{ "id": 5768115, "name": "In re DETENTION OF HARRY CAIN (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Harry Cain, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cain", "decision_date": "2010-06-25", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201409\u20140019", "first_page": "390", "last_page": "400", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "402 Ill. App. 3d 390" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 486381 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120-22", "parenthetical": "holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the respondent \"a full hearing on conditional release or discharge\" where conflicting opinions were presented and the court gave greater weight to those of the State's experts" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8449153 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5575634 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 F. 1013", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 11720199 ], "year": 1923, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f/293/1013-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8449153 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0523-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 967, "char_count": 26408, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.3938067431730576 }, "sha256": "dd16c002b36e6e241c1b61be6a4b56d12972d773815b8e7d1d302c4c57494198", "simhash": "1:2b42ef67964080b0", "word_count": 4157 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:34.233681+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re DETENTION OF HARRY CAIN (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Harry Cain, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WEXSTTEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe respondent, Harry Cain, appeals from the circuit court\u2019s denial of his petition for discharge or conditional release from his commitment as a sexually violent person pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2006)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nIn 1999, the respondent was adjudicated a sexually violent person pursuant to the Act and was committed to the Department of Human Services for control, care, and treatment. See 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998). Since then, he has repeatedly sought a discharge or conditional release from his commitment, and on each occasion, his requested relief has been denied. In re Detention of Cain, No. 5 \u2014 05\u2014 0702 (2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)); In re Detention of Cain, No. 5 \u2014 04\u20140431 (2005) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23); In re Detention of Cain, 341 Ill. App. 3d 480 (2003); In re Detention of Cain, No. 5 \u2014 01\u20140083 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23); In re Detention of Cain, No. 5 \u2014 99\u20140197 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In 2007, the respondent filed the petition for discharge or conditional release that is the subject of the present appeal. In 2008, the circuit court denied the respondent\u2019s petition after a probable cause hearing. The relevant items of evidence that the court considered at the hearing were psychological reexamination reports prepared by the State\u2019s psychologist, Dr. Raymond Wood, and a psychological evaluation report prepared by the respondent\u2019s appointed expert, Dr. Kirk Witherspoon.\nDr. Wood\u2019s Findings\nIn his reports, Dr. Wood indicated that when preparing his most recent evaluations of the respondent, he had reviewed numerous sources of information, including the respondent\u2019s past treatment records. Wood further indicated that he had evaluated or examined the respondent on multiple occasions since 2005. Wood\u2019s findings included the following.\nIn 1988, when the respondent was 52, he was charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and permitting the sexual abuse of a child. The victims of the charged offenses were a 4-year-old girl and her two brothers, who were 8 and 12. The charges ultimately led to the respondent\u2019s incarceration, and in 1992, he was paroled. Following his release from prison, he \u201csporadically attended\u201d sex-offender treatment for six months. In 1996, the respondent was charged with sexually abusing a nine-year-old boy, and he was released from prison on that offense in 1998. While incarcerated, he was referred to, but did not enter, sex-offender treatment. \u201cHis records indicate! ] *** that seven other children reported incidents of sexual abuse or attempted sexual abuse that did not result in criminal charges.\u201d\nIn 1999, the respondent was committed pursuant to the Act. In June 2000, he entered a multifaceted treatment program at his commitment facility, but he withdrew from the program in January 2001. The respondent reentered the program in June 2002 but \u201cwas suspended for non[ ]attendance in November 2002.\u201d He was subsequently removed from the program in January 2003. The respondent later \u201cprovided several justifications for not participating in [the treatment program],\u201d and he blamed his therapists for his decision to withdraw in 2001. Wood indicated that treatment refusal was a perpetual problem with the respondent. Wood explained that the treatment program\u2019s goals included relapse prevention and cognitive restructuring, and one of its component phases required the respondent to fully disclose and accept responsibility for all of his past sex offenses. While in treatment, when questioned about \u201cadditional, undisclosed victims,\u201d the respondent \u201cirrationally\u201d interpreted the questions as suggesting that he should lie and fabricate the existence of victims that did not exist. Before his removal from treatment in 2003, however, the respondent admitted that he had committed sexual offenses against nine victims.\nWood indicated that during self-report assessments conducted while the respondent was in treatment, the respondent had provided untruthful responses regarding his sexual interests and attitudes. The respondent also suggested that his offenses against children were not as serious as reported. When interviewed in 2007, the respondent stated, inter alia, that \u201csome women secretly want to be raped\u201d and that a woman \u201c \u2018could prevent rape if she wanted to.\u2019 \u201d The respondent also stated that \u201cchildren could be seductive\u201d by \u201c \u2018the movements they make.\u2019 \u201d He indicated that he no longer had a sex drive, however, and that his self-estimated risk of recidivism was less than 10%.\nBased on his review of the respondent\u2019s records and assessments, and consistent with previous evaluations, Wood diagnosed the respondent with pedophilia toward both males and females and a personality disorder with antisocial traits. Wood also utilized actuarial assessments to determine the likelihood that the respondent might commit further sex offenses if released. The respondent was designated a moderate-high risk using the Static-99 assessment and a high risk using the MnSOST-R. Wood explained that those assessments are \u201cconservative and underestimate actual risk\u201d and that the respondent\u2019s personality disorder was an additional risk factor. The respondent\u2019s low motivation for treatment, his lack of remorse and victim-blaming, his tolerant attitude toward sex crimes, and his sexual interests in children were also noted as additional risk factors.\nAcknowledging that some research suggested that recidivism rates among sex offenders decrease with age and that \u201cactuarial risk estimates for sex offenders 60 or more years old overestimate their actual risk,\u201d Wood explained that those considerations needed \u201cto be viewed within the context of [the respondent\u2019s] risk when he committed his predicate offense.\u201d Wood further explained that although the respondent\u2019s recidivism risk was less than 20% when he reoffended at age 59, he nevertheless reoffended. Wood stated, \u201cThus, one cannot firmly conclude that an age[-]related reduction in risk is appropriate for [the respondent].\u201d Noting that sex-offender treatment \u201chas been found to reduce recidivism,\u201d Wood stated that the respondent was not currently in treatment and that his past \u201cprogress in treatment was minimal.\u201d\nIn conclusion, Wood stated that although the respondent was 71, his pedophilia and personality disorder were \u201cconditions affecting his emotional and volitional capacity and predisposing him to acts of sexual violence.\u201d Wood reiterated that the respondent was assessed as a moderate-high risk to a high risk and that his additional risk factors \u201cincreased his risk to engage in acts of sexual violence.\u201d Wood also stated, \u201cNo reductions in risk were warranted based on medical condition, progress in sex offense specific treatment, or age.\u201d Wood opined that the respondent remained \u201cdangerous in that, as a result of his mental disorders, it is still substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual violence.\u201d Wood further opined that the respondent was still a sexually violent person who continued \u201cto require institutional care in a secure facility.\u201d\nDr. Witherspoon\u2019s Findings\nIn his report, Dr. Witherspoon indicated that when preparing his evaluation of the respondent, he had also reviewed numerous sources of information, including the respondent\u2019s past treatment records. Witherspoon further indicated that he had interviewed the respondent in February 2008. Witherspoon\u2019s findings included the following.\nThe respondent acknowledged that in 1988 he had touched the vaginal area of a four-year-old girl whom he had been babysitting. He claimed that while bathing the girl, she had grabbed his hand and had used it to rub her vaginal area. She told him that it was okay that he touched her and that \u201cit felt good.\u201d The girl\u2019s mother also suggested that it was okay. The respondent advised that his oldest son and another man had also molested the girl. The respondent indicated that his 1996 sexual-abuse charge was the result of a false accusation made by the mother of a boy who was trying to extort money from him. The respondent \u201cremembered grabbing the boy\u2019s leg, but never his penis.\u201d The respondent indicated that he pled guilty to the charge because his public defender had refused to take the case to trial. Witherspoon suggested that there was no evidence that the respondent had abused additional victims. Witherspoon stated, \u201cConsistently, [the respondent] denied ever having partaken in sexual contact with any males.\u201d\nThe respondent briefly attended sex-offender treatment following his first incarceration but \u201cdid not accept recommended sex offender treatment when incarcerated the second time, as he did not believe that he had justifiably needed it.\u201d While committed under the Act, the respondent \u201centered and dropped out of treatment on two occasions.\u201d Witherspoon stated, \u201cBoth decisions to stop attending were precipitated by harsh confrontational tactics ***.\u201d The respondent complained that his therapists had told him that he had to acknowledge additional sexual-abuse victims. The respondent indicated that he \u201cno longer has sexual thoughts or desires\u201d and that \u201cit is very difficult for him to even obtain an erection.\u201d Witherspoon observed that the respondent \u201cdid not display marked evidence of deviant sexual attitude or interests\u201d but that \u201che did offer enough aberrant endorsements to raise cause for concern about attitudes which may permit a rationalization of sexual misconduct with children.\u201d Witherspoon further explained, however, that the respondent \u201cdid not reflect an ongoing desire to partake in sexual contact with minors.\u201d\nWitherspoon stated that the respondent\u2019s score on the Hare PCL-R, a \u201ctool used to gauge general criminalistic tendencies,\u201d was \u201cnot associated with marked antisocial tendencies.\u201d Additionally, the respondent\u2019s profile as determined by the SVR-20, another clinical assessment tool, \u201csuggested a low reoffense risk categorical estimate at this point.\u201d Witherspoon criticized the use of actuarial schemes such as the Static-99 and the MnSOST-R, indicating that they were generally unreliable. He also stated, \u201cMost data indicate that persons [the respondent\u2019s] age have an estimated reoffense risk of zero percent.\u201d Based on his evaluation of the respondent, Witherspoon opined that the respondent\u2019s pedophilia was \u201cin remission or resolved\u201d and that he did not otherwise suffer from a recognizable personality disorder. Witherspoon explained that despite the respondent\u2019s failure to complete sex-offender treatment, \u201chis estimated sexual reoffense risk categorization at this point is \u2018low.\u2019 \u201d Witherspoon further opined that given the risk level associated with the respondent\u2019s age, treatment completion \u201cwould appear to be a moot issue at this point.\u201d\nIn conclusion, Witherspoon \u201crecommended that [the respondent] be regarded as falling within the \u2018low\u2019 sexual reoffense risk category at this point as a result primarily of his age, increasing infirmity, and markedly abated if not altogether absent sexually deviant interests and propensities.\u201d Witherspoon further recommended that the respondent be discharged from his commitment and \u201cthat he not be required to reenroll in sex offender treatment on an outpatient basis.\u201d\nIn its written order denying the respondent\u2019s 2007 petition for discharge or conditional release, the circuit court discussed the conflicting opinions of Drs. Wood and Witherspoon. In response to Witherspoon\u2019s criticism of the use of the Static-99 and the MnSOST-R as clinical assessment tools, the court stated, \u201c[T]his exact criticism was raised by previous experts who testified on behalf of [the respondent] during an evidentiary hearing in 2004.\u201d The court also noted that in In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523 (2004), the supreme court held that actuarial tools such as the Static-99 and the MnSOST-R were generally accepted in the psychological and psychiatric communities. Observing that the respondent had still not completed any sex-offender treatment, the court stated, \u201cIn essence, the only facts that have changed since [the respondent\u2019s] last discharge hearing! ] are that he is older, more frail, and has received a new independent psychological evaluation.\u201d The court then concluded that there was not probable cause to believe that the respondent was no longer a sexually violent person and that there was not cause to believe that it was not substantially probable that he would engage in acts of sexual violence if on release or conditional release. Following the court\u2019s denial of his motion to reconsider, the respondent filed a timely notice of appeal.\nDISCUSSION\nAn individual committed under the Act has the right to petition the committing court for discharge or conditional release. 725 ILCS 207/60(a), 65(b)(1) (West 2006). When that relief is sought, the committing court must set the matter for a probable cause hearing. 725 ILCS 207/60(c), 65(b)(1) (West 2006). \u201cIf the court determines at the probable cause hearing *** that probable cause exists to believe that the committed person is no longer a sexually violent person, then the court shall set a hearing on the issue.\u201d 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2006). \u201cIf the court determines at the probable cause hearing that cause exists to believe that it is not substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if on release or conditional release, the court shall set a hearing on the issue.\u201d 725 ILCS 207/60(c) (West 2006). \u201cWhether or not probable cause exists to warrant a further evidentiary hearing is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court,\u201d and \u201c[ajbsent an abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the court\u2019s probable cause determination.\u201d In re Detention of Cain, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 482.\nArguing that the circuit court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on his petition for discharge or conditional release, the respondent contends that in light of Dr. Witherspoon\u2019s evaluation, the court improperly found that no probable cause existed to believe that he was no longer a sexually violent person. In essence, the respondent\u2019s argument is that the mere existence of conflicting opinions regarding his propensity for sexual violence warrants an evidentiary hearing. We disagree, and we note that we rejected the same suggestion when affirming the circuit court\u2019s denial of the respondent\u2019s previous petition for a discharge or conditional release.\nIn In re Detention of Cain, No. 5 \u2014 05\u20140702 (2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), the respondent filed a petition for discharge or conditional release in 2005. The respondent\u2019s appointed expert, Dr. Robert Chapman, and the State\u2019s expert, Dr. Wood, subsequently evaluated the respondent and issued reports with divergent conclusions. Specifically, Chapman concluded that the respondent was no longer a sexually violent person and should be released from his commitment, while Wood concluded that the respondent was still sexually violent and should remain committed. After a probable cause hearing, the circuit court denied the respondent\u2019s petition, and he appealed. Affirming the circuit court\u2019s judgment, we concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by giving Wood\u2019s evaluation greater weight than Chapman\u2019s. In re Detention of Cain, No. 5 \u2014 05\u20140702 (2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23); see also In re Ottinger, 333 Ill. App. 3d 114, 120-22 (2002) (holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the respondent \u201ca full hearing on conditional release or discharge\u201d where conflicting opinions were presented and the court gave greater weight to those of the State\u2019s experts).\nHere, we cannot conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in determining that other than the respondent\u2019s age and the fact that he had since obtained a new favorable evaluation, nothing had changed since the respondent\u2019s last request for a discharge or conditional release that would warrant a finding that probable cause existed to believe that he is no longer a sexually violent person. Nor can we conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in rejecting Witherspoon\u2019s suggestion that given the respondent\u2019s age, he was a zero risk to reoffend and treatment completion \u201cwould appear to be a moot issue.\u201d The court obviously gave Wood\u2019s opinions regarding the respondent\u2019s dangerousness greater weight than Witherspoon\u2019s, and Wood explained that the respondent\u2019s age as a risk reduction had to be considered in the context of the fact that the respondent reoffended when he was 59. Wood thus concluded that under the circumstances, no reduction in risk based on age was appropriate. We also note that many of Witherspoon\u2019s findings, such as his assessment that the respondent\u2019s pedophilia was \u201cin remission or resolved,\u201d were apparently based solely on what the respondent had told him on the single occasion that they met.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Christian County is hereby affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGOLDENHERSH, EJ., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WEXSTTEN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE STEWART,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent because I believe the conflicting opinions of qualified experts in this case constituted probable cause for a trial on Cain\u2019s petition for discharge or conditional release. The procedure the majority affirms allows the trial court to choose between conflicting expert reports as the primary basis of its decision that one who is imprisoned indefinitely, albeit for treatment, is not entitled to a trial to determine if he must remain imprisoned indefinitely. Instead of allowing a trial at which disputed questions of fact can be resolved, this procedure allows the court to bypass all of the truth-seeking functions and protections of our rules of evidence. The problem with the procedure the majority affirms is that it is devoid of any standard by which it can be determined what must be presented by a detainee to justify a finding of probable cause. If the statutory procedures by which a detainee is allowed to raise the possibility of his discharge or conditional release are to have any meaning, then a detainee should be able to discern what is required in order to obtain a trial at which a trier of fact can consider and resolve disputed issues of fact.\nThe statutes upon which the trial court based its decision provide for the court to make a determination of whether there is \u201cprobable cause\u201d for a trial. In order to obtain a trial on a petition for a discharge without conditions, the court must determine \u201cthat probable cause exists to believe that the committed person is no longer a sexually violent person.\u201d 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2008). If probable cause is found to exist, a detainee may elect to have a jury determine whether he should be discharged. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2008). In order for Cain to receive a trial to determine if he qualifies for conditional release, the court must determine that \u201ccause exists to believe that it is not substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if on release or conditional release.\u201d 725 ILCS 207/ 60(c) (West 2008). If this finding is made, a hearing on the petition for conditional release is conducted by the court, without a jury. 725 ILCS 207/60(d) (West 2008). In this case, the trial court based its order denying Cain a trial solely upon its assessment of the experts\u2019 reports. Those reports reached opposite conclusions; therefore, faced with conflicting written opinions of experts, the trial court simply chose one expert\u2019s opinion over the other. This procedure denied Cain the opportunity to have the factual issues raised by the conflicting opinions of experts on his petition for discharge decided by a jury.\nIn its order, the trial court stated that it had discussed with the attorneys the issue of how to avoid an evidentiary hearing when \u201cthere are two psychological evaluations which reach opposite conclusions.\u201d The court noted that it had reflected on the matter and had determined as follows:\n\u201c[T]he mere existence of two conflicting reports does not mandate an evidentiary hearing. The trial court must have the discretion to weigh the credibility of both written reports in deciding the issue of probable cause, before ruling that the Respondent is entitled to an evidentiary hearing ***.\u201d\nA review of the record shows that numerous questions of fact raised by the pleadings and reports remain unresolved by the trial court. For example, Cain filed a petition requesting that he be discharged from custody or conditionally released, in part alleging that the State\u2019s expert evaluator had failed to follow the mandatory statutory standards. See 725 ILCS 207/55 (West 2008). Cain also alleged that, since his initial commitment, the State\u2019s evaluators had failed to consider advances in the field of the psychology of sexual offenders, making their opinions less than reliable. These pleadings raise questions of fact about the reliability of the State\u2019s past and present evaluations.\nIn his report, Cain\u2019s evaluator explained what he believed to be problems with the reliability of some of the psychological testing conducted by the State\u2019s evaluator. The trial court dismissed those concerns because the Illinois Supreme Court, in 2004, found that those tests had been generally accepted within the scientific community and that their admission did not require a Frye hearing (Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523, 535 (2004). That decision, however, only renders the tests admissible, and the trial court did not comment on Cain\u2019s expert\u2019s specific concerns about the reliability of those tests as applied to Cain. Even if the testing relied upon by the State\u2019s evaluator is so widely accepted that no Frye hearing is required, without the experts\u2019 testimony, the trial court had no basis for understanding how and to what extent the test results formed the basis of the expert\u2019s opinion.\nIn addition to the facts recited by the majority, Cain\u2019s expert noted that Cain had dropped out of treatment twice due to the \u201charsh confrontational tactics\u201d of the treatment providers. Cain\u2019s evaluator found \u201cno evidence of general significant psychopathy\u201d or any evidence of \u201cdeviant sexual attitude or interests.\u201d Cain\u2019s evaluator acknowledged that Cain had made \u201caberrant\u201d remarks that concerned him because those attitudes could permit Cain to rationalize sexual misconduct with children, but the evaluator found that Cain \u201cdid not reflect an ongoing desire to partake in sexual contact with minors.\u201d Contrary to the findings of the State\u2019s expert, Cain\u2019s expert found that Cain\u2019s earlier diagnosis of pedophilia either had been resolved or was in remission. He found that Cain was sexually impotent and had cardiovascular disease, high blood pressure, and back pain. He determined that Cain\u2019s \u201cestimated sexual reoffense risk categorization\u201d was \u201clow.\u201d He noted that those in Cain\u2019s age group, older than 70, had a \u201creoffense likelihood hovering around zero %\u201d and that, as a result, whether or not Cain completed treatment \u201cwould appear to be moot.\u201d These findings raise issues of fact concerning what level and type of treatment, if any, Cain requires and whether he continues to be a threat to society.\nThe pleadings and written reports of the two evaluators raised numerous questions of fact. In order to resolve those questions of fact, the trial court had to make determinations about which expert\u2019s opinion was entitled to greater weight. Even though this court has endorsed that very process in Cain\u2019s past appeals, I disagree with those decisions. Since Cain\u2019s initial commitment in 1999, the trial court has denied Cain\u2019s requests to be discharged or conditionally released at least eight times, five times without a trial of any type. This is not the first time that the trial court has denied Cain a trial when an appointed expert reached the conclusion opposite to that of the State\u2019s expert. On prior occasions, an expert other than the one appointed to examine Cain in this proceeding has determined that he should be discharged. The State\u2019s expert has repeatedly opined that his imprisonment should continue. If the opinion of a qualified expert that Cain should be discharged from confinement is insufficient probable cause to allow a trial where a trier of fact determines the ultimate issue, then what must he do to establish probable cause? Must he have the opinions of two experts to overcome the opinion of the State\u2019s expert at the probable cause hearing?\nThe procedure affirmed by the majority is contrary to the rules of evidence and is not supported by the plain words of the Act. It is contrary to the rules of evidence because it requires a trial judge to do the impossible \u2014 make credibility and reliability determinations based upon the content of written reports of experts without any testimony from the authors. It is not supported by the plain words of the Act because the plain meaning of a probable cause hearing is to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that a detainee should be discharged or conditionally released. If such grounds exist, the detainee is entitled to a trial where a trier of fact weighs the credibility of witnesses, not reports, and determines the ultimate issue. Surely, the written opinion of a qualified expert that a detainee should be discharged meets the probable cause standard.\nI am convinced that, in this case, the trial court abused its discretion, and its order denying Cain a trial to determine whether he should be discharged or conditionally released should be reversed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE STEWART," } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas E. Doyle, of Taylorville, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Stephen M. Soltanzadeh, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re DETENTION OF HARRY CAIN (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Harry Cain, Respondent-Appellant).\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201409\u20140019\nOpinion filed June 25, 2010.\nSTEWART, J., dissenting.\nThomas E. Doyle, of Taylorville, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Stephen M. Soltanzadeh, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0390-01", "first_page_order": 408, "last_page_order": 418 }