{ "id": 4304601, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES L. BICKERSTAFF, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bickerstaff", "decision_date": "2010-07-29", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201409\u20140586", "first_page": "347", "last_page": "355", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "403 Ill. App. 3d 347" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833699 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680-81" }, { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681-82" }, { "page": "683" }, { "page": "678-79" }, { "page": "679" }, { "page": "684" }, { "page": "684" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2840484 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 209", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11304618 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "946" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544876 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096300 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528-29", "parenthetical": "\"Under both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions, a criminal defendant is entitled to a jury that is impartial, which means ' \"a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it\" ' \"" }, { "page": "528-35", "parenthetical": "evaluating the defendant's impartiality claim by reviewing voir dire questions and answers, and discussing cases in which reviewing courts examined evidence adduced at voir dire or in response to a motion for a change of venue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0502-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 873, "char_count": 18961, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7515994175722214 }, "sha256": "7da54bfa2c576afb515ea9c57327ec1bfa6dce8e32ed4a84a5682483974747e5", "simhash": "1:8b2af04a36d60d71", "word_count": 3056 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:11:09.619155+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES L. BICKERSTAFF, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Charles Bickerstaff, appeals from his conviction of 11 counts of criminal sexual assault. On appeal, he argues that his conviction must be reversed because (1) the current Lee County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s extrajudicial statements about the case deprived him of a fair trial, and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to appoint a special prosecutor in place of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nBefore his trial, defendant filed a motion for change of venue in October 2008 and a motion to disqualify the Lee County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office in February 2009. Both motions were premised on what defendant alleged were improper extrajudicial statements about his case by Henry Dixon, who was a candidate for Lee County State\u2019s Attorney when the statements were made and was elected before defendant\u2019s trial began. Defendant produced documentary evidence of Dixon\u2019s statements, whose authenticity the State did not contest. All of the comments at issue pertained to inculpatory evidence that had been found in a search of defendant\u2019s home but suppressed from evidence at defendant\u2019s trial. Defendant submitted a printout of a Web page, created by Dixon, to criticize his incumbent opponent, Paul Whitcombe. The printout contained the following commentary on the current case:\n\u201cIn the pending case, People v. Bickerstaff, 2007 CF 179, the trial judge ruled that certain critical evidence was not admissible because the search warrant failed to include [evidence of the same type].\nThe person who drafted the Complaint for Search Warrant and the Search Warrant just failed to include a broader list of items once [sic] would expect to find. He asked for DVDs, computer images, and magazines. He just as easily could have \u2014 and should have \u2014 included notebooks, handwritten journals, diaries, or written documents, but he failed to do so. A slipshod job of it.\nSee the accompanying Telegraph article. [The word \u2018article\u2019 appeared as a hyperlink, apparently to a newspaper article describing the trial court\u2019s ruling excluding the evidence.] The way Paul Whit-combe heaps praise on the sheriffs deputies, you would think Paul Whitcombe wants to divert scrutiny away from the important question.\nWho do you suppose it was who failed to do a thorough job of drafting the Complaint and more importantly, the Search Warrant? No doubt it was out [sic] own State\u2019s Attorney.\u201d\nThe printout also included statistics detailing the percentage of Whit-combe\u2019s felony cases in which counts had been dismissed or reduced to misdemeanors or in which Whitcombe had obtained guilty pleas. Comments by the parties and the court on the record indicate that the Web page remained active even after Dixon\u2019s election and after defendant\u2019s motion to disqualify Dixon\u2019s office; those same comments indicate that Dixon discontinued the Web page once defendant pointed out that it remained posted.\nDefendant also submitted a printout of a newspaper article that reported on the Web page\u2019s contents and provided context for the comments by stating that \u201c[d]efense attorneys recently won a major victory when a judge ordered a series of potentially damning journals tossed from the State\u2019s evidence because the search of Bickerstaff s home went beyond the scope of a search warrant Whitcombe drafted.\u201d The article did not, however, attribute that passage to Dixon.\nDefendant also submitted a transcript of public comments Dixon made at a campaign appearance:\n\u201cI will thoughtfully draft correct and correctly draft court documents, such as search warrants, complaints for search warrants which will give the officers the latitude they need and they are entitled to have. Mr. Whitcombe doesn\u2019t. And I give you an example of People v. Bickerstaff 07 CF 179 in which the Telegraph reported that it was a botched search. Sheriff Varga you never should never [sic] have stood up and said nothing. Because it was not a botched search. Your cops did the right thing. It was a botched search warrant and Mr. Whitcombe drafted that warrant. These are acts of conduct that I just cannot tolerate.\u201d\nAnother newspaper article that defendant submitted reported defendant\u2019s request that his case be moved from Lee County. It quoted Dixon as saying that he \u201c \u2018never said anything about Bicker staff\u2019s guilt or innocence\u2019 \u201d but only that \u201c \u2018[w]hen the state\u2019s attorney drew the search warrant, he didn\u2019t do it properly.\u2019 \u201d The article included Whitcombe\u2019s reply that, in the reporter\u2019s words, Dixon\u2019s \u201celection plank could make it impossible for Dixon to pick up prosecution of Bickerstaff if he wins.\u201d Dixon\u2019s quoted response to this argument was that he \u201c \u2018just assumed [the litigants] would have this case resolved. If they can\u2019t get it resolved in one and a half months, I\u2019d have to consider what [Whitcombe] said.\u2019 \u201d\nA later newspaper article contained in the record, titled \u201cDixon blasts venue motion,\u201d stated that Dixon was accusing defendant\u2019s counsel of filing his motion to move the case from Lee County in order to politicize the case to help Wdiitcombe\u2019s reelection bid. In the article, Dixon was quoted as saying \u201c T simply and directly asserted that it was incorrect to refer to the search in the Bickerstaff case as a \u201cbotched search.\u201d It was a botched search warrant.\u2019 \u201d The article also attributed to Dixon the sentiment that \u201cthere\u2019s a difference between calling on WThitcombe to take responsibility for a warrant and calling the case botched.\u201d Defendant also noted to the trial court that he had originally been charged with 8 counts of sexual assault and abuse; after Dixon was elected, the State amended its charges to include a total of 24 counts of sexual assault and abuse.\nIn his motion for a change of venue, defendant argued that Dixon\u2019s statements commented on suppressed evidence, implied defendant\u2019s guilt, used defendant\u2019s name as \u201can object of scorn,\u201d and thus prejudiced the jury pool. In his later motion to disqualify Dixon\u2019s State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, defendant argued that Dixon had violated rules of professional conduct and created an appearance of impropriety by participating in defendant\u2019s case after using it as a political device to win election.\nIn December 2008, the trial court commented in open court that defendant had withdrawn his motion for a change of venue, and defendant did not disagree. The record contains no indication as to why defendant withdrew his motion. In February 2009, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to disqualify Dixon\u2019s office; the court concluded that none of Dixon\u2019s comments demonstrated that Dixon had an inappropriate interest in defendant\u2019s case. The trial court further found that there was no evidence that the public perceived any conflict of interest on Dixon\u2019s part, but the court added that, if \u201cthat becomes an issue in voir dire, [it] could revisit\u201d its assessment of public awareness. In later pretrial proceedings, the parties and the trial court agreed to convene a larger-than-normal jury venire to avoid problems with pretrial publicity. Defendant also filed a written motion requesting that, due to pretrial publicity and the sensitive nature of the charges at issue, potential jurors be examined individually \u201cin order to prevent the venire persons from hearing the questions being asked\u201d of others. The record shows that the trial court granted defendant\u2019s request in part, by allowing separate examination of four potential jurors at a time. However, the record contains no transcript or other description of the voir dire proceedings.\nAt the conclusion of defendant\u2019s trial, the jury found him guilty of 22 charges of sexual assault and abuse, and the trial court sentenced him to a total of 80 years\u2019 imprisonment for the 11 sexual assault charges. Defendant timely appeals.\nDefendant\u2019s first argument on appeal is that Dixon\u2019s extrajudicial statements prejudiced his ability to obtain a fair trial on the charges against him. See People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 528-29 (2000) (\u201cUnder both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions, a criminal defendant is entitled to a jury that is impartial, which means \u2018 \u201ca jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it\u201d \u2019 \u201d), quoting People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 353 (1997), quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78, 86, 102 S. Ct. 940, 946 (1982). However, as the State notes in its brief, \u201ca defendant represented by counsel of his choice cannot, after his conviction, complain of the effect that pretrial publicity may have had on the jury when he failed to move for a change of venue or continuance or to preserve the voir dire examination.\u201d People v. Hagel, 32 Ill. 2d 413, 415 (1965). This rule stands to reason. A reviewing court asked to evaluate the impartiality of a jury can do so only by examining the indications contained in the record, and those indications will almost certainly come from evidence adduced in response to a motion for a change of venue or during voir dire. See, e.g., Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 528-35 (evaluating the defendant\u2019s impartiality claim by reviewing voir dire questions and answers, and discussing cases in which reviewing courts examined evidence adduced at voir dire or in response to a motion for a change of venue). Defendant here did not pursue his motion for a change of venue, and the record on appeal does not include any substantial description of the voir dire proceedings. Further, even though the State argues forcefully in its brief that these problems dictate that defendant\u2019s lack-of-impartiality argument be rejected, defendant does not reply to the State\u2019s position. Thus, we are unable to evaluate the effect of pretrial publicity, or voir dire questioning, on defendant\u2019s jury, and we agree with the State that we must reject defendant\u2019s argument.\nDefendant\u2019s second argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify Dixon\u2019s office from this case and instead appoint a special prosecutor. Section 3 \u2014 9008 of the Counties Code allows a court to appoint an attorney to act on behalf of the State\u2019s Attorney \u201c[wjhenever the State\u2019s attorney is sick or absent, or unable to attend, or is interested in any cause or proceeding *** which it is or may be his duty to prosecute or defend.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 9008 (West 2008). This provision has been interpreted as providing the standard for determining when a State\u2019s Attorney should be removed from a case due to improper interest in a case. See People v. Lang, 346 Ill. App. 3d 677, 680-81 (2004). The decision whether to appoint a special prosecutor under section 3 \u2014 9008 rests within the discretion of the trial court. Lang, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 681.\nThe parties agree that, under our case law, a prosecutor will be deemed \u201cinterested\u201d under section 3 \u2014 9008 in three situations: (1) where the attorney is interested as a private individual in the litigation, (2) where the attorney is an actual party to the litigation, and (3) where the attorney\u2019s continued participation would create the appearance of impropriety in the prosecution of a defendant. Lang, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 681-82. Defendant argues that the third problem \u2014 the appearance of impropriety \u2014 is present here. In order to determine whether a State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office should be removed in order to alleviate the appearance of impropriety, a court must weigh the concern about the appropriateness of the office\u2019s prosecuting the case against \u201ccountervailing considerations\u201d that include \u201c(1) the burden that would be placed on the prosecutor\u2019s office if the entire prosecutor\u2019s office had to be disqualified; (2) how remote the connection is between the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office and the alleged conflict of interest; and (3) to what extent the public is aware of the alleged conflict of interest.\u201d Lang, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 683.\nDefendant bases his argument regarding Dixon\u2019s disqualification on the assertion that Dixon violated Rules 3.6 and 3.8 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.6 prohibits \u201c[a] lawyer who is participating or has participated\u201d in a case from making a public \u201cextrajudicial statement *** if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it would pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding.\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6. Among the types of comments the rule identifies specifically as threatening the fairness of a trial are comments in a criminal case relaying \u201cthe existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant.\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 3.6(b)(2). Rule 3.8(a), as relevant here,\nstates that \u201c[t]he duty of a public prosecutor *** is to seek justice, not merely to convict\u201d (188 Ill. 2d R 3.8(a)) and that a prosecutor \u201cshall refrain from making extrajudicial comments that would pose a serious and imminent threat of heightening public condemnation of the accused\u201d (188 Ill. 2d R 3.8(e)).\nIn response to defendant\u2019s citation to the Rules of Professional Conduct, the State notes, correctly, that the central question for us is not whether Dixon violated an ethical rule; such disciplinary matters are not within this court\u2019s purview. Instead, the central question for us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Dixon\u2019s conduct did not meet Lang\u2019s standard for compelling appointment of a special prosecutor. Dixon\u2019s alleged violations of ethical rules are informative on, but not determinative of, that question.\nThe crux of defendant\u2019s ethical-rules argument is that, when Dixon used defendant\u2019s case as a means to criticize the incumbent State\u2019s Attorney, Dixon necessarily provoked public condemnation of defendant as well. Defendant further complains that Dixon publicized, via his Web site and newspaper interviews, the existence of evidence that had been excluded from defendant\u2019s trial. According to defendant, Dixon by these actions created an appearance of impropriety, both because he unfairly publicized defendant\u2019s case and because his actions left the impression that he had an inappropriately strong interest in the case.\nThe trial court here, however, considered these arguments and still came to the conclusion that the appearance of impropriety was not sufficient to trigger the appointment of a special prosecutor. In so ruling, the trial court made the following observations, which we find particularly apt:\n\u201cThe content of the comments was basically that a ruling by this court evidenced the fact that the then State\u2019s Attorney had not done his job ***. At no time did Mr. Dixon specifically speak towards the guilt or innocence of this defendant. The comments had to do with his view on whether the State\u2019s Attorney had done his job. In fact, in one of the articles Mr. Dixon specifically says he\u2019s not commenting on the guilt or innocence of this defendant.\nI cannot find that the defendant has pointed to anything of substance in any of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s comments *** that would suggest that he has what I would consider to be an interest in this case. Saying the search warrant was botched may be an indictment of the prior State\u2019s Attorney, but it is not of this defendant.\u201d\nThe trial court also addressed the fact that Dixon\u2019s Web site, which contained criticisms of his predecessor\u2019s handling of defendant\u2019s case, was not deactivated after Dixon\u2019s election. The court deemed the Web site\u2019s continuation \u201cinappropriate,\u201d but it credited the prosecution\u2019s representation that Dixon had deactivated the Web site immediately after the hearing at which the defense pointed it out. The court then concluded that the Web site\u2019s continuation after Dixon\u2019s election, combined with Dixon\u2019s pre-election statements about defendant\u2019s case, were insufficient to establish an appearance of impropriety. We agree with the trial court\u2019s analysis, and we therefore cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion.\nFor the contrary position that Dixon was unduly interested in this prosecution, to an extent that his interest tainted defendant\u2019s trial with an appearance of impropriety, defendant relies heavily on this court\u2019s decision in Lang. In Lang, after a hearing in proceedings related to the defendant\u2019s allegedly driving with a revoked license, the prosecutor involved in the case surreptitiously followed the defendant out of court, saw him drive away from the courthouse, and contacted police to inform them that the defendant was driving without a license. Lang, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 678-79. The prosecutor apparently continued to prosecute the case himself \u2014 he even argued against the defendant\u2019s motion to appoint a special prosecutor \u2014 and became the sole witness at trial (which was prosecuted by another attorney from the same office). Lang, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 679. On appeal, this court held that the trial court had abused its discretion by declining to appoint a special prosecutor. See Lang, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 684. This court explained that, \u201c[although the [prosecutor\u2019s] pursuit of the defendant was not wrong in itself, his aggressive behavior toward the defendant created the appearance that the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office was obsessed with finding evidence against the defendant to obtain a conviction against him at all costs.\u201d Lang, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 684. In so holding, the court emphasized that a prosecutor\u2019s becoming a witness would not per se require appointment of a special prosecutor, but that \u201cthe specific facts of\u201d Lang (Lang, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 685), which \u201csignificantly\u201d included the prosecutor\u2019s affirmatively and surreptitiously working to catch the defendant in a crime and then becoming the key witness in the prosecution (Lang, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 686), warranted disqualification.\nThe conduct at issue in this case does not approach that discussed in Lang. As the trial court noted, Dixon\u2019s conduct was directed entirely at criticizing his predecessor, and there is no evidence, or argument, that Dixon personally instigated the case or entangled himself in it to an extent that exceeded his role as a prosecutor. Accordingly, Lang does nothing to alter our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that defendant did not demonstrate that Dixon\u2019s conduct created an appearance of impropriety sufficient to compel appointment of a special prosecutor.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJORGENSEN and HUDSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rolfe F. Ehrmann, of Ehrmann, Gehlbach, Badger & Lee, LLC, of Dixon, for appellant.", "Henry S. Dixon, State\u2019s Attorney, of Dixon (Lawrence M. Bauer and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES L. BICKERSTAFF, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201409\u20140586\nOpinion filed July 29, 2010.\nRolfe F. Ehrmann, of Ehrmann, Gehlbach, Badger & Lee, LLC, of Dixon, for appellant.\nHenry S. Dixon, State\u2019s Attorney, of Dixon (Lawrence M. Bauer and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0347-01", "first_page_order": 363, "last_page_order": 371 }