{ "id": 4301345, "name": "In re DETENTION OF BRAD LIEBERMAN (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Brad Lieberman, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lieberman", "decision_date": "2010-05-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20140796", "first_page": "903", "last_page": "935", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "401 Ill. App. 3d 903" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "521 U.S. 346", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 916116 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "2082" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/521/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224797 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277033 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "trial court did not commit error when it found no probable cause to warrant a further evidentiary hearing on defendant's petition for conditional release where the defendant had not yet participated in any sex-offender-specific treatment program" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5575634 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 486381 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122", "parenthetical": "quoting Black's Law Dictionary for definition of \"probable cause\" as that phrase is used in the Act" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "121-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3778100 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372", "parenthetical": "noting that \"traditional methods, such as cross-examination and rebuttal witnesses, offered defendant the opportunity to challenge Buck's and Leavitt's opinions in the proper forum - that is, during trial in front of the trier of fact\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704702 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431", "parenthetical": "\"the credibility and weight to be given psychiatric testimony are matters for the trier of fact, who is not obligated to accept the opinions of defendant's expert witnesses over those opinions presented by the State\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7327780 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/374/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ariz. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 57688, 57569 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" }, { "page": "1245" }, { "page": "372" }, { "page": "1242" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "1245" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "1245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/211/0370-02", "/ariz/211/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 F.3d 556", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3516344 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "580" }, { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/593/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275548 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" }, { "page": "609" }, { "page": "609" }, { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0585-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1864, "char_count": 86621, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.856319230494445e-08, "percentile": 0.30540100986582613 }, "sha256": "cdc7d27f15319b187633b9e1aae56a304aea7028c976cd85c662d5abd35bfaab", "simhash": "1:a5fffe224741c3d8", "word_count": 13832 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:03:46.574655+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re DETENTION OF BRAD LIEBERMAN (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Brad Lieberman, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn these proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2008)), respondent, Brad Lieberman, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying his petition for discharge or immediate release from the care and custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS). On appeal, respondent contends that the denial of his petition was an abuse of discretion and violated his right to due process of law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nIn 1980, respondent was convicted of multiple counts of rape and sentenced to a number of concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest of which required him to serve 40 years in prison. Immediately prior to his release from the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) in 2000, the State filed a petition pursuant to the Act seeking to have respondent adjudicated a sexually violent person and committed to the care and custody of the DHS. In 2006, a jury found respondent to be a sexually violent person under the Act based primarily upon the expert testimony of two clinical psychologists who diagnosed respondent with paraphilia not otherwise specified, sexually attracted to non-consenting persons (paraphilia NOS, nonconsent), a congenital or acquired disorder that affects respondent\u2019s emotional or volitional capacity and predisposes him to commit future acts of sexual violence. The expert witnesses also concluded that respondent\u2019s mental disorders created a substantial probability that he would engage in future acts of sexual violence if released. Following a subsequent dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered respondent committed to the DHS for institutional care in a secure facility until further order of the court. This court affirmed that judgment on direct appeal. See In re Detention of Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d 585 (2007).\nOn October 29, 2007, the State filed a motion in the circuit court of Cook County asking the court to find that there was no probable cause to believe that respondent was no longer a sexually violent person and to order that respondent remain in a secure facility. Attached to the State\u2019s motion was the October 19, 2007, report of licensed clinical psychologist Dr. David Suire. Dr. Suire\u2019s report was based upon previous psychological assessments, records from the DHS treatment and detention facility where respondent was being detained, records from the IDOC, court records, and risk assessment tools. According to Dr. Suire\u2019s report, respondent refused to participate in a clinical interview for purposes of his annual reexamination. The doctor\u2019s report also noted that respondent had maintained his innocence as to all the sexual offenses with which he had been charged or convicted and had refused to participate in any formal sexual offender treatment program while in the IDOC and while in the DHS treatment and detention facility. In his report, Dr. Suire stated that, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, respondent met the diagnostic criteria under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) for the following diagnoses: (1) paraphilia NOS, nonconsenting females; (2) cannabis abuse; (3) antisocial personality disorder; and (4) narcissistic personality disorder. Dr. Suire concluded that, in his professional opinion and to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, it was substantially probable that respondent would engage in acts of sexual violence in the future. He therefore recommended that respondent continue to be found a sexually violent person and remain committed to the DHS treatment and detention facility for further secure care and sexual offender treatment until he demonstrated that he had made substantial progress in sexual offense treatment to be safely managed in the community on conditional release. Based upon Dr. Suire\u2019s report, the State maintained that there was no probable cause to warrant a full hearing on whether respondent should be conditionally released or discharged and asked the court to enter an order continuing respondent\u2019s confinement.\nOn July 15, 2008, respondent filed a petition for release from the custody of the DHS. Respondent claimed that he lacked the requisite mental abnormality to be confined in the DHS facility and that his mental health since the time of his civil commitment demonstrated that he was entitled to immediate discharge. Respondent sought two alternative forms of relief: (1) immediate discharge pursuant to section 65 of the Act (725 ILCS 207/65 (West 2008)), on the ground that he does not suffer from a mental abnormality that causes him to be a threat to others and that it was not substantially probable that he would engage in future acts of sexual violence; and (2) conditional release pursuant to section 60 of the Act (725 ILCS 207/60 (West 2008)), on the ground that he had made substantial progress since the time of his initial commitment.\nThe trial court appointed Dr. Eric Ostrov to conduct an independent examination of respondent and granted respondent\u2019s request for an examination by Dr. Chester Schmidt. Both experts prepared reports that were submitted to the court. On September 17, 2008, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that respondent was no longer a sexually violent person or that it was not substantially probable that respondent would engage in future acts of sexual violence if released. The first witness to testify at the hearing was defendant\u2019s expert, Dr. Schmidt.\nDr. Schmidt described himself as a \u201cphysician psychiatrist,\u201d a professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, and a founder and member of the sexual behavior consultation unit at Johns Hopkins Hospital. In 1995, he was appointed chairman of a work group for psychosexual disorders and paraphilias, and that group was one of a number of groups charged with revision of the DSM-III-R to the current DSM-IV At that same time, Dr. Schmidt was a member of the American Psychiatric Association\u2019s (APA) board of trustees and he participated in the vote to approve his committee\u2019s recommendation regarding inclusion of the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, nonconsent in the DSM.\nIn preparation for his work in this case, Dr. Schmidt reviewed, among other things, articles on civil commitment and the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, the transcript from respondent\u2019s 2006 sexually violent person trial, police reports, IDOC mental health reports, respondent\u2019s DHS master treatment plans, and expert reports from Dr. Jacqueline Buck, Dr. Barry Leavitt, Dr. Suire, and Dr. Ostrov. He also interviewed respondent for approximately two hours on April 6, 2008.\nDr. Schmidt rendered two opinions following his review of this information. First, that the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, nonconsent does not exist in the DSM-IV Second, that respondent does not have a disorder known as a paraphilia.\nAs to his first opinion, Dr. Schmidt explained that the DSM-IV contains a disorder called paraphilia not otherwise specified and that this section provides examples, such as necrophilia and zoophilia. However, the disorder of paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is not contained within this section. The doctor further explained that in another section, the DSM states that the central diagnostic features of paraphilia include \u201crecurrent, intense, sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges or behaviors generally involving *** nonconsenting persons.\u201d Paraphilia NOS, however, cannot be combined with the diagnostic feature of \u201cnonconsenting persons\u201d in order to conclude that the DSM contains a disorder called paraphilia NOS, nonconsent. There is a formal process by which diagnoses are included in the DSM and that process has not taken place with paraphilia NOS, nonconsent. Moreover, a mental health professional cannot create a diagnosis based on his or her own personal interpretation of the DSM. Rather, the use of only officially recognized diagnoses is essential for purposes of treatment, research, and the \u201cintegrity of the legal system itself.\u201d Further, rape is specifically dealt with in other sections of the DSM. Rapes that contain a paraphilic element are covered in the paraphilia section of the DSM on sexual sadism, which lists rape as a behavior sometimes associated with sadistic behavior. Rapes that do not contain a paraphilic element are found in a section called \u201cother conditions that may be the focus of clinical attention.\u201d The conditions and behaviors in this section are \u201cof interest to mental health professionals\u201d but \u201cdo not rise to the threshold of being mental illnesses in and of themselves.\u201d This section of the DSM contains \u201cV-codes,\u201d and the contingency of rape with no paraphilic element is covered in the section of V-codes entitled \u201csexual abuse of adults.\u201d\nIn 1986, Dr. Schmidt was the chairman of a committee that was convened by the APA to consider whether the disorder of paraphilia NOS, nonconsent should be included in the DSM-III. The committee voted against recommending inclusion of that diagnosis in the DSM for two reasons. First, there was \u201cno scientific support for the diagnosis\u201d but instead only \u201cexpert opinion[,] which is one of the lowest forms of research to support anything.\u201d Second, various organizations raised the concern that including the diagnosis in the DSM could be misused as an insanity defense in rape trials. The committee\u2019s recommendation was submitted to the APA board of trustees, of which Dr. Schmidt was also a member, and the board voted to not include the diagnosis in the DSM-III-R. During his later work from 1995 to 2000 on the revision of the DSM-III-R to the DSM-F^ there were no requests that the disorder be included in that edition of the DSM. To Dr. Schmidt\u2019s knowledge, there is no current reconsideration of this decision, which meant that \u201cthe field in general is essentially satisfied with the *** diagnostic format that exists within the DSM-IV\u201d\nDr. Schmidt\u2019s second opinion was that respondent does not suffer from any type of paraphilia. Dr. Schmidt reviewed the 15 evaluations of respondent conducted during the 20 years he was in the IDOC, none of which diagnosed respondent with any type of paraphilia. Dr. Schmidt testified that the mental health professionals who evaluated respondent would have been required to indicate any such diagnosis on their evaluation forms and that it was \u201chard to believe that any mental health professional worth his or her salt given the circumstances that he was in jail for raping\u201d would not have found paraphilia if it in fact existed.\nDr. Schmidt also stated that respondent\u2019s psychosexual history \u201cup to the time of the 1979 crimes\u201d did not reveal paraphilic urges or behaviors but, rather, \u201ca fairly normal heterosexual development during\u201d his adolescent years. Moreover, based upon respondent\u2019s self-reported information, Dr. Schmidt saw no evidence of recurrent para-philic urges or fantasies. With respect to paraphilic behavior, there were no reported behaviors of any coercive sexual activity with either female staff or prisoners. If respondent had paraphilia, it would be expected that he would have found an outlet to act out that paraphilia, including within the prison\u2019s homosexual community. This would be true even though respondent was otherwise a heterosexual.\nDr. Schmidt also believed that respondent\u2019s symptom severity and functional capacity since he entered the DHS treatment and detention facility in 2000 did not indicate that he suffered from paraphilia NOS, nonconsent. Specifically, Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores, which are determined by the DHS treatment team and which can range from 1 (worst) to 100 (best), are a measure of a person\u2019s symptom severity and level of functioning. Dr. Schmidt testified that respondent\u2019s current GAF score indicates that his symptom severity and functional capacity are \u201cpretty close to normal at this time.\u201d According to Dr. Schmidt, respondent\u2019s GAF scores from 1999 to 2005 were in the area of 45, which indicates serious symptoms or impairment. During his three most recent reviews, respondent\u2019s treatment team gave him a GAF score of 71. This score indicates that symptoms are present but are \u201ctransient and expectable reactions to psychosocial stressors\u201d and that respondent has \u201cno more than slight impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.\u201d Ultimately, assuming that respondent suffered from a paraphilia when he was given that diagnosis in 1999 or 2000, the upward trending of his GAF score indicated to Dr. Schmidt that those who have observed respondent believe that he has dramatically improved in terms of symptom severity and functional capacity.\nDr. Schmidt explained that respondent having committed multiple rapes did not establish that he had a mental disorder. First, rape is not in itself a mental disorder or necessarily paraphilic, and only a small fraction of rapists suffer from paraphilia. Second, Dr. Schmidt believed that respondent\u2019s pre-rape history may be relevant to explaining respondent\u2019s commission of multiple rapes. According to the materials Dr. Schmidt reviewed, respondent reported that, as a teenager, he had a sexual experience in which a woman that he was attempting to have intercourse with \u201cinitially resisted, resisted, and then allowed, then said yes.\u201d Respondent indicated that this was \u201ca very important experience\u201d because as a result he believed at the time that \u201cwhen women say no they really meant yes.\u201d Respondent also reported that his first rape was very sexually gratifying. According to Dr. Schmidt, at that time respondent was acting selfishly for his own sexual gratification and had no regard for the law. When respondent was apprehended and then released on bond, he committed additional rapes because he thought that \u201cthe law had no teeth\u201d and that he \u201cwas immune from the law.\u201d Dr. Schmidt opined that these experiences provide \u201cas plausible an explanation as maybe we\u2019ll ever get from the facts of the case.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Schmidt testified that he has never been a member of any professional organization whose focus is the evaluation and treatment of sexual offenders and that, prior to respondent\u2019s case, he had never been qualified as an expert in a sexually violent persons case or in the evaluation of sexual offenders. Other than respondent, Dr. Schmidt has never evaluated a person who has been found to be a sexually violent person by the laws of any state. The doctor testified, however, that he has evaluated people who are convicted sexual offenders and who have been charged with sexual offenses. Dr. Schmidt testified that he did not review the original police reports or the transcripts from the trials resulting in respondent\u2019s rape convictions. He also acknowledged that he did not speak to any of the treating staff at the DHS facility where respondent has been detained and that the only DHS information he reviewed was that provided by respondent\u2019s counsel. Dr. Schmidt testified that he did not \u201cknow anything\u201d about commitment laws for sexually violent persons until the present case and that he therefore had no personal opinion of them.\nDr. Schmidt further testified under cross-examination that there has been an ongoing debate in the psychiatric field over the last 20 years as to the validity of the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, noncon-sent. Dr. Schmidt believed that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is not a valid disorder despite reports suggesting that there is \u201capparent widespread acceptance\u201d of the diagnosis \u201cby forensic experts in the field.\u201d When asked if every diagnosis in the DSM is universally accepted by every clinic that uses the DSM, Dr. Schmidt responded that \u201call of us have some objections or fault with diagnoses, but the diagnoses are universally used by the medical insurance industry and are strictly required to be used for reimbursement, if for no other reason, not to mention science.\u201d They are also used for diagnosis, for managing patients, and for research. \u201cIt is absolutely essential that there be a consensus with regard to the diagnosis, irrespective of any difficulties or problems any professional has with any aspect of the DSM-IV\u201d\nRespondent testified on his own behalf that since he has been committed to the custody of the DHS, he has married, founded a \u201cfacility band,\u201d taken computer classes, obtained an Occuptional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) certification, and participated in the \u201cinstitutional newsletter.\u201d Respondent also testified that residents at the DHS detention facility are assigned to various status levels based upon their behavior and that, like most others, he began in \u201cadmission status.\u201d For the last several years, he has been in \u201cintermediate A status,\u201d which is the \u201chighest status attainable.\u201d In order to attain that status, respondent was required to comply with the institutional rules and to be involved in the \u201cresponsible living program,\u201d which requires completion of certain tasks and jobs in order to \u201cdemonstrate that you are able to accept responsibility and eventually reintegrate yourself into the community.\u201d\nRespondent testified that since his commitment he has refused to participate in the DHS treatment and detention facility\u2019s formal sexual offender treatment program. Participation in the program requires admission that a person lacks volitional control and, according to respondent, \u201cI don\u2019t lack control of myself.\u201d Respondent also has not participated in formal treatment because he does not want to listen to fellow detainees describe the crimes they have committed. Respondent testified that, \u201cI don\u2019t need [therapists] to tell me how to think,\u201d and that he \u201cknows what is right and what is wrong.\u201d Respondent has, however, spoken openly to his primary therapist at the detention center.\nRespondent further testified that he has been in physical proximity to women in the detention center, including therapists, but that he has not had any behavioral incidents. According to respondent, if he was conditionally released, he would live with his wife and that an attorney has offered him employment in a law firm. Respondent also indicated that if released, he would participate in drug and alcohol testing as well as counseling or therapy.\nOn cross-examination, respondent testified that until recently he had denied committing the rapes of which he was convicted. In early 2008, Dr. Eric Ostrov was appointed by the court to evaluate respondent and at that time respondent admitted that he was in fact guilty of those crimes. Respondent testified, however, that it was \u201cnot exactly\u201d true that he had been denying his guilt for the past 28 years. He explained that in 1983, \u201cJudge Berkos\u201d took respondent, respondent\u2019s father, a public defender and a prosecutor into his chambers and told respondent that if he lied to the judge he would never \u201csee the light of day again.\u201d Respondent then took responsibility for his crimes and his subsequent denials were based in part on \u201cstrategic advice\u201d from his attorneys. Respondent further explained that he admitted his guilt to Dr. Ostrov because after his 2006 sexually violent person trial, he \u201cdidn\u2019t have any rights that had to be protected.\u201d Respondent concluded by testifying that he has taken responsibility for his actions and learned from his mistakes and that he is not the same person today that he was at the age of 19 and 20 when he committed the rapes.\nThe parties stipulated that if called as a witness, Dr. Mark Babula would testify that he was respondent\u2019s primary therapist at the DHS treatment facility and that any contact he had with respondent did not constitute sexual offender treatment. Dr. Babula would further testify that respondent has not participated in sexual offender treatment at the DHS treatment and detention facility. In a 2008 deposition, Dr. Babula testified that respondent\u2019s GAF score is determined by his DHS treatment team using the DSM\u2019s GAF criteria and procedures.\nThe State\u2019s first witness was Dr. Ostrov, who had been appointed by the court to evaluate respondent. Dr. Ostrov testified that he is a psychologist with a focus on forensic psychology. Dr. Ostrov received a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and a J.D. from the University of Chicago and is board certified by the American Board of Professional Psychology. Dr. Ostrov is also on the Illinois Sex Offender Management Board\u2019s approved list of evaluators. Since the sexually violent persons (SVP) law was passed in 1998, Dr. Ostrov has conducted over 100 evaluations of approximately 40 people who were accused of being sexually violent persons pursuant to court order. Dr. Ostrov had previously been qualified as an expert in psychology and in the evaluation of sexual offenders. The trial court qualified Dr. Ostrov as an expert in these areas.\nDr. Ostrov diagnosed respondent, within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, with paraphilia NOS, nonconsent, and he therefore did not recommend that respondent be conditionally released. Dr. Ostrov also testified that he did not diagnose respondent with \u201ccannabis abuse in a controlled environment.\u201d In the doctor\u2019s opinion, however, within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, respondent did suffer from a personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic features. These disorders, including paraphilia, predispose respondent to commit future acts of sexual violence. In arriving at this conclusion, the doctor reviewed portions of respondent\u2019s IDOC master file, reports from other mental health professionals such as Dr. Buck, Dr. Leavitt, and Dr. Linton, and police records from respondent\u2019s past crimes. Dr. Ostrov also met with respondent three times at the DHS treatment and detention facility.\nDr. Ostrov testified that he used the DSM when he evaluated respondent and that, under certain circumstances, paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is an appropriate diagnosis. Dr. Ostrov was aware that some experts believe that the diagnosis is inappropriate because it is not specifically enumerated in the DSM\u2019s examples of paraphilia NOS, and because of concerns that it could be used to exculpate rapists. However, Dr. Ostrov did not agree with the principle that if a diagnosis is not contained in the DSM it is not a widely recognized diagnosis. For example, the word \u201cpsychopath\u201d is not found in the DSM, yet it is widely recognized among mental health professionals. Moreover, the examples given in the DSM of paraphilia NOS are \u201csimply examples\u201d that are \u201cnot meant to be exhaustive.\u201d Dr. Ostrov believed that \u201cnon-consenting per se\u201d is not listed as an example under the paraphilia NOS category due to the concern that it could be used to exculpate a rapist. Dr. Ostrov further explained that the DSM is a standard reference work for mental health professionals so they have a common reference point when they use terminology in the mental health field. The DSM is a way for mental health professionals to communicate with each other and a means to guide diagnosis, which in turn is a way to guide treatment. Dr. Ostrov acknowledged that not all rapists have a paraphilia but this did not mean that \u201cthere are not other persons who have sex with nonconsenting persons who do have a paraphilia.\u201d Dr. Ostrov also did not agree with the notion that a diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, nonconsent should not be given because it could be used to exculpate rapists. According to the doctor, \u201cthere are persons who are criminals who commit rapes, and there are persons who commit rapes who have a mental disorder.\u201d\nDr. Ostrov further testified that the DSM contains guidance for a diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, nonconsent. The DSM states that the person must have \u201crecurrent and intense\u201d sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors. The DSM then gives examples of the objects of these fantasies, urges or behaviors, including \u201cchildren or other nonconsenting persons.\u201d The DSM provides additional criteria, such as a recurrence of the fantasies, urges or behaviors over a period of six months, an age requirement, and a requirement that it \u201chas to have caused clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.\u201d\nDr. Ostrov\u2019s paraphilia diagnosis was informed by several aspects of respondent\u2019s behavior. According to Dr. Ostrov, the police reports, convictions, and respondent\u2019s own testimony showed \u201crepeated instances of non-consensual sex directed to different women over a period of time longer than six months. Moreover, these instances of nonconsensual sex caused respondent clinically significant distress or impairment in that they \u201ccaused him enormous impairment in social and occupational and other areas of functioning.\u201d Further, respondent was over 16 years old at the time of the rapes and his victims were not children. Respondent therefore met the criteria for paraphilia NOS, nonconsent.\nDr. Ostrov\u2019s paraphilia diagnosis was also informed by what he referred to as respondent\u2019s \u201cdrivenness.\u201d He explained that this involved the distinction between someone who commits rapes and either does or does not suffer from a paraphilia. In respondent\u2019s case, raping women was the goal \u201cin and of itself.\u201d Respondent\u2019s rapes were not opportunistic as in the case of a burglar, for example, who enters a home, finds a woman there, and as a criminal takes advantage of that opportunity by committing a rape. Respondent\u2019s case is different in that his goal was not to obtain money or drugs but, rather, to obtain sex. In other words, it \u201cwas a specifically sexually-driven act repeated over and over and over again, and, in fact, repeated even after he was apprehended *** and had spent time in jail for it.\u201d Respondent also struck one victim who would not cooperate and this demonstrated to Dr. Ostrov that the rape was not simply an opportunity that respondent took but, rather, something that he had to do and that he would make her do by hitting her if she did not cooperate.\nWith respect to whether respondent\u2019s behavior might have been driven by fantasies, Dr. Ostrov gave an example of one of the first women that respondent raped. In his interview with the doctor, respondent explained that he met the woman at a party and began to have nonconsensual sex with her until it became consensual. Respondent told Dr. Ostrov that he understood the woman had been raped before and \u201cmay have been cooperating out of fear and giving the illusion that she was cooperating.\u201d However, in one of the tests Dr. Ostrov administered, respondent explained it \u201cin a completely different way\u201d by stating that \u201cshe was into it, she wanted it, that she kept it going, she changed positions, and that that had an effect on him that she was so into it in terms of leading [him] to commit further rapes.\u201d This gave the doctor the clinical impression of a fantasy because from the police reports and what respondent told him in the interview, \u201cthere is no way that she was into it, or she was enjoying it, or she was changing positions to prolong it.\u201d\nDr. Ostrov did not believe respondent\u2019s position that he committed the rapes \u201cbecause he was basically young, ignorant, stupid *** and really didn\u2019t understand the repercussions of his behavior.\u201d The police reports revealed that respondent was often very concerned about being apprehended. Thus, respondent\u2019s actions were not simply \u201cyouthful caprice\u201d but more akin to \u201cdriven behavior\u201d in that \u201cdespite his fear, the drivenness overcame that fear\u201d and led him to commit rapes anyway.\nDr. Ostrov disagreed that respondent has taken full responsibility for his past actions. For example, when respondent was asked how his potential release might affect his victims, he answered in a \u201ccavalier\u201d manner that, to his knowledge, none of the victims remained in the area. This response showed a lack of empathy toward his victims because it failed to address that his victims would almost certainly be concerned about his release, regardless of where they currently lived, and because some of those victims might have family members still living in the area.\nIn arriving at his opinions, Dr. Ostrov also considered respondent\u2019s statements that he has been on good behavior and has not engaged in nonconsensual intercourse while detained in the IDOC and the DHS treatment and detention facility. According to Dr. Ostrov, some people act out in prison and some do not. In the case of those who do not, this may be because the person has changed or it may be because that person does not \u201chave the opportunity to commit the crime they are predisposed to commit.\u201d In respondent\u2019s case, there is no past instance of him having interest in men so his access to other prisoners was not relevant. Moreover, although respondent claimed to have access to women while he has been detained, it was \u201ccertainly not the kind of access he had when he was out in the community\u201d because \u201cthere was always some level of surveillance.\u201d Dr. Ostrov further explained that respondent\u2019s claim that he has not \u201cacted out sexually\u201d while he has been detained must be viewed in context of the fact that he has not been around his preferred sexual stimuli. People with a paraphilia act much differently when they are aroused by being in contact with their preferred sexual stimuli than they do when that stimuli is not available. When someone with paraphilia is aroused, his ability to control himself and to consider the consequences of his actions is \u201cmarkedly\u201d decreased.\nDr. Ostrov also administered an actuarial called the \u201cStatic-99,\u201d and respondent\u2019s score indicated that he posed a high risk of reoffend-ing. Dr. Ostrov further believed respondent was at a high risk of reoff-ending because he has not shown an interest in participating in formal sexual offender treatment and because he has not had the benefit of completing that treatment, which has been empirically shown to decrease the risk that a person will sexually reoffend. Dr. Ostrov considered respondent\u2019s statement that he did not attend therapy because he did not want to listen to the stories of other sexual offenders. However, one aspect of treatment is taking responsibility for your actions and if respondent is not willing to listen to others discuss their past crimes, Dr. Ostrov questioned how respondent could reflect on the crimes he has committed.\nDr. Ostrov acknowledged that respondent\u2019s age (48 years old) would have some impact on his likelihood of recidivism but \u201cnot a very significant impact\u201d because the likelihood of recidivism \u201cdoesn\u2019t reach a very significant level of decrease until about age 60.\u201d The likelihood of recidivism does decrease as a person approaches 50 years old, however, and therefore respondent posed a \u201cmoderately severe risk,\u201d rather than a severe risk, of committing a future act of sexual violence. Dr. Ostrov characterized this as an \u201cappreciable risk\u201d such that he did not believe respondent was an appropriate candidate for conditional release. According to Dr. Ostrov, the question is whether respondent has decreased that risk to the point that it would be tolerable for him to be on conditional release and, other than respondent\u2019s age and the fact that he has not acted out sexually while incarcerated or detained, Dr. Ostrov did not see evidence that respondent has significantly decreased the risk that he would sexually reoffend.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Ostrov testified that he has served on a formal body that decided which disorders belonged in the DSM, although neither the APA nor its board of trustees has vested him with the authority to revise the DSM. Dr. Ostrov acknowledged that the Static-99 does not account for the risk-reducing factors of age after 25 years old and maturity and that respondent\u2019s participation in the facility newspaper, his \u201cIntermediate-A\u201d status, and his attainment of an OSHA certification are, \u201cto some extent,\u201d evidence of risk-reducing maturity. Dr. Ostrov also acknowledged that respondent has married, has taken classes, and has a job waiting for him, but the doctor did not believe these facts were \u201cdispositive\u201d because respondent \u201chas not addressed in any formal manner his paraphilia or his personality disorder.\u201d The doctor testified that he found no evidence that respondent currently has sexually arousing fantasies or urges involving nonconsenting persons. Dr. Ostrov also testified that respondent\u2019s paraphilia is not severe \u201cin the environment he is in,\u201d and he explained that \u201cthe critical words in there [are] \u2018in the environment he is in.\u2019 \u201d The doctor further testified that he was \u201cnot sure what a moderate or mild [paraphilia] would be\u201d because \u201ca paraphilia itself is severe.\u201d Finally, Dr. Ostrov acknowledged that he could not tell whether there is more or less than a 50% likelihood that respondent would reoffend if he was conditionally released.\nThe State\u2019s next witness was Dr. Suire, who performs evaluations relating to sexually violent person commitments for the DHS. Dr. Suire is a licensed clinical psychologist and has worked in the past at the Wisconsin sexually violent person facility, at a Texas state mental health facility where he performed evaluations relating to competency to stand trial, and as clinical director of the Missouri Sexual Offender Program. The doctor has performed approximately 120 evaluations in Illinois pursuant to the Act. In the past, the doctor has been qualified as an expert in SVP evaluations in Wisconsin, Illinois and Missouri. The trial court found Dr. Suire to be an expert in the field of psychology with a speciality in the area of sexual offender evaluations.\nDr. Suire evaluated respondent in 2007 and prepared a report pursuant to the Act. As part of his evaluation, Dr. Suire reviewed records from the IDOC and the DHS treatment and detention facility, police reports, court records, and prior psychological reports of respondent\u2019s mental condition, including those of Dr. Levitt and Dr. Buck. These are documents that experts in Dr. Suire\u2019s field reasonably reply upon. Dr. Suire attempted to conduct a clinical interview of respondent at the DHS treatment and detention facility, but respondent refused to be interviewed. Dr. Suire stated that over half of the people that he has evaluated have refused to be interviewed and that in those situations his report is based primarily upon written records.\nDr. Suire diagnosed respondent, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, with \u201cparaphilia not otherwise specified, sexually attracted to nonconsenting person nonexclusive,\u201d cannabis abuse, antisocial personality disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder. Dr. Suire used the DSM to arrive at these diagnoses and he explained how the DSM is used to diagnose paraphilia NOS, nonconsent. Dr. Suire explained that for a paraphilia to be present, a person must have recurrent severe urges, fantasies, or behaviors related toward certain types of sexual actions or contact. This could include urges, fantasies or behaviors for sexual conduct with inanimate objects, children, or other nonconsenting persons. Some paraphilias have a specific diagnostic code within the DSM, such as exhibitionists, and if there is not a specific code, the diagnosis is made under paraphilia not otherwise specified. Additional more specific coding information is then provided by the DSM. Thus, for the example of obscene phone calls, the diagnosis would be \u201cparaphilia NOS telephone scatologia.\u201d In the case of \u201cwhat is sometimes called paraphilic rape, the commonly used diagnosis would be paraphilia NOS nonconsenting.\u201d\nDr. Suire testified that respondent met all of the diagnostic criteria for this diagnosis. He committed or attempted to commit a large number of rapes within a 10-month period, which satisfied the 6-month requirement and spoke to the intensity of respondent\u2019s urges. Because respondent refused to be interviewed, Dr. Suire could not speak to respondent\u2019s fantasy life. However, the doctor stated that \u201cit\u2019s difficult for me to imagine that you can have this type of pattern without having fantasies attached to it.\u201d Finally, the fact that respondent has spent most of his adult life either in prison or a secure commitment facility spoke to the difficulty his urges, fantasies or behaviors have caused him.\nDr. Suire also considered the nature of the rapes that respondent committed and the fact that he posed as a plumber to gain access to his victims. The doctor explained that not all rapes are due to para-philic urges and therefore it is important to determine if the driving force behind the rape-type behavior is an underlying specific urge toward nonconsenting sexual contact. In making this determination, considerations include the use of a kind of \u201cstereotype repetitious pattern,\u201d whether the rape-type behaviors were occurring while the person had access to consenting sexual partners, the frequency of the acts of sexual misconduct, and whether the person was committing other crimes while committing rapes.\nDr. Suire testified that he was aware of the disagreement regarding the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, nonconsent, but that this did not prevent him from diagnosing respondent with the disorder. He stated that \u201cthere is probably nothing in the field of psychology that doesn\u2019t have some degree of disagreement.\u201d The disagreement over the disorder is primarily due to \u201cpolitical factors\u201d and the general belief that not all rapists have a paraphilia.\nDr. Suire also performed a risk assessment as part of his evaluation of respondent. The first part of the assessment consisted of file review, information gathering, and his attempt to interview respondent. The second step involved the use of actuarial instruments to attain a \u201cbaseline estimate of the risk.\u201d In this case, Dr. Suire used the Static-99 and the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool Revised (MNSOST-R), both of which are well-accepted actuar\u00edais. Respondent scored in the \u201chigh-risk\u201d range on the Static-99 and in the \u201crefer risk\u201d range on the MNSOST-R. The \u201crefer risk\u201d range is a higher risk level than the \u201chigh-risk\u201d range, although Dr. Suire noted that there were questions about one of the items and that respondent might therefore be in the high-risk range. The final step in performing a risk assessment involved consideration of \u201caggravated\u201d and \u201cprotective\u201d factors, which can increase or decrease a risk level above or below that as indicated by the actuaries. Respondent had a \u201cfairly large number\u201d of aggravating factors, including deviant sexual arousal, two personality disorders, a high score on the \u201cHarris psychopathy checklist, which, while not a specific predictor of sexual offense recidivism, is correlated with an elevated risk,\u201d and a high score on the violence risk assessment guide, which also correlates with an elevated risk. The three main protective factors Dr. Suire considered were treatment progress, medical condition, and age. Respondent did not have any medical conditions that were of any relevance to his risk of committing a sexual offense. Age is negatively correlated with the risk of sexual recidivism but, with respect to high-risk offenders such as respondent, Dr. Suire did not think that \u201cwe are at the point where we can say that with any level of confidence.\u201d Therefore, the doctor did not consider respondent\u2019s age to be a significant protective factor. Finally, respondent has never participated in core sexual offender treatment, which can \u201csubstantially reduce the risk of sexually reoffending.\u201d Dr. Suire did not believe that this risk was reduced by respondent\u2019s participating in \u201cancillary treatment-type\u201d programs at the DHS treatment and detention facility.\nBased upon his consideration of all these factors, Dr. Suire opined that, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, it is substantially probable that respondent will commit new acts of sexual violence, that he remains a sexually violent person, and that he has not made sufficient progress to allow him to be safely managed in the community.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Suire testified that the APA has never vested him with the authority to revise the DSM. Dr. Suire acknowledged that he did not know what respondent\u2019s present sexual fantasies or urges are and that he had no evidence \u201cother than the facts of the 1979, 1980 behaviors\u201d to support his paraphilia diagnosis. However, Dr. Suire testified that he did not think \u201cany additional evidence is needed.\u201d Finally, Dr. Suire acknowledged that he was between 51% and 100% certain of his paraphilia diagnosis and he explained that \u201cI don\u2019t know that we ever in psychology rise to a level of one hundred percent certainty.\u201d\nFollowing closing arguments, the trial court denied respondent\u2019s petition and found that there was not probable cause to warrant a trial on the issues of whether respondent remained a sexually violent person or whether it was not substantially probable that respondent would engage in acts of sexual violence if released. The trial court acknowledged disagreement among mental health professionals as to the validity of the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, nonconsent and stated that the question could not be answered simply by testimony that the disorder is not specifically listed in the DSM. The court then commented on the credibility of the witnesses, noting that Dr. Schmidt had \u201cimpressive credentials,\u201d but that there was something \u201cvery troubling about his testimony and his evaluation of sexually violent persons, which this is the first, apparently, he\u2019s done.\u201d The court noted that Dr. Schmidt\u2019s explanation as to why respondent committed multiple rapes if he did not suffer from a mental disorder, specifically his testimony regarding respondent having had intercourse at a young age with a girl who initially told him no and that having led him to believe that no meant yes, \u201cwas absolutely, totally, completely absurd, quite frankly.\u201d On the other hand, the court stated that Dr. Suire and Dr. Ostrov were \u201cquite credible\u201d witnesses. The court found that the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, nonconsent was a mental disorder that satisfied the requirements of the Act. The court further noted that although it was \u201cnot impressed with the credibility of [respondent\u2019s] testimony,\u201d the evidence did show that respondent had made \u201can improvement to some extent.\u201d However, the court observed that respondent had refused to participate in formal sexual offender treatment, claiming he did not need it, and that \u201cwhen you add that to the whole mix of what I observed,\u201d respondent had not made sufficient progress to be conditionally released or discharged. Therefore, the court found that there was not probable cause to hold a further evidentiary hearing on respondent\u2019s petition. This appeal followed.\nPrior to considering respondent\u2019s contentions on appeal, it is necessary to review the provisions of the Act that are at issue in this case. After a person has been committed to institutional care, the Act requires the DHS to conduct an examination of that person\u2019s mental condition within 6 months of the initial confinement and again thereafter at least every 12 months. The purpose of the reexamination is to determine whether the person has made sufficient progress to be conditionally released or discharged. See 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2008). At the time of each reexamination, the committed person may retain, or the court may appoint, a qualified expert to examine him. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2008). The State\u2019s motion for a finding of no probable cause in this case was based upon the first annual (18-month) evaluation of respondent.\nRespondent\u2019s petition for discharge or conditional release in this case was filed pursuant to two sections of the Act. First, at the time of each reexamination, the detained person receives notice of the right to petition the court for discharge. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(l) (West 2008). If the committed person, like respondent in the present case, does not affirmatively waive that right, the court must set a probable cause hearing to determine whether facts exist that warrant a hearing on whether the respondent remains a sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(l) (West 2008). If the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is no longer a sexually violent person, it must set a hearing on the issue. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2008). The State carries the burden at this hearing of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person is still a sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2008). If the State fails to meet this burden, the committed person is entitled to be discharged. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(3) (West 2008).\nThe Act also allows a person who has been committed to institutional care to petition the court for conditional release once certain time requirements have been met. See 725 ILCS 207/60(a) (West 2008). If the person files such a petition, the court must appoint one or more examiners to examine the committed person and make a written report. 725 ILCS 207/60(c) (West 2008). The State has the right to have the person evaluated by experts of its choice. 725 ILCS 207/60(c) (West 2008). The court must thereafter hold a probable cause hearing to determine whether cause exists to believe that it is not substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if released or conditionally discharged. 725 ILCS 207/60(c) (West 2008). If the court so determines, it must hold a hearing on the issue and must grant the petition for conditional release unless the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the person has not made sufficient progress to be conditionally released. 725 ILCS 207/60(d) (West 2008). With these principles in mind, we turn to a consideration of respondent\u2019s contentions on appeal.\nRespondent contends that the trial court\u2019s finding that there was no probable cause to conduct a further evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion and violated his fourteenth amendment right to due process of law. He claims that to satisfy due process requirements, his civil commitment must be based upon a valid mental disorder, the disorder upon which his commitment rests must be \u201csevere,\u201d and the disorder cannot be diagnosed based solely on his past criminal behavior. Respondent claims that the trial court\u2019s finding of no probable cause runs afoul of these requirements and constitutes an abuse of discretion for three reasons.\nFirst, respondent claims that the trial court\u2019s judgment must be reversed because the \u201calleged disorder\u201d upon which his commitment rests does not exist. Respondent\u2019s argument is based upon Dr. Schmidt\u2019s testimony that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is not a valid disorder because it is not found within the DSM.\nIn this case, the trial court heard conflicting expert testimony on this issue. On one hand, defendant\u2019s expert, Dr. Schmidt, testified that the diagnosis is not contained in the DSM. He explained that there has been a debate in the psychiatric community over the last 20 years as to the validity of the diagnosis but that the diagnosis has never proceeded through the formal process by which a disorder is included in the DSM. Dr. Schmidt testified that the committee he chaired voted against recommending the disorder be included in the DSM because there was \u201cno scientific support for the diagnosis\u201d and because of concerns that the diagnosis could be used as a defense at rape trials. Dr. Schmidt acknowledged that the DSM contains a disorder called paraphilia not otherwise specified and that, in another section, the DSM states that the central diagnostic features of paraphilia include \u201crecurrent, intense, sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges or behaviors generally involving *** nonconsenting persons.\u201d However, the doctor opined that a mental health professional cannot combine these two sections to conclude that the DSM contains a disorder called paraphilia NOS, nonconsent.\nOn the other hand, Dr. Ostrov and Dr. Suire testified that the diagnosis is valid and finds support in the DSM, even though it is not listed as a specific disorder. Both witnesses were aware of the controversy surrounding the diagnosis. However, Dr. Ostrov testified that he did not agree with the principle that if a diagnosis is not contained in the DSM it is not a widely recognized diagnosis. For example, the word \u201cpsychopath\u201d is not found in the DSM, yet it is widely recognized among health care professionals. He explained that the DSM is a standard reference work for mental health professionals so they have a common reference point when they use terminology in the mental health field. Dr. Ostrov also testified that the examples given in the DSM for paraphilia NOS are \u201csimply examples\u201d that are not \u201cexhaustive.\u201d Similar to Dr. Ostrov, Dr. Suire diagnosed respondent with the disorder despite the controversy over its validity, explaining that \u201cthere is probably nothing in the field of psychology that doesn\u2019t have some degree of disagreement.\u201d\nThe trial court, as the finder of fact in this case, was free to accept the opinion of one expert witness over another or accept part and reject part of each expert\u2019s testimony. See Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 600. After considering the conflicting testimony in this case, the trial court acknowledged the \u201cdisparity of opinions\u201d on the issue and stated that there was \u201ca good deal of subjectivity in this whole process.\u201d The court also stated that the question of the disorder\u2019s validity could not be resolved by the fact that the diagnosis is not specifically listed in the DSM. The court ultimately chose to credit Dr. Ostrov\u2019s and Dr. Suire\u2019s testimony that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is a valid diagnosis despite the fact that it is not specifically listed in the DSM. Accordingly, the court found that respondent continues to suffer from a mental disorder that satisfied respondent\u2019s commitment under the Act.\nAlthough respondent argues that the trial court\u2019s ruling was an abuse of discretion and violated due process, he cites no authority in which a court has found that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent does not support a finding that a person is a sexually violent person under the Act because that disorder is not specifically listed in the DSM or because not all mental health experts agree on the validity of the diagnosis. He also cites to no authority in which a court has found that due process is violated when a person is committed under a sexually violent person statute based upon a mental disorder that is not specifically listed in the DSM. Indeed, the Act does not require that there be a consensus among mental health professionals regarding a diagnosis or that the diagnosis be listed specifically in the DSM in order for that particular diagnosis to support a sexually violent person finding. Rather, the Act defines a mental disorder as \u201ca congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence.\u201d 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 2008).\nIn this respect, we note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently considered a challenge to civil commitment based on the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, nonconsent because the diagnosis \u201crepresents an extreme minority viewpoint in the profession that has been explicitly and publicly rejected by the APA in crafting the DSM.\u201d McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 573 (7th Cir. 2010). After reviewing the DSM and Supreme Court precedent, the court noted that \u201c[wjhether a legitimate mental health diagnosis must be based on the DSM is a question for the members of the mental health profession\u201d and that, with respect to due process concerns, \u201cwe cannot adopt any rule that asks the DSM to do what the text itself professes that it was not intended to do: answer the ultimate legal questions or create a perfect fit between law and medicine in the realm of involuntary civil confinement.\u201d McGee, 593 F.3d at 576. The court then noted that \u201c[t]he Supreme Court\u2019s cases on this point teach that civil commitment upon a finding of a \u2018mental disorder\u2019 does not violate due process even though the predicate diagnosis is not found within the four corners of the DSM.\u201d McGee, 593 F.3d at 576. Rather, the court recognized that consensus among mental health professionals and the existence of a diagnosis in the DSM are factors to be considered by the finder of fact in determining whether a diagnosis justifies civil commitment. The court reasoned:\n\u201cLikewise, when a particular diagnosis is not accepted or is explicitly rejected by the DSM or other authoritative sources, that factor is a highly relevant consideration for the factfinder. In either situation, however, the factfinder has the ultimate responsibility to assess how probative a particular diagnosis is on the legal question of the existence of a \u2018mental disorder\u2019; the status of the diagnosis among mental health professionals is only a step on the way to that ultimate legal determination. The methodology and the outcome of any mental health evaluation offered as evidence is a proper subject for cross-examination, and we would expect that, in the ordinary case, such efforts would expose the strengths and weaknesses of the professional medical opinions offered.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) McGee, 593 F.3d at 576.\nThe court noted the conflicting opinions in the mental health field on the validity of the diagnosis and also considered \u201cthe Supreme Court\u2019s repeated statements that states must have appropriate room to make practical, common-sense judgments about the evidence presented in commitment proceedings.\u201d McGee, 593 F.3d at 580. Therefore, given the conflicting views on the issue and the state of Supreme Court precedent, the court ultimately held that it could not conclude \u201cthat the diagnosis of a rape-related paraphilia is so empty of scientific pedigree or so near-universal in its rejection by the mental health profession that civil commitment cannot be upheld as constitutional when this diagnosis serves as a predicate.\u201d McGee, 593 F.3d at 581.\nThe principle that the presence of a disorder in the DSM or disagreement among mental health professionals as to the validity of a diagnosis are merely factors to be considered by the trier of fact was illustrated by the Arizona Court of Appeals\u2019 decision in In re Commitment of Frankovitch, 211 Ariz. 370, 375, 121 P.3d 1240, 1245 (App. 2005). In that case, an inmate was found to be a sexually violent person and committed to the DHS under a statutory scheme similar to the Act. The trial court later denied the inmate\u2019s petition for release or a change of status. Frankovitch, 211 Ariz. at 372, 121 P.3d at 1242. On appeal, the inmate argued that the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS is inappropriate because raping a nonconsenting adult woman is not recognized as a paraphilia in the DSM-IV The inmate therefore contended that he did not have a diagnosis that met the statutory requirement for his continued confinement. Frankovitch, 211 Ariz. at 375, 121 P.3d at 1245. The appellate court rejected that claim, noting that the trial court had heard conflicting testimony on that issue and resolved the conflict by finding credible the expert testimony that paraphilia NOS, nonconsenting adult, is recognized as a valid diagnosis by those professionals working in the area of sexual disorders, even if it is not accepted by all psychologists and psychiatrists. The court acknowledged that the trial court was in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and therefore deferred to the trial court\u2019s resolution of the conflicting evidence. Frankovitch, 211 Ariz. at 375, 121 P.3d at 1245.\nAlthough neither of these decisions is binding on this court, we find the reasoning in each case persuasive and applicable to the present case. The fact that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is not specifically listed in the DSM, as testified to by Dr. Schmidt, and the presence of disagreement among mental health professionals as to the validity of the diagnosis, as testified to by all of the expert witnesses, were simply factors for the trial court to consider when determining whether the diagnosis could support respondent\u2019s civil commitment under the Act. The trial court heard testimony from two expert witnesses that the diagnosis was in fact valid and the court concluded that respondent suffered from a mental disorder that satisfied the Act\u2019s requirements. We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s determination was an abuse of discretion.\nRespondent\u2019s arguments to the contrary essentially take issue with the weight that the trial court assigned to each expert\u2019s testimony. First, respondent claims that \u201cconsidering Dr. Schmidt\u2019s world-renowned preeminence in the field of psychiatry and paraphilic disorders in particular, the trial court\u2019s wholesale rejection of his testimony in favor of the opinions of two unheralded local experts, one of whom, unlike Dr. Schmidt, did not even examine Lieberman personally, is a clear abuse of discretion.\u201d\nWe initially note that it was respondent who refused to be interviewed by Dr. Suire. Regardless, it is well settled that the trier of fact, in this case the trial court, is responsible for assessing the credibility of the expert witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. People v. Sims, 374 Ill. App. 3d 231, 251 (2007); People v. Urdidles, 225 Ill. 2d 354, 431 (2007) (\u201cthe credibility and weight to be given psychiatric testimony are matters for the trier of fact, who is not obligated to accept the opinions of defendant\u2019s expert witnesses over those opinions presented by the State\u201d). In this case, respondent had the opportunity to challenge the credentials and testimony of Dr. Ostrov and Dr. Suire during cross-examination of both witnesses and through the testimony of his own expert, Dr. Schmidt. See In re Detention of Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d 350, 372 (2003) (noting that \u201ctraditional methods, such as cross-examination and rebuttal witnesses, offered defendant the opportunity to challenge Buck\u2019s and Leavitt\u2019s opinions in the proper forum \u2014 that is, during trial in front of the trier of fact\u201d). The trial court was aware of Dr. Schmidt\u2019s credentials and past work on revisions to the DSM but nevertheless found the testimony of Dr. Suire and Dr. Ostrov to be more credible and concluded that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent satisfied the Act\u2019s requirements that respondent suffers from a mental disorder. Dr. Suire and Dr. Ostrov were both found by the trial court to be experts in the field of psychology and in the evaluation of sexual offenders and each witness testified as to the basis for his opinion on this issue. After reviewing the record, we find no valid reason to substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.\nSecond, respondent claims that \u201ceven if the expert testimony were evenly weighted,\u201d the \u201ceminently qualified testimony\u201d of Dr. Schmidt that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent does not exist as well as Dr. Suire\u2019s and Dr. Ostrov\u2019s testimony that a controversy exists over the use of the disorder in civil commitment proceeding establishes probable cause or a \u201creasonable ground for belief\u2019 that the disorder does not exist.\nProbable cause is defined as:\n\u201cReasonable cause; having more evidence for than against. A reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of. An apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry (that is, such inquiry as the given case renders convenient and proper), which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe, in a criminal case, that the accused person had committed the crime charged, or, in a civil case, that a cause of action existed.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1081 (5th ed. 1979).\nSee also In re Ottinger, 333 Ill. App. 3d 114, 122 (2002) (quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary for definition of \u201cprobable cause\u201d as that phrase is used in the Act).\nWe find respondent\u2019s argument to be without merit. First, respondent\u2019s argument would render the probable cause standard meaningless. We find that probable cause is not established merely by the presence of a \u201cdisparity of opinions\u201d or by testimony from respondent\u2019s expert witness. If this were the case, a party could always establish probable cause simply by calling an expert witness to testify on his behalf. Respondent\u2019s argument does not account for the trial court\u2019s role of making credibility determinations and assigning weight to the expert testimony or for the discretion the trial court has in determining whether a further evidentiary hearing is required on respondent\u2019s petition for discharge or conditional release. Second, the expert testimony in this case was not \u201cevenly weighted\u201d because the trial court exercised its discretion and chose to credit the testimony of Dr. Suire and Dr. Ostrov that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is a valid diagnosis over Dr. Schmidt\u2019s testimony that the disorder is not valid because it is not specifically listed in the DSM. In light of the weight the trial court assigned to each expert\u2019s testimony, we cannot say that there is \u201cmore evidence for than against\u201d the conclusion that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is not a valid disorder.\nThird, respondent claims that the trial court based its determination that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is a valid disorder upon a mistaken belief that this court, in respondent\u2019s direct appeal from his 2006 sexually violent person trial, previously held that the disorder was valid. Respondent specifically complains of the following comments by the trial court when announcing its ruling:\n\u201cNow it seems to me that your case *** rises or falls with this concept of there is no such diagnosis.\nAnd it seems to me, *** having heard all the testimony regarding that, and that much of this hearing has been taken up with that, and rightly so, actually, it seems to me that the posture of this case is that that diagnosis has been found by the Appellate Courts of this state to exist; and, indeed, they have been found \u2014 that diagnosis has been found to exist specifically in this case and that the rule of law is that that is a \u2014 the law that applies to this case specifically is that that diagnosis will support a *** judgment that an individual is a sexually violent person.\nAnd I haven\u2019t heard enough to think that there has been a revolutionary change in the law since that diagnosis or since that *** ruiing by the Appellate Court.\u201d\nIn claiming that the trial court\u2019s reference was erroneous, respondent points out that there is a difference between whether respondent met the criteria for paraphilia NOS, nonconsent, an issue in respondent\u2019s direct appeal from the finding that he was a SVI^ and whether the diagnosis itself is valid, an issue in this appeal.\nHowever, respondent\u2019s argument takes the trial court\u2019s comments out of context. When read in context, the trial court did not refer to this court\u2019s previous opinion as substantive proof that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is a valid disorder. Rather, the court was stating that in our previous opinion, we affirmed the trial court\u2019s finding that respondent was a sexually violent person based on the fact that he suffered from a mental disorder, paraphilia NOS, nonconsent, that made it substantially probable that he would engage in future acts of sexual violence. The court was further stating that since that time, there has not been a change in the law such that the disorder would no longer support a finding that respondent was a sexually violent person. Indeed, respondent has cited to no authority in which a court has found that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is not a valid mental disorder that supports a sexually violent person finding under the Act. Moreover, we would not find an abuse of discretion even if the trial court\u2019s reference was erroneous. Respondent places undue emphasis on the trial court\u2019s remark, which in no way detracts from the court\u2019s decision to assign more weight to the testimony of Dr. Ostrov and Dr. Suire that paraphilia NOS, nonconsent is a valid disorder despite the fact that it is not specifically listed in the DSM.\nRespondent\u2019s second contention on appeal is that even if he suffers from paraphilia NOS, nonconsent, it is no longer severe enough to justify his civil confinement. Specifically, respondent asserts that Dr. Ostrov testified that respondent\u2019s paraphilia is \u201cnot severe,\u201d and that respondent\u2019s own DHS treatment team records \u201cindisputably confirm that if he presently has a mental disorder of any kind, it is not severe.\u201d Respondent also asserts that the trial court improperly relied upon the fact that respondent has refused to participate in formal sexual offender treatment in denying his petition for conditional release or discharge.\nRespondent\u2019s contention essentially amounts to a claim that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the evidence failed to establish probable cause to believe that he is no longer a sexually violent person or that it is not substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual violence if released. Whether probable cause exists to warrant a further evidentiary hearing on a petition for discharge or conditional release is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court. Ottinger, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 120. On review, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court but, rather, will only ascertain whether the trial court\u2019s determination was an abuse of discretion. Ottinger, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 120. \u201cAn abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court\u2019s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.\u201d Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 609. For the following reasons, our review of the record establishes that the trial court\u2019s judgment was not an abuse of discretion.\nThe trial court heard testimony from two expert witnesses that respondent suffers from paraphilia NOS, nonconsent and that the disorder predisposes him to commit future acts of sexual violence. Dr. Ostrov testified that respondent was at a high risk of sexually reof-fending and that he was therefore not a suitable candidate for conditional release. This opinion was based upon numerous factors, including respondent\u2019s past behavior and his failure to participate in formal sexual offender treatment while in the DHS treatment facility, which \u201chas been empirically shown to decrease the risk of a person sexually reoffending.\u201d Dr. Ostrov\u2019s opinion was also based upon the results of the Static-99 test, his disbelief of respondent\u2019s claim that he essentially committed rapes due to \u201cyouthful caprice,\u201d and respondent\u2019s clinical interview, in which respondent was \u201ccavalier\u201d and showed a \u201clack of empathy\u201d toward his victims. The doctor acknowledged that respondent\u2019s age had an impact on his likelihood of recidivism and that respondent claimed to not have acted out sexually while in the IDOC and the DHS treatment facility. However, Dr. Os-trov explained that this claim must be viewed in context of the fact that respondent is in a controlled environment and does not have access to his preferred sexual stimuli. Dr. Ostrov concluded that the ultimate question was whether respondent had decreased his risk of sexually reoffending to the point where it would be tolerable for him to be on conditional release. In the doctor\u2019s opinion, other than respondent\u2019s age and the fact that he has not acted out sexually while detained, he did not see evidence that respondent had significantly decreased his risk of reoffending and he therefore did not recommend that respondent be conditionally released.\nThe trial court also heard testimony from Dr. Suire, who opined that to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, it was substantially probable that respondent would commit new acts of sexual violence if released, that respondent remains a sexually violent person, and that respondent has not made sufficient progress to allow him to be safely managed in the community. The doctor\u2019s opinion was based upon his paraphilia diagnosis as well as his opinion that respondent suffers from cannabis abuse and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorders. Dr. Suire\u2019s risk assessment of respondent was also based upon his review of various records and the results of the Static-99 and MNSOST-R actuarial instruments, both of which placed respondent in a \u201chigh-risk\u201d category. Finally, Dr. Suire considered what he referred to as \u201cprotective factors,\u201d such as age and treatment progress, which could reduce respondent\u2019s risk of sexually reoffending. The doctor acknowledged that increased age can correlate to a decreased risk of reoffending, but he did not consider respondent\u2019s age to be a significant protective factor because respondent was a \u201chigh-risk\u201d offender. Further, treatment progress did not reduce respondent\u2019s risk because he had refused to participate in core sexual offender treatment, which \u201ccan substantially reduce the risk of sexually reof-fending.\u201d\nIn contrast to the testimony of these two expert witnesses, the trial court heard testimony from defendant\u2019s expert, Dr. Schmidt. Dr. Schmidt testified that respondent does not suffer from a paraphilia and this opinion was based upon the doctor\u2019s evaluation of respondent and his review of various documents. Dr. Schmidt believed that respondent\u2019s pre-rape history could be relevant to explain why he committed multiple rapes. The doctor noted respondent\u2019s explanation of an instance when a woman initially refused to have intercourse with him but later consented and his claim that as a result he believed that \u201cwhen women say no they really mean yes.\u201d The doctor further noted that respondent was acting \u201cselfishly for his own sexual gratification\u201d and that he felt he \u201cwas immune from the law.\u201d According to Dr. Schmidt, these experiences provide \u201cas plausible an explanation as maybe we\u2019ll ever get\u201d as to why respondent committed numerous rapes. In arriving at his conclusion, Dr. Schmidt also considered that respondent had a \u201cfairly normal heterosexual development\u201d during his adolescent years, that there were no reports of respondent exhibiting sexual coercive behavior toward prisoners or the female staff, and that respondent\u2019s GAF scores indicated his symptom severity and functional capacity had \u201cincreased dramatically\u201d and were \u201cpretty close to normal at this time.\u201d However, Dr. Schmidt never testified that respondent was a suitable candidate for discharge or conditional release. He provided no testimony that in his professional opinion, respondent was no longer a sexually violent person or that it was not substantially probable that respondent would engage in acts of sexual violence if released.\nThe trial court also heard testimony from respondent regarding the fact that while in the DHS treatment and detention facility, he had married, founded a facility band, taken classes and written for the institutional newsletter. Respondent testified to his \u201cintermediate-A status\u201d in the detention facility and why he refused to participate in the core sexual offender treatment program. Respondent further stated that if he was released, he would live with his wife, work at a law firm, and participate in drug and alcohol testing as well as counseling or therapy.\nAfter hearing all of this evidence, the trial court stated that it found Dr. Suire and Dr. Ostrov to be \u201cquite credible\u201d witnesses and that it did not find respondent\u2019s testimony to be \u201ccredible at all, quite frankly.\u201d The court also noted that Dr. Schmidt\u2019s testimony as to why respondent committed so many rapes if he did not have a paraphilia was \u201cabsolutely, totally, completely absurd, quite frankly.\u201d The court noted that there was \u201can improvement to some extent in [respondent\u2019s] condition,\u201d pointing to respondent\u2019s GAF scores and his acknowledgment that he had committed some of the crimes with which he was charged. However, considering that respondent had refused to participate in the sexual offender treatment program as well as the other testimony presented at the hearing, the court concluded that respondent had failed to make sufficient progress to be conditionally released or discharged. Accordingly, the court found that there was not probable cause to believe that respondent was no longer a sexually violent person or that it was not substantially probable that he would engage in acts of sexual violence if released. After considering the testimony presented at the hearing, and considering the trial court\u2019s credibility determinations and the weight it assigned to the testimony, we cannot say that the court\u2019s judgment was \u201carbitrary, fanciful, [or] unreasonable,\u201d or that \u201cno reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.\u201d Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 609. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s denial of respondent\u2019s petition for conditional release or discharge was not an abuse of discretion. See Ottinger, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 122 (affirming the trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s petition for discharge or conditional release where there were no facts demonstrating that the defendant could control his behavior outside of a controlled environment, where the defendant did not consistently attend treatment classes, and where the expert found that the defendant continued to be a substantial risk to sexually reoffend).\nRespondent nevertheless claims that Dr. Ostrov testified that \u201cif respondent presently has a paraphilia of any kind, it is not severe.\u201d This portion of the doctor\u2019s testimony, however, is taken out of context. Dr. Ostrov initially testified that \u201ca paraphilia itself is severe\u201d and that he was \u201cnot sure what a moderate or mild one would be.\u201d The doctor acknowledged that in his prior deposition he stated that respondent\u2019s paraphilia is not severe \u201cin the environment he is in,\u201d in the sense that respondent \u201cis not preoccupied by it\u201d and he \u201chas not sexually acted out.\u201d However, the doctor testified that \u201cthe critical words in there is, \u2018in the environment he is in.\u2019 \u201d Dr. Ostrov also expanded on this statement in other portions of his testimony. He testified that respondent\u2019s claim that he has not acted out sexually or that he was not \u201cpreoccupied by it\u201d must be viewed in context of the fact that he has not been around his preferred sexual stimuli. Specifically, Dr. Ostrov explained that people with paraphilia act much differently when they are aroused by being in contact with their preferred stimuli than they do when that stimuli is not present. When someone with paraphilia is aroused, his ability to control himself and to consider the consequences of his actions is \u201cmarkedly\u201d decreased. In the same respect, the doctor explained that some people act out in prison and some do not, and that in the case of those who do not, this may be because that person has changed or it may be because that person \u201cdoes not have the opportunity to commit the crime they are predisposed to commit.\u201d In respondent\u2019s case, his access to men was not relevant because there was no past instance of him being sexually interested in men. Moreover, any access that respondent had to women was \u201ccertainly not the kind of access he had when he was out in the community\u201d because \u201cthere was always some level of surveillance.\u201d\nWhen viewed in context, this isolated statement by Dr. Ostrov does not establish probable cause to believe that respondent is no longer a sexually violent person or that it is not substantially probable that he would engage in acts of sexual violence if released. This is particularly true considering that Dr. Ostrov\u2019s overall opinion was that respondent suffers from a mental disorder, paraphilia NOS, non-consent, that he was at a high risk of sexually reoffending, and that he should not be released into the community. Moreover, even if Dr. Ostrov\u2019s statement regarding the severity of respondent\u2019s paraphilia were made in the context that respondent suggests, which it was not, the trial court was free to accept or reject as much or as little of his testimony as it saw fit. See Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 600. The overall opinions of Dr. Ostrov and Dr. Suire more than supported the trial court\u2019s denial of respondent\u2019s petition for conditional release or discharge.\nRespondent also claims that his GAF score, which measures his symptom severity and level of functioning and is determined by his DHS treatment team, indicates that his paraphilia is not severe. Respondent further claims that the trial court\u2019s judgment was an abuse of discretion because the court improperly focused on respondent\u2019s refusal to participate in formal sexual offender treatment and did not consider his GAF score or Dr. Ostrov\u2019s testimony that respondent\u2019s paraphilia is not \u201csevere.\u201d\nHowever, the record shows that the trial court considered all of these factors when it denied respondent\u2019s petition. The court was aware of Dr. Schmidt\u2019s testimony regarding respondent\u2019s current GAF score and that this score measures symptom severity and level of functioning. The court specifically noted that there had been \u201can improvement in things,\u201d that respondent\u2019s GAF score \u201chas improved,\u201d and that it was a \u201cpositive\u201d that respondent had been \u201cfunctioning fairly well in his present environment.\u201d However, the court also noted that Dr. Ostrov, whose testimony the court found to be \u201cquite credible,\u201d had specifically considered respondent\u2019s GAF score in arriving at his expert opinion. Moreover, as noted above, the court could have also considered Dr. Ostrov\u2019s statement regarding the severity of respondent\u2019s paraphilia in context of the rest of the doctor\u2019s testimony regarding how a person with paraphilia acts when not around his or her preferred stimuli. The trial court, as it was entitled to do, chose to credit Dr. Ostrov\u2019s overall testimony that, despite respondent\u2019s GAF score and other positive things he had done while in the DHS treatment facility, he suffers from paraphilia NOS, nonconsent and was at a high risk of reoffending.\nFinally, we find nothing improper in the trial court\u2019s consideration of respondent\u2019s refusal to participate in formal sexual offender treatment. Respondent claims that such treatment is not a prerequisite to discharge or conditional release and claims that, under section 55 of the Act, the criteria for conditional release or discharge is whether respondent has made \u201csufficient progress.\u201d See 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2008).\nHowever, in addition to the language in section 55 of the Act, the trial court was evaluating respondent\u2019s petition for discharge or conditional release. The court was therefore required to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that respondent is no longer a sexually violent person and whether it was not substantially probable that respondent will engage in future acts of sexual violence. See 725 ILCS 207/65(b), 60(c) (West 2008). In any event, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s consideration of respondent\u2019s refusal to participate in formal treatment given that Dr. Suire and Dr. Ostrov each testified that such treatment can significantly decrease the likelihood that a person will sexually reoffend. See, e.g., In re Detention of Cain, 341 Ill. App. 3d 480, 483 (2003) (trial court properly found that probable cause did not exist to conclude that the defendant was no longer a sexually violent person entitled to release where, among other things, the defendant \u201cremained exceedingly resistive to clinical treatment and instead focused his efforts primarily on legal issues\u201d); In re Commitment of Blakey, 382 Ill. App. 3d 547, 552 (2008) (trial court did not commit error when it found no probable cause to warrant a further evidentiary hearing on defendant\u2019s petition for conditional release where the defendant had not yet participated in any sex-offender-specific treatment program); Ottinger, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 121-22 (affirming denial of petition for release or discharge where, among other things, expert noted that the defendant required further intensive and secure treatment, did not consistently attend treatment classes, reported that treatment did not help and that he would rely on \u201ccommon sense\u201d to prevent recurrence, and where the defendant\u2019s treatment progress was \u201cpainfully slow\u201d). Moreover, the trial court never suggested that the overall standard it used to evaluate respondent\u2019s petition was whether he participated in treatment. After the court noted respondent\u2019s refusal to participate in treatment, it stated that \u201cwhen you add that to the whole mix of what I heard,\u201d respondent had not shown that he had made sufficient progress to be released into the community. Thus, the record shows that the trial court considered all of the evidence presented at trial and, after weighing that evidence, denied respondent\u2019s petition for discharge or conditional release. As we have already found, that determination was not an abuse of discretion.\nRespondent\u2019s final contention is that the trial court\u2019s judgment should be reversed because the alleged disorder upon which respondent\u2019s commitment rests is based solely upon his past criminal behavior. Specifically, respondent claims that Dr. Suire and Dr. Ostrov diagnosed him with paraphilia NOS, nonconsent based solely on his past criminal behavior and that this diagnosis is the only one which supports his civil commitment. Therefore, respondent asserts that the court\u2019s finding of no probable cause \u201cis unconstitutional on due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds.\u201d\nRespondent\u2019s contention is without merit. Our supreme court has already held that the Act is not subject to challenge on either double jeopardy or ex post facto grounds. See In re Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548 (2000). The court held that proceedings under the Act are civil rather than criminal in nature and that confinement pursuant to the Act is not punitive. Therefore, the initiation of commitment proceedings under the Act does not constitute a second prosecution for double jeopardy purposes. Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 559. The court also held that the Act does not implicate ex post facto concerns because it does not have retroactive effect. The court explained that a defendant \u201ccannot be involuntarily committed based on past conduct\u201d but, rather, \u201c[ijnvoluntary confinement is permissible only where the defendant presently suffers from a mental disorder and the disorder creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence [if released].\u201d Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 559. In reaching these conclusions, the court relied upon the United State\u2019s Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), in which the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of a Kansas statute similar to the Act and held that it did not raise ex post facto concerns or violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. In that case, the Court reasoned that the statute at issue \u201cdoes not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct,\u201d but instead \u201csuch conduct is used solely for evidentiary purposes, either to demonstrate that a \u2018mental abnormality\u2019 exists or to support a finding of future dangerousness.\u201d Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.\nWe find nothing in the record that would distinguish this case from the holding in Samuelson. Respondent is correct that Dr. Os-trov\u2019s opinion that respondent continues to suffer from paraphilia NOS, nonconsent was based on police reports, convictions, and respondent\u2019s own testimony which showed \u201crepeated instances of non-consensual sex directed to different women over a period of time longer than six months\u201d as well as the fact that respondent\u2019s behavior \u201ccaused him enormous impairment in social and occupational and other areas of functioning.\u201d Moreover, Dr. Suire did testify that his paraphilia diagnosis was based on respondent\u2019s past criminal behavior. However, as explained in Samuelson, this does not mean that respondent is being punished or detained for his past criminal behavior. Rather, respondent is being detained because, among other things, he presently suffers from a mental disorder that creates a strong probability that he will engage in future acts of sexual violence. We therefore find no constitutional violations arising out of respondent\u2019s continued commitment under the Act.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJ. GORDON and R.E. GORDON, JJ., concur.\nhe Act defines a sexually violent person as an individual who \u201chas been convicted of a sexually violent offense *** and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.\u201d 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998).\nDr. Buck and Dr. Leavitt were the State\u2019s expert witnesses at the 2006 trial to determine whether respondent was a sexually violent person.\nNecrophilia is defined as an \u201cobsession with and usually erotic interest in or stimulation by corpses,\u201d while zoophilia is defined as \u201can erotic fixation on animals that may result in sexual excitement through real or fancied contact.\u201d Meriam-Webster Medical Dictionary (2010), available at http:// www.merriam-webster.com/medlineplus/necrophilia; http://www.merriamwebster.com/medlineplus/zoophilila.\nParaphilia is defined as \u201ca pattern of recurring sexually arousing mental imagery or behavior that involves unusual and especially socially unacceptable sexual practices (as sadism, masochism, fetishism, or pedophilia).\u201d Meriam-Webster Medical Dictionary (2010), available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/medlineplus/paraphilia.\nThe court was considering a committed person\u2019s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his commitment under the Wisconsin sexually violent person statute.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Giel Stein, of Stein Law Group LLC, and Kimball R. Anderson, Nathan Hoffman, and Aesha Pallesen, all of Winston & Strawn LLR of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and David H. Iskowich, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re DETENTION OF BRAD LIEBERMAN (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Brad Lieberman, Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20140796\nOpinion filed May 28, 2010.\nGiel Stein, of Stein Law Group LLC, and Kimball R. Anderson, Nathan Hoffman, and Aesha Pallesen, all of Winston & Strawn LLR of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and David H. Iskowich, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0903-01", "first_page_order": 919, "last_page_order": 951 }