{ "id": 2914438, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John H. Francis, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Francis", "decision_date": "1971-03-01", "docket_number": "No. 71-108", "first_page": "65", "last_page": "68", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 Ill.App.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1599857 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444-445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/103/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 A.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 A.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 A.L.R.3d 506", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 A.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.Y.S.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 So.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8819863 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/miss/246/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 A.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8099205 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/218/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 F.2d 591", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 857651 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/348/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill.App.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1599871 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/103/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill.App.2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2646370 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/93/0146-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 439, "char_count": 6475, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1355588226990232e-07, "percentile": 0.7663852216866698 }, "sha256": "4bbdb51dd34ef9080d30f8e65150420606751f4bb5d9e8bf314c212ecbb48ea3", "simhash": "1:e2ae87e153d320eb", "word_count": 1080 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:19.595106+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John H. Francis, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff appeals from an order granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress certain evidence.\nThe State\u2019s evidence disclosed that at about 9:20 P.M. a police officer on patrol saw defendant\u2019s car parked facing north with one of its wheels on the road. The officer parked his squad car behind defendant\u2019s auto and walked toward it. He testified that, at the time, there were no occupants in the vehicle and defendant was standing about 10-15 feet east of it. He asked if he could assist in getting defendant\u2019s car off the roadway to avoid an accident and the defendant responded that he would move the car. Immediately after the response the officer asked for defendant\u2019s drivers license. The defendant failed to produce one. The officer checked with headquarters and learned that defendant\u2019s license was revoked. He then arrested the defendant and, allowing the vehicle to remain in the same position, took defendant to the police station and charged him with driving while his license was revoked. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 95%, par. 6 \u2014 303.\nUnder cross-examination, the defendant testified that he was not driving the car and when asked who was with him, replied, \u201cno one at that time.\u201d\nRelying upon People v. Harr (1968), 93 Ill.App.2d 146, the trial court allowed the motion to suppress.\nOn appeal, the State contends that the officer\u2019s request for defendant\u2019s drivers license was proper, that the Harr case was distinguishable and not in point, and that Harr did not invalidate provisions of the Driver1 Licensing Law which authorize police officers to request production of drivers\u2019 licenses.\nSection 6 \u2014 112 of the Driver Licensing Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 95%, par. 6 \u2014 112) states in part:\n\u201cEvery licensee * * * shall have his drivers license * * * in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and * * * shall display such license # # # upon demand * * (Emphasis added.)\nIn Harr, this Court held the section could not be used as a subterfuge to obtain information or evidence not related to the licensing requirement. In People v. Miezio (1968), 103 Ill.App.2d 398, we distinguished Harr on the basis that the defendant therein had committed a separate offense for which he was stopped. In the case before us there was no other offense, the car- was not stopped by the officer (it was parked) and the officer\u2019s purpose in stopping was to lend aid which cannot be considered a subterfuge but a duty. We agree with the State; the Harr decision is not applicable to the facts in the instant case.\nWhether the facts disclosed by tire record require a reversal of the trial court\u2019s order is a question resolved by an interpretation of section 6 \u2014 112. Therein a police officer is authorized to demand the production of a drivers license.\nIt is defendant\u2019s position that to invoke the authority granted there must first be probable cause. The contention is founded on the premise that when an officer detains a motorist under the section, such detention is tantamount to an arrest without a warrant; that for the subsequent search and seizure to be valid, the initial arrest must be based upon probable cause.\nFor the defendant\u2019s argument to prevail we must first assume that an arrest takes place when a police officer detains a motorist for the sole purpose of checking his drivers license. We have not been cited nor has our research disclosed a case in Illinois that so holds. Other jurisdictions (under an almost identical provision) have held that the stopping of a motorist for the purpose of checking his driver\u2019s license is not an arrest but a momentary detention or \u201croutine interrogation.\u201d Lipton v. United States (9th Cir. 1965), 348 F.2d 591; Mincy v. District of Columbia (D.C. App. 1966), 218 A.2d 507; Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg (S. Ct. Miss. 1963), 150 So.2d 512. As to the validity of such provision, see (in addition to above) People v. Russo (Cr. Ct. N.Y. 1963), 239 N.Y.S.2d 374; State v. Campbell (S.Ct. R.I.1963), 187 A.2d 543; and State v. Yoss (Ohio App. 1967), 225 N.E.2d 275. Also see, 6 A.L.R.3d 506-512.\nFurther, to adopt defendant\u2019s argument would require some other offense to have been committed before a police officer could demand a drivers license to be displayed. This, in effect, would vitiate the purpose of the section.\nWe conclude, as did the Court in Mincy, supra, p. 508:\n\u201cA routine spot check of a motorist to ascertain if he has complied with the requirement of possession of a permit is neither unreasonable nor invalid, provided such check is not used as a substitute for a search for evidence of some possible crime unrelated to possession of a driver\u2019s permit.\u201d\nStill unresolved is the State\u2019s position. It does not raise or argue the issue that, under circumstantial evidence, defendant must have driven his vehicle to the place of the occurrence, but rather takes the position (in both its original and reply briefs) that Section 6 \u2014 112 authorizes a police officer, as described in the section, to demand the production of a drivers license whenever he \u201cnotices that the person near the car is going to drive that car.\u201d\nWe are of the opinion that acceptance of this position would amount to an unwarranted extension of the authority granted by the Legislature. (Contra, Shipley v. State (Ct. of App., Md. 1966), 220 A.2d 585 and Taylor v. State (App. Md. 1970), 264 A.2d 870.) Under criminal law, with few exceptions, the complained of act must have occurred. This has application to the present case. The \u201cpossession\u201d referred to within the section is conditional, such possession being necessary only \u201cwhen operating a motor vehicle.\u201d We interpret this phrase to mean the act of operating a motor vehicle, not the intent alone to do so.\nSince the State chose to confine this appeal to the specific issue stated, and there being no evidence in the record relied upon by the State which reflects that defendant actually drove the vehicle, we must affirm the order of the trial court. See People v. Ammons (1968), 103 Ill.App.2d 441, 444-445.\nOrder affirmed.\nSEIDENFELD, P. J., and ABRAHAMSON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "William V. Hopf, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton, (Ralph J. Gust, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People.", "Marco & Manniana, of Downers Grove, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John H. Francis, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 71-108;\nSecond District\nMarch 1,1971.\nWilliam V. Hopf, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton, (Ralph J. Gust, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People.\nMarco & Manniana, of Downers Grove, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0065-01", "first_page_order": 85, "last_page_order": 88 }