{ "id": 4302714, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDRE RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Richardson", "decision_date": "2010-04-20", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201405\u20142042", "first_page": "45", "last_page": "54", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "401 Ill. App. 3d 45" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5251673 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592162 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209973 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096308 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781339 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" }, { "page": "35" }, { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2434163 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281434 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2556379 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414-15" }, { "page": "414-15" }, { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/83/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2498204 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153-55" }, { "page": "154-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861378 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193089 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295771 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" }, { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378896 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564578 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11-12", "parenthetical": "ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on matters de hors the record are not proper on direct appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 1121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3832570 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1141-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/1121-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738560 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910291 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 U.S. 91", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12031506 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/350/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "687-88" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694-95" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "693, 695" }, { "page": "697, 698" }, { "page": "2067, 2069" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "2069" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623819 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273948 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0537-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1048, "char_count": 23298, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14483257518102408 }, "sha256": "449c9622ea1fc48995bf106afcad66b58182cef2eba35b36136df8cfdac4eec3", "simhash": "1:ba05ac826e4bb1a5", "word_count": 3753 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:03:46.574655+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDRE RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Andre Richardson was convicted of the first degree murder of his 11-month-old daughter and was sentenced to 40 years\u2019 imprisonment. In People v. Richardson, 376 Ill. App. 3d 537 (2007), we reversed defendant\u2019s conviction on the basis that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress where the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant\u2019s eye injury was not inflicted in order to obtain a confession. The State was granted leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Richardson, 226 Ill. 2d 627 (2008). Before our supreme court, the State argued that defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement was voluntary and not coerced. The supreme court agreed and reversed this court\u2019s decision, instructing this court to consider defendant\u2019s remaining contentions. People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233 (2009).\nDefendant claims: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter; and (3) he was denied a fair trial when autopsy photographs were published to the jury and sent to the jury room during deliberations. After considering defendant\u2019s remaining claims, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nFACTS\nDefendant was tried for the murder of his 11-month-old daughter Diamond. Diamond sustained over 61 injuries after being beaten, slapped and bitten by defendant. A thorough recitation of the facts can be found in Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233. We will discuss only those facts relevant to the disposition of defendant\u2019s remaining claims.\nANALYSIS\nDefendant argues he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to offer expert testimony concerning his mental impairment during the motion to suppress hearing. Defendant contends that if such evidence had been offered, it would have shown that defendant\u2019s Miranda waiver was invalid and that his confession was involuntary.\nTo prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). A defendant must show that (1) trial counsel\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 (1984).\nUnder the first prong of the Strickland test, defendant must overcome a \u201cstrong presumption that counsel\u2019s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, defendant must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action, \u2018might be considered sound trial strategy.\u2019 \u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 100 L. Ed. 83, 94, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164 (1955).\nWith respect to establishing prejudice, \u201c \u2018 \u201c[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test. ***\u201d [Citation.] Rather, a defendant is required to show that \u201cthere is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.\u201d \u2019 \u201d People v. Negron, 297 Ill. App. 3d 519, 537 (1998), quoting People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 274 (1985), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 697, 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2067, 2069.\nWhere the defendant fails to prove prejudice, the reviewing court need not determine whether counsel\u2019s performance constituted less than reasonable assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069; People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 284 (1992). The defendant bears the burden of overcoming a strong presumption in favor of finding that counsel\u2019s advocacy was effective. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 525.\nIn this case, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress defendant\u2019s statement on two grounds. First, his confession was involuntary due to physical and psychological coercion because he was beaten by the police. The second basis for suppression alleged that defendant was unable to knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Evidence was offered as to the first basis for suppression, but defense counsel offered no evidence to support the claim that defendant was unable to waive his Miranda rights, despite counsel\u2019s repeated statements to the court that defendant was being evaluated by an expert to determine his ability to waive such rights.\nThe record shows that counsel did request numerous continuances prior to the hearing on the motion to suppress to obtain such an evaluation. However, at the hearing, counsel made no mention of the evaluation. Defendant would like this court to assume that: (1) defendant received a favorable evaluation but defense counsel failed to use it; or (2) defense counsel did not obtain an evaluation.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s suggestion, we cannot make such assumptions. Whether an evaluation was in fact completed and what the results of that evaluation might be are matters outside the record in this case. We do recognize that defendant\u2019s mental capacity was raised during sentencing. A presentence investigation report indicated that defendant\u2019s most recent test scores showed that he was at the third-grade reading and math levels and that he was at a second-grade spelling level. Furthermore, in the report finding defendant fit for sentencing, psychologist Neu reported that intellectual testing on defendant showed him to be in the \u201cupper echelon of mild mental retardation.\u201d Nevertheless, neither of these evaluations specifically dealt with defendant\u2019s ability to waive his Miranda rights. Therefore, we cannot say that counsel was ineffective for failing to offer expert testimony regarding defendant\u2019s mental impairment during the suppression hearing. A determination as to whether trial counsel was ineffective as to this issue is a claim that would best be raised in a postconviction petition. Where information not of record is critical to a defendant\u2019s claim, it must be raised in a collateral proceeding. People v. Durgan, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1141-42 (2004); People v. Burns, 304 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11-12 (1999) (ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on matters de hors the record are not proper on direct appeal).\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter where the evidence showed that he hit his daughter because' she was misbehaving and he had no intention of actually harming her.\nDefendant testified at trial that he hit his daughter because he did not want her to eat off the floor and because she would not listen to him. At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel requested an involuntary manslaughter instruction, arguing that defendant inflicted the injuries on Diamond not knowing that he would do great harm to her. The trial court denied the request, finding that there was no evidence to support such an instruction. After deliberations began, the jury sent a note posing two questions: (1) \u201cDoes the jury have the option of finding him guilty of a lesser charge?\u201d and (2) \u201cWhat would be the minimum punishment?\u201d Defense counsel again requested that the court instruct the jury on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. The court denied defense counsel\u2019s request. Defense counsel later moved for a mistrial based on the court\u2019s refusal to tender an involuntary manslaughter instruction. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial, stating that the 61 injuries Diamond sustained did not establish recklessness. The court also noted that not one scintilla of evidence existed to demonstrate that defendant did anything but beat Diamond again and again. The jury was instructed that it had the law that applied to the case and it was to continue deliberating.\nInvoluntary manslaughter requires a less culpable mental state than first degree murder. Under section 9 \u2014 1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961, a defendant commits first degree murder when he kills an individual without lawful justification and he knows that his acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(2) (West 2004). A defendant commits involuntary manslaughter, however, when he performs acts that are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another and he performs these acts recklessly. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3(a) (West 2004). Recklessness is statutorily defined:\n\u201cA person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 6 (West 2004).\nClearly, reckless conduct involves a lesser degree of risk than conduct that creates a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. See People v. Davis, 35 Ill. 2d 55, 60 (1966).\nAn instruction on a lesser offense is justified when there is some evidence to support the giving of the instruction. People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 132 (1997). Where there is credible evidence to support reducing the crime of first degree murder to involuntary manslaughter, an instruction should be given. People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 87 (1987). A circuit court\u2019s failure to give the instruction, where the evidence supports the instruction, is an abuse of discretion. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d at 132.\nDefendant claims that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to warrant instructions on involuntary manslaughter. According to defendant, there was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant acted recklessly because the evidence showed that defendant did not intend to kill Diamond and did not know that great bodily harm would result from his actions. In support, defendant cites People v. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d 216, 218 (1967), People v. Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d 152, 153-55 (1990), and People v. Brown, 83 Ill. App. 2d 411, 414-15 (1967).\nIn Lefler, the defendant\u2019s infant daughter died with a skull fracture, extensive brain injury and rib injuries. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d at 218. The defendant admitted to shaking and squeezing his daughter to get her to stop crying and he could have broken her ribs in the process. Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d at 222. In Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d 152, the defendant was charged with the murder of her two-year-old niece. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The evidence at trial showed that the little girl had extensive injuries, including facial and head injuries, fractured ribs, a fractured arm, a torn liver and diaphragm, and numerous scars on her entire body. Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 154-55. After the defendant appealed, this court found that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of involuntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, in People v. Brown, 83 Ill. App. 2d 411 (1967), the defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter after his girlfriend\u2019s three-year-old son died from multiple traumatic impacts, as evidenced by large bruises over the victim\u2019s body, in addition to other injuries. Brown, 83 Ill. App. 2d at 414-15. The Brown court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the defendant of involuntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown, 83 Ill. App. 2d at 415.\nWe find defendant\u2019s reliance on Lefler, Turner and Brown to be misplaced. The cases cited by defendant are not cases involving the question of whether a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter was improperly refused by the trial court. Rather, Lefler, Turner and Brown are mere instances of the cases in which the evidence supported a finding of involuntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of murder.\nAlthough not dispositive, certain factors may suggest whether a defendant acted recklessly and whether an involuntary manslaughter instruction is appropriate. These factors include the disparity in size and strength between the defendant and the victim, the brutality and duration of the beating and severity of the injuries, and whether the defendant used his bare fists or a weapon. People v. Eason, 326 Ill. App. 3d 197, 209 (2001). In addition, an involuntary manslaughter instruction is generally not warranted where the nature of the killing, shown by either multiple wounds or the victim\u2019s defenselessness, shows that defendant did not act recklessly. People v. Trotter, 178 Ill. App. 3d 292, 298 (1988). Whether an involuntary manslaughter instruction is warranted depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.\nDefendant\u2019s testimony that he did not intend to kill Diamond is insufficient to warrant an involuntary manslaughter instruction in this case. By defendant\u2019s own account, he beat his 11-month-old daughter. Defendant hit Diamond\u2019s hand and the front and back of her shoulder and bit her on the stomach when she tried to eat cereal off of the floor. After Diamond finished eating, he pushed on her stomach to see how far he could push it in. When she vomited, he \u201ckarate chopped\u201d Diamond\u2019s ribs and hit her on the buttocks with a plastic hanger. Still not satisfied, defendant hit Diamond about eight times with a belt. When Diamond vomited again after he had washed her and changed her clothes, defendant \u201cwas real angry\u201d and \u201csmacked\u201d her in the face. He then placed Diamond in a corner and told her to face the wall. Diamond would not stand still so defendant \u201cspanked her on the pamper\u201d about four times. Defendant then placed Diamond against the wall and ordered her not to move. Diamond \u201cstarted getting sleepy\u201d and fell back against the wall and hit her head. After Diamond fainted, defendant shook her \u201cpretty hard\u201d and she hit her head on the window casement and windowsill.\nThere is not a scintilla of evidence to support a finding that defendant acted recklessly rather than knowingly and intentionally. Diamond was a defenseless infant who suffered 61 injuries at the hands of defendant. After reviewing the record in this case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give an involuntary manslaughter instruction because the evidence did not warrant such an instruction. Consequently, defendant\u2019s claim fails.\nFinally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial when 27 gruesome autopsy photographs were published to the jury via an overhead projector during the testimony of the medical examiner and then sent to the jury room during deliberations. A total of 53 postmortem photographs were shown to the jury. Twenty-six of these photographs depicted external views of Diamond\u2019s injuries. These photographs are not at issue here. Defendant\u2019s argument concerns the 27 autopsy photos that defendant claims merely show Diamond\u2019s internal organs while she was being autopsied.\nPrior to trial, defense counsel objected to the State\u2019s use of any autopsy photographs that depicted Diamond\u2019s internal injuries. The court responded that the photographs were relevant to show intent because despite the repeated blows to Diamond\u2019s body, the external photographs did not show the cause of death. However, the court reserved ruling on defendant\u2019s motion until Dr. Cogan testified prior to publication. Defendant renewed his testimony at the start of the medical examiner\u2019s testimony. The court overruled the objection, stating:\n\u201cThe doctor said that they were intentionally inflicted wounds, injuries to which the objection was sustained. The pictures do speak for themselves. Over the defense objection, although they are graphic to prove intent, they will be allowed and the doctor can publish them to the jury over the defense objection. Again, keeping in mind that the defense is that he did not intend to kill the victim. And these photographs do point to something other than an accidental injury or an injury that was anything, meant to cause anything but death.\u201d\nPhotographs of a decedent may be admitted to prove the nature and extent of injuries and the force needed to inflict them, the position, condition and location of the body, the manner and cause of death, to corroborate a defendant\u2019s confession, and to aid in understanding the testimony of a pathologist or other witness. People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 34 (1994). While photographs may sometimes be cumulative of the testimony of a witness, photographs may also aid the jury in understanding the testimony. People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 220 (2000). If photographs are relevant to prove facts at issue, the photographs are admissible unless their nature is so prejudicial and so likely to inflame the jury that their probative value is outweighed. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d at 35. Even a photograph that is gruesome is admissible if it is relevant to corroborate oral testimony or to show the condition of the crime scene. People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 147 (1998). The decision to admit photographs into evidence is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d at 34.\nDefendant contends that the 27 autopsy photographs, showing Diamond\u2019s internal injuries after the medical examiner had cut open her body and removed her internal organs, were not only confusing and misleading, but had no probative value and were extremely prejudicial.\nDefendant contends that People v. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d 216 (1967), is instructive. In Lefler, defendant was tried and convicted of involuntary manslaughter after his infant son died while in his care. An autopsy was performed on the infant. With respect to the autopsy, the doctor testified that it revealed numerous hemorrhages along the vertebral column near the junction of the ribs, fractures of several ribs, as well as a skull fracture and extensive brain damage. The doctor testified that the rib injuries could have been caused by a crushing type of injury and that the skull fracture and brain damage could have been caused by a blunt force. Over the defendant\u2019s objection, the trial court allowed photographs from the autopsy to be published to the jury and projected on a screen approximately 44 by 26 in size. One of the pictures showed the chest cavity after the breast bone and a portion of the ribs and the lungs, heart and main blood vessels had been removed. The other photographs showed the skull and portions of the brain after an area of the skull had been removed. The Lefler court held that it was improper for the photographs to be shown to the jury, holding:\n\u201c[T]he testimony was that the body of the deceased bore little superficial evidence of injury and the gruesome nature of the pictures was caused almost entirely by the autopsy procedure. We believe that the pictures had little probative value in view of the detailed testimony by the physician and the fact that the nature and extent of the injuries was not disputed. The pictures were of such a nature as to arouse strong emotions on the part of the jurors and we hold that the court erred in permitting these photographs to be shown to the jury.\u201d Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d at 222.\nWe find Lefler distinguishable from the instant case. Diamond\u2019s autopsy photographs were relevant to illustrate Dr. Cogan\u2019s testimony of the extent of the victim\u2019s injuries, the manner of death and defendant\u2019s intent. Unlike Lefler, the autopsy photographs admitted in this case depicted Diamond\u2019s injuries at the hands of defendant. Dr. Cogan testified that Diamond had external injuries that consisted of swelling, bite marks and bruising. However, it was the internal injuries that caused her death. Dr. Cogan testified that photographs 27 through 34 depicted Diamond\u2019s brain just as he saw it upon examination and showed numerous hemorrhages at various different locations inside her skull. Dr. Cogan testified that those hemorrhages were inconsistent with a fall. Photographs 35 through 49 showed the blood found in Diamond\u2019s abdominal cavity and injuries caused to her heart, diaphragm, thymus, liver, anterior chest wall, spine and ribs. With respect to each photograph, Dr. Cogan testified regarding each hemorrhage to each organ, showing significant internal injury, indicative of a large amount of force exerted on Diamond\u2019s chest area. In addition, Diamond had a bruise on the back of her heart and a tear in her liver that were consistent with blunt-force trauma and at least one sharp blow to the anterior chest wall. Photograph 50 depicted a fresh hemorrhage to Diamond\u2019s left forearm and photographs 52 and 53 depicted a hemorrhage to the buttocks, which could have been caused by someone hitting Diamond with a plastic hanger. According to Dr. Cogan\u2019s testimony, many of these autopsy photographs showed a correspondence between the visible, external injuries and the otherwise concealed internal injuries. Furthermore, Dr. Cogan testified that Diamond\u2019s injuries were intentionally inflicted; they were not accidental.\nWe reject defendant\u2019s argument that these photographs were unfairly prejudicial. Although the photographs were graphic, they were relevant to show the location and extent of the injuries, as well as their character and depth. In addition, the photographs aided the jury in understanding Dr. Cogan\u2019s testimony. Furthermore, the photographs of the injuries, in conjunction with Dr. Cogan\u2019s testimony, aided the jury in determining defendant\u2019s intent.\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s argument that the photographs were confusing and misleading. Dr. Cogan testified as to each photograph, explaining each injury.\nWe conclude the prejudicial effect of the photographs did not outweigh their probative value and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to view them during deliberations.\nEven if the admission of the photographs were deemed erroneous, their admission is, at the very worst, harmless error. An erroneous evidentiary ruling by a trial court requires reversal only where it can be said that the error played a substantial part in the verdict. See People v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108, 170 (1991). The evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt in this case was overwhelming. Hence, no such error should be found here. See People v. Driskel, 224 Ill. App. 3d 304 (1991).\nBased on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHALL and THEIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Melissa C. Chiang, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald and Nancy Colletti, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDRE RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20142042\nOpinion filed April 20, 2010.\nRehearing denied June 1, 2010.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Melissa C. Chiang, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald and Nancy Colletti, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0045-01", "first_page_order": 61, "last_page_order": 70 }