{ "id": 4303039, "name": "WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. ERNESTINE TERRY et al., Defendants (Ernestine Terry, Counterplaintiff-Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant; Option One Mortgage Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Terry", "decision_date": "2010-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20140617", "first_page": "18", "last_page": "24", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "401 Ill. App. 3d 18" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 1145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3194827 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1146", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/1145-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 995", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interpreting section 1640 of the TILA, as opposed to section 1635" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3176530 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interpreting section 1640 of the TILA, as opposed to section 1635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 1381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "incorrectly treating section 1635(f) as a statute of limitations" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927651 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "incorrectly treating section 1635(f) as a statute of limitations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "explicitly abrogated" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3622503 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "explicitly abrogated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 So. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11991125 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/692/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 B.R. 312", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 11095093 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "\"rejecting] Plaintiff's argument that Pennsylvania state law allows a consumer to raise his or her right to rescission under [the] TILA defensively beyond the three year bar in \u00a71635(f)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/262/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 B.R. 394", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 9421085 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" }, { "page": "397" }, { "page": "397-98" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/276/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Fed. Reg. 14882", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "Fed. Reg.", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14890" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 B.R. 734", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 11677891 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" }, { "page": "735" }, { "page": "736" }, { "page": "736" }, { "page": "736" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/226/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "857 N.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604629 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 B.R. 651", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 3318278 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/400/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "837 N.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "counterclaim otherwise barred by statute of limitations permitted to proceed where plaintiff's underlying claim was timely" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3827903 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437", "parenthetical": "counterclaim otherwise barred by statute of limitations permitted to proceed where plaintiff's underlying claim was timely" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 1306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385723 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "cause of action under Wisconsin law properly barred in Illinois courts when the cause of action was not recognized in Illinois" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856164 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332-33", "parenthetical": "cause of action under Wisconsin law properly barred in Illinois courts when the cause of action was not recognized in Illinois" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 B.R. 558", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 6455175 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/195/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 F. Supp. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3801776 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/451/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11503738 ], "weight": 24, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" }, { "page": "569" }, { "page": "1409" }, { "page": "412-13" }, { "page": "570" }, { "page": "1410" }, { "page": "417" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "1412" }, { "page": "417" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "1412" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "574" }, { "page": "1413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Stat. 146", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "836 N.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 997", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5594088 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1000" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/0997-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a71635", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(i)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(f)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a71601", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." }, { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 755, "char_count": 14902, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6922169990516086e-08, "percentile": 0.2944416836657272 }, "sha256": "ccd1b7f78c81610eae46718ea789a50606e2c99e0a7e68c6175f625d23a128d2", "simhash": "1:fc6e1f772a16b80e", "word_count": 2480 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:03:46.574655+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. ERNESTINE TERRY et al., Defendants (Ernestine Terry, Counterplaintiff-Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant; Option One Mortgage Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nErnestine Terry, defendant, counterplaintiff, and third-party plaintiff, appeals the dismissal of her affirmative defense, counterclaim, and third-party complaint that the circuit court granted pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 615 (West 2008). The circuit court held that her right to rescind a mortgage issued by appellees Wells Fargo Bank and Option One Mortgage Corporation (the lenders), upon which all of her pleadings were founded, expired under the Truth in Lending Act (the TILA) (15 U.S.C. \u00a71601 et seq. (2006)) when she failed to exercise it within three years of receiving the mortgage. The lenders assert that even if she had exercised her right of rescission in a timely manner, her claim under that right would have failed on the merits.\nTerry contends that under section 1635(i)(3) of the TILA, her \u201cright of rescission in recoupment under State law\u201d (15 U.S.C. \u00a71635(i)(3) (2006)) survives. She asserts in her brief: \u201c[Section] 1635(i)(3) is a \u2018savings clause\u2019 allowing defensive TILA rescission claims under state law, even after the 3-year period has passed.\u201d\nBecause we find that under Illinois law there is no right of rescission in recoupment that falls within the provision of section 1635(i)(3) of the TILA, we are compelled to reject Terry\u2019s claim. We affirm Judge Atkins\u2019 ruling that Terry\u2019s affirmative defense, counterclaim, and third-party complaint fail as a matter of law.\nBACKGROUND\nOn October 25, 2002, Terry entered into an adjustable rate note and mortgage from Option One for a home mortgage refinance loan. In connection with the refinance of her mortgage, Terry received a United States Department of Housing and Urban Development settlement statement at closing. She contends the settlement statement indicated she was charged $3,720 in fees that were not disclosed on the federal \u201cTruth-In-Lending Disclosure Statement\u201d she received.\nAfter closing, Option One assigned Terry\u2019s mortgage to Wells Fargo. On April 12, 2007, Wells Fargo filed a complaint to foreclose the mortgage alleging Terry failed to make payments on her note. On January 29, 2008, Terry filed an affirmative defense, a counterclaim, and a third-party complaint against the lenders. The affirmative defense, counterclaim, and third-party complaint all sought rescission under the TILA.\nThe lenders moved to dismiss the affirmative defense, counterclaim, and third-party complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2008). Judge David B. Atkins granted the motion on September 8, 2008, finding Terry\u2019s right of rescission had expired. On February 19, 2009, Judge Atkins entered judgment for foreclosure and sale that was \u201cfully dispositive of the interest of all defendants.\u201d\nThis timely appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nStandard of Review\n\u201cThis court reviews the grant of a section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss de novo, and we accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the nonmoving party.\u201d Addison v. Distinctive Homes, Ltd., 359 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1000, 836 N.E.2d 88 (2005).\nThe Truth in Lending Act\n\u201cUnder the Truth in Lending Act, 82 Stat. 146, 15 U.S.C. \u00a71601 et seq., when a loan made in a consumer credit transaction is secured by the borrower\u2019s principal dwelling, the borrower may rescind the loan agreement if the lender fails to deliver certain forms or to disclose important terms accurately.\u201d Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411, 140 L. Ed. 2d 566, 569, 118 S. Ct. 1408, 1409 (1998), citing 15 U.S.C. \u00a71635 (1994). \u201cWithin 20 days after receiving notice of rescission, the lender must \u2018return to the [borrower] any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction.\u2019 \u201d Beach, 523 U.S. at 412-13, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 570, 118 S. Ct. at 1410, quoting 15 U.S.C. \u00a71635(b) (1994).\nA borrower\u2019s right to seek rescission under the TILA is not indefinite. Subsection (f) of section 1635, titled \u201cTime limit for exercise of right,\u201d provides:\n\u201cAn obligor\u2019s right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms required under this section or any other disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the obligor ***.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a71635(f) (2006).\nIt is undisputed that more than three years elapsed between the closing of Terry\u2019s refinance mortgage and the filing of her claim for rescission under the TILA, which suggests her claim is time-barred. However, Terry contends that she \u201cbrought [the] claim for recoupment in defense to Wells Fargo\u2019s foreclosure action and therefore the three-year expiration date does not preclude Terry\u2019s TILA rescission claim, so long as Illinois law allows it.\u201d Thus, she presents the question before us: Does Illinois law allow Terry\u2019s claim for recoupment in defense of Wells Fargo\u2019s foreclosure action apart from her claim under the TILA?\nTerry cites three cases to support her position: Beach, 523 U.S. 410, 140 L. Ed. 2d 566, 118 S. Ct. 1408; Johnson v. Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2006); and In re Botelho, 195 B.R. 558 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). The difficulty for Terry is that none is an Illinois case, which means none stands as authority for Illinois law. See Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 332-33, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968) (cause of action under Wisconsin law properly barred in Illinois courts when the cause of action was not recognized in Illinois). Because Beach references an Illinois case, we look only to Beach to determine whether it supports Terry\u2019s position.\nTerry reads Beach to hold that \u201cwhen a consumer brings a defensive rescission claim in a state where recoupment is allowed, such as Illinois, then the expiration of the three year period is not a bar to her TILA claim.\u201d\nUnder Illinois law, \u201c[recoupment is *** a cross-action in which a defendant alleges that it has been injured by a breach by plaintiff of another part of the contract on which the action is founded.\u201d Cox v. Doctor\u2019s Associates, Inc., 245 Ill. App. 3d 186, 199, 613 N.E.2d 1306 (1993); 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 608 (West 2008) (a claim by a defendant against a plaintiff \u201cin the nature of *** recoupment *** may be pleaded as a cross claim in any action, and when so pleaded shall be called a counterclaim\u201d).\nUnder existing Illinois case law, Terry\u2019s claim would survive the expiration of the three-year period as a defensive claim against the lenders\u2019 action if section 1635(f) of the TILA were a statute of limitations. See Barragan v. Casco Design Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 435, 437, 837 N.E.2d 16 (2005) (counterclaim otherwise barred by statute of limitations permitted to proceed where plaintiff\u2019s underlying claim was timely), citing 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 207 (West 2008) (\u201cA defendant may plead a set-off or counterclaim barred by the statute of limitation, while held and owned by him or her, to any action, the cause of which was owned by the plaintiff or person under whom he or she claims, before such set-off or counterclaim was so barred, and not otherwise\u201d).\nHowever, the United States Supreme Court made clear in Beach, \u201c[sjection 1635(f) is a statute of repose, not a statute of limitation.\u201d In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651, 660 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009), citing Beach, 523 U.S. at 417, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 118 S. Ct. at 1412. The provision \u201ctalks not of a suit\u2019s commencement but of a right\u2019s duration.\u201d Beach, 523 U.S. at 417, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 118 S. Ct. at 1412. Accordingly, \u201cthe [TILA] permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year period of \u00a71635(f) has run.\u201d Beach, 523 U.S. at 419, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 574, 118 S. Ct. at 1413.\nIllinois law observes the same distinction between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. \u201c[A] statute of repose differs from a statute of limitations in that a statute of limitations governs the time within which lawsuits may be commenced after a cause of action has accrued, while a statute of repose extinguishes the action itself after a fixed period of time, regardless of when the action accrued.\u201d DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 61, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006).\nOf the cases cited by Terry that were decided after Beach, there is only one case that expressly finds state law to support a recoupment claim. In In re Fidler, 226 B.R. 734, 735 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998), the mortgage debtors filed defensive claims of recoupment under both the TILA and the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (the CCCDA) (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140D, \u00a71 et seq.), seeking rescission more than three years after consummating a mortgage transaction. Fidler, 226 B.R. at 735. The CCCDA was modeled directly after the TILA and has the same objective of protecting debtors. Fidler, 226 B.R. at 736. Because of an exemption by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fidler, 226 B.R. at 736, citing 48 Fed. Reg. 14882, 14890 (April 6, 1983)), \u201cthe transaction at issue [was] governed not by [the] TILA but by [the] CCCDA.\u201d Fidler, 226 B.R. at 736. Even if the TILA had controlled, the court stated \u201c\u00a71635(i)(3) *** would direct [its] inquiry to [the] CCCDA and other Massachusetts law concerning recoupment.\u201d Fidler, 226 B.R. at 736 n.6.\nApplying Massachusetts law, the court in Fidler adhered to the CCCDA\u2019s provision that \u201c \u2018Nothing in this section shall be construed so as to affect a consumer\u2019s right of recoupment under the laws of the commonwealth.\u2019 \u201d Fidler, 226 B.R. at 737, quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140D, \u00a710(i)(3). The court followed the CCCDA\u2019s clear statutory mandate and granted the debtors the common law right of recoupment. Fidler, 226 B.R. at 737. The debtors\u2019 claim was barred under the TILA, but not under the CCCDA. Fidler, 226 B.R. at 738.\nThus, section 1635(f) constitutes an absolute bar to Terry\u2019s action under the TILA unless, under Illinois law, her right of rescission in recoupment pursuant to section 1635(i)(3) is preserved. In other words, to save her claim, there must exist an Illinois statute analogous to the CCCDA of Massachusetts. Terry, however, does not point us to any Illinois statute remotely similar to the CCCDA; nor have we found such an Illinois statute.\nThus, Terry\u2019s position before us is identical to the debtor\u2019s position in In re Williams, 276 B.R. 394 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2002). The court in Williams observed Fidler had relied on \u201cspecific language in a Massachusetts statute\u201d to permit a borrower to rescind a mortgage transaction after the three-year period expired. Williams, 276 B.R. at 397. There was, however, \u201cno similar state law *** in Pennsylvania.\u201d Williams, 276 B.R. at 397, citing In re Roberson, 262 B.R. 312, 320 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (\u201crejecting] Plaintiff\u2019s argument that Pennsylvania state law allows a consumer to raise his or her right to rescission under [the] TILA defensively beyond the three year bar in \u00a71635(f)\u201d). The Williams court concluded, \u201cunlike the statute in Fidler, neither statute [cited by the debtor] provides rescission rights to the borrower or reserves a borrower\u2019s recoupment rights.\u201d Williams, 276 B.R. at 397-98. \u201cAccordingly, [section] 1635(f) renders the Debtor\u2019s belated attempt to rescind the loan transaction invalid.\u201d Williams, 276 B.R. at 399. See Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 153 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam) (distinguishing Florida statute of limitations cases and holding \u201cunder Florida law, an action for statutory right of rescission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. \u00a71635 may not be revived as a defense in recoupment beyond the three-year expiration period contained in section 1635(f)\u201d).\nLike the debtors in Williams and Roberson, Terry has failed to identify a statute, case, or any other source of Illinois law that might afford her a right of rescission in recoupment analogous to a claim under the TILA. She does not cite a single case decided subsequent to Beach. Every authority she cites is either no longer good law following Beach (Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Ablin, 177 Ill. App. 3d 390, 395, 532 N.E.2d 379 (1988) (explicitly abrogated); Westbank v. Maurer, 276 Ill. App. 3d 553, 658 N.E.2d 1381 (1995) (incorrectly treating section 1635(f) as a statute of limitations)) or simply inapposite (Mt. Vernon Memorial Estates, Inc. v. Wood, 88 Ill. App. 3d 666, 410 N.E.2d 995 (1980) (interpreting section 1640 of the TILA, as opposed to section 1635); National Boulevard Bank of Chicago v. Thompson, 85 Ill. App. 3d 1145, 1146, 407 N.E.2d 739 (1980) (same); 735 ILCS 5/13\u2014207 (West 2008) (\u201cA defendant may plead a set-off or counterclaim barred by the statute of limitation ***\u201d)).\nIn the absence of an Illinois statute similar to the Massachusetts statute in Fidler, section 1635(i)(3) provides no basis to save Terry\u2019s claim for rescission.\nCONCLUSION\nBeach makes clear that section 1635\u00a9 is a statute of repose that extinguishes all claims for rescission outside the three-year period. Section 1635(i)(3) does not \u201csave\u201d Terry\u2019s TILA claim in the absence of an Illinois statute that expressly allows a defensive rescission claim. Accordingly, Terry\u2019s rescission claim is barred because it was not filed within three years of obtaining her home mortgage refinance loan. We do not reach the lenders\u2019 argument that the claim fails on its merits.\nAffirmed.\nHALL, EJ., and EATTI, J., concur.\nfin her notice of appeal, Terry also sought reversal of the circuit court\u2019s February 19, 2009, judgment for foreclosure and sale. Because no argument for this relief is asserted in her brief, we do not address it.\nAs the United States Supreme Court noted in a footnote, section 1635(i)(3) had no application in Beach because \u201cthere is no claim *** that Florida law purports to provide any right to rescind defensively on the grounds relevant under the [TILA].\u201d Beach, 523 U.S. at 418 n.6, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 573 n.6, 118 S. Ct. at 1413 n.6.\nThis case became the Beach case. Ocwen Federal Bank replaced Great Western Bank as the plaintiff while the case was pending. Beach, 523 U.S. at 414 n.4, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 571 n.4, 118 S. Ct. at 1411 n.4.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lloyd Brooks, of Brooks Law Firm, of Dolton, for appellant.", "Dianne E. Rist, S. Todd Sipe, and Gina M. Lavarda, all of Chapman & Cutler LLP, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. ERNESTINE TERRY et al., Defendants (Ernestine Terry, Counterplaintiff-Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant; Option One Mortgage Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20140617\nOpinion filed March 29, 2010.\nRehearing denied May 27, 2010.\nLloyd Brooks, of Brooks Law Firm, of Dolton, for appellant.\nDianne E. Rist, S. Todd Sipe, and Gina M. Lavarda, all of Chapman & Cutler LLP, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0018-01", "first_page_order": 34, "last_page_order": 40 }