{ "id": 5769596, "name": "PRORESSIVE PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUKE KOCHER, a Minor, by and Through the Guardian ad litem, Jeffrey E. Fleming, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Progressive Premier Insurance v. Kocher", "decision_date": "2010-07-13", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201407\u20140468", "first_page": "756", "last_page": "766", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "402 Ill. App. 3d 756" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1998 WL 124501", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 F.3d 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "table" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.J. Super. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 316298 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" }, { "page": "1370" }, { "page": "33-34" }, { "page": "1371-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/260/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "807 N.E.2d 1255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1258", "parenthetical": "referring to \"the Bruder dicta\"" }, { "page": "1257" }, { "page": "1257" }, { "page": "1257" }, { "page": "1259" }, { "page": "1259" }, { "page": "1260" }, { "page": "1260" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950397 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "704" }, { "page": "705" }, { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "883 N.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274121 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607-10" }, { "page": "609" }, { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "916 N.E.2d 1175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1182" }, { "page": "1182" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4291172 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/395/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 N.E.2d 1042", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1044" }, { "page": "1045" }, { "page": "1045" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415355 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799" }, { "page": "800" }, { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 So. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11513365 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35", "parenthetical": "explaining that stacking \"occurs when coverage from vehicles not involved in the accident is sought to be added to the coverage for the vehicle involved\" (emphasis in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/756/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "889 N.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794", "parenthetical": "noting that a case involving circumstances similar to this case was \"not a 'true' antistacking case\"" }, { "page": "792" }, { "page": "791-92" }, { "page": "792" }, { "page": "794" }, { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4276802 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530", "parenthetical": "noting that a case involving circumstances similar to this case was \"not a 'true' antistacking case\"" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "526" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "530" }, { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 N.E.2d 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358", "parenthetical": "explaining that antistacking clauses do not undermine the legislative purpose behind the uninsured-motorist statute" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "361-63" }, { "page": "362" }, { "page": "362" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777559 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "explaining that antistacking clauses do not undermine the legislative purpose behind the uninsured-motorist statute" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "191-94" }, { "page": "192-93" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 952", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307253 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "828 N.E.2d 1175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1180" }, { "page": "1180", "parenthetical": "\"Whether an agreement is contrary to public policy depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060027 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "823 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 13, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "567", "parenthetical": "noting that the declarations page \"contains important information specific to the policyholder\" even though it is just \"one piece of the insuring agreement\"" }, { "page": "567-69" }, { "page": "568-69" }, { "page": "568-69" }, { "page": "569" }, { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450488 ], "weight": 13, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "17-18" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23-25" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0011-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 848, "char_count": 25598, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.497341544922815e-08, "percentile": 0.39977736153729426 }, "sha256": "5b0a0882ad395552d1ccb9a26fb72e3ef44202982a1538bcc6c87c20c5d23438", "simhash": "1:abf4bd5635e684d5", "word_count": 4202 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:34.233681+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PROGRESSIVE PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUKE KOCHER, a Minor, by and Through the Guardian ad litem, Jeffrey E. Fleming, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal requires us to construe a limitation-of-liability provision in a vehicle insurance policy and to determine the effect of that provision where two of the three vehicles covered under the policy crashed into each other. The plaintiff, Progressive Premier Insurance Company of Illinois (Progressive), appeals an order of the trial court finding in favor of the defendant, Luke Kocher, in a declaratory judgment action in which Progressive sought a ruling declaring that Luke\u2019s recovery was limited to the bodily injury liability limits for only one of the vehicles. We affirm.\nThis case involves an accident that occurred when Luke Kocher was riding as a passenger on an all-terrain vehicle (ATVj driven by his father, Timothy Kocher. Luke\u2019s brother, Nick Kocher, was driving a motorcycle. The motorcycle and the ATV collided. As a result, Luke suffered head injuries requiring five days of initial hospitalization and three surgeries.\nAt the time of the accident, both vehicles were covered under an insurance policy issued by Progressive to Timothy and Paula Kocher. The policy also covered a third vehicle, another motorcycle. Under a section entitled \u201cLimits of Liability,\u201d the policy provides as follows:\n\u201cThe limit of liability shown on the Declarations Page is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:\n1. claims made;\n2. covered vehicles;\n3. trailers shown on the Declarations Page;\n4. insured persons;\n5. lawsuits brought;\n6. vehicles involved in an accident; or\n7. premiums paid.\u201d\nThe declarations page itself states, \u201cThe policy limits shown for a vehicle may not be combined with the limits for the same coverage on another vehicle.\u201d\nThe policy limits appear on the declarations page in an \u201cOutline of coverage,\u201d which consists of four sections. The first section is titled \u201cGeneral policy coverage.\u201d The other three sections pertain to each of the covered vehicles. Each section is laid out as a chart with four columns. The four columns are essentially the same in each section of the outline of coverage \u2014 they show, respectively, the types of coverage provided and the limits, deductibles, and premiums for each. The outline of coverage is laid out as follows:\n\u201cGeneral policy coverage\nUninsured/Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury\nTotal general policy coverage\n2002 Yamaha YFM660FWA\nLiability to Others (with guest passenger)\nBodily Injury Liability\nProperty Damage Liability\nMedical Payments\nComprehensive\nCollision\nCustom Parts or Equipment\nTotal premium for 2002 Yamaha\n1995 Yamaha (ALL MODEL)\nLiability to Others (with guest passenger)\nBodily Injury Liability\nProperty Damage Liability\nMedical Payments\nComprehensive\nCollision\nCustom Parts or Equipment\nTotal premium for 1995 Yamaha\n2001 Honda TRX250EX\nLiability to Others (with guest passenger)\nBodily Injury Liability\nProperty Damage Liability\nMedical Payments\nComprehensive\nCollision\nCustom Parts or Equipment\nTotal premium for 2001 Honda\nTotal 12 month policy premium\nLimits Deductible Premium\n$100,000 each person/ $300,000 each accident $15\n$15\nLimits Deductible Premium\n$18\n$100,000 each person/ $300,000 each accident\n$50,000 each accident\n$1,000 each person 6\n$100 17\n$250 19\n$1,000 with Comprehensive included or Collision\n$60\nLimits Deductible Premium\n$54\n$100,000 each person/ $300,000 each accident\n$50,000 each accident\n$1,000 each person 8\n$100 5\n$250 8\n$1,000 with Comprehensive included or Collision\n$75\nLimits Deductible Premium\n$49\n$100,000 each person/ $300,000 each accident\n$50,000 each accident\n$1,000 each person 6\n$100 10\n$250 10\n$1,000 with Comprehensive included or Collision\n$75\n$225\u201d\nAfter Paula Kocher filed a petition for authority to settle a minor\u2019s personal injury claim, Progressive filed the declaratory judgment complaint that forms the basis of this appeal. The complaint sought a declaration ruling that its liability was limited to $100,000, the policy limits provided for bodily injury liability for a single vehicle. Each party filed a motion for a summary judgment. The court ruled from the bench at the end of a hearing on the motions. The court first noted that this case is a case of first impression because the court \u201ccould find no other case relating to two vehicles that collided with each other covered under the same policy.\u201d The court next pointed to the fact that the declarations page shows policy limits separately for the bodily injury liability coverage for each vehicle but lists the limits for uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage only once. The court then explained as follows:\n\u201cI don\u2019t believe that this policy clearly addresses a situation where two covered vehicles collided. I don\u2019t believe that it is unambiguously addressed in this policy. And I believe that \u2014 it\u2019s a reasonable interpretation where you have three vehicles \u2014 and really two is what we are dealing with here \u2014 where coverage would be assumed to the limits of bodily injury liability as to each of those vehicles where they collide and both vehicles were operated negligently to injure someone ***.\u201d\nFinally, the court noted that any ambiguity caused by the failure to specifically address this situation must be resolved in favor of coverage. The court denied Progressive\u2019s motion for a summary judgment and granted Luke\u2019s motion. The court entered its rulings in a docket entry. This appeal followed.\nOn appeal, Progressive argues that the court below erred in finding that the policy did not unambiguously limit coverage to the $100,000 limit applicable to one vehicle. Because this case involves a question of contract interpretation, which is an issue of law, our review is de novo. Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17, 823 N.E.2d 561, 564 (2005).\nInsurance policies are subject to the same rules that govern the interpretation of other types of contracts. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 17, 823 N.E.2d at 564. Our primary goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties. To do this, we look first to the express language of the policy. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 17, 823 N.E.2d at 564. Policy provisions will be enforced as written unless the policy is ambiguous or violates the public policy of this state. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 17, 823 N.E.2d at 564.\nA policy provision violates public policy if it fails to conform to a statutory requirement. Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 129, 828 N.E.2d 1175, 1180 (2005). The supreme court has held that antistacking provisions similar to the one here at issue generally do not violate public policy. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 17-18, 823 N.E.2d at 564, citing Grzeszczak v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 168 Ill. 2d 216, 229, 659 N.E.2d 952, 959 (1995); see also Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179, 184, 620 N.E.2d 355, 358 (1993) (explaining that antistacking clauses do not undermine the legislative purpose behind the uninsured-motorist statute). However, neither the supreme court nor this court has addressed whether those clauses violate public policy under the circumstances of this case. See Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois, 215 Ill. 2d at 130, 828 N.E.2d at 1180 (\u201cWhether an agreement is contrary to public policy depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case\u201d). Because the parties do not address this issue and we find that the policy provides coverage on other grounds, we need not consider whether prohibiting the stacking of liability coverage where more than one covered vehicle is involved might violate public policy.\nA provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation; however, we will consider only reasonable alternative interpretations and will not strain to find an ambiguity where none exists. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 17, 823 N.E.2d at 564. Moreover, an ambiguity \u201cmay be revealed in the terms used in view of the particular circumstances involved.\u201d Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 185, 620 N.E.2d at 358. In resolving ambiguities, we are guided by principles of public policy, and we will resolve ambiguities in favor of the insured. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 185, 620 N.E.2d at 358.\nThe relevant policy language in the \u201cLimits of Liability\u201d section of the Kochers\u2019 policy with Progressive is what is commonly referred to as an antistacking clause. Stacking ordinarily involves combining or aggregating the policy limits applicable to more than one vehicle where the other vehicles are not involved in the accident. See Progressive Premier Insurance Co. v. Cannon, 382 Ill. App. 3d 526, 530, 889 N.E.2d 790, 794 (2008) (noting that a case involving circumstances similar to this case was \u201cnot a \u2018true\u2019 antistacking case\u201d); Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 35 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that stacking \u201coccurs when coverage from vehicles not involved in the accident is sought to be added to the coverage for the vehicle involved\u201d (emphasis in original)). Here, Luke argues that he is not seeking to aggregate coverage; rather, he is seeking to receive up to the policy limits for each vehicle involved in the accident. Progressive argues that this distinction is irrelevant because the policy language unambiguously limits its liability to the policy limits for one vehicle in all circumstances, while Luke contends that the cases cited by Progressive are distinguishable because they involve stacking in the traditional sense. Although we will find this distinction to be dispositive in the instant case, we emphasize that we reach this conclusion only after considering the policy language and the circumstances of this case in their entirety. The fact that this case does not involve traditional stacking does not, standing alone, answer the question before us.\nWhen we interpret an insurance policy, we must consider the policy as a whole. Yates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass\u2019n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 797, 799, 724 N.E.2d 1042, 1044 (2000). The declarations page\u2014 which lists the types of coverage provided and the policy limits and premiums for each \u2014 is a part of the insurance contract. See Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 23, 823 N.E.2d at 567 (noting that the declarations page \u201ccontains important information specific to the policyholder\u201d even though it is just \u201cone piece of the insuring agreement\u201d).\nAs previously noted, the relevant language in the limitation-of-liability section expressly incorporates the declarations page \u2014 it provides that the most Progressive will pay is the limit \u201cshown on the Declarations Page\u201d (emphasis added). This language requires us to determine what the limit shown on the declarations page actually is. To answer this question, both this court and the Illinois Supreme Court have often looked to the layout of the declarations page of the policy involved in conjunction with the language of the antistacking clause. E.g., Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 23-25, 823 N.E.2d at 567-69; Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 191-94, 620 N.E.2d at 361-63; Abram v. United Services Automobile Ass\u2019n, 395 Ill. App. 3d 700, 708, 916 N.E.2d 1175, 1182 (2009); Johnson v. Davis, 377 Ill. App. 3d 602, 607-10, 883 N.E.2d 521, 527- 29 (2007); Yates, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 800, 724 N.E.2d at 1045.\nGenerally, these cases have found that, where the declarations page lists the policy limits for uninsured- or underinsured-motorist coverage more than once, this creates an ambiguity regarding whether the coverage may be stacked and that ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured. Where, however, the limit is shown only once, these cases have held that there is no ambiguity and the coverages do not stack. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 25, 823 N.E.2d at 568-69; Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192-93, 620 N.E.2d at 362; Abram, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 708, 916 N.E.2d at 1182; Johnson, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 609, 883 N.E.2d at 528- 29; Yates, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 800, 724 N.E.2d at 1045. As both this court and the supreme court have recognized, this does not mean there is a per se rule that where the limits for a particular type of coverage are shown multiple times they may be stacked. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 26 n.l, 823 N.E.2d at 569 n.l; Johnson, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 609, 883 N.E.2d at 528. Rather, whether coverage may be stacked in such a case depends on the language used both in the body of the policy and on the declarations page itself.\nProgressive argues, however, that this type of analysis is \u201cflawed and contrary to contract interpretation principles which require a review of the entire policy before determining whether the declarations page creates an ambiguity.\u201d According to Progressive, this court in Yates and the supreme court in Hobbs and Bruder focused \u201csolely\u201d on the declarations pages in the policies, which contravenes the rule that insurance policy provisions are to be read with an eye toward the policy as a whole rather than in isolation. Progressive contends that cases such as the Second District\u2019s decision in In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill. App. 3d 700, 807 N.E.2d 1255 (2004), provide a better framework for resolving the question before us.\nWe first note that, regardless of which cases Progressive finds most compelling, this court\u2019s decision in Yates (where we found that the layout of the declarations page created an ambiguity regarding whether the policy allowed stacking) has not been overruled. The supreme court in Hobbs specifically distinguished the policy at issue there with the one we construed in Yates. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 25, 823 N.E.2d at 568-69. In fact, the Hobbs court stated that, under Bruder, our Yates decision was correct. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 25, 823 N.E.2d at 569. This is because Yates involved the type of policy the Bruder court had in mind when it noted that if an antistacking clause limits liability to the limit shown on the declarations page \u2014 and the declarations page lists the limit for a type of coverage more than once \u2014 \u201cit would not be difficult to find an ambiguity.\u201d Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 25, 823 N.E.2d at 569, citing Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192, 620 N.E.2d at 362.\nWe acknowledge that these statements in Hobbs and Bruder were dicta. See In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 703, 807 N.E.2d at 1258 (referring to \u201cthe Bruder dicta\u201d). However, as Progressive acknowledges, the court devoted a great deal of attention in both decisions to interpreting the declarations pages. As the Bruder court explained, \u201cUnderstanding the arrangement of entries in the columns is important in determining the effect of what is [or is] not there included.\u201d Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192, 620 N.E.2d at 362. Thus, while the supreme court\u2019s statements regarding the effect of multiple listings of policy limits were dicta, its statements regarding the importance of the declarations page layout in interpreting the policy as a whole were not. This is the law in Illinois.\nMoreover, we believe that Progressive\u2019s argument mischaracterizes Hobbs, Bruder, and Yates. Contrary to Progressive\u2019s contention, all three cases looked at the declarations pages in conjunction with the general policy language. We also find that In re Estate of Striplin does not conflict with our holding in Yates or the supreme court\u2019s holdings in Hobbs and Bruder. Indeed, we believe that the case actually supports Luke\u2019s position rather than Progressive\u2019s.\nIn In re Estate of Striplin, the Second District was called upon to determine whether a policyholder could stack the underinsuredmotorist coverages on two vehicles insured under the same policy. There were two declarations pages \u2014 one for each covered vehicle. The declarations pages showed the relevant coverage limits twice \u2014 once on each declarations page. In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 701, 807 N.E.2d at 1257. Although the court does not explicitly say so, the fact that each vehicle had its own page indicates that the types of coverage, liability limits, and premiums for each vehicle must have been listed separately, much as they were in the declarations page in the instant case.\nThe antistacking clause at issue in In re Estate of Striplin stated, \u201c \u2018The limits of liability applicable to any one auto *** will not be combined with or added to the limits of liability applicable to any other auto ***.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 701, 807 N.E.2d at 1257. It further provided as follows:\n\u201c \u2018If two or more autos are shown on the policy declarations and one of these autos is involved in the accident, the limits of liability shown on the policy declarations for the involved auto will apply. If none of the autos shown on the policy declarations is involved in the accident, the highest limits of liability *** for any one auto will apply.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 701, 807 N.E.2d at 1257.\nThe court rejected \u201ca per se rule that any listing of multiple limits of liability creates an ambiguity.\u201d In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 703, 807 N.E.2d at 1259. However, the court also found that \u201clistings of multiple liability limits may create an ambiguity in conjunction with other language in the policy\u201d (emphasis in original). In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 704, 807 N.E.2d at 1259.\nThe court concluded that the multiple listings in the case before it did not create an ambiguity regarding whether the coverages could be stacked. In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out that the provision specifically addressed what happened there \u2014 the insured had an accident involving neither of the two automobiles covered under the policy. In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 705, 807 N.E.2d at 1260. The In re Estate of Striplin court contrasted this very specific language with limit-of-liability clauses that \u201cmerely refer to the \u2018limits of liability\u2019 in the declarations pages.\u201d In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 705, 807 N.E.2d at 1260. Thus, the court did not reject the rationale of Yates and other similar cases; rather, it applied that rationale to the facts before it and found a crucial distinction which led it to conclude that the policy involved was unambiguous.\nThe facts of the instant case make it distinguishable from In re Estate of Striplin. Although the language in the limitation-of-liability section in the body of the policy is more like that found in Yates and Johnson than that involved in In re Estate of Striplin, the declarations page itself contains a statement similar to the relevant language in In re Estate of Striplin \u2014 that is, the declarations page states that coverage for one vehicle may not be combined with the same coverage for another. It is not relevant that the language appears on the declarations page rather than in the body of the policy. If this were a traditional stacking case \u2014 that is, if Luke were seeking to aggregate coverage from the additional covered motorcycle that was not involved in the accident \u2014 we might be inclined to find that the policy unambiguously prohibits that stacking. However, this is not a true stacking case in the traditional sense. Under these circumstances, we find that a full consideration of the relevant provisions \u2014 the antistacking language on the declarations page, the layout of the outline of coverage, and the language of the limit-of-liability section \u2014 leads to the conclusion that the bodily injury liability limits applicable to each vehicle involved in the accident are available to Luke.\nAs we have discussed, the declarations page contains separate headings for each vehicle and an additional heading for the general policy coverage. Significantly, uninsured- and underinsured-motorist protection is provided under the general policy provision section and appears to be applicable to any or all of the vehicles with a single limit. By contrast, the other types of coverage \u2014 including the bodily injury liability coverage, which is what is at issue here \u2014 are listed separately for each vehicle under a heading that indicates the vehicle for which the coverage is provided. The most logical implication of this layout is that if any vehicle is involved in an accident, the limit of bodily injury liability coverage available is the limit listed under that vehicle, whether or not any of the other covered vehicles are involved.\nAs previously noted, both the general policy provisions and the declarations page contain antistacking language. The former provides that the most Progressive will pay is the limit shown on the declarations page. The latter provides that the policy limits shown for any one vehicle \u201cmay not be combined with the limits for the same coverage on another vehicle\u201d (emphasis added). Because the clause in the general policy provisions refers to \u201c[t]he limit of liability shown on the Declarations Page,\u201d it depends for its meaning on a determination of what the limit shown on the declarations page is. The antistacking language in the declarations page is subject to two reasonable interpretations. The statement can be read to prohibit only true stacking \u2014 that is, it can be read to prohibit combining the coverage for vehicles that were not involved in the accident with the coverage for a vehicle that was involved. In that case, the policy unambiguously provides full coverage for any vehicle actually involved in an accident. The statement might also be read to preclude recovery of the policy limits for more than one vehicle under any circumstances. In that case, under this court\u2019s decisions in Johnson and Yates, the listings of coverage separately for each vehicle create an ambiguity which must be resolved in favor of coverage. Because we must resolve any ambiguities in favor of the insureds, either interpretation leads us to conclude that the policy provides coverage for both the ATV and the motorcycle.\nFinally, we note that the trial court and both parties treated this as a case of first impression in Illinois; however, after briefing was complete, the Third District addressed a situation analogous to the one before us. Progressive Premier Insurance Co. v. Cannon, 382 Ill. App. 3d 526, 889 N.E.2d 790 (2008). That case involved a policy issued by Progressive that insured two jet skis. Cannon, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 527, 889 N.E.2d at 792. The two jet skis collided with each other, seriously injuring the passenger on one of the jet skis. Cannon, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 526, 889 N.E.2d at 791-92. The court reached the opposite conclusion from the one we reach today. We find Cannon distinguishable.\nThere, the general policy provisions contained an antistacking clause nearly identical to the \u201cLimits of Liability\u201d section of the policy at issue here. That provision, like the one at issue here, expressly referenced the policy limits shown on the declarations page. Cannon, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 527, 889 N.E.2d at 792. The opinion does not describe in detail the layout of the declarations page. As mentioned, the case involves a policy issued by Progressive, the plaintiff in this case. However, the declarations page on the policy issued to the jet ski owners in Cannon is different from the policy here in at least one significant way: the court pointed out that the declarations page there listed the limits of liability only once. Cannon, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 530, 889 N.E.2d at 794. The court considered this to be a critical distinction between the policy it was construing and the policy involved in Johnson, where this court found that multiple listings of the policy limits created an ambiguity in the antistacking language. Cannon, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 530, 889 N.E.2d at 794. Thus, we do not believe that Cannon dictates that we find that Luke\u2019s recovery here is limited to the policy limits for one vehicle.\nSimilarly, we find the out-of-state cases cited by Progressive distinguishable and unpersuasive. Progressive first cites Suh v. Dennis, 260 N.J. Super. 26, 614 A.2d 1367 (1992), an 18-year-old decision of a New Jersey trial court. That case involved a business automobile policy with a declarations page that specifically stated, \u201c \u2018The most we will pay for any one accident or loss [is $500,000].\u2019 \u201d Suh, 260 N.J. Super, at 31, 614 A.2d at 1370. The court then discussed whether the chain of events at issue constituted two separate accidents or just one, an issue that is not relevant in this case. Suh, 260 N.J. Super, at 33-34, 614 A.2d at 1371-72. Progressive also cites State Auto Insurance Co. v. Stinson, 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1998) (table), a 12-year-old unreported decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applying Kentucky law. The declarations page in Stinson, much like that in Suh, stated, \u201c$100,000 is \u2018the most we will pay for any one accident or loss.\u2019 \u201d Stinson, No. 96-6689, 1998 WL 124501, at *2. Neither court considered the layout of the declarations page, as Illinois courts do. Nothing in either case persuades us to reach a different conclusion.\nWe conclude that the policy provides coverage up to the policy limit of $100,000 for each of the two vehicles involved in the accident. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nGOLDENHERSH, PJ, and WEXSTTEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bill Porter and Reagan F. Goins, both of Chilton Yambert Porter & Young, of Geneva, for appellant.", "Jeffrey E. Fleming, of Fleming Law Office, of Olney, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PROGRESSIVE PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUKE KOCHER, a Minor, by and Through the Guardian ad litem, Jeffrey E. Fleming, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201407\u20140468\nOpinion filed July 13, 2010.\nBill Porter and Reagan F. Goins, both of Chilton Yambert Porter & Young, of Geneva, for appellant.\nJeffrey E. Fleming, of Fleming Law Office, of Olney, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0756-01", "first_page_order": 774, "last_page_order": 784 }