns are implicated at all.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 715. The court found it significant that Congress made the private right of action available exclusively through state courts, noting that it was likely due to the millions of telemarketing calls made daily and because the locus of regulation was centered in the states. The court then found it reasonable to presume that Congress recognized the burden on state courts that these claims could present and further that Congress would, in consideration of the potential burden on state court resources of a flood of TCPA litigation, choose to allow states to have a voice in the matter. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 715-16. Finally, noting that more than half the states had statutes restricting telemarketing when the TCPA was enacted, the court concluded that the TCPA\u2019s \u201cremedies were meant to enhance the states\u2019 existing attempts to regulate unsolicited calls and faxes. *** There is strong evidence that Congress wanted to assist state regulation in reaching interstate communications if a state so desired, not to create an independent regulatory framework for a potential flood of individual state-court lawsuits.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W3d at 716.\nHaving rejected the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d and \u201copt-out\u201d approaches, the Chair King court turned to the \u201copt-in\u201d interpretation. Relying on the dictionary definitions of \u201cotherwise\u201d and \u201cpermit,\u201d its reading of congressional intent, and its interpretation of the TCPA\u2019s preemption language, the court adopted the \u201copt-in\u201d approach. The court used the dictionary definitions to conclude that the words \u201cotherwise permitted\u201d suggested \u201cthe necessity of affirmative state action to activate the TCPA\u2019s private cause of action.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 716. The court next concluded that the congressional intent supported its \u201copt-in\u201d reading of the statutory proviso, where the TCPA was intended to supplement state regulation and where Congress was likely aware that state courts could become inundated with suits. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 716-17 (proviso \u201cindicates deliberate deference to an area of uniquely state concern\u201d). Agreeing that the statute\u2019s most important purpose is to swiftly eliminate unsolicited facsimile advertising, the court noted, \u201c[b]ut we believe Congress hinged the swiftness of the federal legislation on the willingness of states to bear the burden and cost of overseeing these claims.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 717. Finally, the court rejected an argument that the TCPA\u2019s preemption language would be rendered meaningless by an \u201copt-in\u201d interpretation, stating that the statute\u2019s language does not preempt state laws imposing more restrictive requirements or even prohibiting the use of telemarketing equipment (47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(e) (2000)), and concluding:\n\u201cCongress\u2019s intent to supplement state legislation explains why the preemption concern would have focused on more aggressive regulation by the states. [Citation.] Congress clearly did not intend the TCPA to establish a ceiling if states decided to be more aggressive in their approach, but it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended the TCPA to be a mandatory floor for private enforcement whether or not a state chose to allow it.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 718.\nThe court cited case law discussing federal preemption in fields traditionally occupied by the states and noted that there is an assumption that the states\u2019 historic police powers are not to be superseded by federal statutes unless that is Congress\u2019s clear purpose. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 718.\n3. Parties\u2019 Arguments and Analysis of the Emerging Approaches\nIn light of the foregoing background, we turn to the parties\u2019 arguments in this case. Defendants urge us to follow Chair King, arguing that it is the most well reasoned and persuasive of the various interpretations of the TCPA\u2019s \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language. Defendants contend that First Capital Mortgage Corp. v. Union Federal Bank of Indianapolis, 374 Ill. App. 3d 739 (2007), upon which Italia Foods relies, does not control because it did not directly address the question here, as the parties in that case agreed that the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach should apply to the court\u2019s analysis and because the court did not address Chair King and the \u201copt-in\u201d approach. Accordingly, defendants urge us to answer \u201cyes\u201d to the first certified question.\nItalia Foods counters that Chair King is poorly reasoned and inconsistent with jurisprudence concerning state-court jurisdiction over federal statutory claims. State courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have jurisdiction over federal statutory claims, and the presumption can be overcome only by explicit statutory language, legislative history, or clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests. In Italia Foods\u2019 view, the TCPA\u2019s \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language does not amount to an explicit statutory directive and is, at most, ambiguous. It reasons that any doubts concerning the meaning of the phrase should be resolved by holding that no specific enabling legislation is required. Italia Foods next argues that Chair King\u2019s construction of the statutory language violates the tenth amendment and the Illinois Constitution because it amounts to an attempt by Congress to dictate how Illinois should organize its courts. Addressing the Illinois Constitution, Italia Foods notes that only courts in this state have the power to determine whether a matter is justiciable and within the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court. Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335-36 (2002). Thus, enabling legislation could never be enacted in Illinois because it is beyond the General Assembly\u2019s power. Finally, Italia Foods argues that Chair King wrongly concluded that any alternative construction of the \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language would render it \u201cdoubly redundant.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 713. According to Italia Foods, Congress routinely includes language reflecting constitutional limitations on its powers in \u201can exercise of caution\u201d (R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 715, 857 A.2d at 15-16) and it should not be construed to have any further meaning.\nWe find unconvincing Chair King\u2019s analysis and conclude that the case is wrongly decided. The court\u2019s textual analysis and its review of the legislative history is unconvincing to rebut the presumption of state-court jurisdiction. First, the court failed to show that the TCPA\u2019s proviso reflects Congress\u2019s \u201cexplicit statutory directive\u201d (Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 791, 101 S. Ct. at 2875). Rather, the court merely determined that the \u201copt-in\u201d approach would give full effect to the \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language and would not render it redundant. The court noted that Congress had elsewhere in the statute used more succinct and unqualified language to clarify that private claims may be brought in state courts and concluded that, by using the \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d qualification, Congress necessarily intended something different, specifically, to give the states a voice in the matter with respect to private actions under section 227(b)(3). We disagree. It has been noted:\n\u201c[L]egislative bodies often refer to the pertinent constitutional principles underlying legislation even though such references may not, strictly, be required. For example, when Congress enacts legislation under its Commerce Clause power, it will often refer to the underlying constitutional principle or the constitutional provision. Legislation in the criminal law field sometimes will recite that it applies only to offenses committed after the effective date of the statute, even though constitutional ex post facto principles would require the same result.\u201d R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 714, 857 A.2d at 15-16.\nWe agree with the Mulhern court that the \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language reflects a congressional intention \u201cthat Federal claims remain subject to State procedural law: Congress is no doubt aware of the Supreme Court\u2019s long-standing recognition that States \u2018have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts\u2019 and \u2018may apply their own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless those rules are pre-empted by federal law.\u2019 [Citation.] The TCPA was crafted to accommodate State interests, while respecting the structure, jurisdiction, and procedural rules of State courts.\u201d Mulhern, 441 Mass, at 757-58, 808 N.E.2d at 780-81.\nWe also find persuasive the Court of Appeals of Maryland\u2019s reasoning that the first part of the phrase \u201cif otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State\u201d (coupled with the legislative history, which we address below) refers to \u201cneutral general jurisdictional and procedural laws and rules governing each state\u2019s court system.\u201d See R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 711, 857 A.2d at 14. As that court explained, the word \u201cotherwise\u201d refers to state laws and rules other than substantive telemarketing laws (which are the subject of the TCPA), and the phrase \u201cof court\u201d reinforces this interpretation. R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 711, 857 A.2d at 14. Congress, thus, left to state legislators or courts to determine proper venue (possibly in small-claims courts, which were the sponsor\u2019s preference) and not the issue whether the federal action should be entertained in state courts. R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 711, 857 A.2d at 14. We also find persuasive the Maryland court\u2019s reasoning that the reference to \u201claws\u201d does not mean state laws regulating telemarketing, because those laws were aimed at intrastate communications, whereas the TCPA targets interstate activity. \u201cThe federal statute was designed to fill a void in state laws; it was not intended to be a statute limited by state laws which Congress deemed inadequate.\u201d R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 713-14, 857 A.2d at 15 (further noting that, in many states, state supreme courts do not have constitutional authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure). In this respect, we reject Chair King\u2019s criticism that any reading other than the \u201copt-in\u201d approach renders the phrase doubly redundant.\nAs to the legislative history of the TCPA\u2019s private right of action, we find Chair King\u2019s analysis thereof even more problematic. The Texas Supreme Court seized upon Senator Hollings\u2019 statement that he expected that the states would act reasonably and permit their citizens to go to court to enforce the bill. However, the Chair King court did not analyze the context in which the statement was made. Senator Hollings commented:\n\u201c \u2018Small claims court or a similar court would allow the consumer to appear before the court without an attorney. The amount of damages in this legislation is set to be fair to both the consumer and the telemarketer. However, it would defeat the purposes of the bill if the attorneys\u2019 costs to consumers of bringing an action were greater than the potential damages. I thus expect that the States will act reasonably in permitting their citizens to go to court to enforce this bill.\u2019 \u201d R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 710-11, 857 A.2d at 13-14, quoting 137 Cong. Rec. 30821-22 (1991) (statements of Senator Hollings).\nIt is clear from the context that the Senator, in the final sentence above, was referring to his concern about attorney fees and noting that access to small-claims courts would permit plaintiffs to avoid this burden. Thus, in our view, the Chair King court failed in its legislative history analysis to show that the \u201cunmistakable implication\u201d (Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 791, 101 S. Ct. at 2875) of the TCPA\u2019s legislative history is that the presumption of state-court jurisdiction is rebutted. We believe the legislative history reflects a congressional intent to permit states to determine which of their courts may hear TCPA claims.\nTurning to Chair King\u2019s supremacy-clause and efficiency concerns, we note that, in rejecting the \u201copt-out\u201d approach, the court referred to the \u201cexplicit\u201d statutory directive and the TCPA\u2019s purpose. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 716. Here, again, the court\u2019s analysis is unpersuasive and fails to rebut the presumption of state-court jurisdiction. The court dismissed supremacy-clause concerns by reasoning that giving effect to the \u201cconditional\u201d proviso that Congress drafted could not run afoul of the supremacy clause. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 715. This analysis is problematic because it presumes that Chair King\u2019s reading of the proviso is correct. As we determined above, contrary to the Chair King court, the proviso is ambiguous. The Chair King court also found it reasonable to presume that Congress recognized the burden on state courts of TCPA claims and that it chose to allow the states to have control over their court dockets. Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 715-16. In this respect, it concluded that the TCPA\u2019s remedies were meant to assist state regulation \u201cif a state so desired, not to create an independent regulatory framework for a potential flood of individual state-court lawsuits.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 716. We fail to see how this interpretation necessarily flows from the statute\u2019s purpose and wording. In our view, it is more plausible (especially in light of the statute\u2019s legislative history) that Congress intended to assist state regulation by creating a private right of action under the TCPA and not requiring any action on the states\u2019 parts to permit TCPA claims to be brought in their courts. We find the Chair King court\u2019s arguments insufficient to rebut the presumption of state-court jurisdiction, as that intention must be \u201cexplicit,\u201d \u201cunmistakable,\u201d or shown by \u201ca clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.\u201d Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 791, 101 S. Ct. at 2875.\nFinally, we are unpersuaded by the Texas Supreme Court\u2019s analysis and adoption of the \u201copt-in\u201d approach. The court relied on the dictionary definitions of \u201cotherwise\u201d and \u201cpermit\u201d in concluding that they suggest \u201cthe necessity of affirmative state action to activate the TCPA\u2019s pr\u00edvate cause of action.\u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 716. We fail to see how this conclusion necessarily results from terms that mean \u201c \u2018DIFFERENTLY\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018ALLOW\u2019 \u201d Chair King, 184 S.W.3d at 716, quoting Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1961). Further, we note that another criticism of the \u201copt-in\u201d approach is that it might run afoul of the tenth amendment. It has been noted that \u201crequiring states to \u2018opt-in\u2019 before they could hear private damages actions under the TCPA would be akin to Congress commanding state legislatures to legislate\u201d (Accounting Outsourcing, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 796). See also MLC Mortgage, 2009 OK 37, \u00b614, 212 P.3d 1199, 1205; Consumer Crusade, 121 P.3d at 353.\nHaving rejected Chair King\u2019s rationale for adopting the \u201copt-in\u201d approach, we conclude that the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d theory is the correct approach to analyzing the TCPA\u2019s private right of action. In light of the ambiguity in the statutory language, we find guidance, as noted above, in the legislative history and the statute\u2019s purpose. We also find that constitutional considerations warrant adoption of the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach and not the \u201copt-out\u201d or \u201copt-in\u201d theory.\nThe Howlett Court stated that three corollaries follow from the proposition that federal law is the law of the land in the states: (1) when the parties and controversy are properly before it, a state court may not deny a federal right in the absence of a valid excuse; (2) \u201cAn excuse that is inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse. The supremacy clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from federal law because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize the superiority or authority of its source\u201d; and (3) the Court must act with caution before deciding that a state court is obligated to entertain a claim when the state\u2019s neutral rules of court administration obligate the court to refuse jurisdiction; in other words, states have great latitude in structuring their courts, establishing their jurisdiction, and applying their neutral procedural rules (unless those rules are preempted by federal law). Howlett, 496 U.S. at 369-72, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 348-51, 110 S. Ct. at 2439-41.\nThe Illinois Constitution provides that Illinois circuit courts have \u201coriginal jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office. Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a79. Although the legislature can create new justiciable matters via legislation creating rights and duties with no common-law or equitable counterparts, any such actions do not confer jurisdiction on the circuit courts. Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335. Rather, except in the area of administrative review, the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction is conferred by the constitution, not the legislature. Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335-36. \u201cThe General Assembly, of course, has no power to enact legislation that would contravene article VI.\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335. Thus, our constitution precludes and would invalidate any legislative action purporting to \u201copt-in\u201d or \u201copt-out\u201d of the TCPA. Furthermore, it has been noted that there is a tension between an interpretation of the TCPA that requires a state to pass enabling legislation (i.e., to \u201copt-in\u201d) before a private action may be brought in that state\u2019s courts and \u201cthe rule of presumed enforceability derived from the Supremacy Clause.\u201d Portuguese American Leadership Council, 956 A.2d at 676-77. It has been further noted that the presumption of state-court jurisdiction is \u201ccompelling where, as under the TCPA, private litigants have no recourse to Federal courts.\u201d Mulhern, 441 Mass. at 757, 808 N.E.2d at 780. Finally, we noted above the tenth amendment concerns in terms of Congress \u201ccommanding state legislatures to legislate\u201d (Account Outsourcing, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 796).\nAs to the \u201copt-out\u201d approach, the court in another case has commented:\n\u201cIt would be an extreme anomaly, in the unusual situation where state courts have apparently been given exclusive jurisdiction over the federal cause of action, for Congress to have intended that states could discriminate against the federal cause of action. ***\n*** If Congress were to authorize such an unusual and unprecedented result, one would expect that it would do so expressly and unequivocally. Absent such a clear congressional statement, the normal rule precluding state law discrimination against federal causes of action should apply.\u201d R.A. Ponte Architects, 382 Md. at 715-16, 857 A.2d at 16-17.\nSee also Consumer Crusade, 121 P.3d at 354. This approach raises supremacy-clause concerns in that it permits states to close their courts to federal claims for which Congress provided no federal forum. See Consumer Crusade, 121 P.3d at 354 (further noting that early cases failed to address this constitutional issue).\nAlthough we agree with Italia Foods that the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach is the proper analytical framework, we disagree with its argument that we must follow First Capital Mortgage. Italia Foods argues that the First Capital Mortgage court independently analyzed the issue and adopted the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach, that the case is binding precedent, and that, even if the court did not expressly analyze the issue, the court\u2019s reference to the parties\u2019 agreement in that case would be irrelevant because courts have an independent duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction.\nIn First Capital Mortgage, a mortgage company sued a bank, alleging that the bank sent it hundreds of unsolicited faxes for over two years. In the first count of its complaint, the mortgage company sought to recover under the TCPA. The trial court granted the bank\u2019s motion to dismiss that count. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2004). On appeal, the parties agreed that the interpretation of the TCPA\u2019s \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language should follow the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d theory. After noting that the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d theory comported with the Supreme Court\u2019s reasoning in Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367-72, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 347-51, 110 S. Ct. at 2438-41 (addressing the supremacy clause), and that the TCPA expressly grants a private right of action, the First District held that the \u201cif otherwise permitted\u201d language \u201callows state courts to apply \u2018neutral rule[s] of judicial administration\u2019 \u201d to TCPA claims and that, if the rules bar such claims, state courts may dismiss them. First Capital Mortgage, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 742, quoting Howlett, 496 U.S. at 374, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 352, 110 S. Ct. at 2442. The court further concluded that, because no neutral rule of judicial administration barred the mortgage company\u2019s TCPA claim against the bank, reversal of the dismissal was warranted. First Capital Mortgage, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 742.\nFirst Capital Mortgage offers limited insight here because the parties in that case agreed that the \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach was the correct interpretive framework. Further, other than noting that the approach comported with Howlett, the First Capital Mortgage court did not undertake any analysis of the interpretive theories that have developed, nor did it specifically address Chair King.\nWe further note that we find of limited guidance the FCC\u2019s statement concerning the TCPA. Italia Foods argues that Chair King ignored the FCC\u2019s \u201cinterpretation\u201d of the TCPA. In 1992, the FCC adopted rules implementing the TCPA. In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752 (1992) (1992 Report & Order). In discussing the private right of action under the statute, the FCC stated: \u201cAbsent state law to the contrary, consumers may immediately file suit in state court if a caller violates the TCPA\u2019s prohibitions on the use of automatic telephone dialing system [s] and artificial or prerecorded voice messages. \u00a7227(b)(3).\u201d 1992 Report & Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 8780; see also F.C.C. DA No. 03 \u2014 153, par. 206 (June 26, 2003) (language \u201csuggests that Congress contemplated that [private actions were] a matter for consumers to pursue in appropriate state courts, subject to those courts\u2019 rules\u201d). Italia Foods argues that Congress has not altered the statute\u2019s language since the FCC\u2019s statement and notes that the Chair King court did not consider the FCC\u2019s pronouncement. In its view, as courts are required to defer to agencies\u2019 reasonable interpretations of federal statutes, the FCC\u2019s statement in its 1992 Report & Order is binding.\nIn reaching our decision, we note that the FCC\u2019s pronouncement, although ordinarily entitled to some deference (Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 704, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984)), offers limited guidance because the FCC did not directly address the issue here.\nIn summary, we answer the first certified question in the negative. The Illinois General Assembly need not enact enabling legislation before private TCPA claims can be brought and enforced in Illinois state courts.\nB. Penalties/Assignability/Limitations Period\nThe second certified question asks: \u201cAre the TCPA claims alleged in this case \u2018statutory penalties\u2019 under Illinois law? And if so: (a) Are those claims assignable under Illinois law? [and] (b) Does Illinois\u2019 two[-]year statutory penalty limitations period [(735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 2002))] apply to such claims, as opposed to [the federal four-year limitations period for civil actions (28 U.S.C. \u00a71658 (2000))]?\u201d These issues, as parts of a certified question, present questions of law that we review de novo. Barbara\u2019s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill. 2d 45, 57-58 (2007).\nPreliminarily, we note that the first two parts of the second certified question are inartfully drafted, in that they appear to confuse several legal theories or concepts. In essence, the parties ask us to resolve whether the TCPA claim here was assignable; specifically, whether Eclipse properly assigned its TCPA claim to Hinman. Courts have taken two approaches in addressing this issue. The first approach, which is the essential question in the first part of the second certified question, asks whether the statute is a penal (as opposed to remedial) enactment. Generally, if a statute is penal, claims thereunder are not assignable, because they are personal rights. See, e.g., Hart Conversions, Inc. v. Pyramid Seating Co., 658 N.E.2d 129, 131 (Ind. App. 1995) (\u201cThe general rule is that the right to collect a penalty is a personal right which is not assignable\u201d); see also North Chicago Street R.R. Co. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, 117 (1897) (in reviewing common law, noting that personal-injury actions are not assignable). The second approach, which is the primary question raised in subpart (a) of the second certified question, asks whether recovery under the statute is personal to the injured party. This question is relevant because the only causes of action that are not assignable in Illinois are personal-injury and related actions. Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 225. Either approach can provide an independent basis upon which to determine whether a TCPA claim is assignable. Because current Illinois law does not favor one approach over the other and because it is not clear to us that our supreme court would choose one approach over the other, we address both approaches.\n1. Penal v. Remedial Statute\nThe trial court found that the TCPA presumes damages for economic injury that are difficult to quantify and, therefore, the statute is remedial and not penal. The court found Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Swiderski Electronics, Inc., 223 Ill. 2d 352 (2006), instructive and further found that the TCPA implicates privacy and property interests and that property interests are assignable. Finally, the court relied on the rule that claims are generally assignable.\nRelying on the test in McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Levine, 108 Ill. App. 3d 732 (1982), defendants argue that, in light of the TCPA\u2019s silence on assignability, we must look to Illinois law, which provides that TCPA claims are statutory penalties and that such penalty claims are not assignable.\nIn McDonald\u2019s, this court stated:\n\u201cA statute is a statutory penalty if [(1)] it imposes automatic liability for a violation of its terms and [(2)] the amount of liability is predetermined by the act and [(3) that liability is] imposed without actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. [Citation.] A statute is remedial when it gives rise to a cause of action to recover compensation suffered by the injured person. [Citation.] *** [A] statute is remedial and not penal where it imposes liability only when actual damage results from a violation. In such a case, liability is contingent upon damage being proven by the plaintiff. Under a penal statute, liability is not contingent but imposed automatically when a violation of the statute is established.\u201d McDonald\u2019s, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 738.\nThis court further stated: \u201cA statute requiring the payment of actual and punitive damages by a wrongdoer does not constitute a statutory penalty.\u201d McDonald\u2019s, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 739 (holding that section 14 \u2014 6 of the Eavesdropping Act, which lists three civil remedies available for violations thereunder \u2014 injunctive relief and actual and punitive damages \u2014 is not a statutory penalty).\nThe TCPA provides that a plaintiff may bring an action: (1) for an injunction; (2) for \u201can action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater\u201d; or (3) both an injunction and the greater of the actual damages amount or $500 per violation. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) (2000). Further, a court has discretion to treble the $500 amount in cases where it finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the statute or regulations. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) (2000). In its third amended complaint, Italia Foods sought injunctive relief and $500 in damages for each violation.\nHere, defendants argue that the monetary relief Italia Foods seeks \u2014 $500 in damages per violation \u2014 constitutes a statutory penalty because it is not intended to compensate plaintiffs for any actual damages incurred from the \u201cpennies\u201d they may have lost from a single unsolicited fax. Further, they contend that the TCPA\u2019s $500 damages award requires no proof of actual injury. In defendants\u2019 view, Italia Foods\u2019 ability to potentially recover actual damages for alleged TCPA violations does not preclude application of the TCPA\u2019s preset $500 damages award for each unsolicited fax.\nWe disagree with defendants\u2019 argument that McDonald\u2019s controls. That case provides little interpretive assistance here because its test is not easily applied to a statute like the TCPA, which contains both a provision for actual damages and a statutory penalty component. We also find defendants\u2019 reliance on Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1 (2009), to be misplaced. That case involved a provision in Chicago\u2019s landlord and tenant ordinance, and the issue presented was whether the provision imposed a statutory penalty for the purposes of the two-year limitations period in section 13 \u2014 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 2004)). The supreme court, applying the McDonald\u2019s test, held that the provision was a penalty because it imposed automatic liability for violations thereunder, set forth a predetermined amount of damages, and imposed liability regardless of the plaintiffs\u2019 actual damages. Landis, 235 Ill. 2d at 13. We conclude that Landis does not compel a conclusion here that the TCPA is penal, because, in assessing the final prong of the McDonald\u2019s test (i.e., that the penalty is imposed without regard to the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff), the supreme court noted that, in contrast to other provisions of the landlord and tenant ordinance, the provision at issue \u201cdoes not specifically allow a plaintiff to recover actual damages.\u201d Landis, 235 Ill. 2d at 14. Significantly, the TCPA provides that option. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3)(B) (2000).\nWe find Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, International, 88 Ill. 2d 279 (1981), instructive. In Scott, the supreme court, in the context of addressing a due process argument, held that the Fraud Act was not penal. Scott, 88 Ill. 2d at 288. The court noted that the statute \u201cis a regulatory and remedial enactment intended to curb a variety of fraudulent abuses and to provide a remedy to individuals injured by them. *** The [Fraud] Act is clearly within the class of remedial statutes which are designed to grant remedies for the protection of rights, introduce regulation conducive to the public good, or cure public evils.\u201d Scott, 88 Ill. 2d at 288. The court found that the fact that the Fraud Act contains a civil penalty component does not render it a penal statute. Scott, 88 Ill. 2d at 288. The supreme court stated that \u201cthe penalty is but one part of the regulatory scheme, intended as a supplemental aid to enforcement rather than as a punitive measure.\u201d Scott, 88 Ill. 2d at 288.\nWe find the Scott court\u2019s analysis and characterization of the civil penalty provision in the Fraud Act persuasive in analyzing the TCPA. The Fraud Act provides that a plaintiff may bring an action for actual damages (815 ILCS 505/10a (West 2008)) and that the Attorney General or a State\u2019s Attorney may bring an action seeking an injunction, restitution, or a civil penalty (815 ILCS 505/7 (West 2008)). Similarly, the TCPA provides that a plaintiff may bring an action for injunctive relief and/or the greater of actual damages or $500 per violation; it also contains a treble-damages provision. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) (2000). Further, another portion of the statute contains a federal enforcement component that authorizes state Attorneys General to bring civil actions in federal court on behalf of their residents to obtain injunctive relief and to recover monetary damages; in addition, the FCC may intervene in any such action. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7227(f)(l), (f)(3) (2000).\nWe are further persuaded by the fact that it appears that the majority of courts to consider the issue have concluded that the TCPA is a remedial statute, at least in part on the basis, as did the Scott court (Scott, 88 Ill. 2d at 288), that the statute\u2019s purpose (discerned in part from a reading of its legislative history) warrants this result. See, e.g., Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dandy-Jim, Inc., 182 Ohio App. 3d 311, 322-23, 2009 \u2014 Ohio\u20142270, \u00b6\u00b635, 36 (holding that TCPA is a remedial law because the purpose of the statutory damages provision is to liquidate uncertain actual damages and to encourage victims to bring suit; damages are set at fair amount; treble-damages provision is not punitive, because it is imposed irrespective of any intent to violate the law); Penzer v. Transportation Insurance Co., 545 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing cases and noting that TCPA\u2019s statutory damages provision is not punitive); Terra Nova Insurance Co. v. Fray-Witzer, 449 Mass. 406, 419, 869 N.E.2d 565, 575 (2007) (applying New Jersey law and holding that the TCPA is a remedial statute, where Congress\u2019s purpose was to protect fax machine owners from unsolicited advertisements and where the statutory damages remedy flows to the consumer and not the government; possibility that statutory damages could be greater than actual harm suffered does not transform TCPA into a penal statute, as this would ignore nature of penal statute and would conflict with New Jersey\u2019s mandate to liberally interpret insurance policies in favor of the insured); Melrose Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 432 F. Supp. 2d 488, 509 n.10 (E.D. Penn. 2006), aff\u2019d sub nom. Subclass 2 v. Melrose Hotel Co., 503 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 2007); Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Lou Fusz Automotive Network, Inc., 401 F.3d 876, 881 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that fixed damages award provides incentive for private parties to enforce TCPA: \u201cWhether we view the fixed award as a liquidated sum for actual harm or an incentive for aggrieved parties to act as private attorneys general, or both, it is clear that the fixed amount serves more than purely punitive or deterrent goals. Also, the fact that Congress elected to make treble damages available separate from fixed damages strongly suggests that the fixed damages serve additional goals other than deterrence and punishment\u201d); Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. American Global Insurance Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1375-76 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (TCPA is a remedial statute, where it redresses harms to individual fax machine owners who are harmed by the receipt of unsolicited advertisements, where the damages issue to the individual and not to a third party, and where, although statutory damages do not closely correspond to actual damages, this fact does not convert a remedial statute to a penal one), aff\u2019d, 157 F. App\u2019x 201 (11th Cir. 2005); Western Rim Investment Advisors, Inc. v. Gulf Insurance Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 836, 849 (N.D. Tex. 2003). But see Kruse v. McKenna, 178 P.3d 1198, 1200-01 (Colo. 2008) (holding that state law determines matter of assignability and further holding that, under Colorado law, TCEA claims are penal and, therefore, not assignable, because the TCEA created a new and distinct cause of action, the monetary recovery sought requires no proof of actual damages, and any recovery exceeds any actual damages); Kaplan, 266 A.D.2d at 849, 698 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (TCPA\u2019s statutory damages provision is punitive rather than compensatory, where the legislative history shows that the statute was intended to provide a remedy to consumers and to encourage them to sue; statutory penalty provides incentive for consumers to enforce statute; penalty need not be measured by actual loss incurred where it is imposed as a punishment for a violation).\nIn summary, we conclude that the TCPA is a remedial statute and, given that defendants have not advanced an argument that claims under remedial statutes are unassignable, we decline to hold that TCPA claims are not assignable by virtue of being remedial.\n2. Whether the TCPA Claim Here Is a Personal-Injury Claim and Is, Therefore, Not Assignable\nNext, defendants argue that the TCPA claim, even if not penal, is not assignable. Defendants address the trial court\u2019s rationale, where, relying on Valley Forge and Kleinwort, it found that TCPA claims are assignable.\nIn Kleinwort, Kleinwort sued Quantum and Quantum counterclaimed, asserting common-law fraud and seeking punitive damages in connection with the sale of a brokerage firm. During the pendency of the litigation, Quantum assigned its interest in the lawsuit to its two shareholders. Kleinwort challenged the shareholders\u2019 standing to pursue the punitive damages claim. The supreme court held that the assignees could recover punitive damages on the common-law fraud counterclaim. Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 226. The court noted that, traditionally, courts examined the assignability issue by considering whether the action would survive the death of the owner. Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 220. The supreme court rejected this approach, concluding that the \u201cprimary\u201d consideration in determining the assignability of causes of action is whether such assignments would violate public policy. Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 224 (\u201c[tjhis court has held that a cause of action cannot be assigned if such assignment violates public policy, even if such an action would otherwise survive the death of the owner\u201d). The court criticized the survival analogy, noting:\n\u201cThis court long ago used the survival analogy when considering whether a cause of action is assignable, not whether punitive damages standing alone are assignable. This court has not applied the survival analogy to invalidate part of an assignment where the parties sought an assignment of the entire action.\u201d Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 224.\nThe court further noted that \u201cassignability is the rule and nonassignability is the exception.\u201d Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 225. It stated that, in Illinois, \u201cthe only causes of action that are not assignable are torts for personal injuries and actions for other wrongs of a personal nature, such as those that involve the reputation or feelings of the injured party.\u201d Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 225. After further noting that the issue depends on the facts and circumstances of the case and that courts apply a strict test in determining whether an assignment violates public policy, the court held that allowing the assignees to seek punitive damages did not violate public policy. Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 226. The court found significant that the assignees were Quantum\u2019s shareholders at the time of the alleged fraud, that one shareholderassignee was intimately involved in the negotiations for the purchase of an entity that served as the basis for the alleged fraud, that the assignees did not \u201cshop around\u201d for the fraud claim, and that the same defendants would be involved regardless of the assignment. Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 226-27.\nDefendants argue that Kleinwort is inapposite. They do not dispute that punitive damages that are part of an underlying claim, which defendants refer to as \u201cancillary punitive damages,\u201d are assignable. Instead, defendants urge that \u201cindependent statutory penalties,\u201d such as those under the TCPA, are not assignable because they are personal to the injured party. In their view, a party\u2019s actions underlying TCPA claims should constitute the sort of personal injury contemplated by Kleinwort as being unassignable, and public policy concerns should act to bar Eclipse\u2019s alleged assignment of its TCPA claim to Hinman.\nItalia Foods preliminarily responds that the assignment issue is of no import because the statute of limitations has been tolled (a reference to the third certified question) in this case since the filing of the initial complaint in June 2003. We reject Italia Foods\u2019 argument that, if we adopt their tolling argument, we need not address the assignment issue. The status of Hinman as an assignee of Eclipse\u2019s claim goes to his standing to bring suit. Standing, which is a jurisdictional requirement, must be continuous throughout the suit. Eclipse Manufacturing Co. v. M&M Rental Center, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 739, 742 (N.D. Ill. 2007).\nNext, Italia Foods responds that defendants are incorrect as to the assignment issue. Italia Foods relies on Kleinwort and the principle that corporations have the power to sell, convey, pledge, lease, and otherwise dispose of their property and assets. See 805 ILCS 5/3.10 (West 2008) (listing the general powers of a corporation); see also Grunloh v. Effingham Equity, Inc., 174 Ill. App. 3d 508, 518 (1988) (\u201cit has long been recognized that corporations generally possess the power to assign choses in action, provided the assignments are made for a legitimate corporate purpose and violate no express restrictions in the corporate charter\u201d). Italia Foods argues that, as in Kleinwort, Hinman is not a stranger to the underlying claim, as he was the sole shareholder and president of Eclipse when defendants sent the unsolicited fax advertisements that gave rise to the TCPA claim. Also, as in Kleinwort, the \u201cassignment\u201d was the product of the sale of the corporation after litigation had commenced. Thus, in Italia Foods\u2019 view, Eclipse\u2019s \u201cassignment\u201d of its TCPA claim to Hinman did not violate public policy, because Hinman owned and ran Eclipse at the time the claim arose and was intimately involved in it.\nIn Valley Forge, upon which the trial court relied, the supreme court addressed whether TCPA claims were covered by the advertising-injury provisions in commercial and general liability insurance policies. The primary policy at issue defined an advertising injury as: \u201c \u2018[Ojral, written, televised or videotaped publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u2019 \u201d Valley Forge, 223 Ill. 2d at 364. The underlying complaint did not assert a common-law tort for invasion of privacy, but asserted a TCPA claim. The court held that the insurer had a duty to defend the TCPA claim under the policy\u2019s definition of advertising injury because the TCPA claim vindicated the same injuries as a common-law action for violation of privacy. Valley Forge, 223 Ill. 2d at 365. The court noted that the \u201creceipt of an unsolicited fax advertisement implicates a person\u2019s right of privacy insofar as it violates a person\u2019s seclusion, and such a violation is one of the injuries that a TCPA fax-ad claim is intended to vindicate.\u201d Valley Forge, 223 Ill. 2d at 365 (citing \u201coverwhelming\u201d case law). As to the specific policy language in the case, the court, relying on the dictionary definitions of, inter alia, \u201cright of privacy,\u201d further held that the terms refer to both an interest in seclusion and an interest in the secrecy of personal information. Valley Forge, 223 Ill. 2d at 368. Accordingly, the court concluded that unsolicited fax advertisements fall within the category of material that violates a person\u2019s seclusion. Valley Forge, 223 Ill. 2d at 368. The court determined that, given its holding, it did not need to reach the issue whether the insurers had a duty to defend their insured pursuant to the policies\u2019 property-damage provisions. Valley Forge, 223 Ill. 2d at 379.\nWe find Valley Forge distinguishable. That case involved advertising-injury provisions in insurance policies held by an individual and not a corporation, and the court did not address assign-ability. The court determined only that TCPA claims vindicate the same injuries as invasion-of-privacy claims and, therefore, unsolicited fax advertisements implicate a person\u2019s right to privacy. Valley Forge, 223 Ill. 2d at 365-68.\nWe find Eclipse instructive. In Eclipse, which involved the same plaintiffs as this case but a different defendant, the court held that Hinman had standing as an assignee to pursue Eclipse\u2019s TCPA claim and it granted Hinman\u2019s and Italia Foods\u2019 motion for leave to file a second amended class action complaint naming them as plaintiffs. The court reviewed corporation law and noted Kleinwort\u2019s statement that only torts for personal injuries and actions for other wrongs of a personal nature are unassignable and noted that the relevant inquiry was whether TCPA claims are actions for personal injuries. Eclipse, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 743. The court concluded that the TCPA is partly intended to protect privacy interests. Eclipse, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 743. The court noted that a privacy tort is a personal-injury action because the right protected is a personal right. Eclipse, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 743. However, the court also determined that a corporation \u201chas no cause of action for invasion of privacy other than intrusions upon the use of its own name or identity.\u201d Eclipse, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 743. It held that corporations bringing TCPA claims may assert only the property interests the TCPA was designed to protect and, therefore, their TCPA claims are assignable under Illinois law. Eclipse, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 743-44; see also Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 225 (only torts for personal injuries and actions for other wrongs of a personal nature are unassignable). The court noted that Valley Forge did not foreclose the court\u2019s holding because that case did not reach the issue whether a corporation had standing to assert privacy interests under the TCPA; rather, Valley Forge involved an individual doing business as a private investigation business, and the supreme court\u2019s holding was that TCPA claims implicate \u201caperson\u2019s right to privacy\u201d (emphasis added) (Valley Forge, 223 Ill. 2d at 365). Eclipse, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 743-44.\nWe conclude, as did the Eclipse court, that Eclipse could and did assign its TCPA claim to Hinman. As the Kleinwort court noted, assignability is the rule, not the exception, and is determined primarily by considering public policy issues, not the survival analogy. Klein-wort, 181 Ill. 2d at 224-25. Kleinwort also clearly states that the only unassignable claims are those involving personal-injury torts and other claims asserting personal wrongs. Kleinwort, 181 Ill. 2d at 225. We find persuasive the Eclipse court\u2019s analysis and its conclusion that corporations may assert in TCPA claims only the property and not the privacy interests the TCPA was designed to protect. See Eclipse, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 743-44; see also Resource Bankshares Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 407 F.3d 631, 639 (4th Cir. 2005) (\u201cJunk faxes cause some economic damage\u201d); American States Insurance Co. v. Capital Associates of Jackson County, Inc., 392 F.3d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 2004) (TCPA protects company\u2019s property rights in that it avoids consumption of the recipient\u2019s ink and paper). Accordingly we conclude that a corporation\u2019s, like Eclipse\u2019s, TCPA claims are assignable.\nIn summary, we conclude that the TCPA claim here was properly assigned from Eclipse to Hinman.\n3. Statute of Limitations\nBecause the TCPA claim in this case was assignable and, as we determine below, the limitations period is measured to the initial filing of Eclipse\u2019s complaint in 2003, we conclude that we need not address the question of the appropriate statute of limitations presented in this portion of the second certified question.\nWhether the two-year or four-year limitations period applies need not be resolved. Eclipse filed its initial complaint on June 13, 2003, and alleged that defendants sent it four unsolicited fax advertisements in July and August 2002, or about one year earlier. We disagree with defendants, who assert without explanation that we must resolve the issue of the appropriate statute of limitations and determine if the limitations period for the initial complaint goes back two years under section 13 \u2014 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure to June 13, 2001, or four years under section 1658 of Title 28 of the United States Code to June 13, 1999. It is clear to us that, under either limitations period, the complaint was timely filed.\nC. Tolling of Claim\nThe third certified questions asks: \u201cIf the claim is not assignable, then should absent class members\u2019 putative claims against defendants be treated as tolled when no class representative with proper standing represented the putative class for a 27-month period?\u201d Because we determined above that the TCPA claim is assignable, we need not address the third certified question.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we answer the first certified question in the negative. As to the second certified question, we modify the first two parts of the question and conclude that the TCPA claim here is remedial and assignable and, alternatively, that (whether or not it is remedial) it is assignable because it does not constitute a personal-injury action. Further, we conclude that we need not answer subsection (b) of the second certified question (concerning the appropriate statute of limitations) and the third certified question. We remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nCertified questions answered; cause remanded.\nO\u2019MALLEY and SCHOSTOK, JJ., concur.\nIn 2005, the TCPA was amended and renamed the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227 (Supp. 2005).\nIllinois\u2019s junk fax statute, effective as of January 1, 1990, designates violations thereof as petty offenses that are subject to a $500 maximum fine. 720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 3 (West 2008).\nFollowing several requests by the parties for extensions of time to file their briefs on appeal, this case was ready for this court\u2019s review in September 2009.\nThe majority of federal courts that have considered the issue have held that, although federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over TCPA enforcement actions brought by state Attorneys General and the FCC, federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear private rights of action under the TCPA. Specifically, six courts of appeal have held that federal courts lack federal question subject matter jurisdiction to hear TCPA cases. See Murphey v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 913-15 (9th Cir. 2000); Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium Services, Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1998); ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 520 (3d Cir. 1998); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289, modified, 140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 1998); International Science & Technology Institute, Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1152 (4th Cir. 1997); Houston Cellular, 131 F.3d at 513. However, one court of appeal has held that federal question jurisdiction is properly invoked in private TCPA claims. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 2005). Further, three courts of appeal have held that federal courts may hear TCPA claims when subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity. See US Fax Law Center, Inc. v. iHire, Inc., 476 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 2007); Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 341 (2d Cir. 2006); Brill, 427 F.3d at 450-51.\nThe second private cause of action in the TCPA targets violations of the FCC\u2019s do-not-eall rules and, as in the first cause of action, applies \u201cif otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State.\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(c)(5) (2000).\nThe federal-question statute provides: \u201cThe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a71331 (2006).\nSeveral courts refer to this portion of the International Science decision as \u201cdicta.\u201d See, e.g., Accounting Outsourcing, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 800.\nThe tenth amendment provides: \u201cThe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. X.\nNew York\u2019s intermediate courts appear to be split on whether the \u201copt-out\u201d or \u201cacknowledgment\u201d approach is the correct analytical framework. Compare Kaplan, 266 A.D.2d at 849, 698 N.Y.S.2d at 800-01, with Schulman, 268 A.D.2d at 179, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 372.\nThe Court noted that only on three occasions had it found a valid excuse for a state court\u2019s refusal to entertain a federal cause of action, each of which involved a neutral rule of judicial administration: first, where neither party was a resident of the forum; second, where the cause of action arose outside the territorial jurisdiction; and third, where the Court allowed a state court to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens to bar adjudication of a Federal Employer Liability Act case, so long as the doctrine was impartially enforced. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 374-75, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 325, 110 S. Ct. at 2442.\nThe TCPA\u2019s operative language is the same with respect to suits to enforce prohibitions against telephone solicitations and unsolicited advertisements via fax machine. Compare 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) (2000), with 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(l)(A) (2000).\nBut see US Fax Law Center, Inc., 476 F.3d at 1120 (holding that TCPA claims are not assignable under Colorado law because they are in the nature of personal-injury privacy claims and declining to address whether TCPA claims are unassignable because they are penal).\nIn so concluding, we express no opinion herein on the meaning of \u201cprivacy\u201d in the context of insurance coverage law.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JORGENSEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael D. Richman and Henry Pietrkowski, both of Reed Smith LLEJ of Chicago, and Charles W. Smith, of Smith & LaLuzerne, Ltd., of Waukegan, for appellants.", "Phillip A. Bock and Robert M. Hatch, both of Bock & Hatch, LLC, of Chicago, and Brian J. Wanca and Ryan M. Kelly, both of Anderson & Wanca, of Rolling Meadows, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ITALIA FOODS, INC., Indiv. and as the Representative of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SUN TOURS, INC., d/b/a Hobbit Travel, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201408\u20141148\nOpinion filed February 24, 2010.\nModified on denial of rehearing April 5, 2010.\nMichael D. Richman and Henry Pietrkowski, both of Reed Smith LLEJ of Chicago, and Charles W. Smith, of Smith & LaLuzerne, Ltd., of Waukegan, for appellants.\nPhillip A. Bock and Robert M. Hatch, both of Bock & Hatch, LLC, of Chicago, and Brian J. Wanca and Ryan M. Kelly, both of Anderson & Wanca, of Rolling Meadows, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1038-01", "first_page_order": 1054, "last_page_order": 1089 }