{ "id": 5768442, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY B. HOLMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Holman", "decision_date": "2010-06-10", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201408\u20140599", "first_page": "645", "last_page": "653", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "402 Ill. App. 3d 645" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599301 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624", "parenthetical": "noting that considerations of public policy should not lure courts away from a statute's clear language" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 252832 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415360 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4282288 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453249 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4298997 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80-81" }, { "page": "83" }, { "page": "82" }, { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/399/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609702 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637099 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 1069", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5468515 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1076-77", "parenthetical": "allowance of a chart summarizing the opinion testimony of an expert witness was an abuse of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/1069-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5657947 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684-85", "parenthetical": "disallowance of the use of overhead slides to accompany a defense witness's testimony was a proper exercise of the court's discretion because the evidence was cumulative" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783181 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435351 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264960 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906698 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 860", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267497 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "police officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of baggies of cocaine found on floor under bar table near defendant's feet, despite presence of 35 to 40 patrons in the bar" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0860-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20-21" }, { "page": "905-06" }, { "page": "1879-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980730 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0849-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29936 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623819 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706168 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602037 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0530-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 958, "char_count": 21082, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.16983422585641095 }, "sha256": "ae996a4b38334d570d9a9f717df24610d788044b672bc07b2f5d6c283cf46bd4", "simhash": "1:afafb42071ec9fe4", "word_count": 3523 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:34.233681+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY B. HOLMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Jerry B. Holman, was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c) (2) (West 2006)). He was sentenced to 14 years\u2019 imprisonment plus a 3-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence; (2) he was denied his right to due process when the trial court prohibited defense counsel from using demonstrative evidence during cross-examination; (3) the trial court erred in imposing a fee for reimbursement of court-appointed counsel; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to a three-year term of MSR where he was convicted of a Class 1 felony that carries only a two-year MSR term. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPrior to trial, defendant\u2019s attorney left the public defender\u2019s office but was granted leave to continue to represent defendant pro bono as private counsel. The succeeding assistant public defender was then allowed to withdraw as counsel. After a short exchange between the trial court and the attorneys present, the trial court assessed a public defender fee of $1,200.\nThe following evidence was adduced at trial. Waukegan police officer Joshua Amann testified that on September 15, 2007, he was patrolling a bike path in Waukegan that he described as an area having \u201ca lot of graffiti\u201d and \u201cactivity.\u201d At 9 p.m., Amann saw two men walking toward his parked squad car. One man, Donald Dagen, was carrying what Amann believed was a 40-ounce bottle of alcohol. The other man, defendant, was not carrying anything. Amann announced he was a police officer and turned on his squad car\u2019s spotlight. He ordered them loudly to \u201ccome here.\u201d Dagen put the bottle down near the bike path. Then he and defendant veered off the path and crouched behind some bushes. At this point, Amann could see only the tops of their heads. Amann called for backup and again ordered the two men to come over and talk to him. After \u201ca few seconds,\u201d defendant and Dagen emerged from the bushes and approached the squad car. Amann had them stand with their hands on the squad car until two other police officers arrived approximately a minute or two later. The officers then patted down both men. Amann testified that they did not find any weapons or contraband on either man.\nWhile the backup officers watched defendant, Amann searched the bushes in the area where he saw Dagen and defendant crouch down. He found a bag containing 20 individually wrapped \u201ccrack\u201d cocaine rocks sitting on a leaf that was growing underneath the bushes. Dagen and defendant were placed under arrest and handcuffed. They were transported to the police station in separate squad cars. Amann noticed defendant moving around in the backseat of his squad. He told defendant he always searched his car after transporting anyone. Amann testified that defendant replied that he was \u201cthrowing crack rocks in the back of [his] squad car.\u201d After defendant was brought into the station for booking, Amann searched the car while it was in the police garage and found 10 individually packaged crack rocks on the floor of the car.\nThree officers then conducted a \u201cstrip search\u201d of defendant and found seven individually wrapped \u201ccrack\u201d cocaine rocks in the elastic of his underwear.\nWaukegan police department Lieutenant Jon Oliver, the State\u2019s expert witness in narcotics, testified regarding the packaging and the weight of the packages of cocaine. During cross-examination of Oliver, defense counsel used a whiteboard to record Oliver\u2019s responses regarding factors that he routinely considered in determining whether a person possessed narcotics with the intent to sell them. Initially, the trial court allowed defense counsel to proceed over the State\u2019s objection to the use of the board. When defense counsel wrote \u201cfacts are better than assumptions\u201d on the board, the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection on the ground that the phrase was argumentative. The trial court allowed defense counsel to continue using the board to record a few more of Oliver\u2019s responses such as \u201ccell phone,\u201d \u201cmoney,\u201d and \u201cscales,\u201d until the State renewed its objection. After ruling that the use of the board unfairly highlighted the officer\u2019s testimony during his cross-examination and was unfairly prejudicial, the trial court told defense counsel that he could:\n\u201cmake a list of all the things the officer testifies to that are factors and those things that are not, and in his closing argument he is certainly entitled to produce an exhibit which reflects those items. But I find that in cross-examination, before the State has rested its proofs, and before we have even gotten to a defense case, [sic] that the effect of this exhibit is purely prejudicial.\u201d\nDefendant was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. 720 ILCS 5 70/401(c) (2) (West 2006).\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Denial of Motion to Suppress Evidence\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence because the cocaine was recovered as a result of his unconstitutional seizure. Courts of review apply a two-part standard of review when faced with a challenge to a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (2006). First, the trial court\u2019s findings of historical fact are reviewed only for clear error, and deference is afforded to any inferences the fact finder drew from those facts. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542. We will not disturb the trial court\u2019s factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542. \u201cA finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.\u201d People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). This deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the trial court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses\u2019 demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony. People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 251 (2009). However, the reviewing court is free to assess the facts in relation to the issues presented in the case and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542. We review de novo the trial court\u2019s ultimate legal ruling on the motion to suppress. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542.\nThe fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a76. A person is \u201cseized\u201d within the meaning of the fourth amendment when, in view of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave and the person submits to the police order. People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 111 (2001).\nIn Thomas, the defendant did not submit to the police order and fled from the police, first on a bicycle and then on foot, and prevented what would have been an unlawful stop: \u201cHad the defendant stopped when his path was obstructed, had he submitted to [the police officer\u2019s] show of authority, a seizure of the kind offensive to our constitution would have occurred. [The officer] would have effected an investigatory stop absent the requisite degree of suspicion to support it. The stop would have constituted an unreasonable seizure of the defendant\u2019s person. However, [the officer\u2019s] attempt to effect an unlawful stop did not implicate the fourth amendment because the defendant took flight and prevented it.\u201d Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 112, quoting People v. Thomas, 315 Ill. App. 3d 849, 857 (2000).\nIn this case, Amann was patrolling a bike path in an area that was known for \u201ca lot of graffiti\u201d and \u201cactivity.\u201d At 9 p.m., Amann saw two men walking toward his parked squad car. One of them was carrying what Amann believed was a 40-ounce bottle of alcohol. The second man, defendant, was not carrying anything. Amann announced he was a police officer and turned on his squad car\u2019s spotlight. He ordered them loudly to \u201ccome here.\u201d It was at this point that defendant\u2019s companion put down the bottle he was carrying and he and defendant \u201cveered\u201d off the path and into the bushes. Amann could still see where they were, and when they emerged from the bushes 5 to 10 seconds later, they approached his squad car. Moments later, backup officers had arrived. The search of the bushes where Amann observed defendant and his companion stoop down revealed cocaine \u201cresting on a leaf.\u201d Immediately after the cocaine was found in the bushes, Amann placed defendant under arrest.\nDefendant argues that Amann had no justifiable basis for initiating a Terry stop, because the facts of this case establish only a mere hunch on the part of the officer, rather than specific articulable facts that, when taken together with rational inferences, warranted the intrusion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905-06, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80 (1968). However, the stop itself did not produce any \u201cfruit of the poisonous tree.\u201d Therefore, the cases cited by defendant are inapposite, as the circumstances differ in that this search was not the product of an improper Terry stop.\nWe must point out that we do not agree with the State\u2019s argument that the police were justified in making a Terry stop because defendant \u201cevaded\u201d the police officer. This does not appear to be an \u201cunprovoked flight\u201d on the part of defendant, as asserted by the State. However, a perimeter search by an experienced officer led to the discovery of the cocaine. A reasonable inference is that defendant, who later was found to possess 17 similar packages of cocaine, placed it on the leaf in the area where he had been observed spending a few moments during his evening stroll. See People v. Long, 369 Ill. App. 3d 860, 869 (2007) (police officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of baggies of cocaine found on floor under bar table near defendant\u2019s feet, despite presence of 35 to 40 patrons in the bar).\nThe amount of time that had passed and the proximity of defendant to the bushes render reasonable the inference that defendant possessed the cocaine. Defendant abandoned the drugs before he was seized. He was not seized until he returned to the path, approached the squad car, and submitted to the order. The allegedly unlawful seizure at the time of submission did not result in the recovery of any evidence. Thus, the arrest based on the drugs found during the perimeter search was proper, and the search incident to that arrest was valid.\nB. Denial of Use of Demonstrative Evidence\nDefendant next contends that the trial court\u2019s decision to prohibit the use of the whiteboard during cross-examination of the State\u2019s expert witness was an abuse of discretion that denied defendant his right to due process and a fair trial. The use of demonstrative evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court\u2019s decision for an abuse of that discretion. People v. Williams, 275 Ill. App. 3d 242, 248 (1995). \u201c \u2018Abuse of discretion\u2019 is the most deferential standard of review \u2014 next to no review at all \u2014 and is therefore traditionally reserved for decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial.\u201d People v. Anderson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 653, 664 (2006). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court\u2019s decision is \u201cfanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable\u201d to such a degree that no reasonable person would agree with it. People v. Campos, 349 Ill. App. 3d 172, 175 (2004).\nDuring cross-examination of Oliver, the State\u2019s expert witness in narcotics, defense counsel used a whiteboard to record Oliver\u2019s testimony regarding factors that he routinely considered in determining whether, in his opinion, a person possessed narcotics with the intent to sell them. Initially, the trial court allowed defense counsel to proceed over the objection of the State. The trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection on the ground that the phrase \u201cfacts are better than assumptions\u201d was argumentative. The trial court allowed defense counsel to continue using the board to record Oliver\u2019s responses, until the State renewed its objection. At this point, the trial court informed defense counsel that he was entitled to prepare an exhibit for use during closing argument, but ruled that the use of the board unfairly highlighted the officer\u2019s testimony during his cross-examination and was prejudicial.\nTo be allowed, demonstrative evidence must be relevant to an issue of the case. \u201cCertain demonstrative aids, such as those which illustrate and thus assist the jury in understanding testimonial evidence, may be allowed at trial. [Citation.] However, an exhibit which merely summarizes clearly understandable testimony and thereby serves only to memorialize particular evidence should be disallowed.\u201d People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 67-68 (1994); see Simmons v. City of Chicago, 118 Ill. App. 3d 676, 684-85 (1983) (disallowance of the use of overhead slides to accompany a defense witness\u2019s testimony was a proper exercise of the court\u2019s discretion because the evidence was cumulative); People v. Kinion, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 1076-77 (1982) (allowance of a chart summarizing the opinion testimony of an expert witness was an abuse of discretion). Any layman would understand the terms such as \u201cmoney,\u201d \u201ccell phone,\u201d and even \u201cscales\u201d as testified to by this witness. In other words, while this witness was an expert, his testimony on cross-examination concerned matters that could be readily understood by the jury from his oral testimony.\nFurther, the record reflects that defense counsel gave no indication to the trial court of his intention to use the board as a visual aid. After he began to write on it, the trial court overruled the State\u2019s objection, and it was only after defense counsel began to write what can only be considered his own interpretation of Oliver\u2019s testimony that the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objections. During a side-bar conference, the court informed defense counsel that he was free to use a chart during his closing argument, but ruled that, at that point in the trial, the use of the board had become prejudicial and was disallowed.\nIn his reply brief, defendant asserts that \u201cdefense counsel needed the whiteboard to effectively cross-examine the only State\u2019s witness testifying as to an element of the offense.\u201d He further asserts that he had \u201cno other way to present his defense.\u201d We consider these assertions to be an overstatement in that the whiteboard was being used to merely write down responses that defense counsel was eliciting from the witness during cross-examination. The testimony was not technical and was clearly understandable. Had defense counsel chosen to use a chart of the very same testimony, he would have been allowed to do so during his closing argument. Claiming that he had no defense without the board is meritless hyperbole.\nThis was a matter for the trial court to decide and we will not interfere absent an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in preventing defense counsel from using the whiteboard as demonstrative evidence during cross-examination.\nC. Fee Imposed for Appointed Counsel\nThe State concedes error, stating in its brief that \u201c[t]he defendant complains that the trial court improperly imposed a fee of $1,200 for the services of the public defender\u2019s office. The record indicates that he is correct.\u201d Further, \u201c[t]he record does not show that the defendant was given notice of the fact that reimbursement was to be considered by the court, and was not given the opportunity to present evidence regarding the payment order. Additionally, the record does not show the trial court considered the defendant\u2019s financial affidavit.\u201d The State concludes that the requirements of section 113\u2014 3.1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/113 \u2014 3.1(a) (West 2006)) were not followed. See People v. Roberson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 798, 804 (2002). Therefore, we vacate the reimbursement order and remand for a hearing on defendant\u2019s ability to pay for the services of his court-appointed attorney pursuant to section 113\u2014 3.1(a) of the Code.\nD. Mandatory Supervised Release\nDefendant argues that his three-year term of MSR was erroneous and should have been a term of two years under the provisions of the sentencing statute. Because interpreting a statute presents a question of law, our review is de novo. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 172 (2003).\nDefendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, a Class 1 felony. Due to his previous convictions he was sentenced under the \u201chabitual offender\u201d statute, which mandates that when a defendant is convicted of a Class 1 or 2 felony, after having twice been convicted of a Class 2 or greater felony, such defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) (West 2006). The trial court sentenced him to 14 years\u2019 imprisonment with a 3-year term of MSR.\nThe identical issue was raised in a recent case before this court, People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77 (2010), where the defendant was convicted of a Class 2 felony but sentenced as a Class X offender because of his criminal history. This court concluded that the term of MSR applicable to Class X felonies should apply and that \u201csuch a defendant \u2018shall be sentenced as a Class X offender\u2019 and shall receive the sentence \u2014 the entire sentence \u2014 that one convicted of a Class X felony would receive.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 80-81. Three years is the length of MSR applicable to a Class X felony (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(d)(1) (West 2006)), while the term of MSR for a Class 1 felony is two years (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(d)(2) (West 2006)).\nDefendant, citing People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), argues that \u201cthe plain language of the statute is clear \u2014 the class of conviction, not the sentence, determines what will be the offender\u2019s term of MSR.\u201d With language equally applicable to this case, the McKinney opinion distinguished Pullen: \u201cThe statute considered in Pullen does not specify what sentence a Class X offender receives. Rather, it merely limits the extent to which separate sentences for separate offenses may be served consecutively.\u201d McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 83.\nDefendant also asserts that this court should not be persuaded by the decisions in People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764 (2009), People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415 (2000), and People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537 (1995). Defendant suggests that this entire line of cases is wrongly decided. These cases were extensively analyzed by this court in McKinney, which then concluded:\n\u201cAlthough we agree with the result reached in Anderson, Smart, and Watkins, we find them overreaching to the extent that they relied on public policy reasons rather than the plain language of the relevant statutes. See In re Estate of Snodgrass, 336 Ill. App. 3d 619, 624 (2003) (noting that considerations of public policy should not lure courts away from a statute\u2019s clear language). In our view, the plain language of the applicable statutes dictates that defendants sentenced as Class X offenders shall receive the same three-year MSR term imposed on defendants convicted of Class X felonies.\u201d McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 82.\nWe agree that the statutory mandate means that \u201cdefendant shall receive a sentence that one convicted of a Class X felony would receive, i.e., a prison term ranging from 6 to 30 years followed by a 3-year term of MSR.\u201d McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 83. Therefore, defendant, who was convicted of a Class 1 felony but sentenced as a Class X offender because of his criminal history, is subject to an MSR term of three years. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8), 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d)(1) (West 2006).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the cause is remanded.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.\nHUTCHINSON and BURKE, JJ., concur.\nCommon sense would indicate that the positioning of a bag of crack rocks \u201con a leaf\u2019 was somewhat precarious and would not have remained as placed for very long.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary R. Peterson and Colleen Morgan, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Lawrence M. Bauer, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and David A. Hibben, of Chicago, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY B. HOLMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201408\u20140599\nOpinion filed June 10, 2010.\nGary R. Peterson and Colleen Morgan, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Lawrence M. Bauer, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and David A. Hibben, of Chicago, for the People." }, "file_name": "0645-01", "first_page_order": 663, "last_page_order": 671 }