{ "id": 5767600, "name": "In re T.S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Catherine Johnson, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Johnson", "decision_date": "2010-07-15", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201410\u20140091", "first_page": "1159", "last_page": "1173", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "402 Ill. App. 3d 1159" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208085 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 1102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283886 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/388/1102-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57342 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544910 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259033 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 871", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186487 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "874" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0871-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442049 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263224 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "443" }, { "page": "443" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349563 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450528 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0031-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1160, "char_count": 38388, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1697863466171194 }, "sha256": "2c8904ced887829f3a9c2b00f561037682a9db62f919b39b00a3244588d75655", "simhash": "1:8cad0d4e702a46b5", "word_count": 6570 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:34.233681+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re T.S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Catherine Johnson, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WEXSTTEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe respondent, Catherine Johnson, appeals from the Randolph County circuit court\u2019s order placing the custody and guardianship of her daughter, T.S., with T.S.\u2019s half-sister\u2019s father, Javier Q. Javier and the respondent are the biological parents of T.S.\u2019s half-sister, C.Q., but Javier is not T.S.\u2019s biological father. We reverse and remand.\nBACKGROUND\nOn September 25, 2008, the State filed a petition for an adjudication of wardship on behalf of six-year-old T.S. and two-year-old C.Q., seeking to obtain the guardianship and custody of the children from their mother, the respondent. The petition filed on behalf of C.Q. is not at issue here. In T.S.\u2019s petition, the State alleged that T.S. was dependent because C.Q. suffered serious multiple bruising to her buttocks and T.S. was unable to protect herself. The petition averred that it was in the best interest of T.S. for her to be adjudged a ward of the court.\nThe same day, the court held a shelter-care hearing on behalf of both C.Q. and T.S. Karen Holtz, a Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigator, testified that on September 23, 2008, she responded to a call from the police alleging that a child had cuts, welts, and bruises. She testified that she observed severe bruising on C.Q.\u2019s buttocks, contacted her manager, and was approved to take protective custody of C.Q. and T.S. from the police.\nJanice Barbour, a detective captain with the Randolph County sheriff\u2019s office, testified that she received a call on September 23, 2008, stating that there was some bruising on C.Q.\u2019s buttocks. She testified that she went to C.Q.\u2019s babysitter\u2019s house and that the respondent arrived at the house while she was there. She testified that she asked the respondent where C.Q.\u2019s bruising had come from and that the respondent told her that it could have come from C.Q. falling or from C.Q.\u2019s babysitter spanking her one time the previous week. She testified that she also asked C.Q. where the bruising had come from and that C.Q. told her \u201cthat her mommy hit her because she had peed on herself.\u201d She testified that when she asked the respondent why C.Q. would tell her that the respondent had spanked her when the respondent said it had come from somebody else, she stated that C.Q. \u201cis a storyteller.\u201d She testified that she also asked T.S. about C.Q.\u2019s bruises and she related T.S.\u2019s response: \u201c[H]er mom had hit [C.Q.] with a belt because she had peed on herself.\u201d She testified that in her opinion it was not safe to leave C.Q. or T.S. with the respondent and that is why the children were taken into protective custody.\nFollowing the hearing, the court entered an order for temporary custody and guardianship, finding that probable cause existed to believe that T.S. was a minor who was abused, neglected, or dependent and directing that T.S. be placed in the temporary custody of DCFS until October 15, 2008. C.Q. was also placed in the temporary custody of DCFS. DCFS thereafter placed T.S. and C.Q. with C.Q.\u2019s father\u2019s mother, Donna Q. The court appointed T.S. a guardian ad litem (GAL), and the respondent was appointed counsel. On October 2, 2008, the court entered an order appointing a representative from Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) to represent T.S.\nOn October 15, 2008, an adjudicatory hearing was held. At that hearing, the only witnesses to testify were (1) Amie Klausing, C.Q. and T.S.\u2019s babysitter, and (2) DCFS investigator Karen Holtz. Amie testified that while babysitting C.Q. on September 22, 2008, she noticed bruising on C.Q.\u2019s buttocks while helping her use the restroom and that, as a result, her husband called DCFS and reported the bruising. Karen gave essentially the same testimony that she gave previously at the shelter-care hearing (i.e., that she observed severe bruising on C.Q.\u2019s buttocks and took protective custody of C.Q.) but also testified that the respondent did not have an answer to the question of why she did not report the bruising to DCFS or to the police out of concern for C.Q.\u2019s safety when she noticed the bruising. Following this testimony, the court found that the State had proven its petition in the cases of both C.Q. and T.S. The court then ordered DCFS and Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois (CSS) to complete a predispositional report. The dispositional hearing was set for November 14, 2008.\nOn November 13, 2008, CSS submitted a case summary to the court. The summary indicated that both T.S. and C.Q. had been placed with a relative \u2014 C.Q.\u2019s paternal grandmother, Donna. It also set forth a service plan for the respondent, T.S., Javier (C.Q.\u2019s biological father), and Justin S. (T.S.\u2019s biological father). It recommended that DCFS receive the guardianship of T.S. and C.Q. and that Javier receive the physical custody of the minors since the allegation of abuse was not against him.\nOn November 20, 2008, a dispositional hearing was held. At the hearing, prior to any evidence being presented, the respondent stipulated to T.S. and C.Q. becoming wards of the court and to custody and guardianship being awarded to DCFS. The only witness to testify was Emily Toenjes, CSS\u2019s foster care worker for T.S. and C.Q. and the author of the CSS case summary. Emily testified that the respondent had been cooperating with her service plan, that there was nothing that the respondent was doing incorrectly, that when the respondent visits with the children, the children miss her when they leave, that Javier had a service plan whereby he has to complete a substance abuse and domestic violence assessment, that she has been unable to get in contact with Justin despite multiple attempts to do so, that she would estimate a five-month time frame to complete the service plan, and that the goal should be for the children to return home in five months. The court also asked Javier and Justin if they had any objections to custody being given to DCFS. Both replied that they did not.\nFollowing the dispositional hearing, the court entered an order finding that it was in the best interest and welfare of T.S. and the public for T.S. to be adjudged a ward of the court, finding that both the respondent and Justin were unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, or discipline T.S., and ordering that T.S. be placed in the custody and guardianship of DCFS. The court set the case for a permanency hearing on May 20, 2009.\nOn May 12, 2009, CASA volunteer Michelle Nellis filed a case report on behalf of both T.S. and C.Q. In that report, Michelle indicated that the respondent\u2019s progress on her service plan was satisfactory but incomplete, that Javier\u2019s progress was satisfactory and complete, and that Justin\u2019s progress was unsatisfactory. The report recommended that custody and guardianship remain with DCFS, that the respondent complete her service plan and have increased supervised visitation, and that Javier continue with unlimited, unsupervised visitation. The report summarized its report with regard to T.S. as follows:\n\u201c[T.S.] has specifically told CASA that she is happy living at Javier or Donna\u2019s house, but she wants to \u2018come home to mom.\u2019 This CASA [representative] has observed a change in [T.S.\u2019s] behavior since the last court date. [T.S.] appears to be withdrawn and quiet. *** CASA\u2019s other concern is that [T.S.] may be feeling second to [C.Q.], since [T.S.] often says \u2018Jav isn\u2019t my dad, he\u2019s [C.Q.\u2019s] dad.\u2019 \u201d\nOn May 20, 2009, CSS filed a case summary with the court. In that summary, CSS noted that Javier had completed his service plan, that no further recommendations were made with regard to Javier, and that CSS had attempted to contact Justin by phone but no response had been received. The following was written with regard to the respondent\u2019s progress with her service plan:\n\u201c[The respondent] has worked at Perry Oaks Rehab and Nursing for about nine months. [The respondent] is a CNA at Perry Oaks Rehab and Nursing Center.\n[The respondent] has been attending [s]ubstance [a]buse [treatment at Human Service Center. [The respondent] has been attending parenting classes at Human Service Center. According to Pam\nJackson, clinician, [the respondent] has participated in group but is unsure if [the respondent] realizes the significance of having her children removed from her care.\n[The respondent] received a psychiatric evaluation completed on February 17, 2009[,] by Dr. Gupta from Human Service Center. It was recommended that [the respondent] receive counseling. [The respondent] cancelled her follow[-]up appointment with Dr. Gupta twice.\nA mental health assessment was completed on January 13, 2009[,] where [the respondent] was diagnosed with [generalized [a]nxiety [disorder.\n[The respondent] has not admitted to the alleged allegation which brought her children into care.\n[The respondent] interacts well with her children. There is some concern regarding supervision during [the respondent\u2019s] visits because [T.S.] recently told [the] supervisor and worker that her favorite thing to do at mom\u2019s is to ride her bicycle in the street and down the hill by herself. Charlotte Johnson is currently supervising [the respondent\u2019s] visits. When [T.S.] was asked who supervised her while she was outside, she said a neighbor boy but could not recall his name.\u201d\nCSS recommended that Javier receive physical custody of T.S. and C.Q. and that aftercare begin. The summary provided the following reasoning for its recommendations:\n\u201cWorker realizes that [T.S.] is not biologically related to Javier Q[.][;] however, [Javier] has been [T.S.\u2019s] father figure for the past three and a half years. [Javier] provides a safe, secure, loving home environment.\n[T.S.] has spent the majority of her time in foster care at Javier Q[.]\u2019s home with [C.Q.] [T.S.] is attached to Javier, his girlfriend[,] and his girlfriend\u2019s daughter.\nIt is also important to keep [T.S.] and [C.Q.] together because they are attached to one another and love each other. [T.S.] and [C.Q.] have been together since [C.Q.] was born[;] therefore they should not be separated. This worker and worker\u2019s supervisor feel that [the respondent] cannot adequately care for [T.S.] and that she will be better taken care of and protected with Javier Q[.]\u201d\nOn May 20, 2009, a permanency review hearing was held. At that hearing, Emily testified that Javier had completed his service plan; that the respondent was making satisfactory progress with her service plan; that the respondent had not completed her individual counseling, her follow-up appointment with her psychiatrist, her parenting classes, or her substance abuse treatment; that the respondent had not refused to do anything; that she was not happy with the CASA representative because she is \u201csupposed to be looking out for the welfare of the kids, but she hasn\u2019t been to the foster home and that\u2019s where they reside\u201d; and that her goal was for Javier to receive custody and for aftercare to be started. On cross-examination, she testified that the respondent lives in a mobile home, is employed as a CNA, had a babysitter in place should she reobtain custody of her children, and had begun all the components required by her service plan but had not completed them. She testified that she thought that the service plan should be completed in two to three months and that her recommendation was for the custody of both T.S. and C.Q. to be awarded to Javier despite the fact that T.S. is not Javier\u2019s child \u201c[bjecause Javier *** has been a father figure in [T.S.\u2019s] life.\u201d She testified that Javier considers himself T.S.\u2019s father, that Justin and a few of the respondent\u2019s family members have expressed a desire to have the custody of T.S., that she thought that Javier would be a better placement for T.S. than one of the respondent\u2019s family members because it would keep T.S. and C.Q. together, that T.S. is attached to Javier, and that T.S. considers Javier and his family her family. She testified that she had seen T.S. and C.Q. interact at Javier\u2019s home on approximately three occasions and that she was asking for custody and guardianship to remain with DCFS and for an aftercare plan to continue on Javier\u2019s behalf.\nMichelle, T.S.\u2019s and C.Q.\u2019s CASA representative, testified that she had been to Javier\u2019s house one time, that she saw the children interact, that she had been to the respondent\u2019s house, that the respondent had come a long way, that she and Emily had different opinions, that she had yet to visit Donna\u2019s home, that she had been present during some of the visits between the respondent and her children and that they went well, that the respondent and her children were affectionate with each other and played games together, that the respondent\u2019s current visitation schedule was from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Saturdays, that she believed that it was in the best interest of the children to increase the respondent\u2019s visitation, that she recommended that the visits be moved to unsupervised, that \u201c[T.S.] ha[d] told [her] that she\u2019s happy living with Javier at Donna\u2019s, but she would like to come home,\u201d and that T.S. had made remarks to her to indicate to her that T.S. does not feel that she is as important as C.Q.\nAfter the evidence had been presented, Eric Rieckenberg, T.S.\u2019s and C.Q.\u2019s GAL, stated the following to the court:\n\u201cYour Honor, on February 26, 2009,1 visited the home of Donna Q[.], the foster \u2014 actually, the natural father\u2019s mother. The home appeared to be neat and well-kept. I interviewed the child[ren] privately. They appeared to be happy in their placement given the limited interview ability of the \u2014 given the fact that they\u2019re very young children. I was also taken to the home of the natural father, Javier Q[.] He was at work at that time. Again, the home appeared to be neat with no sanitary or other hazards present. Again, the children seemed to be \u2014 when I met with them, seemed to be well-adjusted to their current placement.\u201d\nThe court then stated the following:\n\u201cOkay. Okay. The [cjourt\u2019s reviewed the reports by CASA and by [CSS], heard testimony and narration by Mr. Rieckenberg, the GAL. The [c]ourt feels that it\u2019s in the best interest of both these minors that guardianship remain with [DCFS] at this time with the permanency goal of return home. And I\u2019m going to order that both \u2014 it seems that [Justin] is not very interested. He\u2019s not done anything with regards to a service plan. He\u2019s not even come to court here, so he\u2019s still a factor in this case, but as time goes by, he becomes less and less of a factor. Permanency goal return home.\nNow, the question[ ] is[,] [W]hose \u2014 whose home? At this time it\u2019s pretty clear to me, you know, [Javier] had pretty well completed his service plan six months ago, the way I remember this. And [the respondent] was just getting started with her service plan, although this case goes back a ways. And since then there\u2019s been also a new file open on [B.J.], [the respondent\u2019s] newest baby, which we\u2019re due to have a dispositional hearing on after this.\nThe [c]ourt feels it\u2019s in the best interest of [T.S.] and [C.Q.] that these two children remain together. They\u2019ve been as brother and sister their whole life, and from my reading of the case and the testimony of the evidence, Javier has been, I guess, the only father that [T.S. has] known. Or she\u2019s known. I\u2019m saying he, she. And so I think it\u2019s in the children\u2019s best interest that these two children stay together. And there\u2019s no reason not to grant custody of [C.Q.] and [T.S.] to [Javier] at this time. DCFS is still going to have legal guardianship.\u201d\nFollowing the permanency hearing, the court entered a permanency order finding that the respondent had made substantial progress toward the return home of T.S. but that Justin had not. The court awarded the custody of T.S. to Javier, ordered that the guardianship of T.S. remain with DCFS, and awarded the respondent unsupervised visitation from 10 a.m. Saturday to 10 a.m. Monday every other weekend. The court found that the permanency goal was for T.S. to return home within 12 months, and the court ordered that the respondent continue to cooperate with DCFS or any private agency assigned, cooperate with the service plan and prior court orders, and correct the conditions which caused the placement of T.S. A permanency review hearing was scheduled for December 2, 2009.\nOn December 2, 2009, CSS filed a case summary with the court. The summary noted the following with regard to the respondent\u2019s service plan progress:\n\u201c[The respondent] has been attending [s]ubstance [a]buse [treatment at Human Service Center. During a family meeting on November 25, 2009, [the respondent] stated that she completed parent education last week. Worker has tried to get in contact with Pam Jackson, Human Service Center, but has not heard back from her.\u201d\nIt also noted, as it did previously in the May 20, 2009, case summary, that Dr. Gupta had recommended that the respondent receive counseling, that the respondent had twice cancelled her follow-up appointments with Dr. Gupta, and that a follow-up session had been scheduled for December 1, 2009. The following recommendation was given to the court:\n\u201cWorker recommends that Javier Q[.] receive guardianship of [T.S.] and [C.Q.] The family has proven time and time again that they love [T.S.] and accept her as a member of their family. Worker realizes that [T.S.] is not biologically related to Javier Q[.][;] however, [Javier] has been [T.S.\u2019s] father figure for the past four years. [Javier] provides a safe, secure, loving home environment. [T.S.] has spent the majority of her time in foster care at Javier Q[.]\u2019s home with [C.Q.] [T.S.] is attached to [C.Q.], Javier, his fianc\u00e9 [szc][,] and his fianc\u00e9\u2019s [sic] daughter.\u201d\nOn December 2, 2009, the court held a permanency review hearing. Emily was the only witness the State called to testify. Emily testified that Justin had done nothing toward meeting the goals of his service plan other than take an integrated assessment over the phone because he was unable to meet with her in person, that he had not had any visitation with T.S., and that he had done nothing toward getting visitation other than ask for it. She testified that the respondent was doing what she was supposed to be doing; that the respondent had just reported to her that she had finished her parenting education about a week and a half to two weeks previously; that she called the Human Service Center to confirm the respondent\u2019s report but no one had yet returned her calls; that the respondent had her follow-up appointment with Dr. Gupta later that day; that the respondent stated that she completed her substance abuse treatment but that this also had yet to be confirmed by the Human Service Center; that assuming that the respondent had completed her parenting and substance abuse classes and met with Dr. Gupta for her follow-up, she would have completed her service plan (besides individual counseling, which was ongoing); that she was recommending that Javier receive guardianship and permanent custody and that T.S.\u2019s and C.Q.\u2019s cases be closed; and that she was asking the court to change the permanency goal of a return home within 12 months to a guardianship with Javier. On cross-examination, she testified that she was aware that Javier was a convicted felon; that as far as she knew, relative to DCFS protocols, a convicted felon was allowed to take guardianship over a minor child; that she was not aware of any law that prevented a convicted felon from becoming a guardian; that she would not change her opinion even if there were such a law; that when she wrote her case summary, everything the respondent was supposed to complete under her service plan was not done and it still had not been confirmed that the respondent had completed her service plan; that the respondent had passed all of her drug tests recently; that the respondent had been completing counseling with the Human Service Center relative to her substance abuse issues; that when writing the case summary, the fact that the respondent had not completed her service plan was something she considered; and that even if the respondent had completed her service plan, it would not change her recommendation to have guardianship given to Javier. She explained: \u201c[Even though] he\u2019s not biologically related to her, *** he has been considered her family for many years. He\u2019s been living with her for almost the past nine months or so. [T.S.] is happy there. She\u2019s safe. She\u2019s doing very good in school. She has friends.\u201d\nFollowing Emily\u2019s testimony, the court then called the respondent as a witness. The respondent testified that she had completed her psychiatric evaluation on February 17, 2009, that she had a follow-up later that day with Dr. Gupta, that B.J. was born in March, that as a result of B.J. being born she got a new service plan through CSS about a month prior to her testimony, and that she had seen her substance abuse counselor the prior day. The court then continued the hearing until December 21, 2009, so that the GAL, who was not present, could testify and so that Emily could verify whether the respondent had completed her service plan.\nOn December 21, 2009, CSS filed another case summary dated December 18, 2009. This summary again noted that CSS had been unable to contact Karen Grace to determine if the respondent had completed her parental education requirement. It also noted that the respondent attended her follow-up session on December 2, 2009, with Dr. Gupta. It indicated that Dr. Gupta found that the respondent did not have a mental health diagnosis. It also noted that the respondent had her last counseling appointment on January 20, 2010, and stated that the respondent was \u201ccooperating with [CSS] and ha[d] completed most of her service plan at this time.\u201d Nevertheless, CSS gave the same recommendation that was given in the December 2, 2009, case summary, i.e., that Javier receive the guardianship of T.S.\nOn December 22, 2009, a permanency review hearing was held for C.Q. and T.S. The only witness to testify was Emily. Emily testified that in her case summary dated December 18, 2009, she indicated that she was asking for the custody and guardianship of T.S. to be awarded to Javier, that neither she nor anyone on behalf of DCFS had completed a legal screening to effectuate that goal, and that it was not her understanding that a prospective guardian must submit for a legal screening before DCFS could recommend a guardian other than the natural parent.\nFollowing Emily\u2019s testimony, the court stated with regard to T.S. and C.Q., \u201c[I]t\u2019s going to be the order of the [c]ourt that guardianship and custody be awarded to Javier Q[.] at this time.\u201d The court appears to have based its decision on the fact that DCFS\u2019s goal had been completed:\n\u201cWe don\u2019t keep the case open once the DCFS says, you know, they\u2019ve reached the goal. DCFS says they\u2019ve reached the goal with regards to Mr. Q[.] I \u2014 if you got two parents, you can\u2019t \u2014 you can\u2019t give the kids to both of them. They don\u2019t live together. So the case is going to get terminated sooner or later.\u201d\nThe respondent then objected, based upon the fact that Javier was not T.S.\u2019s biological father, and noted that it was her understanding that a legal screening must be completed through DCFS before Javier could be appointed as the guardian. The court acknowledged that it knew that Javier was not T.S.\u2019s biological father, and it responded to the latter argument by stating the following: \u201cAre you telling me the [cjourt\u2019s bound by \u2014 DCFS has to have a legal screen before I can rule on and enter an order? No.\u201d\nFollowing the permanency hearing, the court entered an order finding that Javier had successfully completed his service plan and that it was in the best interest of T.S. that Javier be appointed as the guardian. Accordingly, the court appointed Javier as T.S.\u2019s guardian and awarded Javier full custody. The court also ordered that the respondent be awarded unsupervised visitation with T.S. every other weekend from Friday at 6 p.m. until Sunday at 6 p.m. and at any other time as mutually agreed between the parties. On January 19, 2010, the respondent filed a motion to reconsider the court\u2019s order awarding the custody and guardianship of T.S. to Javier.\nOn January 20, 2010, the court entered an order denying the respondent\u2019s motion to reconsider. In that order, the court made the following findings:\n\u201cJavier Q[.] has custody of his natural daughter by [the respondent], [T.S.] and [C.Q.] are sisters and Javier Q[.] has been the father figure for both minors and has had custody of them for the past four years. Emily Toenjas [sic], [floster [c]are [c]ase [m]anager for [CSS], has recommended that Javier Q[.] receive custody and guardianship of [T.S.], and it is the best interest of [T.S.] and [C.Q.] that they remain united in the same household. The natural mother, [the respondent], has not completed her service plan. A third minor child of [the respondent], [B.J.], remains in the custody of [DCFS]. It is in the best interest of [T.S.] that Javier Q[.] be appointed guardian and custodian of [T.S.]\u201d\nOn February 18, 2010, the respondent filed her timely notice of appeal.\nANALYSIS\nThe Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2008)) \u201cis a statutory scheme, created by the legislature, the purpose of which is to secure for each minor subject thereto the care and guidance which will best serve the minor\u2019s safety and moral, emotional, mental[,] and physical welfare[ ] and the best interests of the community.\u201d In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 43 (2005); 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2 (West 2008). Section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act \u201crequires the trial court to establish a permanency goal that is in the best interest of the child.\u201d In re E.I., 309 Ill. App. 3d 392, 397 (1999); 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28 (West 2008). \u201cWhen reviewing the trial court\u2019s best-interest determination, the reviewing court will not overturn the court\u2019s determination unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d In re S.J., 364 Ill. App. 3d 432, 441 (2006).\nWhile a trial court may determine that it is in a minor\u2019s best interest to place the custody of that minor with someone other than a biological parent, the court must comply with section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act and first rule out any return-home possibilities. See In re S.J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 442; 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28 (West 2008). \u201cSection 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile [Court] Act provides for court review of the proceedings of abused, neglected, and dependent minors.\u201d In re S.J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 442; 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28 (West 2008). Whether the trial court complied with section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act is a matter of statutory construction. Thus, our review is de novo. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 404 (2002); In re M.G., 313 Ill. App. 3d 871, 874 (2000).\n\u201cThe primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.\u201d In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 405. \u201cThe most reliable indicator of the legislature\u2019s intent is the language used in the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.\u201d In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 405. \u201cWhere the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to other aids of construction.\u201d In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 405.\n\u201cSubsection 2 of section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile [Court] Act describes the trial court\u2019s role at a permanency hearing.\u201d In re S.J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 442; 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28(2) (West 2008). The relevant part of that section provides as follows:\n\u201cAt the permanency hearing, the court shall determine the future status of the child. The court shall set one of the following permanency goals:\n(A) The minor will be returned home by a specific date within 5 months.\n(B) The minor will be in short-term care with a continued goal to return home within a period not to exceed one year, where the progress of the parent or parents is substantial giving particular consideration to the age and individual needs of the minor.\n(B \u2014 1) The minor will be in short-term care with a continued goal to return home pending a status hearing. When the court finds that a parent has not made reasonable efforts or reasonable progress to date, the court shall identify what actions the parent and the Department must take in order to justify a finding of reasonable efforts or reasonable progress and shall set a status hearing to be held not earlier than 9 months from the date of adjudication nor later than 11 months from the date of adjudication during which the parent\u2019s progress will again be reviewed.\n(C) The minor will be in substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights.\n(D) Adoption, provided that parental rights have been terminated or relinquished.\n(E) The guardianship of the minor will be transferred to an individual or couple on a permanent basis provided that goals (A) through (D) have been ruled out.\n* * *\nIn selecting any permanency goal, the court shall indicate in writing the reasons the goal was selected and why the preceding goals were ruled out.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28(2) (West 2008).\nIn In re S.J., a case involving the permanency placement of a child at a permanency review hearing absent a termination of parental rights, the circuit court changed the permanency goal of a return home within five months and found that it was in S.J.\u2019s best interest for custody and guardianship to be placed with S.J.\u2019s foster mother. In the circuit court\u2019s order, however, the trial court failed to set a permanency goal, stating, \u201c \u2018[T]here is no goal as custody and guardianship have been \u2014 at this juncture been placed with [S.J.\u2019s foster mother].\u2019 \u201d In re S.J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 443. \u201cWhen the court failed to select a goal, the court also failed to rule out the first five goals and provide reasons for doing so.\u201d In re S.J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 443. The respondents, S.J.\u2019s biological parents, appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for the circuit court\u2019s failure to comply with section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act. In re S.J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 445. The court ordered the circuit court on remand to select a permanency goal and explain the reasons for that goal. In re S. J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 445.\nHere, like in In re S.J., the trial court failed to comply with many aspects of section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act. At the first permanency hearing on May 20, 2009, the trial court set the permanency goal for T.S. to return home pursuant to subsection (2)(B) of section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28(2)(B) (West 2008)), i.e., short-term care with a continued goal to return home within a period not to exceed one year. At the hearing, however, the trial court appears to have been confused regarding the goal of a return home, stating, \u201cNow, the question[ ] is[,] *** [W]hose home?\u201d By asking this question, the trial court implicated that a return home could mean either (1) a return home to the respondent or (2) a return home to Javier, who was not T.S.\u2019s biological father. We find the answer to this question obvious: a return home means a return home to the respondent, T.S.\u2019s mother, where T.S. was living prior to being removed from her home. Javier was not T.S.\u2019s guardian or custodian prior to T. S. being removed from the respondent\u2019s home, and from the record it does not appear that T.S. ever lived in Javier\u2019s home prior to custody and guardianship being taken from the respondent. For the trial court to grant Javier guardianship and custody on a permanent basis, it first has to rule out the permanency goal of a return home to the respondent or adoption (provided that T.S.\u2019s parents\u2019 rights were terminated or relinquished). See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28(2) (West 2008). That did not occur here. The trial court cannot magically pull a rabbit out of a hat and replace Javier\u2019s home for the respondent\u2019s home.\nNot only that, the trial court also erred in leaving blank the section in the form permanency order where the trial court was supposed to provide in writing why the permanency goal was selected and why the preceding goals were ruled out. This is not an optional requirement, and the trial court erred in not providing its reasoning for the goal and why subsection (2)(A) was ruled out. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28(2) (West 2008) (\u201cIn selecting any permanency goal, the court shall indicate in writing the reasons the goal was selected and why the preceding goals were ruled out\u201d (emphasis added)). The supreme court has construed \u201cshall\u201d \u201cas a clear expression of legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation,\u201d and the trial court was not free to ignore this mandate. People v. O\u2019Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 93 (2001); see, e.g., Village of Winfield v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 176 Ill. 2d 54, 64 (1997); People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 222 (1996); In re James S., 388 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1107 (2009); In re Williams, 305 Ill. App. 3d 506, 510 (1999).\nFurther, on December 2, 2009, at the permanency review hearing, T.S.\u2019s foster care worker asked the court to change the permanency goal of a return home within 12 months to a guardianship with Javier. The court then continued the hearing so that T.S.\u2019s foster care worker could verify regarding whether the respondent had completed her service plan and so that T.S.\u2019s GAL could testify. On December 22, 2009, however, the permanency review hearing was held, but T.S.\u2019s GAL was not present to testify, nor had T.S.\u2019s foster care worker verified whether the respondent had completed her service plan. Despite this, the court entered an order appointing Javier as T.S.\u2019s guardian and awarding him full custody of T.S. In entering this order, the court did not utilize the form permanency order that it had utilized previously. It appears, however, that the court changed the permanency goal from subsection (2)(B) to subsection (2)(E), i.e., \u201c[t]he guardianship of the minor will be transferred to an individual or couple on a permanent basis provided that goals (A) through (D) have been ruled out\u201d (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28(2)(E) (West 2008)). As with the previous permanency order filed on May 20, 2009, the court again erred in failing to indicate in writing the reasons the goal was selected and why the preceding goals were ruled out. Moreover, the preceding goals were not ruled out. This was error, and the court\u2019s order is reversed and the cause is remanded. On remand, the trial court is directed to comply with section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act.\nWe also note that pursuant to section 2 \u2014 28, the public agency that is the guardian or custodian of the minor \u2014 here, CSS \u2014 shall ensure \u201cat least 14 days in advance of the hearing\u201d that all the parties to the permanency hearings are provided a copy of (1) the most recent service plan prepared within the prior six months and (2) a report detailing \u201cwhat progress or lack of progress the parent has made in correcting the conditions requiring the child to be in caret,] whether the child can be returned home without jeopardizing the child\u2019s health, safety, and welfare[ ] and[,] if not, what permanency goal is recommended to be in the best interests of the childt ] and why the other permanency goals are not appropriate.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 28(2) (West 2008). Here, the court held permanency hearings on May 20, 2009, December 2, 2009, and on December 22, 2009. On either the day of the hearing or the day prior to the hearing, CSS filed its mandatory report with the court and presumably with the parties. Without going into the details of these reports, we note that they are untimely filed and are deficient in detailing one or more of the requirements set out in section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act. Had these reports been timely filed, perhaps the respondent could have obtained the requisite verification needed to prove that she had completed her service plan as she claimed.\nNonetheless, we fail to see any reasonable excuse for CSS\u2019s failure to verify whether the respondent had completed her service plan in this case. At the December 2, 2009, permanency review hearing, the trial court continued the hearing so that T.S.\u2019s GAL could testify and so that CSS could verify whether the respondent had completed her service plan. The court set the permanency review hearing for 20 days later, and when the hearing was continued on December 22, 2009, still the GAL was not present to testify and CSS had not verified whether the respondent had completed her service plan. Nevertheless, the court entered an order finding that DCFS and CSS\u2019s goal had been reached, and the court awarded guardianship and custody to Javier. The court appears to have made this decision solely on the testimony of CSS\u2019s foster care worker. Neither T.S.\u2019s GAL nor her CASA representative testified at this hearing, and although CSS indicated in its report that it had been unable to verify whether the respondent had completed her service plan, no explanation had been provided for why CSS was not able to verify this information in the 20-day period between the two permanency review hearings. We find this unacceptable. Because many provisions of section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act were not complied with, we reverse and remand for a new permanency hearing where T.S.\u2019s GAL, CASA representative, and foster care worker can testify and where CSS can file a report in compliance with section 2 \u2014 28 that also explains whether the respondent has completed her service plan.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Randolph County circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.\nReversed; cause remanded.\nWELCH and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WEXSTTEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeremy R. Walker, Public Defender, of Red Bud, for appellant.", "Randall Rodewald, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chester (Patrick Delfino, Stephen E. Norris, and Kendra S. Peterson, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re T.S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Catherine Johnson, Respondent-Appellant).\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201410\u20140091\nOpinion filed July 15, 2010.\nRehearing denied August 10, 2010.\nJeremy R. Walker, Public Defender, of Red Bud, for appellant.\nRandall Rodewald, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chester (Patrick Delfino, Stephen E. Norris, and Kendra S. Peterson, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1159-01", "first_page_order": 1177, "last_page_order": 1191 }