{ "id": 2916594, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Kendricks, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kendricks", "decision_date": "1972-04-13", "docket_number": "No. 55822", "first_page": "1029", "last_page": "1034", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 1029" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "208 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill.App.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2604666 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/60/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 N.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill.App.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2547696 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/87/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill.App.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2477173 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/97/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 N.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2838438 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill.App.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2539278 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/95/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 N.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill.App.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2900023 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/101/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 N.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2855750 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0522-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 516, "char_count": 9777, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.657440892281739e-07, "percentile": 0.8245947929782779 }, "sha256": "b1327c1cd846e1907f0bd569b5646cd63484ca40f0ae10e107709d389dad5ea6", "simhash": "1:83958dfcb42d9045", "word_count": 1606 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:19.595106+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Kendricks, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was charged with murder and aggravated battery. The Mai court, sitting without a jury, found him guilty of both charges. Defendant was sentenced to 18 to 40 years for murder and 8 to 10 years for aggravated battery, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, defendant urges that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain the convictions for the crimes; that, with respect to the murder charge, defendant\u2019s right to due process was violated; and that the sentence imposed on the murder charge was excessive.\nCertain facts are undisputed. On February 24, 1968, defendant fired the shot that fatally injured the deceased, Marie Richardson, and wounded deceased\u2019s brother, Lonnie Richardson. Defendant, 22 years of age at the time, and deceased, 33 years old, had lived together for a few years, although they were not living together at the time of the occurrence. Earlier in the evening, deceased had gone to defendant\u2019s place of work, a gas station, and after an argument, had placed a gun to defendant\u2019s head. Defendant called the police but, before their arrival, one of deceased\u2019s sons ran away with the gun. After finding no weapons on the deceased, the police merely took her home in a squad car. At about 4:00 A.M., defendant went to the deceased\u2019s apartment.\nJoseph Richardson, a son of the deceased, testified that when defendant knocked on the door, Lonnie Richardson, the uncle of the witness, answered. The witness stood beside Lonnie in the doorway. Defendant asked to see the deceased, but Lonnie stated that she was sleeping. The witness unsuccessfully attempted to awaken his mother. The next thing he knew, a shot had been fired and his uncle fell to the ground. Defendant then entered the room where deceased was sleeping, walked up to her and shot her in the head. Deceased\u2019s younger son Melvin testified substantially to the same facts as his brother concerning the shootings. It was he who took the gun from his mother earlier in the evening. Melvin also testified that he had seen defendant\u2019s car driving around the house prior to the shootings.\nLonnie Richardson, the other victim, also testified on behalf of the State. Lonnie opened the door when defendant knocked and told defendant that he could not see Marie because she was sleeping. The witness turned to see if his sister was still sleeping, and when he turned back toward the defendant, was shot in tire face. Lonnie was hospitalized for two weeks and had a steel plate in his head as a result. All three occurrence witnesses testified that the deceased did not have a gun and that there was no gun in the apartment.\nSeveral police officers also testified for the State. Defendant was arrested in a vacant lot near the premises, and the gun was found the next afternoon in the yard behind defendant\u2019s apartment. Defendant told the police that he shot Marie because she was harassing him and had threatened him with a gun, and that he shot Lonnie because he would not let defendant in the apartment. The police found no gun near either victim although they did not search the premises thoroughly. One of the officers testified that defendant had made several complaints against the deceased.\nEarl Payton, a friend and co-worker of defendant, testified for the defense. Defendant lived in Payton\u2019s house. Payton was present when deceased threatened defendant with a gun earlier in the evening. Defendant left work because he was upset. Defendant came in the next moming to teU Payton that he had shot Marie and her brother. At trial, Payton recognized the gun used as one kept in the gas station.\nDefendant testified that he had been trying to break off the relationship with deceased for some time. Defendant testified about the incident at the gas station and also told of other incidents when the deceased had threatened him. He testified that the deceased came to his apartment at 3:30 A.M., saying that she wanted to talle to him, but he was frightened because she had a gun. Defendant then went to her apartment to talk, but Lonnie would not let him in the apartment. Lonnie made a sudden move and turned back quickly. Although defendant did not see anything in Lonnie\u2019s hand, he shot him because he thought Lonnie might have been handed a gun. Defendant testified that, as he entered the room, the deceased was sitting up on the couch pointing a gun at him. Defendant shot her because he was afraid that she would shoot first. Defendant denied maldng any statements to the police.\nDefendant first contends that the proof was insufficient to sustain the convictions. He maintains that all his actions were justified in the defense of his person. The issue of self-defense is always a question of fact and a judgment will not be disturbed \u201cunless the evidence is so palpably contrary to the verdict, or so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to justify entertaining a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d (People v. Williams, 40 Ill.2d 522, 526, 240 N.E.2d 645.) The trier of fact is not required to accept defendant\u2019s account of the events, but may consider all of the surrounding circumstances and the improbabilities of the matters testified to by defendant. (People v. Watts, 101 Ill.App.2d 36, 241 N.E.2d 463; People v. Williams, 95 Ill.App.2d 421, 237 N.E.2d 740.) In finding defendant guilty of both crimes, the trial judge specifically stated that defendant\u2019s testimony that he acted in self-defense was not credible. We believe that such a determination was reasonable and proper.\nAs to the aggravated battery charge, defendant\u2019s argument that he acted in self-defense in shooting Lonnie is based solely on his own testimony. Three witnesses testified that Lonnie had no weapon of any kind, and that there was no gun on the premises. Indeed, defendant admitted that he saw nothing in Lonnie\u2019s hand, but predicated his theory of self-defense on the possibility that one of deceased\u2019s sons could have slipped a gun to Lonnie. Evidence was also adduced, contrary to defendant\u2019s self-defense claim, that defendant had stated that he shot Lonnie because he would not let defendant in the apartment. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated battery.\nAs to the murder charge, the trier of fact was aware that the deceased had threatened defendant\u2019s life several times in the past. However, the court also knew that defendant went to deceased\u2019s apartment, armed with a gun, to settle their dispute. Defendant\u2019s deliberate return to the conflict with the deceased is inconsistent with a claim of self-defense. (People v. Lewis, 32 Ill.2d 391, 207 N.E.2d 65.) Moreover, the trial court believed the testimony of two occurrence witnesses that defendant deliberately killed deceased while she slept. It is the province of the trier of fact to settle conflicts in evidence and to determine from the facts and circumstances whether defendant acted in self-defense or, if not, whether tire circumstances attending the assault were such that the death at defendant\u2019s hands constituted murder, manslaughter or justifiable homicide. (People v. Brumbeloe, 97 Ill.App.2d 370, 240 N.E.2d 150.) In the instant case, the trial court properly found defendant guilty of murder.\nDefendant next contends that as to the charge of murder his right to due process of law was violated by the trial court. In rendering judgment, the judge stated that he was not impressed with defense counsel\u2019s argument that defendant could be convicted only of voluntary manslaughter. The judge went on to state that voluntary manslaughter was inconsistent and incompatible with the theory of self-defense. Defendant maintains that the comments of the judge show that he did not consider the possibility of finding defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.\nThe theory of self-defense is compatible and consistent with the crime of voluntary manslaughter, (People v. Gajda, 87 Ill.App.2d 316, 232 N.E.2d 49), and the trial court\u2019s statement to the contrary was erroneous. However, the statement was not prejudicial and did not deprive defendant of due process because the trial court specifically found that defendant\u2019s evidence as to self-defense was not credible. The evidence as presented and believed by the court showed that defendant was guilty of murder in that he deliberately shot the deceased with full intent to take her life. Defendant was not deprived of due process by the comments of the trial judge.\nDefendant also contends that the sentence of 18 to 40 years imposed on the murder charge was excessive. The minimum sentence for murder is 14 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1.) The power of a reviewing court to reduce sentences should be exercised with caution. A sentence imposed by the trial judge who sees the defendant and is, therefore, in a far better position to appraise him and to evaluate the likelihood of his rehabilitation than a reviewing cotut, should not be reduced unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. (People v. Valentine, 60 Ill.App.2d 339, 208 N.E.2d 595.) In the instant case, defendant was found guilty of the brutal murder of a sleeping woman. Despite defendant\u2019s youth, his lack of prior felony record, and previous harassment by tire victim, we believe that the facts and circumstances of the crime justify the sentence imposed.\nJudgments affirmed.\nMcGLOON, P. J., and DEMPSEY, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lawrence Stephen Galka, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Edward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle and Stephen Connolly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Kendricks, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 55822;\nFirst District\nApril 13, 1972.\nLawrence Stephen Galka, of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle and Stephen Connolly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "1029-01", "first_page_order": 1049, "last_page_order": 1054 }