{ "id": 2969636, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME JAVUREK, Defendant.-(THE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, Petitioner-Appellant.)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Javurek", "decision_date": "1976-07-15", "docket_number": "No. 75-393", "first_page": "218", "last_page": "220", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 218" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "323 N.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2700809 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/25/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2877462 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 659", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5306312 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" }, { "page": "813-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0810-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 395, "char_count": 6792, "ocr_confidence": 0.866, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.896602053381583e-08, "percentile": 0.535389708048616 }, "sha256": "7d44509c18530fcf375ac8bcc1c57de2cae8d4beb13f38efa7240670edf3d204", "simhash": "1:e23e5af3aacedfdc", "word_count": 1115 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:46:14.004939+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME JAVUREK, Defendant.\u2014(THE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, Petitioner-Appellant.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Illinois Department of Mental Health appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Kankakee County which committed defendant Jerome Javurek to M\u00e1nteno State Hospital for treatment after his acquittal on a murder charge by reason of insanity. Additionally, the trial court found that defendant had riot recovered from his insanity and a portion of the order appealed from provided that the Department \u201cis ordered not to release, nor transfer nor discharge 0 0 0 defendant, until further order of this Court.\u201d\nDefendant has been and is continuing to be treated by the Department at the Manteno Mental Health Center.\nThe appeal raises the question whether the circuit court had authority to require a hearing prior to release, transfer or discharge.\nThe Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144(b)) provides for the procedure the trial court must follow after an acquittal by reason of insanity, where the trial court finds that the person has not yet recovered from insanity. The court is directed to make a specific finding as to \u201ccompetence\u201d and to make a specific finding that the defendant is \u201cin need of mental treatment.\u201d If it is found that the defendant is still in need of mental treatment, the court is to then order the defendant to be hospitalized in the custody of the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. These specific actions are the only ones which the trial court is authorized to take. The final sentence in subsection (b) places upon that Department the responsibility for the \u201cadmission, detention, care, treatment, and discharge of the defendant.\u201d\nThe Department contends that the legislature intended that the trial court jurisdiction of an acquitted defendant terminate with the commitment order, and thereafter that he be treated and discharged without further review by the court. The State\u2019s Attorney disputes this view.\nThis identical question was raised in the recent case of People v. Adams (1st Dist. 1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 810, 343 N.E.2d 659. Adams arose from an order of the trial court that the defendant, who was acquitted because of insanity and found to be in need of mental treatment \u201c * \u00b0 * be returned to this Court for a hearing and determination by this Court that the Defendant is no longer afflicted with said insanity and is no longer in need of psychiatric treatment.\u201d (35 Ill. App. 3d 810, 812.) When the Department discharged the defendant without the hearing required by the trial court a contempt order followed, and the Department appealed from that finding and adjudication of contempt. In Adams, the court said:\n\u201cThe question becomes when does the circuit court lose jurisdiction over the defendant. Jurisdiction was acquired by the circuit corut when the defendant was indicted. The circuit corut heard the matter, tried the defendant on the indictment, and returned a verdict. Section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) provides that admission, detention, care, treatment, and discharge after such order shall be under the Mental Health Code. We hold that the circuit court loses jurisdiction over the person and subject matter after the defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity and the corut enters its order. Under the Mental Health Code, the circuit court only has jurisdiction over persons not charged with a felony who are in need of mental treatment (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 91/2, \u00a72 \u2014 1.) The Mental Health Code of 1967 cannot be invoked until a defendant like the one in the instant case, is acquitted. Once invoked, the section of the Mental Health Code of 1967 on discharge (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 91M, \u00a710 \u2014 4) provides that the superintendent may grant an absolute discharge by notifying the court which originally entered the order of hospitalization that such?person has been given an absolute discharge from such hospital.\u201d \u201d \u201d. It is clear that the court issuing the original order, herein the circuit court, has no statutory authority to bring the defendant back before that court.\u201d 35 Ill. App. 3d 810, 813-14.\nThis court can appreciate the trial court\u2019s concern that the Department may give insufficient consideration to the need to protect the community from dangerous persons, and that a court should determine when one has been restored to reason and is able to function in society without fear of harming others. Some experts contend that the doctor\u2019s concern is primarily that of his patient\u2019s mental health, wh\u00fce the community is concerned with the extent of a threat to public tranquility posed by a particular patient. The court is in a better position to balance both viewpoints.\nWe believe however, that the legislature has issued its instructions and its directives must be followed. It is the function of the legislature, not the courts, to prescribe the procedures to be followed in treating persons acquitted by reason of insanity after their acquittal. \u201cCourts have no legislative powers, and their sole function is to determine and, within the constitutional limits of the legislative power, give effect to the intention of the lawmaking body. We will not, and cannot inject provisions not found in a statute, however desirable or beneficial they may be.\u201d Droste v. Kerner (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 495, 504, 217 N.E.2d 73; Rios v. Jones (1st Dist. 1974), 25 Ill. App. 3d 381, 323 N.E.2d 380.\nThe next session of the Illinois General Assembly may wish to consider a revision of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144(b) and the Mental Health Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 10 \u2014 4) to establish new standards for release, keeping in mind that the effect of a determination of insanity is that no indictable \u201ccrime\u201d was committed. The offender is not a criminal, but an individual requiring medical attention. The basis for his confinement is rehabilitation and-treatment. Any new standards for release must be based on this nature of commitment, given the overriding concern for the public safety.\nSince the circuit court lost jurisdiction under section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b), the last paragraph of its order of February 4, 1975, was void ab initio and is hereby vacated. Since the remainder of the commitment order was not challenged on appeal, it is affirmed.\nReversed in part; affirmed in part.\nALLOY, P. J., and BARRY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (William J. Fitzpatrick, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Edward P. Drolet, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME JAVUREK, Defendant.\u2014(THE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, Petitioner-Appellant.)\nThird District\nNo. 75-393\nOpinion filed July 15, 1976.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (William J. Fitzpatrick, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nEdward P. Drolet, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee, for the People." }, "file_name": "0218-01", "first_page_order": 246, "last_page_order": 248 }