{
  "id": 2964774,
  "name": "WALTER GELETO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JOSEPH GIGLIETTI, Individually and d/b/a Early Realty, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Geleto v. Giglietti",
  "decision_date": "1976-07-21",
  "docket_number": "No. 76-44",
  "first_page": "226",
  "last_page": "228",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 226"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "cites_to": [
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      "cite": "242 N.E.2d 237",
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    {
      "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 236",
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:46:14.004939+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "WALTER GELETO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JOSEPH GIGLIETTI, Individually and d/b/a Early Realty, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Joseph Giglietti, lessee, appeals from a judgment in favor of the lessors, Walter and Esteele Geleto, who brought this forcible entry and detainer action to recover possession of first floor business premises located at 755 and 757 Ruby Street in Joliet, Illinois.\nIn 1970 plaintiffs and defendant entered into a written five-year lease which provided for a rent of *150 per month with defendant to have an option to renew the lease for an additional five years at *175 per month, provided that the option is exercised by written notice to plaintiffs more than 90 days before August 31,1975. In October of 1975, plaintiffs brought this action to recover possession and three months rent totaling *510. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs for possession and *450 rent, and defendant appeals from the judgment entered on that verdict.\nDefendant testified that he orally notified plaintiffs of his intent to renew his lease for five years, when he saw Walter Geleto on the street during May, 1975, and said to him, \u201cWalt, I intend to stay as a tenant.\u201d Mr. Geleto made no response, and defendant suggests that silence implied assent.\nAccording to other evidence, in August 1975, defendant, through an agent, tendered a check for *150 for the rent due September 1, which would have been the first payment under the five-year renewal. Mr. Geleto told defendant\u2019s agent, \u201cYou better go back and tell Joe he better read his lease.\u201d Defendant argues that this statement implied that plaintiff wanted a check for *175 as provided in the lease, and thus was a waiver of the written notice requirement. Plaintiffs respond that this statement refers to the fact that the original lease had ended.\nDefendant also asserts that plaintiffs are estopped from claiming the benefit of the written notice provision because they previously waived other requirements in the lease. Evidence concerning remodeling bills and other transactions was introduced to show that the parties had not strictly followed the lease provisions. All of these matters were considered by the jury in reaching a verdict.\nDefendant seems to contend either that plaintiffs\u2019 conduct amounted to waiver of written notice as a matter of law, or that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. As to the first, the evidence is obviously susceptible to various conflicting inferences and thus the question of waiver was within the province of the jury.\nSecond, we need not consider the manifest weight question because the record filed on appeal does not contain the transcript of the morning session of the trial at which plaintiffs presented their case. When a transcript is incomplete, we are bound to presume that all of the epidence heard by the jury was sufficient to support the verdict. Flynn v. Vancil (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237.\nBecause defendant wrote to Mr. Geleto on September 15, 1975, requesting renewal of the lease, defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to give his jury instruction no. 4 on unilateral waiver. However, the Excerpts of Record do not contain the instructions given, or the conference on instructions. We are unable to determine whether refusal to give this instruction was error without considering all the instructions given. A reviewing court need not search the record for reasons to reverse, and therefore we will not consider this issue. Mitchell v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. Co. (3d Dist. 1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 1, 279 N.E.2d 782.\nDefendant also claims the complaint was fatally defective because plaintiffs\u2019 names were typed at the bottom but no signature appeared in the blank provided. The Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 57, par. 5) requires a \u201ccomplaint in writing,\u201d but a signature is not required. (Wolff v. Jurgenson (1st Dist. 1914), 185 Ill. App. 347.) Furthermore, any defects in pleadings, either of form or of substance, not objected to in the trial court are waived on appeal. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 42.\nAfter considering all of defendant\u2019s contentions, we conclude that the judgment entered in the Circuit Court of Will County must be affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nALLOY, P. J., and BARRY, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Codo and Bonds, of Joliet (Bruce L. Sumstein, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Galowich, Galowich, McSteen & Phelan, of Joliet (James E. Egan, of counsel), for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WALTER GELETO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JOSEPH GIGLIETTI, Individually and d/b/a Early Realty, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 76-44\nOpinion filed July 21, 1976.\nCodo and Bonds, of Joliet (Bruce L. Sumstein, of counsel), for appellant.\nGalowich, Galowich, McSteen & Phelan, of Joliet (James E. Egan, of counsel), for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0226-01",
  "first_page_order": 254,
  "last_page_order": 256
}