{ "id": 2970597, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONNIE L. SIMPSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Simpson", "decision_date": "1976-08-18", "docket_number": "No. 74-316", "first_page": "1059", "last_page": "1062", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 1059" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2891168 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 N.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2883509 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5363269 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 3d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2705139 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92, 597, 600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/25/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5308216 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0304-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 519, "char_count": 8900, "ocr_confidence": 0.887, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.465486604789825e-08, "percentile": 0.34311401938877517 }, "sha256": "97e368ac43f0d6d4c0d2f99823f5e29ad7bd0e3a5ce6e74220afdddef58d50c9", "simhash": "1:b45a99a6f5f8b34a", "word_count": 1474 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:46:14.004939+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONNIE L. SIMPSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Ronnie L. Simpson was indicted for burglary of a drugstore and for theft of certain drugs, watches, and currency, having a total value of less than *150. He was tried before a jury, found guilty of theft under *150, and was sentenced to 360 days at the State Penal Farm in Vandalia. He appeals the conviction, and asserts as error the improper admission of hearsay evidence and prejudicial closing argument by the prosecutor.\nThe evidence at trial showed that someone broke into the Taraboletti Pharmacy in Canton, Illinois, about 11 p.m. on April 16, 1974. Large quantities of various barbiturates and other drugs, syringes, needles, two Timex watches, and some cash were taken from the store. About three hours later defendant and Richard Emery were seen together in a grocery store in Bartonville, Illinois. There defendant encountered an acquaintance, Pierre DeLorme, with whom he left the store. He got into a car with DeLorme, George Sigler and Joe. Signe, who owned the car. Emery also left the store and got into his own car.\nDeLorme testified that defendant asked for a ride out of Bartonville, and said he was \u201cin trouble about the drugstore thing.\u201d Defendant also said he had some drugs referred to as \u201cdowns.\u201d Sigler testified that he heard defendant and DeLorme talking in the back seat about a drugstore burglary, and defendant said he was in trouble. Sigler also heard defendant say he had \u201cyellow jackets, reds and syringes.\u201d Signe drove around the block and saw police talking to Emery in his car near the store. Sigler got out of the car, and talked to the policeman. A short time later, he rejoined his friends in a nearby apartment, and told Signe to get defendant back to the store because the police wanted him.\nMeanwhile, after Emery left the store and went to his car, a Bartonville police officer came up to investigate Emery\u2019s car, which had no license plates and was parked on a sidewalk. While checking a windshield sticker with his flashlight, the officer saw two brown paper bags in the front seat area of the car. One bag was open with needles and syringes in plain view. Emergy, who was sitting behind the wheel, handed the bags to the officer when the officer asked permission to search the car. The bags contained large numbers of loose barbiturate capsules in plastic bags, and some bottles of capsules as well as needles and syringes. Emery later took police to a location in Canton and to another place along a road outside of Bartonville where empty drug containers and other items from the drugstore burglary were found.\nThe disputed testimony involved the police officer\u2019s account of statements made by Emery while the officer was interviewing him at his car. The officer testified that, when Emery handed him the bags, Emery said they belonged to defendant. The court sustained defendant\u2019s objection that Emery\u2019s statement to the officer was hearsay, and instructed the jury to disregard it.\nThe officer then related that, while he was standing by the car holding the bags, defendant came walking along the sidewalk toward the car. The officer testified first that defendant said, \u201cIt ain\u2019t mine, man,\u201d and that defendant\u2019s statement was in answer to Emery, who had called out, \u201cI am not going to take the rap for you.\u201d Defendant\u2019s objections that both these statements were hearsay were overruled, and, on appeal, defendant contends that Emery\u2019s statement to defendant was incompetent hearsay evidence and admission of that evidence was prejudicial. Emery was not called as a witness.\nDefendant suggests that Emery\u2019s statement was asserted \u201cto show the truth of the matter\u201d that defendant had taken part in the theft, and thus depended for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court declarant, Emery, who was not available in court for cross-examination. See, e.g., People v. Harden (5th Dist. 1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 304, 320 N.E.2d 587.\nThe State argues that the officer\u2019s account of this conversation was admitted to show that such a conversation took place, and not to prove that defendant committed a theft of the drugs. In People v. Thomas (3d Dist. 1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 88, 322 N.E.2d 597, a similar objection was raised when a police investigator testified that he arrested defendant on the basis of information given him by defendant\u2019s confederate and an informant. After finding that defendant had waived this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court, this court went on to say:\n\u201cThe statement was properly admitted, in any event, as testimony of the witness to the effect that another person made an extrajudicial statement, where the purpose is not to show the truth of such statement but to show the reason why the witness followed the course of conduct which he did and the fact that he relied and acted upon the information so received. Such statement was not objectionable on the ground that it was hearsay \u00b0 * * . [The police investigator] did not testify as to what was said in the third-party conversation, as it pertained to defendant, but rather he testified that such statements as were made to him were the basis of his investigation that led to defendant\u2019s arrest.\u201d 25 Ill. App. 3d 88, 92, 597, 600.\nUnlike Thomas, the police officer here did testify to what Emery said to defendant, and he did not testify that Emery\u2019s statements were the basis for defendant\u2019s arrest. Furthermore, when the trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objection to this testimony, the jury was not instructed that Emery\u2019s statement accusing defendant could be considered only for some limited purpose and not as proof of defendant\u2019s guilt. Thus, there is nothing in the record to show that the conversation was admitted for any purpose other than to prove that defendant took part in the theft of the drugs.\nAssuming that the testimony was offered to prove the truth of the assertions it contained, then under orthodox concepts this testimony would be hearsay and would be admissible only if it fell within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Consequently, the value of Emery\u2019s statement rested upon the credibility of Emery, the out-of-court asserter, who was not available for cross-examination, and the statement was thus not admissible. In People v. Carpenter (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 116, 121, 190 N.E.2d 738, the rule was stated, as follows:\n\u201c[T]he essential feature, without which testimonial offerings must be rejected, is the opportunity for cross-examination of the party whose assertions are offered to prove the truth of the act asserted.\u201d\nSee also People v. Cook (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 363, 211 N.E.2d 374; McCormick, Evidence ch. 24, \u00a7245, 583. (2d ed. 1972).\nWe must also reject the State\u2019s contention that Emery\u2019s statement was not hearsay because defendant was present and took part in the conversation. As is stated in McCormick, on Evidence ch. 24, \u00a7246, at 586 (2d ed. 1972):\n\u201cThe presence or absence of the party against whom an out-of-court statement is offered has significance only in a few particular situations, e.g., when a statement spoken in his presence is relied upon to charge him with notice, or when failure to deny a statement spoken in his presence is the basis for claiming that he acquiesced in or adopted the statement.\u201d (Footnotes omitted).\nAlthough the misconception persists that characterization of a conversation as hearsay depends upon the absence of the defendant, the Illinois Supreme Court has expressly rejected that notion. People v. Cook; People v. Carpenter. Furthermore, Emery\u2019s hearsay statement was not rendered admissible by the State\u2019s strategy of having the officer first testify to defendant\u2019s denial that the bags were his and thereafter relate Emery\u2019s accusation in order to explain the defendant\u2019s statement.\nUnder this set of circumstances, we can only conclude that the jury\u2019s finding was based in part on incompetent evidence which denied defendant his right to a fair and impartial trial. We believe that justice will be better served in a new trial, free from such error, and we remand the case for that purpose.\nDefendant also contends that the prosecuting attorney improperly stated his personal belief of defendant\u2019s guilt in closing argument. Defendant made no objection at trial, and thus the alleged error, if any, was waived. People v. Hampton (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 41, 253 N.E.2d 385.\nAccordingly, we reverse the judgment entered by the circuit court and remand this cause for a new trial consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nALLOY, P. J., and BARRY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Robert A. Downs, State\u2019s Attorney, of Lewistown, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONNIE L. SIMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 74-316\nOpinion filed August 18, 1976.\nRobert Agostinelli, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nRobert A. Downs, State\u2019s Attorney, of Lewistown, for the People." }, "file_name": "1059-01", "first_page_order": 1087, "last_page_order": 1090 }