{ "id": 5768663, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VONDRAE EDWARD (a/k/a Edward Vondrae), Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Edward", "decision_date": "2010-06-11", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201408\u20142607", "first_page": "555", "last_page": "566", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "402 Ill. App. 3d 555" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "920 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242-43" }, { "page": "243" }, { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625396 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "919 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625248 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "860 N.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604853 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 544", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185389 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "1877" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "898 N.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3617207 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" }, { "page": "909" }, { "page": "1883" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "784 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799408 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "876 N.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272783 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "820 N.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448182 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "845 N.E.2d 962", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "969" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263498 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060013 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" }, { "page": "268-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "857 N.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "195" }, { "page": "196" }, { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602037 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" }, { "page": "544" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 690", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746351 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "1663" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "1663" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0690-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1300, "char_count": 28238, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.16984658178913134 }, "sha256": "a48f876ac323f4f6cd8bcf82cbbdcc8050ce994157e3b00a46985286e8c5383d", "simhash": "1:a081408236730467", "word_count": 4571 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:34.233681+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VONDRAE EDWARD (a/k/a Edward Vondrae), Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE TOOMIN\ndelivered the opinion of the\ncourt:\nIn this case we determine, inter alia, whether a defendant who has been lawfully seized has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a city-owned garbage can in his possession. Following a bench trial, defendant, Vondrae Edward, was convicted of burglary and sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. He appeals, contending: (1) the trial court erred by failing to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence contained in the garbage can he possessed; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant was charged by indictment with the burglary of A.C. Bailers, a retail store, and theft of personal property belonging to the owner. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized contemporaneously with his warrantless arrest, allegedly made without probable cause. Notably, the only information contained in the motion relative to defendant\u2019s case was the date and location of his arrest. The remaining allegations of the motion consisted of boilerplate language and offer little insight into the factual basis underlying defendant\u2019s motion.\nAt the hearing on the suppression motion, Officer Salgado testified that during the early morning hours of June 15, 2007, he was on routine patrol with his partner, Officer Otero, in a marked squad car. At about 2:30 a.m., they were in the vicinity of 16th Street and South Pulaski Road in Chicago. The officers were driving down Harding Street, one block east of Pulaski, when they observed defendant walking on the east sidewalk with two men. Defendant and a man named Joseph Ellis each had a hand on a City of Chicago garbage can and were pulling it down the sidewalk. Salgado described that block of Harding as a residential street. The officers had not received any calls concerning thefts or burglaries nor had they heard any alarms sounding in the area.\nThe officer explained, \u201cJust based on my training, I see three individuals pulling [a] City of Chicago garbage can, I thought it was suspicious so we stopped, exited the vehicle. We approached to conduct a field interview.\u201d Officer Salgado called defendant over to the squad car. In response, the three men separated and \u201cpretended like they didn\u2019t know each other.\u201d The men began to walk away. In turn, Officer Salgado called to defendant again in a louder voice, asking him to approach the vehicle. As Salgado began to walk toward the three men, they complied with the request and approached the officers. Initially, he asked what they were doing but received no response because \u201cthey were arguing that they didn\u2019t know each other.\u201d The men were then taken to Officer Salgado\u2019s vehicle, where Salgado \u201cdetained\u201d them up against the vehicle as his partner checked the contents of the garbage can. Salgado testified that he did not have a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest and did not see him violating any laws.\nUpon inspection of the garbage can, Officer Otero discovered clothing, with retail tags affixed. The officers called for assistance and were joined by Sergeant Graff. After being apprised of the situation, the sergeant recalled that a clothing store had recently opened nearby. Graff proceeded to that location and checked the premises. In doing so, he discovered a hole above the rear door of the store, suggesting a forced entry. Officers Salgado and Otero then conducted protective pat-downs of defendant and the other two men and transported them to the store, located approximately one block west at 1552 South Pulaski. The men were not free to leave while the officers investigated the source of the clothing. Thereafter, the owner of the store, Charles Coleman, arrived on the scene. He identified the items recovered from the garbage can as clothing sold in his store. In turn, the men were placed under arrest, separated, and removed to the police station for processing.\nOn questioning by the trial court, the officer explained how he knew the rolling can belonged to the City: \u201cIt\u2019s a brown garbage can everybody has behind their house, the one that [has] the wheels with the brown lid, serial number with the City of Chicago written on it, property of.\u201d Moreover, it was consistent with the other cans in the area and those distributed by the Department of Streets and Sanitation. Although the can contained a serial number, the officers were unable to determine its precise origin. Additionally, efforts to contact the Department of Streets and Sanitation were unavailing.\nAfter hearing argument, the trial court determined that given the circumstances, the officers were justified in stopping the men, \u201cIf for no other reason than community care-taking responsibility of the police. It\u2019s totally reasonable for them to stop and ask what was going on.\u201d Moreover, the court found the defendant and his associates lacked standing to contest the officer\u2019s inspection of the contents of the can. The judge reasoned, \u201cPeople put things in garbage cans, relinquish their possession. Because they are going to the city and streets and sanitation [sic] and ultimately to the garbage dump, so it\u2019s reasonable for the police to stop and investigate.\u201d Furthermore, on discovering the items, which appeared brand new and still had the tags attached to them, the court found that the police acted reasonably in detaining the men \u201cfor a short period of time to determine whether a crime has been committed.\u201d Lastly, the court observed that probable cause to arrest existed once a link was established between the clothing in the can and the forced entry to the store. Therefore, the trial court denied the motion and the matter proceeded to a bench trial.\nOfficer Salgado\u2019s trial testimony mirrored what he had related on the motion to suppress. Additionally, Salgado acknowledged that his report did not indicate the men dispersed when the officers approached. According to Salgado, no burglary tools were recovered from defendant. The officers found more than 12 \u201cnew clothing items, shirts, jeans, shorts, plastic wrapping on some of the clothes with tags, retail tags on them.\u201d After noting the serial number on the can, they placed the clothing into their squad car. The can itself was left adjacent to the sidewalk on Harding because of the \u201cmaggots and other types of bugs\u201d inside the receptacle.\nSalgado further testified that the owner of A.C. Bailers, Mr. Coleman, was notified of the incident and came to the store. Salgado indicated that it appeared \u201csomebody kicked the wood that was above the door.\u201d Prior to encountering defendant and the other two men, the officers had not received any calls regarding a burglary in progress. Likewise, when they arrived at A.C. Bailers, no alarm was sounding. According to Salgado, an evidence technician was called to the scene. However, he did not know whether any prints were, in fact, recovered.\nDetective Kevin Carney, a 22-year veteran of the Chicago police department, testified that he was assigned to investigate the alleged burglary of the A.C. Bailers retail store. Carney, accompanied by his partners, Detectives Xanos and Lopez, interviewed defendant in a lockup at the 10th district police station. After being advised of his Miranda warnings and acknowledging his understanding, defendant chose to make a statement, which lasted 20 to 30 minutes. Carney had previously spoken to the other two men accused of the burglary.\nDefendant did not sign a waiver of his Miranda rights and his statement was not memorialized by audiotape, videotape, court reporter, or handwritten statement. Detective Carney claimed he took notes during the conversation. When asked if those notes were given to the prosecutor, Carney explained, \u201cWhat we do, we complete a file and the file is held in Area 4. And later the prosecutor would get that file.\u201d When he was shown a handwritten summary of defendant\u2019s statement, Carney denied that he prepared it. However, Carney stated, \u201cAny notes I do would be on a general offense progress note. That report is put in a file, and that report is stayed [sic] or kept in Area 4.\u201d Defense counsel then asserted that no such notes were tendered in response to the motion for discovery. The trial court instructed the parties to resolve that matter before the next court date.\nAccording to Carney, defendant claimed he did not enter the store. Defendant explained that Ellis forced open the hole above the door, which was previously covered by a board. Ellis and \u201cRockmore\u201d entered the store while defendant waited outside. Defendant\u2019s associates grabbed clothing from inside the store and threw the items to defendant through the hole above the door. The men then put the clothes into the garbage can. They planned to sell the stolen merchandise for money. According to Detective Carney, the plan to rob the store was conceived earlier that evening when the group met near 16th and Komensky. Carney was aware that an evidence technician was sent to the scene. However, he and his partners did not request fingerprinting and he did not know whether the scene was processed.\nCharles Coleman testified that he is the owner of A.C. Bailers clothing store. During the early morning hours of June 15, 2007, he received a call from the police. In turn, he went to his store and inspected the premises. He noticed that someone had \u201cknocked a hole through the wall\u201d above the store\u2019s rear door. Inside the store, he observed the damage to the drywall above the door. When asked to view the clothing in the trunk of a police car, Coleman identified the items as belonging to his store. He further described where the items were located in his store before they were taken. While the store was equipped with a burglar alarm, it may have malfunctioned, as it did not work from time to time.\nFollowing the close of the State\u2019s case, the judge inquired about resolving the discovery issue brought out during Detective Carney\u2019s testimony. According to the prosecutor, the detective contacted Area 4, but was unable to locate the case file. The prosecutor further stated that everything in the State\u2019s possession was tendered to the defense. In an effort to resolve the situation, the detective was brought back to the stand. On questioning by the trial judge, Detective Carney stated, \u201cAt the time I thought I did write \u2014 I know I did write some GPR\u2019s. I thought I did write some GPR\u2019s regarding the interview.\u201d However, he had not seen them since that time. Consequently, the trial court ordered him to return to Area 4 and search for his notes. Following a continuance, the prosecutor informed the court that Detective Carney was unable to locate any additional notes. The State then rested.\nDefendant\u2019s motion for directed finding was denied. Thereafter, the defense rested without offering any evidence. Following closing argument, defendant was found guilty of burglary. However, in the absence of proof of the value of merchandise, he was acquitted of the theft charge. Defendant was then sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. He now appeals.\nDefendant frames his claim of error concerning his motion to suppress as follows:\n\u201cWhere the police stopped [defendant] without reasonable suspicion, and then immediately detained and searched him and his container without having fear of danger and without probable cause, the evidence obtained as a result of this action was illegal and should have been suppressed.\u201d\nDefendant maintains the encounter was initiated solely based upon Officer Salgado\u2019s \u201cvague statement that he thought the activity looked suspicious.\u201d Moreover, defendant contends the error was compounded by his detention and the subsequent search of the garbage can without probable cause. According to defendant, the trash can was an object \u201cin which he had a legitimate expectation of privacy.\u201d\nWe review rulings on motions to suppress in accordance with the two-part standard articulated in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 920, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996), whereby findings of historical fact are viewed for clear error and we afford due weight to any inferences drawn therefrom by the trial court and the ultimate legal ruling concerning suppression is reviewed de novo. Great deference is afforded to factual findings which will not be reversed unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542, 857 N.E.2d 187, 195 (2006). \u201cThis deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the circuit court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses\u2019 demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony.\u201d People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 268, 830 N.E.2d 541, 548 (2005). A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. People v. Beverly, 364 Ill. App. 3d 361, 368, 845 N.E.2d 962, 969 (2006). Nevertheless, we as a reviewing court are free to assess the facts along with the issues raised in order to draw conclusions when determining appropriate relief. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542, 857 N.E.2d at 195.\nIn the present case, defendant concedes the facts as adduced at the hearing, where he states, \u201c[Defendant] assumes the truth of the testimony of the State\u2019s witness, and only questions whether such testimony shows that the police complied with the Fourth Amendment.\u201d Consequently, our review is properly de novo. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 116 S. Ct. at 1663.\nThe fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a76) protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. See People v. Rosenberg, 213 Ill. 2d 69, 77, 820 N.E.2d 440, 446 (2004). As our supreme court observed in Jones:\n\u201cThe central requirement of the fourth amendment is reasonableness. [Citation.] The touchstone of a fourth amendment analysis \u2018is always \u201cthe reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen\u2019s personal security.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.] Indeed, the \u2018essential purpose\u2019 of the fourth amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement officers, to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. [Citation.] To enforce the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness, the United States Supreme Court \u2018has interpreted the Amendment as establishing rules and presumptions designed to control conduct of law enforcement officers that may significantly intrude upon privacy interests.\u2019 [Citation.] ***\n*** [\u2018]When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable.\u2019 [Citation.] Thus, the reasonableness of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its promotion of legitimate governmental interests against its intrusion on fourth amendment interests, i.e., the individual\u2019s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement officers. [Citations.]\u201d Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 268-70, 830 N.E.2d at 548-49.\nIt is well settled that the facts underlying a claim of reasonable suspicion need not rise to the level of probable cause and do not require an officer to actually witness a violation. People v. Richardson, 376 Ill. App. 3d 612, 625, 876 N.E.2d 303, 314 (2007). Yet, a \u201cTerry investigative detention cannot be justified *** on the basis of \u2018unparticularized suspicion\u2019 or on a \u2018hunch.\u2019 \u201d People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 181, 784 N.E.2d 799, 808-09 (2003), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (1968). Notably, section 107 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides that: \u201cA peace officer *** may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person is committing, is about to commit or has committed an offense ***.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/107 \u2014 14 (West 2006).\nManifestly, every interaction between a private citizen and a police officer neither constitutes nor results in a seizure. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 544, 857 N.E.2d at 196. Instead, \u201cA person is seized when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, the person\u2019s freedom of movement is restrained.\u201d People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 273, 898 N.E.2d 603, 611 (2008), citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). Informed precedent has created a three-tiered structure for evaluating encounters between the police and private citizens, as follows:\n\u201c(1) arrests, which must be supported by probable cause; (2) brief investigative detentions, or \u2018Terry stops,\u2019 which must be supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) encounters that involve no coercion or detention and thus do not implicate fourth amendment interests.\u201d Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 544, 857 N.E.2d at 196.\nIn the present case, defendant\u2019s argument is focused on the inception of the encounter between the police officers and defendant\u2019s triumvirate. The trial court determined that the officers were justified in making the stop, at the very least, by their role as community caretakers. We perceive significantly greater justification than the trial judge allowed. In determining the reasonableness of the encounter we must assess the totality of the circumstances at the time of the event. Here, the interaction commenced around 2:30 a.m., as the officers observed three men walking down a residential street. Two of the three men were collaborating in the pulling of a wheeled City of Chicago garbage can down the sidewalk. The scene is one that would objectively give rise to a suspicion sufficient to meet the requirement of reasonableness. See 725 ILCS 5/107 \u2014 14 (West 2006). Officer Salgado justified the decision to stop the men, in part, upon his training. While the officer denied having observed any criminal activity, we are not bound by his analysis or determination. Rather, a review of the Chicago Municipal Code is instructive:\n\u201cIt shall be unlawful for any person other than a city refuse collector or a private scavenger licensed by the city, to remove, displace, uncover, or otherwise disturb, any refuse container or the contents thereof when placed on location, as provided for in Section 7 \u2014 28\u2014230.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a77 \u2014 28\u2014280 (1990).\nIn the absence of any suggestion that defendant and his cohorts were \u201ccity refuse collectors\u201d or \u201cprivate scavenger[s] licensed by the city,\u201d the circumstances were manifestly sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion given Officer Salgado\u2019s observations.\nIn reaching this conclusion, we reject defendant\u2019s attempt to characterize the circumstances, as they presented themselves to Salgado and Otero, as embracing \u201ca very large category of presumably innocent travelers. Individuals often transport trash cans in the course of everyday activities.\u201d The innocence of the travelers is not the issue. This was not \u201ctrash day.\u201d Instead, the question is whether the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop defendant and his associates. We conclude that they did.\nDefendant\u2019s contentions progress a step further in his assertion that the police officers, even if they had a reasonable suspicion to effect a stop, violated the fourth amendment by searching the receptacle in their possession. The question in this regard thus refines itself to whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the can or its contents. See People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 230, 860 N.E.2d 178, 210 (2006). We discern that defendant enjoyed no such expectation. The evidence, which was not controverted and the truthfulness of which has been stipulated on appeal, clearly established that the can was the property of the City of Chicago. Section 7 \u2014 28\u2014 210(a) of the Chicago Municipal Code provides:\n\u201c(a) Standard refuse container. The standard refuse container required by this chapter shall be a receptacle of impervious material and sturdy construction, with a tight fitting cover, and shall be provided by the department of streets and sanitation.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a77 \u2014 28\u2014210(a) (1990).\nHere, to be sure, absent any proof that defendant and his associates were in the business of garbage collection, it was unlawful for them to have moved the container from its location or staked any claim to its contents. See Chicago Municipal Code \u00a77 \u2014 28\u2014280 (1990).\nDefendant similarly claims the evidence seized in this case should have been suppressed as \u201cfruit of the poisonous tree.\u201d Yet, this doctrine would have application only if there was an illegal search or seizure. Here, however, having concluded the initial encounter fell within permissible and constitutional boundaries on the part of the officers and that defendant had no standing to object to the search of the garbage can, we find this argument unavailing. Where there was no poison or taint injected into the encounter or the seizure, we fail to perceive how the evidence could be so characterized. Consequently, we find this argument to be of dubious merit.\nHaving carefully considered the record in this case, we find the trial court did not err in its ruling denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The facts and circumstances surrounding the officers\u2019 initial observations gave rise to entirely reasonable concerns, entitling them initially to approach and then stop the three men. Moreover, the subsequent discovery of the clothing inside the garbage can, coupled with the investigation at A.C. Bailers, escalated the encounter to the level of probable cause supporting a full custodial arrest. Furthermore, evidence lawfully seized by the officers was not subject to suppression inasmuch as none of the men were entitled to any reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the receptacle in their possession. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and the evidence recovered was properly admitted at trial.\nNext, defendant maintains the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of burglary. Defendant contends:\n\u201c[T]he State relied on two faulty pieces of evidence: (1) the presumption that [defendant] committed the burglary because he and two other men were pulling a garbage can that contained articles of clothing from the store; and (2) the testimony of Detective Carney that [defendant] told him that he participated in the burglary.\u201d\nAccordingly, defendant asserts his acts do not prove the burglary and that Carney\u2019s testimony was unworthy of belief.\nWhen considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, courts of review must consider whether, when viewing all the evidence adduced at trial in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find proof of the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. De Filippo, 235 Ill. 2d 377, 384-85, 919 N.E.2d 921, 925 (2009). Our task is not to retry defendant. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228, 920 N.E.2d 233, 242-43 (2009). \u201cRather, in a bench trial, it is for the trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom, and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.\u201d Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228, 920 N.E.2d at 243. We will not reverse a conviction on the basis of contradictory evidence or a defendant\u2019s claim that a witness is not credible. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228, 920 N.E.2d at 243.\nIn order to establish the offense of burglary, the State must prove the defendant: \u201cwithout authority *** knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building *** or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a) (West 2006). In the case sub judice, the State established that defendant did not have authority to enter or remain in the A.C. Bailers clothing store through the testimony of the store\u2019s owner, Charles Coleman. The State proved the entry into the store by virtue of the investigation of the premises coupled with the testimony of Coleman. The uncontroverted testimony of Detective Carney revealed that defendant admitted the entry into the store by his associates, which was sufficient to establish, at the very least, his accountability for that element of the offense. See 720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1 (West 2006) (\u201cA person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an offense if the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of another and he is legally accountable for such conduct as provided in section 5 \u2014 2, or both\u201d); 720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 2006) (\u201cA person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when: *** (c) Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense\u201d). Furthermore, defendant explained to Carney how he stood outside and received the merchandise as it was handed out of the store. Indeed, this evidence provides proof of the requisite intent to commit a felony or theft within the store, as well as defendant\u2019s participation in the crime. That the court found defendant not guilty of the theft count does not alter our analysis where all that is necessary to commit the offense of burglary is an intent to commit the offense and not the actual completion of the predicate offense. See 720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a) (West 2006).\nIn sum, the evidence gathered by the police from the scene of the initial stop, the store, and the interview with defendant was compelling. The absence of notes from defendant\u2019s statement, while troublesome, is certainly subject to innocent explanation. Likewise, Carney\u2019s inability to recall facts of the case over a year later does not compel a finding that his testimony was incredible. Given defendant\u2019s manner and mode of flight from the crime scene, the circumstances of this case are rather unique. Therefore, it is within the realm of human reason that an experienced police officer might remember particular facts about the case well beyond the end of the day. Regardless, there was no evidence presented to contradict any of the State\u2019s evidence. Despite any infirmities, real or imagined, in the State\u2019s case, we find the evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of the offense of burglary when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. There was ample proof and available inferences to sustain the trial court\u2019s finding of guilt.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nFITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, JJ., concur.\nThe caption utilized by the parties identifies defendant as \u201cVondrae Edward a/k/a Edward Vondrae. The Illinois Department of Corrections identifies him as \u201cEdward Vondrae.\u201d Defendant\u2019s signature on the jury waiver in the present case reflects his name as \u201cEdwards Vondray.\u201d When the confusion over his name arose at trial, defense counsel told the court his client\u2019s name was \u201cVondrae Edwards.\u201d The trial court, on its own motion, then corrected the indictment, charging \u201cEdward Vondrae,\u201d to reflect charges against \u201cVondrae Edwards,\u201d and including an \u201calso known as\u201d designation.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE TOOMIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, and Caroline E. Bourland, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan Spellberg, Matthew Connors, and Brian W Reidy, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VONDRAE EDWARD (a/k/a Edward Vondrae), Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201408\u20142607\nOpinion filed June 11, 2010.\nRehearing denied July 8, 2010.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, and Caroline E. Bourland, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan Spellberg, Matthew Connors, and Brian W Reidy, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0555-01", "first_page_order": 573, "last_page_order": 584 }