{ "id": 4302743, "name": "In re ADOPTION OF S.G., a Minor (Kamette G. Hixson et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. S.G., a Minor, et al., Respondents-Appellees (Douglas Baker et al., Petitioners-Appellees))", "name_abbreviation": "Hixson v. S.G.", "decision_date": "2010-05-03", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201409\u20140912", "first_page": "775", "last_page": "788", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "401 Ill. App. 3d 775" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3593078 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 1004", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1007", "parenthetical": "\"an adoption will not relinquish a natural parent's obligation to support the child if the adoptive parent is unable to do so\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3564244 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "\"an adoption will not relinquish a natural parent's obligation to support the child if the adoptive parent is unable to do so\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "882 N.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564", "parenthetical": "recognizing the conflict but declining to address it" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705724 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" }, { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "853 N.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 Ill. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 3043681 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he overruling of a petition to intervene is a final order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/223/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 1040", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1048", "parenthetical": "denial of petition to intervene in an estate proceeding was a final judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3358686 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 1099", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1102" }, { "page": "1102" }, { "page": "1102" }, { "page": "1102" }, { "page": "1102" }, { "page": "1102" }, { "page": "1102" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Hixson et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. S.G., a Minor, et al., Respondents-Appellees (Douglas Baker et al., Petitioners-Appellees))." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter the Champaign County circuit court terminated the parental rights of both parents of respondent, S.G. (born in September 2005), S.G.\u2019s paternal grandparents, petitioners Kamette G. and Michael E. Hixson (hereinafter the Hixsons), filed a petition for adoption, custody, guardianship, and visitation (case No. 09\u2014AD\u201441). Five days later in a separate case (case No. 09\u2014AD\u201442), S.G.\u2019s foster parents, Douglas and Amy Baker (hereinafter the Bakers), also filed a petition for adoption. On the Bakers\u2019 motion, the trial court consolidated the two cases.\nThe Hixsons appeal (1) the trial court\u2019s September 2009 order that dismissed with prejudice their adoption petition and (2) the court\u2019s December 2009 order that severed the consolidated cases and struck the Hixsons\u2019 response to the Bakers\u2019 adoption petition. We dismiss part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment for which we have jurisdiction.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. The Underlying Juvenile Case (No. 06 \u2014 JA\u201485)\nOn May 22, 2008, the Champaign County circuit court entered a written order terminating the parental rights of S.G.\u2019s father, Justin Hixson. In re S.G., No. 06 \u2014 JA\u201485 (Cir. Ct. Champaign Co.). The order noted the guardian administrator of respondent, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), was to continue as S.G.\u2019s guardian. In September 2008, this court affirmed that judgment. In re S.G., No. 4\u201408\u20140391 (September 22, 2008) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On October 28, 2008, the circuit court terminated the parental rights of S.G.\u2019s mother, Heather Vineyard, and continued the placement of S.G.\u2019s custody with the guardian administrator of DCFS. In re S.G., No. 06\u2014JA\u201485 (Cir. Ct. Champaign Co.). In the October 28, 2008, docket entry, the circuit court authorized DCFS to appear in court and consent to S.G.\u2019s adoption when a petition was before the court. In re S.G., No. 06\u2014JA\u201485 (Cir. Ct. Champaign Co.).\nAt some point after the termination of Vineyard\u2019s parental rights, the Hixsons filed a petition to intervene and a petition for custody, guardianship, and visitation in case No. 06\u2014JA\u201485. After an April 29, 2009, hearing, the circuit court denied the Hixsons\u2019 petition to intervene.\nB. The Hixsons\u2019 Case (No. 09\u2014AD\u201441)\nOn May 1, 2009, the Hixsons filed the petition at issue in case No. 09\u2014AD\u201441, seeking adoption, custody, and guardianship of S.G. and visitation with her. Ten days later, DCFS filed a motion to dismiss the Hixsons\u2019 petition under section 2\u2014619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619.1 (West 2008)) and a memorandum in support of its motion. DCFS attached numerous documents from the juvenile case to its memorandum. The Hixsons filed a response to DCFS\u2019s dismissal motion, and DCFS later filed a reply.\nC. The Bakers\u2019 Case (No. 09 \u2014 AD\u201442)\nOn May 6, 2009, the Bakers filed their petition to adopt S.G. The petition noted they had received custody of S.G. on October 28, 2008. On May 12, 2009, the trial court entered an interim order, granting the Bakers custody of S.G. during the proceedings and appointing a guardian ad litem for S.G. Nine days later, the court entered an amended interim order, appointing a different guardian ad litem.\nD. Consolidation\nOn June 16, 2009, the Bakers filed a motion to consolidate the two adoption cases. After a June 17, 2009, hearing, the trial court granted the consolidation motion over the objection of the Hixsons. The court ordered the parties to file all pleadings in case No. 09 \u2014 AD\u201442. The docket entry further noted the cause was continued to July 2, 2009, for a hearing on DCFS\u2019s motion to dismiss the petition in case No. 09 \u2014 AD\u201441.\nOn July 1, 2009, the guardian administrator of DCFS entered her appearance and consent to the Bakers\u2019 adoption of S.G. The two documents contained both case numbers. On July 2, 2009, the trial court heard arguments on the motion to dismiss the Hixsons\u2019 petition and took the matter under advisement. The record on appeal lacks a report of proceedings for that hearing. On July 24, 2009, S.G.\u2019s guardian ad litem filed his answer to the Bakers\u2019 petition, listing only case No. 09 \u2014 AD\u201442.\nOn September 29, 2009, the trial court entered its memorandum opinion and order granting DCFS\u2019s motion to dismiss with prejudice the Hixsons\u2019 petition. The order contained the captions for both cases and noted the consolidation. The order noted the Bakers and their competing petition but did not expressly note any arguments by them. Additionally, in the order, the court stated it took judicial notice of the documents in the file, including the guardian administrator\u2019s consent to adoption by the Bakers.\nOn October 30, 2009, the Hixsons filed a response to the Bakers\u2019 adoption petition.\nOn November 2, 2009, the trial court held a status hearing, at which the Hixsons, the Bakers, DCFS, and the guardian ad litem appeared. During the hearing, the guardian ad litem emphasized he was only appointed to represent S.G. on the Bakers\u2019 petition. The Bakers first asked for a motion to sever, but the Hixsons objected because the Bakers had not filed a written motion. The court found a written motion was necessary. The Bakers then noted the Hixsons had indicated they may still appeal the dismissal of their petition. The Bakers argued the 30-day period for an appeal had already run, but if it had not, they wanted a Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding. The Hixsons and DCFS contended a Rule 304(a) finding was necessary to appeal the court\u2019s September 2009 dismissal. The court stated it would make such a finding. Also, on the day of the hearing, the Bakers filed a motion to strike the Hixsons\u2019 response to their adoption petition.\nOn November 3, 2009, the trial court entered its written order for a Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding, declaring no just cause existed to delay enforcement or appeal of the court\u2019s September 29, 2009, order. The Bakers also filed their motion to sever the two cases.\nOn November 25, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to sever the cases and strike the Hixsons\u2019 response. The motions were addressed by the Hixsons\u2019 counsel, the Bakers\u2019 counsel, DCFS\u2019s counsel, and the guardian ad litem. After hearing the parties\u2019 arguments, the court first granted the motion to sever and then struck the Hixsons\u2019 response because the cases were no longer consolidated. The court also stayed the proceedings in case No. 09 \u2014 AD\u201442, due to a potential appeal by the Hixsons from the dismissal of their petition. On December 1, 2009, the court entered its written judgment, granting the motions to sever the cases and to strike the Hixsons\u2019 response. The order contained a Rule 304(a) finding. Also, on December 1, 2009, the court entered a written order staying the proceedings in case No. 09 \u2014 AD\u201442.\nOn December 2, 2009, the Hixsons filed a notice of appeal, stating they were appealing the trial court\u2019s September 29, 2009, dismissal of their adoption petition, and the December 1, 2009, order severing the two adoption cases and striking their response to the Bakers\u2019 petition. On appeal, the Hixsons state this court has jurisdiction to address both orders under Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). DCFS and the Bakers argue Rule 304(a) does not apply and thus this court lacks jurisdiction over the Hixsons\u2019 appeal.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Jurisdiction\nIn several recent decisions, our supreme court has emphasized a reviewing court\u2019s duty to ascertain its jurisdiction before considering the appeal\u2019s merits. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 251-52 (2010); People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 36-37, 912 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (2009); Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213, 902 N.E.2d 662, 664 (2009); People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 106, 885 N.E.2d 1053, 1059 (2008). Thus, the questioning of our jurisdiction by DCFS and the Bakers is a threshold issue. See Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 37, 912 N.E.2d at 1223.\n\u201cThe timely filing of a notice of appeal is both jurisdictional and mandatory.\u201d Secura Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d at 213, 902 N.E.2d at 664. Unless the appealing party has properly filed notice of appeal, a reviewing court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d at 104, 885 N.E.2d at 1058. Additionally, we note \u201cappellate jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement, waiver, or estoppel.\u201d Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Jennings, 316 Ill. App. 3d 443, 453, 736 N.E.2d 179, 187 (2000).\n1. September 2009 Judgment\nThe Hixsons contend this court has jurisdiction of the September 2009 dismissal judgment under Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), which governs final judgments that do not dispose of all the matters before the trial court (see Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Whitehall Convalescent & Nursing Home, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 879, 885-86, 748 N.E.2d 674, 680 (2001)). Such final judgments may only be appealed \u201cif the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). When a trial court makes a Rule 304(a) finding, the appealing party has 30 days from the date of the finding\u2019s entry to file a notice of appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. May 30, 2008); 210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). In this case, the trial court entered a Rule 304(a) finding on November 3, 2009, as to the court\u2019s September 2009 motion. Thus, if Rule 304(a) applies, the Hixsons\u2019 December 2, 2009, notice of appeal was timely filed.\nHowever, DCFS and the Bakers contend Rule 304(a) does not apply. They assert the September 2009 order completely disposed of the Hixsons\u2019 petition as the cases\u2019 consolidation did not merge them into one suit. Thus, the September 2009 order was a final judgment appealable under Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301). Supreme Court Rule 303 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. May 30, 2008)) governs the time for filing a notice of appeal from final judgments and requires such notice to be filed within 30 days after the court\u2019s entry of judgment to be appealed when a timely postjudgment motion has not been filed. Accordingly, for us to have jurisdiction under Rule 301, a notice of appeal from the September 2009 order had to be filed by October 29, 2009.\nThe Hixsons challenge DCFS\u2019s and the Bakers\u2019 argument the two cases did not merge when the trial court consolidated them. Section 2 \u2014 1006 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1006 (West 2008)) permits a court to consolidate cases as long as a substantial right is not prejudiced. Distinct forms of consolidation exist. See Busch v. Mison, 385 Ill. App. 3d 620, 624, 895 N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (2008). One form is \u201c[wjhere a consolidation concerns several actions involving an inquiry into the same event in its general aspects and is limited to a joint trial, with separate docket entries, verdicts[,] and judgments.\u201d Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Filos, 285 Ill. App. 3d 528, 532, 673 N.E.2d 1099, 1102 (1996). With that form of consolidation, \u201can order dismissing one of the actions is deemed final and immediately appealable,\u201d and a Rule 304(a) finding is not required. Nationwide, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 532, 673 N.E.2d at 1102. A second form of consolidation is \u201c[wjhere several actions actually merge into one action, *** thereby losing their identity, [and] they are disposed of as one suit.\u201d Nationwide, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 532, 673 N.E.2d at 1102. With the second form, Rule 304(a) applies to an appeal from the dismissal of less than all counts. Nationwide, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 532, 673 N.E.2d at 1102.\nThe Hixsons argue this case is similar to Busch, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 624-25, 895 N.E.2d at 1020-21, where the First District found the consolidated cases merged into one action. There, the record reflected the trial court consolidated the two causes into one action that was decided by one arbitration award with three separate findings. The consolidation motion argued that, \u201csince \u2018both cases arise from the same set of facts and involve the same witnesses,\u2019 both lawsuits should \u2018be consolidated into one.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Busch, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 625, 895 N.E.2d at 1021. The trial court then consolidated the two cases \u201c \u2018for the purposes of discovery and trial.\u2019 \u201d Busch, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 625, 895 N.E.2d at 1021.\nDCFS and the Bakers contend this case is like Nationwide, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 532, 673 N.E.2d at 1102, where the First District found the consolidated action did not merge the cases into one action. There, the motion for consolidation stated that, since \u201cboth cases involved the same parties and common questions of fact, judicial economy, the convenience of the parties, and the avoidance of inconsistent results required consolidation.\u201d Nationwide, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 532, 673 N.E.2d at 1102. The Nationwide court concluded that, \u201c[bjecause the consolidation was done only for convenience and economy, \u2018it did not merge the causes into a single suit, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who were parties in one suit parties in another.\u2019 \u201d Nationwide, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 532, 673 N.E.2d at 1102, quoting Shannon v. Stookey, 59 Ill. App. 3d 573, 577, 375 N.E.2d 881, 884 (1978).\nThe Bakers\u2019 June 2009 consolidation motion noted they had been S.G.\u2019s foster parents since October 2008, received interim custody of S.G. in May 2009, and expected DCFS to consent to their adoption of S.G. The petition further noted the parental rights of S.G.\u2019s parent had been terminated, and the birth paternal grandparents, the Hix-sons, had also filed a petition regarding S.G. The Bakers alleged the consolidation of the two pending and competing adoption petitions was in S.G.\u2019s best interests. On June 17, 2009, the trial court granted the motion over the Hixsons\u2019 objection and ordered all pleadings to be filed in case No. 09 \u2014 AD\u201442. A review of the docket entries in both cases after the consolidation shows that, on some dates, the two cases had the same docket entry but, on other dates, the two cases had different docket entries.\nThe docket entry for July 2, 2009, which is only contained in the docket sheets of the Bakers\u2019 case, shows the Bakers appeared at the hearing on DCFS\u2019s motion to dismiss but S.G.\u2019s guardian ad litem did not. We note the record lacks a transcript or other report of proceedings for that hearing (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 321; 210 Ill. 2d Rs. 323(a), (c), (d)), and the Hixsons, as the appellants, had the burden of supplying a sufficiently complete record. See Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432, 749 N.E.2d 958, 962 (2001). Without a transcript for that hearing, we are unable to tell if the Bakers participated in that hearing or were mere spectators. The trial court\u2019s September 2009 written order that granted the dismissal only referred to the arguments of the Hixsons and DCFS, suggesting the Bakers did not argue DCFS\u2019s motion to dismiss in the trial court.\nIn between the consolidation and the dismissal order, DCFS filed its consent to the Bakers\u2019 adoption, which was noted in the docket entries of both cases. Also, the guardian ad litem in the Bakers\u2019 case filed his answer to the Bakers\u2019 petition, which is only noted in the Bakers\u2019 docket sheets. After the dismissal, the trial court struck the Hixsons\u2019 response to the Bakers\u2019 petition and severed the case, both of which are challenged by the Hixsons on appeal.\nThis case is clearly different from both Busch and Nationwide and does not neatly fall into either of the discussed types of consolidated cases. As the Hixsons note, if the trial court got to the merits of the petitions, the court would make one determination regarding S.G.\u2019s best interests. However, the court never got to the petitions\u2019 merits. Instead, the trial court dismissed the Hixsons\u2019 petition with prejudice a little more than three months after the consolidation. During the interim, the record reflects (1) the cases had different docket entries at times, (2) each set of petitioners was not treated as parties in the other case, and (3) the September 2009 order only addressed the Hixsons\u2019 petition. Additionally, the parties in the two cases are not all identical, and the court gave no indication that discovery would be joint. Importantly, S.G.\u2019s guardian ad litem, who was appointed in the Bakers\u2019 case, did not appear at the hearing on the motion to dismiss the Hixsons\u2019 petition and emphasized he only represented S.G. on the Bakers\u2019 petition.\nThe record suggests that, even after consolidation, the two cases continued to have separate identities in the trial court. Besides the filing of all documents in one case, the record contains little evidence the trial court treated the two cases as one single suit. Accordingly, we find consolidation is more like the first form with the cases maintaining separate identities. Thus, a Rule 304(a) finding was not required, and the Hixsons had to file their notice of appeal by October 29, 2009. Since they did not, we must dismiss that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Smith, 228 Ill. 2d at 104, 885 N.E.2d at 1058.\n2. December 2009 Judgment\nDCFS also alleges the trial court\u2019s December 2009 judgment was not appealable under Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) because the December 2009 order was an interlocutory order, not a final one. The Hixsons did not respond to DCFS\u2019s contention.\nA Rule 304(a) finding only permits an appeal from a final order in a case involving multiple parties or claims. In re Adoption of Ginnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d 789, 793, 737 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (2000). The finding does not turn a nonfinal order into a final and appealable one. A final judgment absolutely and finally fixes the rights of the parties to the lawsuit. Ginnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 737 N.E.2d at 1098. Moreover, \u201c[a judgment] is final if it determines the litigation on the merits so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment.\u201d Ginnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 737 N.E.2d at 1098. Additionally, \u201c[t]o be final, a judgment must dispose of or terminate the litigation or some definite part of it.\u201d Ginnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 737 N.E.2d at 1098. If the trial court retains jurisdiction to determine future matters of substantial controversy, the order is not a final judgment. Ginnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 737 N.E.2d at 1098.\nThe trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to sever did not fix the rights of any parties or terminate any part of the litigation. The granting of the motion to sever was an interlocutory order that did not become final and appealable by the court\u2019s Rule 304(a) finding. Thus, we dismiss the appeal as to the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to sever.\nThe trial court\u2019s striking of the Hixsons\u2019 response to the Bakers\u2019 petition is more complex. As we found in the previous section, the court consolidated the two cases but continued to treat them separately. The record contains no indication the Hixsons became a party to the Bakers\u2019 petition or the Bakers became a party to the Hixsons\u2019 petition. Thus, the Hixsons\u2019 response is akin to a petition to intervene in the Bakers\u2019 adoption petition, and the court\u2019s striking of the response is essentially the denial of a petition to intervene. By striking the Hixsons\u2019 response, the court fixed and disposed of the Hixsons\u2019 rights in the Bakers\u2019 action. Thus, the striking of the Hixsons\u2019 response was a final order. See In re Estate of Mueller, 275 Ill. App. 3d 128, 139, 655 N.E.2d 1040, 1048 (1995) (denial of petition to intervene in an estate proceeding was a final judgment); Hartzell v. Hungate, 223 Ill. App. 346, 351 (1921) (\u201c[t]he overruling of a petition to intervene is a final order\u201d). Accordingly, the court\u2019s Rule 304(a) finding in the December 2009 order made the court\u2019s granting of the motion to strike appealable under Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).\nSince the Hixsons\u2019 notice of appeal complied with the requirements of Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) and Rule 303 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. May 30, 2008)), which addresses the timing and form of the notice of appeal, this court has jurisdiction over the trial court\u2019s grant of the motion to strike.\nB. The Striking of the Hixsons\u2019 Response\nAs stated, since the trial court treated the consolidated cases separately, the granting of the motion to strike is akin to the denial of a petition to intervene. This court reviews a decision on a petition to intervene under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Regnery v. Meyers, 345 Ill. App. 3d 678, 683, 803 N.E.2d 504, 509 (2003). \u201cA trial court abuses its discretion only where its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.\u201d In re A.W., 397 Ill. App. 3d 868, 873, 921 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (2010).\nThe Hixsons contend the trial court should hear all evidence as to S.G.\u2019s best interests and, as her paternal grandparents, they possess such information. DCFS argues the Hixsons have no right to participate in the Bakers\u2019 adoption petition.\nSection 2 \u2014 408 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 408 (West 2008)) provides for intervention as a matter of right and intervention as a matter of the trial court\u2019s discretion. See In re Adoption of Ruiz, 164 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1040, 518 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1987). Illinois courts have held \u201c[gjrandparents may not intervene in a pending adoption case as a matter of right.\u201d Ruiz, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 1040, 518 N.E.2d at 439, citing In re Adoption of Oliva, 52 Ill. App. 3d 626, 630, 367 N.E.2d 971, 974-75 (1977). As to discretion, the court may allow intervention when (1) \u201ca statute confers a conditional right to intervene\u201d or (2) \u201can applicant\u2019s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 408(b) (West 2008). Regarding adoption, Illinois courts have held \u201c[i]ntervention will be allowed only where the party has an enforceable or recognizable right, not simply a general interest, in the subject matter of the proceeding.\u201d In re Petition of C.M.A., 306 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1069, 715 N.E.2d 674, 681 (1999), citing Ruiz, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 1040, 518 N.E.2d at 439. Moreover, \u201c \u2018a party without custody or other legal rights to a child has no right to intervene in a proceeding brought by some other persons to adopt that child.\u2019 \u201d Ruiz, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 1040, 518 N.E.2d at 439, quoting Gray v. Starkey, 41 Ill. App. 3d 555, 559-60, 353 N.E.2d 703, 707 (1976).\nIt is undisputed the Hixsons do not have custody of S.G. As to any rights to S.G., the Hixsons are S.G.\u2019s paternal grandparents. However, S.G.\u2019s father\u2019s parental rights were terminated in May 2008. Thus, the paramount issue is whether the Hixsons have any rights regarding S.G. after the termination of their son\u2019s parental rights.\nWhen a trial court concludes a child\u2019s best interests warrant the termination of parental rights and enters an order so finding, \u201cthe parent-child relationship is permanently and completely severed.\u201d In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1222 (2004). We note the Hixsons\u2019 son\u2019s May 2008 termination order expressly provided \u201c[a]ll residual, natural, parental rights and responsibilities of Justin Hixson are hereby terminated and the respondent minor is relieved of all obligations of maintenance and obedience with respect to the above-named party.\u201d Moreover, section 2 \u2014 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29(2) (West 2008)) provides that, once certain conditions are satisfied, the court may terminate parental rights and appoint a guardian of the minor\u2019s person with the power to consent to the minor\u2019s adoption. That section further provides as follows:\n\u201cAn order so empowering the guardian to consent to adoption deprives the parents of the minor of all legal rights as respects the minor and relieves them of all parental responsibility for him or her, and frees the minor from all obligations of maintenance and obedience to his or her natural parents.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29(2) (West 2008).\nThe circuit court entered such an order in October 2008 after it terminated S.G.\u2019s mother\u2019s parental rights. Thus, section 2 \u2014 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act also provides the Hixsons\u2019 son\u2019s parental rights and interests were completely severed.\nAdditionally, this court has held a termination of parental rights ends all parental responsibility, including the common-law, residual duty of support. Department of Healthcare & Family Services ex rel. Stover v. Warner, 366 Ill. App. 3d 1178, 1182, 853 N.E.2d 435, 439 (2006), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 227 Ill. 2d 223, 236, 882 N.E.2d 557, 564 (2008). We recognize the Third District has reached a different conclusion with regard to the support duty and adoption. See Bodine v. Bodine, 127 Ill. App. 3d 492, 496, 468 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (1984) (\u201can adoption will not relinquish a natural parent\u2019s obligation to support the child if the adoptive parent is unable to do so\u201d). Our supreme court has yet to resolve the conflict. See Warner, 227 Ill. 2d at 236, 882 N.E.2d at 564 (recognizing the conflict but declining to address it).\nMoreover, when an adoption has completely severed the natural parent-child relationship, the Second District noted it naturally follows the adoption terminated the rights and interests of the natural parent\u2019s relatives in the child. In re Adoption of Schumacher, 120 Ill. App. 3d 50, 52, 458 N.E.2d 94, 97 (1983). When a child is sought to be adopted, section 17 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2008)) treats the effect of an order terminating parental rights the same as an adoption judgment and provides the following:\n\u201cThe natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsibility for such child and shall be deprived of all legal rights as respects the child, and the child shall be free from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such natural parents.\u201d\nSection 17 applies to this case as S.G. is clearly \u201ca child sought to be adopted.\u201d 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2008). Since the termination of parental rights severs the natural parent\u2019s rights and interests in the child like an adoption judgment does, it logically follows the termination of parental rights also severs the rights and interests of the natural parent\u2019s relatives.\nSection 2 \u2014 4(b) of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act) (755 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 4(b) (West 2008)), which addresses inheritance from an adopted child, supports the conclusion the rights of the natural parent and the natural parent\u2019s relatives are severed upon an adoption judgment and hence an order terminating parental rights. That section provides the following:\n\u201cAn adopting parent and the lineal and collateral kindred of the adopting parent shall inherit property from an adopted child to the exclusion of the natural parent and the lineal and collateral kindred of the natural parent in the same manner as though the adopted child were a natural child of the adopting parent ***.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 4(b) (West 2008).\nThe section does contain one narrow exception allowing a natural parent and his or her kindred to take from a child and the child\u2019s kindred \u201cproperty that the child has taken from or through the natural parent or the lineal or collateral kindred of the natural parent by gift, by will[,] or under intestate laws.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 4(b) (West 2008).\nLikewise, section 2 \u2014 4(d) of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 4(d) (West 2008)), which addresses inheritance both from or through a natural parent and for determining the property rights of any person under any instrument after a child has been adopted, declares \u201can adopted child is not a child of a natural parent, nor is the child a descendant of a natural parent or of any lineal or collateral kindred of a natural parent,\u201d unless one or more of three defined conditions applies. 755 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 4(d) (West 2008). Those three narrow exceptions are the following:\n\u201c(1) The child is adopted by a descendant or a spouse of a descendant of a great-grandparent of the child, in which case the adopted child is a child of both natural parents.\n(2) A natural parent of the adopted child died before the child was adopted, in which case the adopted child is a child of that deceased parent and an heir of the lineal and collateral kindred of that deceased parent.\n(3) The contrary intent is demonstrated by the terms of the instrument by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 4(d) (West 2008).\nBased on the aforementioned case law and statutes, we hold that, when a natural parent\u2019s parental rights and interests are completely severed by the termination of parental rights, the rights and interests of the natural parent\u2019s relatives are also completely severed. Thus, the Hixsons had no rights to S.G. Since the Hixsons did not meet the statutory criteria for discretionary intervention, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking the Hixsons\u2019 response to the Bakers\u2019 adoption petition. Last, we note that whether biological grandparents in the Hixsons\u2019 position should be allowed to intervene in posttermination adoption proceedings is a matter to be determined by our legislature.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we dismiss those parts of the appeal for which we lack jurisdiction and affirm the trial court\u2019s striking of the Hixsons\u2019 response to the Bakers\u2019 adoption petition.\nAppeal dismissed in part and judgment affirmed in part.\nKNECHT and APPLETON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TURNER" } ], "attorneys": [ "David R. Moore, of Prillaman & Moore, Ltd., of Urbana, for appellants.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Ann C. Chalstrom, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Department of Children and Family Services.", "Ellyn J. Bullock, of Law Office of Ellyn J. Bullock, LLC, of Champaign, for appellees Douglas Baker and Amy Baker." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ADOPTION OF S.G., a Minor (Kamette G. Hixson et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. S.G., a Minor, et al., Respondents-Appellees (Douglas Baker et al., Petitioners-Appellees)).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201409\u20140912\nArgued March 16, 2010.\nOpinion filed May 3, 2010.\nDavid R. Moore, of Prillaman & Moore, Ltd., of Urbana, for appellants.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Ann C. Chalstrom, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Department of Children and Family Services.\nEllyn J. Bullock, of Law Office of Ellyn J. Bullock, LLC, of Champaign, for appellees Douglas Baker and Amy Baker." }, "file_name": "0775-01", "first_page_order": 791, "last_page_order": 804 }