{ "id": 2920830, "name": "Frederick W. Schmidt, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul Powell, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Schmidt v. Powell", "decision_date": "1972-03-08", "docket_number": "No. 11515", "first_page": "34", "last_page": "38", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 34" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "355 Ill. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5286312 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/355/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5279888 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/358/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2587380 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/364/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2663521 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5146549 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/317/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ill. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2588802 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/363/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ill.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12127481 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 Ill. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2491356 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/384/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ill.2d, 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12121469 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2496830 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/387/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 Ill. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314083 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/414/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 N.E.2d, 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill.2d, 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2786451 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/11/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2726387 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 N.E.2d, 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2769513 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0261-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 467, "char_count": 6846, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9743122018959495e-07, "percentile": 0.8505169606413346 }, "sha256": "3c06093b9202e031393c77369d9dfd80180c64bde9792f71d413378f99aec472", "simhash": "1:989446192b1cb7a7", "word_count": 1115 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:19.595106+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Frederick W. Schmidt, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul Powell, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SIMKINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff-Appellant Frederick W. Schmidt appeals from the order of the Circuit Court which affirmed the administrative decision of the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, dated June 30, 1970, which denied issuance of a drivers license to appellant because his application did not contain a Social Security number as required by Chapter 95%, Section 6 \u2014 106(b), Ill. Rev. Stat., 1969. The plaintiff did insert in the application the number assigned by the Federal Government for Federal income tax identification.\nPlaintiff asserts that the statutory requirements are directory not mandatory. The legislature provided in par. 6 \u2014 106, supra, that every application for a drivers license \u201cshall\u201d be made on a form furnished by the Secretary of State and that the application shall state \u201c* * * the name, social security number, zip code, date of birth, sex and residence address of the applicant; briefly describe the applicant; * *\nPar. 6 \u2014 110 of the same Act provides that \u201cThe Secretary of State shall issue to every applicant q\u00fcalifying therefore a drivers license * * * which license shall bear * * * the name, social security number, zip code, date of birth, address, and a brief description of the licensee #\nIn construing statutes courts have generally held the word \u201cshall\u201d to be mandatory, and particularly when the word is addressed to a public official. Thus in People ex rel. Benjamin S. Adamowski v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 14 Ill.2d 261, 278, 151 N.E.2d, 319, it was held where the statute provided that monies are available in the working cash fund \u201cthey shall be transferred\u201d, the word was mandatory. Whether the word \u201cshall\u201d is mandatory or discretionary depends on the legislative intent. (Cooper v. Hinricks 10 Ill. 2d 269, 272, 140 N.E.2d 293.) A reading of the various sections of the Drivers License Act, ch. 95%, pars. 6 \u2014 101 through 6 \u2014 118, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, compels the conclusion that the word \u201cshall\u201d in pars. 6 \u2014 106, 6 \u2014 110, was intended by the legislature to be mandatory. The Act provides that the Secretary of State \u201cshall\u201d not issue licenses to certain classifications of individuals, that he \u201cshall\u201d cancel licenses issued to certain minors under the conditions prescribed in the Act, that he \u201cshall\u201d examine every applicant for license who has not been previously licensed, that the examination of the applicant \u201cshall\u201d include a test for eyesight, etc.; that he \u201cshall\u201d file every application and \u201cshall\" maintain suitable indexes thereof.\nThe legislative intent being clearly manifested, we hold that the word \u201cshall\u201d contained in pars. 6 \u2014 106, 6 \u2014 110 is mandatory.\nPlaintiff also urges that furnishing the number assigned to him for Federal Income Tax purposes \u201c* 9 9 should be adequate added identification for the defendant\u201d. Perhaps it should, but that is not what the statute then provided and the defendant, as well as plaintiff, was bound by the statute.\nPlaintiff contends that the statute is an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the police power of the State contrary to the provisions of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution and the provisions of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution of Illinois, 1870. He argues that the requirement of furnishing his Social Security number is \u201c9 9 9 merely for the administrative convenience of the Secretary of State 9 9 9\u201d. This is a patent absurdity in view of the obvious purpose of the requirement which was to aid in establishing identity. The requirement was also a legislative response to the provisions of the National Highway Safety Act of 1966 (Title, U.S.C.A. Ch. 23, Sec. 402) which is applicable to every State and the Drivers Licensing Standard (4.45) promulgated under the Act, and which directs each State to establish a driver licensing program and to maintain a record of each licensed driver which includes \u201c9 9 9 positive identification 9 9 e\u201d.\nIn People v. Warren, 11 Ill.2d, 420, 143 N.E.2d, 28, the Court said:\n\u201cEvery presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute enacted under the police power. (Gadlin v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 414 Ill. 89, 95 Zelney v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 492, 499; Thillens, Inc. v. Hodge, 2 Ill.2d, 45, 57.) The only limitations upon the legislature in the exercise of its police power is that the statute must reasonably tend to correct some evil or promote some interest of the State and not violate some positive mandate of the constitution. (Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 579; People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 Ill.2d 332, 344.) The General Assembly has a wide discretion in the enactment of laws for the protection of the public health, safety and morals or the promotion of the general welfare and such statutes are valid when they apply accordingly and uniformly to all persons similarly situated. (City of Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 624; Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 138.) In the exercise of its inherent police power the legislature may enact laws regulating, restraining or prohibiting anything harmful to the welfare of the people, even though such regulation, restraint or prohibition interferes with the liberty or property of an individual. Bode v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 204, 225; City of Evanston v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198, 202; Fenske Bros., Inc. v. Upholsterers Union, 358 Ill. 239, 251; People v. Anderson, 355 Ill. 289, 296.\u201d\nTested by the foregoing standards we find no constitutional prohibition to the provisions of the statute in question which was intended, among other things, to promote the safety of those using the highways of this State.\nWe note that par. 6 \u2014 106, ch. 95%, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, was amended, effective January 1, 1972, and now provides that:\n\u201cThe Secretary of State may in his discretion substitute a federal tax number in lieu of a social security number, or he may instead assign an additional distinctive number in lieu thereof, where an applicant is prohibited by bona fide religious convictions from applying or is exempt from applying for a social security number. The Secretary of State shall, however, determine which religious orders or sects have such bona fide religious convictions.\u201d\nPar. 6 \u2014 110 of the same Chapter was amended, also effective January 1, 1972, to provide:\n\u201cIn lieu of the social security number, the Secretary may in his discretion substitute a federal tax number or other distinctive number.\u201d\nJudgment affirmed.\nCRAVEN, P. J., and SMITH, J. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SIMKINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas R. Wilson, of Joliet, for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago, (Francis T. Crowe, Samuel E. Kirsch, and A. Zola Groves, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel,) for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Frederick W. Schmidt, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul Powell, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 11515;\nFourth District\nMarch 8, 1972.\nThomas R. Wilson, of Joliet, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago, (Francis T. Crowe, Samuel E. Kirsch, and A. Zola Groves, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel,) for appellee." }, "file_name": "0034-01", "first_page_order": 54, "last_page_order": 58 }