{ "id": 5767666, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CYNTHIA FARIA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Faria", "decision_date": "2010-06-22", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20140131", "first_page": "475", "last_page": "484", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "402 Ill. App. 3d 475" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25383 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2568462 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 853", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9689 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862-65" }, { "page": "600-02" }, { "page": "2555-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302616 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" }, { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442059 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ill. App. 3d 1048", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2851293 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1051" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/1048-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5361214 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336132 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544405 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411646 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" }, { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602986 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615113 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360433 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122017 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625059 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175", "parenthetical": "a defendant forfeits review of errors unless she makes an objection during trial and raises the issue in a posttrial motion" }, { "page": "178-79" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 900, "char_count": 20982, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.408767690195799e-08, "percentile": 0.2766304135878192 }, "sha256": "c1fff52102f31f7f66478cd44dfc4b559ab9b25217cbf9390c1de63425c02ab0", "simhash": "1:0a6be4377f00892c", "word_count": 3511 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:34.233681+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CYNTHIA FARIA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Cynthia Faria was found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 103(a)(1) (West 2008)) and was sentenced to a term of six years\u2019 imprisonment, to be followed by a two-year period of mandatory supervised release. On appeal, defendant contends she was denied the right to a fair trial because the trial court: (1) limited defense counsel\u2019s ability to cross-examine the State\u2019s witnesses and advocated for the State by taking over the cross-examination of the State\u2019s witnesses; (2) demonstrated bias against defense counsel that evidenced a prejudgment of defendant\u2019s guilt; and (3) denied her right to making a closing argument by interrupting and challenging defense counsel\u2019s remarks. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nThe record indicates that on January 14, 2008, at about 5:30 a.m., the victim\u2019s car, a black 1989 BMV^ was stolen. The victim, Rocio Escamilla Cruz, spoke only limited English and testified through an interpreter. Cruz stated that she had just parked her car outside a bakery located in Chicago and had left the car running while she went inside. She also left her purse in the car. As Cruz entered the bakery, she saw a man and a woman standing on the sidewalk. When she exited the bakery, her car was missing and the man and woman were gone. Later that day, she and a friend drove around looking for her car and saw it parked with two individuals inside. Cruz called 9-1-1 and flagged down a sheriff\u2019s car that happened to be passing by. Deputy Sheriff Ernesto Leon testified that he approached Cruz\u2019s car and detained defendant as defendant exited the car. Chicago police officers also responded to the scene and arrested defendant. Cruz\u2019s identification card and car keys were found in defendant\u2019s coat pocket. Cruz identified defendant as the woman she had seen in front of the bakery that morning. Chicago police officer Susana Lacasa testified that after defendant was arrested and given Miranda warnings, she asked defendant if defendant knew the car was stolen. Defendant told her, \u201cYes, I knew but was \u2014 was not me the one who took the car from the bakery. It was my friend Eric. I was with him but I knew the car was stolen.\u201d When the officer asked defendant if she knew that the car\u2019s radio was missing, defendant replied, \u201cYeah. Eric took it. Eric took the radio to sell it, to sell it in [sic] the west side of Chicago.\u201d After the close of evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty. Defendant now appeals.\nOn appeal, defendant raises several issues regarding the propriety of the trial court\u2019s comments and interjections during pretrial and trial proceedings. She maintains that because of the court\u2019s actions she was denied the right to a fair trial. Initially, we note that defense counsel neither objected to the court\u2019s actions, neither at trial nor in a posttrial motion. Therefore, defendant\u2019s contentions are forfeited. See People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 175 (2005) (a defendant forfeits review of errors unless she makes an objection during trial and raises the issue in a posttrial motion).\nDefendant asks this court to review her claim for two different reasons. First, she argues that we should relax the forfeiture rule because the error concerns the trial court\u2019s conduct. Second, she argues we should consider the error under the second prong of the plain error exception because the error was so serious she was denied a fair trial.\nOur supreme court has recently discussed forfeiture and the plain error doctrine in People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478 (2009). In McLaurin, the court first noted that the application of the forfeiture rule is less rigid where the basis for the objection is the trial judge\u2019s conduct, citing to People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 161 (1998), and People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398 (1963). However, courts generally only relax application of the forfeiture rule in the \u201cmost compelling of situations,\u201d such as when a trial judge makes inappropriate remarks to the jury or in cases involving capital punishment. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 488. In McLaurin, the court determined that the defendant had not presented an extraordinary or compelling reason to relax the forfeiture rule because the defendant did not claim \u201cthat the trial court overstepped its authority in the presence of the jury\u201d or that counsel\u2019s objection to the trial court\u2019s conduct \u201c \u2018would have fallen on deaf ears.\u2019 \u201d McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 488.\nHere, as in McLaurin, defendant has not established that an extraordinary or compelling reason exists to relax application of the forfeiture rule. First, defendant\u2019s trial was a bench trial and not a jury trial. Therefore, there was no jury to hear or be influenced by the court\u2019s remarks. Had this been a jury trial, we may well have reached a different decision. Second, the record does not show that defendant\u2019s objections would have fallen on deaf ears. The trial court neither acted in defense counsel\u2019s absence nor prevented defense counsel from making an objection. We decline to relax the forfeiture rule in this case.\nWe next examine defendant\u2019s contentions pursuant to the plain error doctrine. Plain error applies to a forfeited error affecting the substantial rights of a defendant when: (1) the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence; or (2) the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178-79. To establish the first prong of plain error, the defendant must show both that there was plain error and that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against him. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. To establish the second prong of plain error, defendant must establish that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. Defendant has the burden of persuasion of establishing plain error. People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593 (2008).\nWe first note that defendant would not be able to establish plain error under the first prong of the plain error analysis because the evidence was not closely balanced. The evidence presented at trial established that defendant was found sitting in the victim\u2019s car and made an inculpatory statement that she knew the car had been stolen. Needless to say, this was not a close case.\nWith respect to the second prong of plain error, we must first consider whether defendant established that a clear or obvious error occurred. Defendant first contends the trial court limited defense counsel\u2019s ability to cross-examine the State\u2019s witnesses and advocated for the State by taking over counsel\u2019s cross-examination. Specifically, defendant argues the court limited counsel\u2019s ability to cross-examine all three of the State\u2019s witnesses: Cruz, Deputy Sheriff Leon and Officer Lacasa.\nA defendant\u2019s right to cross-examine a witness concerning possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives is protected by both the federal and state constitutions. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 67 (1992). The right to confront adverse witnesses cannot be denied by the trial court, but the court is granted latitude in certain instances. People v. Nutall, 312 Ill. App. 3d 620, 627 (2000). For example, the court may interject to avoid repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation. Nutall, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 627. Furthermore, a trial court is justified in questioning witnesses when the court\u2019s purpose is to clarify issues. People v. Reiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d 102, 115 (1996). This flows in conjunction with the trial court\u2019s responsibility to achieve prompt and convenient dispatch of court proceedings. People v. Thigpen, 306 Ill. App. 3d 29, 40 (1999). Also, the trial court\u2019s latitude to question witnesses on material issues is enhanced in the context of a bench trial because the danger of prejudice to the defendant is lessened. People v. Palmer, 27 Ill. 2d 311, 314-15 (1963). However, the court must always remain impartial and cannot assume the role of an advocate. People v. Cofield, 9 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1051 (1973).\nDefendant points to numerous specific instances of the court interrupting his cross-examination of Cruz. We highlight a few of the instances below.\n\u201cMR. DOUGLASS [defense counsel]: When you rode by at that time, you couldn\u2019t see any faces in the car, correct?\nMS. CRUZ: The one to this side I could see.\nQ. What side?\nTHE COURT: What side of what?\nA. The left side.\nMR. DOUGLASS: What side of what?\nTHE COURT: Just, Ma\u2019am, because I can\u2019t stand the way you do this Mr. Douglass, it\u2019s going to make me scream. Ma\u2019am, you said you could see somebody in the car. What seat were they sitting in? The face you could see, what seat was the person sitting in?\u201d\nWhen defense counsel was attempting to impeach Cruz, the following colloquy occurred.\n\u201cMR. DOUGLASS: When you remember testifying\u2014\nTHE COURT: It\u2019s not when you remember testifying. Ask her the question and the answer that you\u2019re challenging.\nMR. DOUGLASS: Okay. Let me ask this question first, Judge.\nQ. Do you remember when you spoke in court that in court did you raise your hand to take an oath and swear to tell the truth?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Just like you did today, right?\nTHE COURT: She doesn\u2019t have to go over that. She said she rose her hand.\nMR. DOUGLASS: I\u2019ll move on.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Douglass, you just waste time and it\u2019s unbelievable.\nMR. DOUGLASS: Judge, I don\u2019t think that answer is responsive to my question. I\u2019d ask that the court ask her to answer my question.\nTHE COURT: I don\u2019t think she understands because it\u2019s a language problem and you\u2019re not trying to make it easier. Ma\u2019am\u2014 MR. DOUGLASS: Judge, you want to see the transcript?\nTHE COURT: I don\u2019t need to see it. I need to ask the question\u2014 MR. DOUGLASS: Okay.\nTHE COURT: \u2014of somebody who speaks a different language as you know she does. Ma\u2019am, he\u2019s not asking you what you saw at the time. He\u2019s asking you when you testified, when somebody posed a question to you, did you answer it the way that he is saying you answered it. And the question is were you asked \u2018and you didn\u2019t see anyone\u2019s faces then, did you\u2019 and your answer was \u2018no.\u2019 Is that what you said?\nA. Yes.\nTHE COURT: Okay. You can go on.\u201d\nDefendant also cites to several pages of the record in which the trial court made various interjections when defense counsel was cross-examining Deputy Sheriff Leon and Officer Lacasa. For example, during Deputy Sheriff Leon\u2019s cross-examination, when defense counsel misstated Deputy Sheriff Leon\u2019s testimony, the court interrupted counsel stating, \u201c[w]ell, don\u2019t say something he hasn\u2019t said. I\u2019m listening. I can\u2019t stand it.\u201d\nAdditionally, during Officer Lacasa\u2019s cross-examination, the court interrupted defense counsel numerous times when his questions were repetitive. For example, the court stated, \u201c[n]o. We will not ask that again. You\u2019ve asked it now three times.\u201d The court later commented to counsel, \u201c[yjou\u2019re taking this inch by inch, step by step, second by second.\u201d Also, at the conclusion of Officer Lacasa\u2019s testimony, the court noted that the officer spoke with an \u201cexceedingly strong accent,\u201d did not quite speak in full sentences and it was clear that English was not her first language.\nHere, the record reflects that the trial court\u2019s numerous interjections of defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of the State\u2019s witnesses was for the purpose of clarification and moving the proceedings along. It was especially important to avoid confusion when Cruz and Officer Lacasa testified since Cruz was testifying through an interpreter and Officer Lacasa was not fully proficient in English. Also, it was important for the court to correct defense counsel\u2019s misstatement of Deputy Sheriff Leon\u2019s testimony. We do not find that the court limited defense counsel\u2019s ability to cross-examine the State\u2019s witnesses or that the court\u2019s actions rose to the level of becoming an advocate for the State.\nNext, defendant contends the trial court\u2019s bias toward defense counsel caused the court to prejudge defendant\u2019s guilt. Defendant points to the court\u2019s following pretrial remarks to counsel.\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Douglass, I am going to have your supervisor down here, because I\u2019m making a record. I think every case that you have had set for the last two months for trial, you have not had the witness here. They have not been served. I mean, it could not continually be somebody else\u2019s error. Just five minutes ago, I had a case here with seven witnesses.\nMR. DOUGLASS: Judge, I\u2019m not denying that.\nTHE COURT: Now on this one, you say seven days before trial, well, first you shouldn\u2019t be issuing a subpoena seven days before trial. This case was set May 15th for trial. You had 50 days or so to subpoena the witness. You don\u2019t wait seven days before trial to subpoena a witness and not follow through on it. I am not tolerating this any longer. You all can step away. I need a supervisor.\n# %\nAnd it\u2019s not the investigator\u2019s fault, it\u2019s Mr. Douglass, for giving the investigator a request seven days before jury trial is set when he had a month and a half to do so.\u201d\nAs a result, the court had to postpone the trial until the next day in an attempt to allow defense counsel to bring in the witness to testify in defendant\u2019s defense. Ultimately, however, the witness was unavailable and did not testify.\nDefendant also points to the court\u2019s numerous remarks to defense counsel throughout trial as evidence of the court\u2019s bias.\n\u201cMR. DOUGLASS: That person you\u2019ve just described and the woman you just described\u2014\nTHE COURT: She didn\u2019t describe a woman. She just described a man.\nMR. DOUGLASS: I\u2019m sorry. You\u2019re right, Judge.\nTHE COURT: I know. And don\u2019t even start. Don\u2019t do that.\nMR. DOUGLASS: Okay.\nTHE COURT: Okay. There\u2019s a language problem clearly so don\u2019t try to confuse by putting different things together. Don\u2019t do that.\u201d\nDefendant also notes the court\u2019s following remarks at trial, \u201c[y]ou may not make a novel out of a question\u201d; \u201c[yjou\u2019re taking forever to ask a simple question\u201d; \u201c[yjou\u2019re just redundant\u201d; and \u201cdon\u2019t go over these useless questions.\u201d\nDefendant next points to the court\u2019s interruptions of defense counsel\u2019s closing argument as further evidence of the court\u2019s prejudgment of defendant\u2019s guilt. Defense counsel was pointing out discrepancies in the State\u2019s witnesses\u2019 testimony, commenting that it did not make sense, when the court responded, \u201cit does to me.\u201d\nDefendant also refers to the following colloquy.\n\u201cMR DOUGLASS: And I\u2019ll finish. We believe that there is reasonable doubt, that the State has not met their burden on each and every element of this case. We ask that you find [defendant] not guilty of this crime.\nTHE COURT: Okay. I would normally let you argue, [defense counsel], but I can\u2019t stand it so I have to actually go on. The State does not have to prove the plate number. The State does not have to prove the VIN number. The State has to prove that the defendant possessed a car knowing that it was stolen. They have proved that she possessed a car knowing that it was stolen.\u201d\nA trial judge is presumed to be impartial, and the burden of overcoming this presumption rests on the party making the charge of prejudice. Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 280 (2002). Allegations of judicial bias or prejudice must be viewed in context and should be evaluated in terms of the trial judge\u2019s specific reaction to the events taking place. People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247, 277 (2001). A judge\u2019s display of displeasure or irritation with an attorney\u2019s behavior is not necessarily evidence of judicial bias against the defendant or his counsel. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d at 277.\nHere, when the trial court\u2019s comments are viewed within the context they were made, they do not evidence a bias or prejudice against defense counsel. If anything, they show the trial court\u2019s impatience with defense counsel\u2019s lack of preparedness for trial regarding the subpoena, the court\u2019s attempt to correct defense counsel\u2019s misstatement of the evidence and the court\u2019s attempt to move the proceedings along when counsel asked redundant or unclear questions. This showing of impatience, with nothing more, does not lead this court to conclude that the trial court was biased against defense counsel or defendant. Perhaps the court could have shown a touch more patience when dealing with defense counsel; however, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial and not a perfect trial. Defendant\u2019s trial may not have been perfect, but it was fair. Therefore, we find that defendant has not overcome her burden of challenging the court\u2019s presumption of impartiality.\nLastly, defendant contends she was denied the right to a fair trial when the trial court limited defense counsel\u2019s closing argument by interrupting and challenging counsel\u2019s remarks.\nSpecifically, the trial court challenged defense counsel\u2019s argument that it did not make sense that Deputy Sheriff Leon would turn over defendant\u2019s arrest to the Chicago police department rather than make the arrest himself. The court commented that it made sense to her because in her experience it was rare that a sheriff made an arrest when the Chicago police department was also involved. Defense counsel further argued that the State had not proven defendant guilty because the State failed to prove that the vehicle identification number (VIN) from the recovered car matched the victim\u2019s car. The court commented both before and after counsel concluded his argument that the State did not have to prove the VIN and the victim\u2019s testimony that the recovered car was her car was sufficient. Defense counsel concluded his closing argument by stating that the State had not proven defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nA defendant has a constitutional right to present a closing argument. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593, 95 S. Ct. 2550 (1975). However, the trial court has broad discretion in regards to limiting the argument. Herring, 422 U.S. at 862-65, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 600-02, 95 S. Ct. at 2555-57. Although the closing argument is not evidence, the trial court has a duty to be attentive, patient, and impartial. People v. Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d 153, 157 (1990).\nHere, defense counsel presented a full closing argument to the court. Although his remarks were challenged by the court, he was permitted to argue his theory of the case to the court. He was neither given a time limit nor pressured by the court to finish prematurely. Counsel finished his argument by stating that the State had not proven each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and asked the court to find defendant not guilty.\nWe are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d 102 (1996), and People v. Stevens, 338 Ill. App. 3d 806 (2003). In Heiman, the cause was reversed and remanded for a new trial because the court made \u201cexcessive and exaggerated derogatory\u201d comments about the defendant during closing argument as well as negative comments about a defense witness prior to and after the witness\u2019s cross-examination. Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 112. This court found on appeal that the trial court\u2019s 40 to 50 interruptions and arguments with defense counsel during closing argument indicated that the trial court had already decided the case and was not interested in any argument from the defense. Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 112. In Stevens, the trial court repeatedly interrupted defense counsel, exhibited impatience by telling counsel he had two minutes left to argue and then immediately telling counsel he had overrun his time, and showed a prejudgment of the case by remarking before counsel concluded that the court was convinced the State had proven the defendant guilty. Stevens, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 810. Unlike in Heiman and Stevens, the trial court here did not make derogatory comments about defendant, did not cut short defense counsel\u2019s argument with a time limitation and did not show a prejudgment of the case before counsel concluded his argument.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find that no clear or obvious error occurred. Therefore, defendant has failed to meet her burden of establishing plain error. Defendant\u2019s claims are forfeited.\nAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nHOFFMAN and THEIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Andrea D. Lyon and Frank Cesarone, both of DePaul University Legal Clinic, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Tasha-Marie Kelly, and Jacqueline James, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CYNTHIA FARIA, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20140131\nOpinion filed June 22, 2010.\nAndrea D. Lyon and Frank Cesarone, both of DePaul University Legal Clinic, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Tasha-Marie Kelly, and Jacqueline James, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0475-01", "first_page_order": 493, "last_page_order": 502 }