{ "id": 4302014, "name": "CHARLOTTE PANKROS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRED TYLER et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Pankros v. Tyler", "decision_date": "2010-05-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20142212", "first_page": "936", "last_page": "947", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "401 Ill. App. 3d 936" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "559 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3582176 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "990" }, { "page": "991" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/559/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 U.S. 639", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3674023 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" }, { "page": "1027-28" }, { "page": "2144-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/553/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 519", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6199687 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" }, { "page": "735" }, { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 F.3d 257", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9314293 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/313/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a71962", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799371 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448979 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "441" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365841 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2832377 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 479", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6201448 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498-99" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "3286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "767 F. Supp. 157", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3726768 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163", "parenthetical": "finding that RICO claims are assignable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/767/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 U.S. 258", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6226783 ], "weight": 45, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" }, { "page": "544" }, { "page": "1317" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "544" }, { "page": "1317" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "544" }, { "page": "1318" }, { "page": "265-66" }, { "page": "542" }, { "page": "1316" }, { "page": "262" }, { "page": "540-41" }, { "page": "1315" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "540" }, { "page": "1314" }, { "page": "262-63" }, { "page": "541" }, { "page": "1315" }, { "page": "269" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "1318" }, { "page": "272-73" }, { "page": "546-47" }, { "page": "1319-20" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "544" }, { "page": "1318" }, { "page": "271" }, { "page": "546" }, { "page": "1319" }, { "page": "271" }, { "page": "546" }, { "page": "1319" }, { "page": "271-72" }, { "page": "546" }, { "page": "1319-20" }, { "page": "272-73" }, { "page": "546-47" }, { "page": "1319-20" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "544" }, { "page": "1318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/503/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 451", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3275572 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "1994" }, { "page": "456" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "1996" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "729" }, { "page": "1996", "parenthetical": "rejecting a civil RICO claim for failure to establish Holmes' proximate cause requirement" }, { "page": "460-61" }, { "page": "730" }, { "page": "1998" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "2004" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71961", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 921, "char_count": 28035, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7492960360752035e-08, "percentile": 0.29839712662784584 }, "sha256": "70f70924a88e6fa492ca54fa65b44af96e4b3442fb2de733bcaa6fb78879ab37", "simhash": "1:feef470caf0794e5", "word_count": 4528 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:03:46.574655+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHARLOTTE PANKROS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRED TYLER et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Charlotte Pankros filed a complaint against defendants Fred Tyler (Tyler) and Ricky Dahms (Dahms), in the circuit court of Cook County alleging a civil violation of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71961 through 1968 (2006)). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2008)). Defendants argued that their conduct was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury and that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a civil lawsuit against defendants under RICO. The trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss with prejudice.\nPlaintiff then filed a motion to reconsider and requested leave to amend her complaint, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in which the changes are set forth in detail in this decision. Defendants again filed a section 2- \u2014 615 motion to dismiss on substantially similar grounds as their initial motion. The trial court again granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss with prejudice. No further pleadings were filed. On appeal, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in finding that: (1) defendants\u2019 RICO violations were not a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury; and (2) plaintiff lacked standing to bring a RICO action against defendants. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nA. The Parties\nAccording to the complaint, defendant Tyler is the former owner of a tavern called \u201cOff Broadway Pub\u201d located in Brookfield, Illinois. The complaint does not detail the type of business formation under which the tavern was created. Defendant Dahms is the current owner and operator of the tavern. Plaintiff is the ex-wife of Dennis Pankros (Dennis), who patronized the tavern during the couple\u2019s marriage and who allegedly lost large sums of money gambling on video machines in the tavern.\nB. Procedural History\n1. Initial Complaint\nOn February 22, 2008, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against defendants for a civil RICO violation.\nIn her complaint, plaintiff alleged that during the course of her divorce proceedings with Dennis, she discovered \u201chundreds of thousands of dollars\u201d of the marital estate had been lost as a result of Dennis\u2019s alleged illegal gambling activities which took place at the Off Broadway Pub.\nThe first count in the complaint alleged the following: Tyler had placed entertainment \u201cgambling machines\u201d in the tavern. Since 1999, Tyler had encouraged the tavern\u2019s patrons to use credit or debit cards \u201cto obtain funds to gamble\u201d on the machines. Tyler falsely represented patrons\u2019 gambling charges as \u201cfood or beverage service\u201d charges when he submitted the charges to the credit or debit card companies or financial institutions that issued the card.\nThe first count further alleged that Tyler allowed Dennis to make charges on his credit or debt cards so that Dennis could \u201cpay for or obtain cash to gamble on\u201d the tavern\u2019s machines. Tyler then submitted Dennis\u2019s gambling charges as food and beverage service to Dennis\u2019s credit or debit card companies.\nThe allegations in the second count were similar to the first count, except that they were asserted against Dahms, who had purchased the tavern from Tyler in 2003.\nUnder each of the two counts, plaintiff claimed that she suffered damages as a result of Tyler\u2019s and Dahms\u2019s alleged RICO violations because \u201chundreds of thousands of dollars of assets which would otherwise have been a part of [plaintiff and Dennis\u2019s] marital estate *** had been dissipated\u201d through the tavern owners\u2019 fraudulent billing scheme.\nThe complaint further claimed that \u201c[a]s part of the marital settlement agreement [between plaintiff and Dennis], [p]laintiff was assigned and retained this claim, at least in part, as compensation for the dissipation of the marital estate.\u201d\nOn September 19, 2008, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code, claiming that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. First, defendants argued that the alleged RICO violation was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury as held by the United States Supreme Court in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453, 164 L. Ed. 2d 720, 726, 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1994 (2006), citing Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 117 L. Ed. 2d 532, 544, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1317 (1992). Rather, defendants argue that any damages that plaintiff may have suffered was a result of Dennis\u2019s gambling and not any acts of defendants.\nSecond, defendants argued that plaintiff also lacked standing to bring a civil RICO claim because plaintiff was not injured \u201cby reason of\u201d defendants\u2019 alleged RICO violations, as required by the RICO statute. Rather, they argued, plaintiff was injured as a result of Dennis\u2019s proclivity to gamble.\nDefendants further argued that plaintiffs allegation that she had been assigned the right to pursue the matter was without factual support. They asserted that the RICO statute does not provide for an assignment of a claim but did not provide any support for that assertion. Defendants further argued that even if one could assign a civil claim under RICO, Dennis could not assign his civil claim to plaintiff against defendants. This argument also lacked any statutory or case law support. Again, they argued that Dennis lacked standing to bring a civil RICO claim against defendants because any injury was the result of Dennis\u2019s gambling, not the defendants\u2019 alleged RICO violations.\nIn her answer to defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, plaintiff argued that she suffered a direct injury as a result of defendants\u2019 alleged RICO violations because defendants were fraudulently billing Dennis\u2019s credit card companies, which were reimbursed by funds from the marital estate and caused plaintiff to incur debt for which she was responsible. Furthermore, plaintiff argues that under \u201cthe traditional view of proximate cause,\u201d plaintiff was a \u201cforeseeable victim of the defendants\u2019 RICO violation.\u201d Thus, plaintiff concluded, \u201cproximate causation existed and she ha[d] standing to bring her [civil] RICO claims.\u201d\nOn November 7, 2008, the trial court entered an order with a written opinion and granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss with prejudice. The trial court found that the financial losses to plaintiff were a result of Dennis\u2019s actions and that \u201cthe direct victims in this case are the credit card companies who were defrauded by [defendants.\u201d\nIn addition, the trial court disagreed with plaintiff\u2019s allegation that she had been assigned the right to bring a civil claim under RICO. The trial court found the federal RICO statute does not provide for an assignment of a claim but did not provide any support for that finding. The trial court further found that even assuming that the statute provided for such an assignment, Dennis lacked standing to bring a civil RICO claim because the financial losses he suffered were caused by his gambling. Thus, the trial court concluded, if Dennis could not have assigned to plaintiff the right to bring a civil RICO claim against defendants, then plaintiff also lacked standing to bring such a claim.\n2. Motion to Reconsider\nOn November 21, 2008, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the November 7 order granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss.\nFirst, plaintiff asked the trial court to reconsider its finding that \u201cthe credit card companies were the \u2018direct victims\u2019 of the defendants\u2019 [RICO violations]\u201d when there were no facts in the complaint alleging that the credit card companies suffered any injury.\nSecond, plaintiff argued that she was injured by defendants\u2019 actions because she had a direct and legal interest in the marital estate, a common asset by law, which had been dissipated as a result of defendants\u2019 actions.\nThird, plaintiff argued that the trial court incorrectly found that a civil RICO violation is not assignable. Federal Insurance Co. v. Parello, 767 F. Supp. 157, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding that RICO claims are assignable).\nFourth, plaintiff argued that the trial court incorrectly found defendants\u2019 actions were not a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury when she \u201csuffered a direct injury to an asset in which she had a direct interest,\u201d namely the marital estate. Moreover, plaintiff argued that RICO was intended to broaden the relief available to private litigants unhampered by strict requirements as \u201cstanding to sue\u201d and \u201cproximate cause.\u201d Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498-99, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346, 360, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286 (1985).\nPlaintiff further argued that in negligence actions, there could be more than one \u201cproximate cause\u201d for an injury. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 88 (1964); Jefferson v. City of Chicago, 269 Ill. App. 3d 672, 676 (1995). Plaintiff argued that the same concept should apply in a civil RICO action where proximate cause \u201cis supposed to be somewhat relaxed, not made more restrictive.\u201d\nOn January 9, 2009, defendants filed a response to plaintiffs motion to reconsider in which they argued again that plaintiff did not suffer damages as a result of the alleged actions of defendants. Rather, Dennis was the cause of any financial losses suffered by plaintiff.\nDefendants also argued that plaintiff presented no authority showing that her claim was assignable and distinguished Federal Insurance Co. v. Parello, 767 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1991), which involved a contractual agreement between the parties that allowed one party to exercise its subrogation rights against the defendants. Moreover, they argued, even if plaintiffs claim were assignable, Dennis could not have assigned her the claim, because he did not have standing to sue defendants. Therefore, defendants concluded, there was no legal basis for plaintiffs action.\nOn February 25, 2009, the trial court entered an order, without a written opinion, granting plaintiffs motion to reconsider and vacating its order of November 7, 2008. The trial court granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.\n3. Amended Complaint\nOn March 25, 2009, plaintiff filed an amended complaint that was similar to the initial complaint, but added the following allegations.\nFirst, the amended complaint now alleged that Tyler and Dahms knew that Dennis drank liquor to excess and was an obsessive gambler. In addition, Tyler and Dahms \u201ctargeted\u201d Dennis as a potential user of the gambling machines located in the tavern, knowing that Dennis would not be able to resist gambling, particularly when he consumed liquor.\nSecond, the amended complaint now alleged that Tyler and Dahms knew Dennis was married to plaintiff and that plaintiff disapproved of Dennis\u2019s drinking and gambling.\nOn April 22, 2009, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs amended complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code. Defendants\u2019 arguments in this motion to dismiss were substantially similar to their initial motion, namely, that plaintiffs alleged injuries were not proximately caused by defendants\u2019 claimed RICO violations and that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a civil RICO claim against defendants. Defendants added that they did not owe a duty to plaintiff for Dennis\u2019s \u201cdrinking or gambling problem[s].\u201d\nOn June 11, 2009, plaintiff filed a response to defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. Plaintiff argued that her injury consisting of financial loss to her marital estate through defendants\u2019 RICO violations was foreseeable because defendants knew that Dennis drank liquor to excess, was an obsessive gambler, and would be unable to resist gambling after he consumed liquor and that plaintiff disapproved of Dennis\u2019s drinking and gambling. Furthermore, plaintiff argued that defendants knew that by disguising Dennis\u2019s gambling charges as food and beverage charges, they were receiving funds from plaintiffs marital estate, to which they were not entitled. Thus, plaintiff concluded, proximate cause exists and plaintiff has standing to bring her civil RICO claim against defendants.\nIn her reply to defendants\u2019 argument that defendants did not owe plaintiff a duty, plaintiff argued that it is not an issue of whether defendants owed her a duty, but that \u201cdefendants owed a duty not to commit a RICO violation.\u201d\nOn July 28, 2009, the trial court entered an order with a written opinion granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code. The trial court found that plaintiff failed to allege any facts to support a \u201cdirect relation\u201d between defendants\u2019 conduct and her alleged damages. The trial court found that Dennis used the marital funds for gambling and that plaintiff suffered damages from Dennis\u2019s actions when he \u201cvoluntarily spent the funds.\u201d The trial court further found that plaintiff failed to cite any authority to support her assertion that defendants should be held responsible for Dennis\u2019s dissipation of the marital estate.\nThe trial court also found that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a civil RICO claim against defendants under the facts of this case. The trial court found that the RICO statute does not provide for an assignment of a claim to third parties under the facts of this case. Moreover, even assuming the statute did provide for an assignment, plaintiff could not be assigned this right by Dennis, because Dennis did not have standing to bring a civil RICO claim against defendants since the financial losses suffered were caused by his own actions. The trial court concluded that plaintiff was indirectly harmed by defendants\u2019 conduct and thus lacked standing.\nThe trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiffs amended complaint with prejudice. On August 25, 2009, plaintiff filed this timely appeal.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss her civil RICO claim when it found that: (1) defendants\u2019 RICO violation was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury; and (2) plaintiff lacked standing to bring a RICO action against defendants.\nA. Standard of Review\nA motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2008)) challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint by alleging defects on its face. Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Ill. 2d 433, 440 (2004); Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 228 (2003). We review de novo an order granting a section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss. Young, 213 Ill. 2d at 440; Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2d at 228.\nThe critical inquiry is whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2d at 228. In making this determination, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts, are taken as true. Young, 213 Ill. 2d at 441. In addition, we construe the allegations in the complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Young, 213 Ill. 2d at 441.\nB. Civil Claims Under RICO\nRICO provides a private cause of action for \u201c[a]ny person injured in his [or her] business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964(c) (2006). Section 1962(c) further provides, in pertinent part, that it is \u201cunlawful for any person employed by or associated with\u201d an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce \u201cto conduct or participate directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises\u2019s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a71962(c) (2006). The term \u201cracketeering activity\u201d is defined to include so-called predicate acts, including mail and wire fraud, which are alleged in the case at bar. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a71961(1) (2006).\nTo state a civil claim under RICO, the United States Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show that the alleged RICO violation \u201cnot only was a \u2018but for\u2019 cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.\u201d Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 117 L. Ed. 2d 532, 544, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1317 (1992). The United States Supreme Court employed the term \u201c \u2018proximate cause\u2019 to label genetically the judicial tools used to limit a person\u2019s responsibility for the consequences of that person\u2019s own acts.\u201d Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 544, 112 S. Ct. at 1318. While the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the RICO statute broadly, the Court has limited the reach of civil RICO claims through the element of proximate cause. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265-66, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 542, 112 S. Ct. at 1316; Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 456, 164 L. Ed. 2d 720, 728, 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1996 (2006).\nIn Holmes, Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) brought a civil RICO claim against defendants who, SIPC alleged, conspired to manipulate stock prices. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 262, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 540-41, 112 S. Ct. at 1315. SIPC, a private nonprofit organization, had a statutory duty to reimburse customers when SIPC-member brokerage firms were unable to meet their financial obligations. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 540, 112 S. Ct. at 1314. When the defendants\u2019 stock manipulation was discovered, the stock prices collapsed, and the \u201cdecline caused [two SIPC-member] brokerage-dealers\u2019 financial difficulties in their eventual liquidation and SIPC\u2019s advance of nearly $13 million to cover their customers\u2019 claims.\u201d Holmes, 503 U.S. at 262-63, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 541, 112 S. Ct. at 1315. SIPC brought suit claiming that it was subrogated to the rights of its members\u2019 customers who did not purchase manipulated stocks. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 545, 112 S. Ct. at 1318.\nThe United States Supreme Court rejected SIPC\u2019s civil RICO claim, holding that it could not recover from defendants under a RICO violation because SIPC failed to establish that the RICO violation was the proximate cause of its injury. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272-73, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 546-47, 112 S. Ct. at 1319-20. The United States Supreme Court evaluated the proximate cause requirement for bringing a civil RICO claim under common-law principles and required that there be \u201csome direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.\u201d Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 544, 112 S. Ct. at 1318; see also Anza, 547 U.S. at 457, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 729, 126 S. Ct. at 1996 (rejecting a civil RICO claim for failure to establish Holmes\u2019 proximate cause requirement).\nIn applying that proximate cause standard, the Supreme Court in Holmes held that the defendants\u2019 RICO violation directly harmed only SIPC-member brokerage firms and that SIPC\u2019s injury was \u201cpurely contingent\u201d on the brokers\u2019 injury. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 546, 112 S. Ct. at 1319. The Court concluded that SIPC\u2019s injury was \u201ctoo remote\u201d to satisfy RICO\u2019s direct relationship requirement. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 546, 112 S. Ct. at 1319.\nIn the case at bar, plaintiff claims that she suffered a direct injury because funds that she was entitled to through the marital estate were fraudulently billed to credit card companies, thereby incurring debt for which she was directly responsible.\nDefendants do not contest whether their alleged conduct constitutes a RICO violation. Rather, defendants argued, and the trial court found, that plaintiff failed to show that defendants\u2019 alleged RICO violation was a proximate cause of her injury, and therefore, plaintiff cannot state a claim under RICO.\nAccording to the amended complaint, Dennis \u201cobtain[ed] funds to gamble on [the tavern\u2019s gambling] machines\u201d through the use of his credit card at the tavern. Defendants, in an alleged violation of RICO, submitted to the credit card companies charges \u201cfalsely representing that [cash charges] represented charges for food and beverage service.\u201d Dennis then spent the funds that he received following the transaction with defendants when he deposited the funds in the tavern\u2019s gambling machines.\nBased on the allegations in the amended complaint, the conduct directly responsible for plaintiffs injury was Dennis\u2019s spending funds he obtained through the use of his credit card. The conduct that constituted the alleged RICO violation was defendants\u2019 fraudulent submission of Dennis\u2019s charges for cash as \u201cfood and beverage service\u201d charges.\nThe distinction between the claimed injury and the alleged RICO violation is further emphasized by the federal Fifth Circuit\u2019s decision in In re MasterCard International, Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002). In that case, plaintiffs brought a civil RICO claim against a credit card company alleging that the company \u201ccreated and operate [d] a \u2018worldwide gambling enterprise\u2019 that facilitates\u201d Internet gambling in violation of various state statutes. MasterCard, 313 F.3d at 260.\nAccording to the facts in that case, an Internet gambler is permitted to use a credit card to purchase \u201ccredits\u201d for gambling in an internet casino Web site. MasterCard, 313 F.3d at 260. After the purchase of the credits is completed, an Internet gambler may then place wagers in an Internet gambling casino. MasterCard, 313 F.3d at 260. The Fifth Circuit found that the credit card companies could not have violated state Internet gambling statutes because the credit card companies \u201ccompleted their transaction with the [pjlaintiffs before any gambling occurred.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) MasterCard, 313 F.3d at 262.\nSimilarly, in the case at bar, defendants permitted Dennis to use his credit cards to obtain funds to gamble on the tavern\u2019s gambling machines. Next, defendants committed the alleged RICO violation by falsely labeling Dennis\u2019s transactions as \u201cfood and beverage service\u201d and submitted those transactions to the credit card company. After the credit card transactions were complete, defendants forwarded the funds to Dennis. He then used those funds to gamble on the tavern\u2019s gambling machines.\n\u201c \u2018The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.\u2019 \u201d Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271-72, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 546, 112 S. Ct. at 1319-20, quoting Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534, 74 L. Ed. 2d 723, 735, 103 S. Ct. 897, 906 (1983). This \u201cgeneral tendency\u201d has been applied to the proximate cause requirement in determining whether a plaintiff was directly injured as the result of a civil RICO violation. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272-73, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 546-47, 112 S. Ct. at 1319-20; Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 659, 170 L. Ed. 2d 1012, 1027-28, 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2144-45 (2008); Anza, 547 U.S. at 460-61, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 730, 126 S. Ct. at 1998.\nHere, plaintiffs theory of causation extends beyond that \u201cfirst step\u201d and, thus, her injury is too remote to satisfy proximate cause. Defendants\u2019 conduct of the alleged fraudulent billing scheme is separate from Dennis\u2019s conduct of using the funds, which is the harm plaintiff claims she suffered. Based on the allegations in the amended complaint, plaintiff failed to establish the direct relationship required to bring a civil RICO claim. Thus, the trial court properly granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss based on plaintiffs failure to establish that the alleged RICO violation was a proximate cause of her injury.\nPlaintiff further argues that under the traditional view of proximate cause, her injury was a foreseeable consequence of defendants\u2019 alleged RICO scheme, and therefore, proximate cause exists. Specifically, plaintiffs amended complaint alleges that defendants knew Dennis drank liquor in excess, was an obsessive gambler, would be unable to resist gambling after he drank in excess, and that plaintiff disapproved of Dennis\u2019s drinking and gambling. Furthermore, the amended complaint alleges that defendants knew that by disguising Dennis\u2019s gambling charges as food and beverage service charges, they were receiving funds from plaintiffs marital estate to which they were not entitled. Plaintiff concludes that based on those facts, it was foreseeable that plaintiff would be injured by defendants\u2019 conduct and her injury was directly related to the alleged RICO violation. We do not find this argument persuasive.\nIn a recent United States Supreme Court case, Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 983 (2010), the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument that RICO\u2019s proximate cause requirement may turn on foreseeability rather than on a \u201cdirect relationship\u201d between the alleged RICO violation and the injury. Hemi Group, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 990. The United States Supreme Court stated as follows:\n\u201cIf this line of reasoning [that proximate cause turn on foreseeability rather than a \u2018direct relationship\u2019] sounds familiar, it should. It is precisely the argument lodged against the majority opinion in Anza. There, the dissent criticized the majority\u2019s view for \u2018permitting] a defendant to evade liability for harms that are not only foreseeable, but the intended consequences of the defendant\u2019s unlawful behavior.\u2019 [Anza, 547 U.S. at 470, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 737, 126 S. Ct. at 2004] (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But the dissent there did not carry the day, and no one has asked us to revisit Anza.\nThe concepts of direct relationship and foreseeability are of course two of the \u2018many shapes [proximate cause] took at common law,\u2019 Holmes, [503 U.S. at 268, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 544, 112 S. Ct. at 1318]. Our precedents make clear that in the RICO context, the focus is on the directness of the relationship between the conduct and the harm. Indeed, Anza and Holmes never even mention the concept of foreseeability.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Hemi Group, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 991.\nAs previously noted, in the case at bar, there is no direct relationship between the alleged RICO violation and plaintiff\u2019s injury to establish the proximate cause requirement. To date, the United States Supreme Court does not include foreseeability as part of the proximate cause analysis for a civil RICO claim. Accordingly, we decline to do so here.\nPlaintiffs argument that there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury (Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 88 (1964)) is not applicable here. As noted, plaintiffs causation theory does not establish the requisite \u201cdirect relationship\u201d requirement. Furthermore, plaintiff provides no alternative causation theory for us to consider that does establish a direct relationship between her injury and the alleged RICO violation as required under Holmes and its progeny. Plaintiffs injury here is just too remote.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiffs amended complaint for failure to establish a direct relationship between defendants\u2019 conduct and her alleged injury as required to bring a civil RICO claim.\nHaving determined that plaintiff cannot establish the proximate cause requirement for her injury, we do not need to determine whether plaintiff lacks standing to bring this claim.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the forgoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County in dismissing plaintiffs amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under RICO. Even accepting all well-pleaded facts in the amended complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from those facts, we find that the amended complaint fails to allege proximate cause, as defined by United States Supreme Court precedent for the federal RICO statute.\nAffirmed.\nJ. GORDON and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "William R Suriano, of Law Offices of William E Suriano, of Riverside, for appellant.", "James J. Roche and Justyna A. Ziolo, both of James J. Roche & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLOTTE PANKROS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRED TYLER et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20142212\nOpinion filed May 21, 2010.\nWilliam R Suriano, of Law Offices of William E Suriano, of Riverside, for appellant.\nJames J. Roche and Justyna A. Ziolo, both of James J. Roche & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0936-01", "first_page_order": 952, "last_page_order": 963 }