{ "id": 4304187, "name": "THE VILLAGE OF WOODRIDGE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 99, Defendant-Appellant (The County Board of School Trustees of Du Page County et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Village of Woodridge v. Board of Education", "decision_date": "2010-07-26", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201408\u20140593", "first_page": "559", "last_page": "584", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "403 Ill. App. 3d 559" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317112 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302", "parenthetical": "\"The legislative function of enacting general laws and the executive function of enforcing those laws are complemented by the judicial function of interpreting and applying laws in specific cases\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159486 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3218027 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477773 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2730759 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5539612 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "noting that \"where the so-called offer is not intended to give the so-called offeree the power to make a contract there is no offer\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453258 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2547939 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "168" }, { "page": "169-70" }, { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ill. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4750621 ], "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/262/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2490826 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he courts have frequently upheld levies despite large cash balances on hand where no improper purpose was shown\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75276 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4739021 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263-64", "parenthetical": "\"We reaffirm the principle that these cases expound, namely that it is unconstitutional to impose unnecessary taxes\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2848137 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4293531 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/397/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3749835 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 1071", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351161 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/1071-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29939 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4289916 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491780 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3616988 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549773 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288", "parenthetical": "holding that the erroneous admission of a victim impact statement at a sentencing hearing was harmless where the trial court did not rely on the statement in sentencing the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600095 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651-52", "parenthetical": "the district seeks to distinguish Heanue because the discovery request it addressed was not timely; however, that clearly was an alternative basis for our ruling in that case (see Heanue, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 651-52)" }, { "page": "651-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 1037", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4294186 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1041" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/397/1037-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5450012 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273718 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596984 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293046 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409942 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "\"It is universally recognized that municipal corporations are creatures of the State and that, absent constitutional restraints, municipal corporations are subject to the will and discretion of the legislature\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223608 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" }, { "page": "24", "parenthetical": "\"Historically, this court has assumed only an exceedingly limited role in matters relating to public education, recognizing that educational policy is almost exclusively within the province of the legislative branch\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 U.S. 186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166554 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "682" }, { "page": "706" }, { "page": "210" }, { "page": "682" }, { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/369/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 1006", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643951 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1009" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/1006-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251559 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 Ill. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2635235 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/406/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3606865 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2909926 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031017 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 895", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274061 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912" }, { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4293512 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/397/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 Ill. App. 3d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4295876 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/398/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4291196 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134863 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0120-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1985, "char_count": 64914, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.3335449286811702 }, "sha256": "dccb53a0fcfb66fed183271d7b1c9a5fef1184e3e032699e1f7b048bd422b391", "simhash": "1:1beca5b64b48704d", "word_count": 10727 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:11:09.619155+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE VILLAGE OF WOODRIDGE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 99, Defendant-Appellant (The County Board of School Trustees of Du Page County et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HUDSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, the Board of Education of Community High School District 99 (hereinafter defendant or the district), appeals the Du Page County circuit court\u2019s order denying the traverse and motion to dismiss (hereinafter the traverse) it filed in response to an eminent domain proceeding initiated by plaintiff, the Village of Woodridge (hereinafter plaintiff or the village), as well as the court\u2019s denial of its subsequent motion to reconsider that order. The district also appeals the denial of its posttrial motion. The district raises a number of issues relating to both the traverse and the valuation of the property taken by the village. A number of school districts have filed a brief as amici curiae, which we have reviewed and considered. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe instant case commenced when the village filed an eminent domain action on May 23, 2005. The village sought to acquire a parcel (hereinafter the property) adjacent to its village hall and owned by the district. The district, whose territorial boundaries lie within seven municipalities, acquired most of the property in 1967 in a voluntary, negotiated sale. It subsequently acquired the balance of the property in 1995 in a land swap with the village. When the parties made this agreement in 1995, they included a provision that would require the village to grant the district a special-use permit for the property. In 1971, the district and the Woodridge Park District entered into an agreement under which the park district leased the property for park and recreation purposes. The lease was for a one-year term, and it automatically renewed each year. The district could terminate the lease with 60 days\u2019 notice.\nOn August 15, 2005, the district adopted a resolution regarding its need for the property. The resolution provided, inter alia, that the property is \u201cnecessary, suitable and convenient for school facilities\u201d; that the taking \u201cwill materially impair or interfere with the uses already existing, such current uses including but not limited to providing for outdoor educational opportunities and the real estate needs of the district\u201d; that the district will be deprived of the ability to use the property in the future for school facilities; that the district will not realize full value of the property in an eminent domain action; that the district will not be able to purchase comparable property with the proceeds of an eminent domain action; and that the \u201cfuture taxable value of the [p]roperty will be lost.\u201d The district asserts that we owe deference to the legislative findings it made in the course of adopting the resolution.\nDuring the hearing on the traverse, the following evidence was presented. The village first called Julia Beckman, who was the president of the district. She acknowledged that the district had solicited bids for the property, through a company called Newcastle. She agreed that the district had \u201cpotential uses for the property,\u201d and she explained that the district had drawn up plans for athletic fields. It had \u201cstudied various uses for the property,\u201d but it \u201chad no money.\u201d Previously, it had planned to build a third high school on the site, but that was not an \u201cimmediate option\u201d due to the failure of a referendum in 1997. She agreed with the village\u2019s counsel that \u201cthere weren\u2019t any particular plans in place and there were just potential uses for the property in May 2005.\u201d Beckman was unaware of any school-sponsored educational activity that had ever taken place on the property, though one was planned for the summer of 2007. To her knowledge, the property had never been used for any classes. She testified that the district lacked classroom space, as the State continued to mandate new classes. Beckman stated that she was aware of the opinion of the district\u2019s superintendent that the district could accommodate \u201ca few hundred more students.\u201d She agreed that, \u201cnarrowly construed,\u201d the opinion was valid. She was also aware of Dr. John Casarda\u2019s demographic report, which concluded that enrollment was at a peak and would decline through 2020. She was aware of no study that concluded otherwise. Beckman further testified that the district would be unable to purchase an acceptable replacement if it received the fair market value of the property. On the other hand, she agreed that the proceeds from a sale of the property could be used to meet \u201csignificant needs for capital improvement.\u201d The district had considered selling the property.\nDuring cross-examination, Beckman testified that she was a realtor and was familiar with the local market. Though the district considered selling the property, it had never decided to do so. It had never determined that the property was \u201csurplus.\u201d The property itself could not be replaced, as there was no comparable property within the district. She also testified that, in 1997, the district had voted to construct a third high school on the property. She noted that the mere fact that a third high school was not currently a possibility did not foreclose building one in the future. Beckman explained that the reason bids were solicited for the property in 2005 was to ascertain its value. She believed that it was better to solicit bids than to simply get an appraisal, because the property was unique and previous appraisals \u201cjust didn\u2019t seem to capture its uniqueness.\u201d During redirect examination, Beckman agreed that the effect of the condemnation concerned \u201cthe future use of the property\u201d \u2014 uses that \u201cmay or may not occur.\u201d She acknowledged that her real estate practice consisted primarily of single-family residences and that she had never sold a parcel the size of the property. Further, one of the purposes of having Newcastle determine the value of the property was to see if it was high enough to warrant a sale.\nThe village next called Dr. David Eblen, the superintendent of the district. Eblen denied that the district had no intention of seeking another referendum to construct a third high school, though he agreed that the district had no specific plan to do so as of May 2005. Previously, there had been three similar referendums, the most recent occurring in 1997, and all three had failed. Eblen agreed that the district did not have the resources to fund such a project. Moreover, the district had never made a decision to develop the property or otherwise use it to meet the district\u2019s needs. Eblen acknowledged that the district solicited bids for the property to establish a value so the district could determine whether to sell it and that the district was still considering selling the property. Eblen identified an e-mail authored by him that stated, \u201cthe Community High School District 99 Board of Education has agreed to offer for sale and solicit bids for the district\u2019s 44 acre parcel land [sic] located in Woodridge.\u201d The e-mail (which was released as part of Newcastle\u2019s marketing effort) stated that the district was selling the property to fund capital improvement projects. The marketing release also quoted the district\u2019s comptroller as stating that, due to a 2004 study of projected growth in the district, it was determined that a third high school was unnecessary. The release also stated that a majority of the district\u2019s constituents believed that the property should be sold.\nDuring cross-examination, Eblen explained that there had been a recent school board election where three incumbents were reelected. All three were opposed by candidates who advocated selling the property. He explained that, though he believed that the district could absorb a \u201ccouple of hundred more students,\u201d it would be difficult in that it would require \u201cclasses to be held in less than appropriate areas.\u201d Eblen noted that the first line under the heading in the solicitation for bids stated that the district was not obligated to accept any of the bids it received (he later agreed that this was a standard reservation in the district\u2019s solicitations for bids). He added that the fact that the district had determined what it would do with the proceeds of a sale did not mean that it had actually decided to proceed with a sale. Eblen identified plans an architectural firm had drawn up for athletic fields on the property. The district never went ahead with this work due to the \u201cincredible amount of capital\u201d needed. Eblen further testified that the district had never determined that the property was not needed. During redirect examination, Eblen acknowledged that he was unaware of any \u201coutdoor educational activities\u201d or classes taking place on the property. He had, however, heard that it had been used for classes \u2014 though he had no personal knowledge to that effect.\nThe next witness called by the village was Theresa Pavesich, a member of the district\u2019s board. Pavesich voted for the district\u2019s resolution regarding the need for the property. She explained that Casarda\u2019s enrollment projections were only one factor she considered in voting for the resolution. She had not independently ascertained whether there were any viable replacement properties within the district. She agreed that the district had no present need for a third high school. Pavesich testified that she was unaware of any use to which the property was put, with the exception of uses by the village. In May 2005, the district had no \u201cspecific use [to which] it intended to put the property.\u201d During cross-examination, Pavesich stated that the lawsuit by the village was a factor in her voting for the resolution. She also testified that a \u201cband camp\u201d was scheduled to take place on the property in August 2007. Finally, Pavesich stated that the district had never determined that the property was not needed.\nMichael Adams next testified for the village. He is the director of parks and recreation for the Woodridge Park District. He has held that position since 2006 and has been employed by the park district since 1990. In 1991, Adams was charged with creating a conceptual master plan for use of the property for park district purposes. In 2004, the park district and the village hired Hitchcock Design Group to prepare a conceptual master plan for the town-center area, which included the property. The park district leased the property from the district. The lease allows the park district to use the property for parks, recreation, and park services. The park district maintains the property. The property is used for soccer practices, hay wagon rides, garden plots, a mulch site, and special events, such as the \u201csummertime jubilee.\u201d The park district operates a soccer league that is open to nonresidents. Further, a person does not have to be a resident of the park district to have a garden plot. The mulch site and the summertime jubilee are organized jointly by the park district and the village. Approximately 10,000 people attend the summertime jubilee, which has been held since 1984. People also use the property for \u201cpassive park use,\u201d such as picnicking, walking, or playing frisbee. Adams later clarified that a passive park use is an actual physical use of the property, that is, there is actually someone on the property using it. Any member of the public can use the property in this fashion. Adams testified that he observes the property on a daily basis and has never seen the district using it. Adams also stated that he expects no adverse impact from the village\u2019s taking of the property and that there would \u201cactually [be] an enhancement in the development of that site.\u201d\nDuring cross-examination, Adams acknowledged that portions of the park district lie outside the district. The lease, which goes back to 1971, can be cancelled with 60 days\u2019 notice. In 1991, the park district became interested in obtaining a longer-term commitment regarding the property so it could expend resources on longer-term projects. A report from the Hitchcock Design Group indicated that the district\u2019s needs would have to be considered. Adams told Hitchcock that he was unaware of any potential needs that the district might have. He made no effort to get any input from the district. Adams agreed that building a third high school or athletic fields on the property would comport with the park district\u2019s developmental plan. Adams denied any knowledge regarding the purpose for which the district was holding the property.\nThe village next called John Perry, the administrator for the village. He testified that he had held that position since 1989. His job is to administer the \u201c[v]illage government on a day to day [sic] basis.\u201d He also has a role in \u201cstrategic management.\u201d Perry has a degree in public administration from the University of Chicago and is credentialed by the International City/County Management Association. Perry is familiar with the property. From 1992 to 2000, he coached a soccer team there. Perry recounted the activities the park district conducted on the property. He had never observed or been made aware of any formal uses of the property by the district. The village intends to ensure that the existing uses of the property continue and, perhaps, are enhanced. Perry testified that the relationship between the village and the park district was \u201cprobably one of the outstanding governmental cooperation arrangements that you will find anywhere.\u201d Perry added that the existing uses of the property would be allowed to continue after the village acquires the property. Use of the property is not restricted to village residents, and Perry did not expect that it would be so restricted in the future.\nPerry also testified that the village had had discussions with the district regarding the property. The village believed that the district would make a decision regarding the property in 2004 or 2005. The district, however, did not do so. Instead, the property was \u201cput on the market for development as multi-family townhomes.\u201d This prompted the village to \u201cinvolve itself more actively in proposed acquisition of the subject property.\u201d Perry stated that developing the property for multifamily housing or any use other than that which has been planned by the village would be detrimental to the village\u2019s residents. The village has included the property in its plans for its town center since 1971.\nDuring cross-examination, Perry agreed that, at numerous points in planning for the use of the property, it had been recognized that the property might be used for a third high school. In 1999, he attended a meeting at the high school administrative center regarding developing the property with athletic fields. At the meeting the district sought funds from other parties for this purpose. Perry met with Eblen in 2004 to discuss establishing a process by which the village could purchase the property. On April 15, 2005, the district and the village met. The village was dissatisfied with the district\u2019s failure to make a decision with regard to the property. The village \u201cdidn\u2019t agree with the process that [the district] wanted to follow.\u201d It requested good-faith progress by April 19. The village also wanted the district to take the property off the market. The district offered a long-term lease, but that was not acceptable to the village as it would preclude certain investments in the property. Perry acknowledged that a potential use of the property would be expansion of other village facilities; however, he later clarified that such expansion would not preclude public use of the property.\nThe village rested after the conclusion of Perry\u2019s testimony. The district moved for a directed finding. The trial court denied that motion. The district then called Robert Lemke.\nLemke testified that he is a member of the district\u2019s board. He was first elected in 2003. The district had never determined that it did not need the property or that the property constituted a surplus. Instead, it adopted a resolution reaffirming the need for the property. The property has been the subject of discussion between the district and the village since before Lemke was on the board. Lemke opined that the district retaining ownership of the property best served the community in that it allowed the district to serve its current and future needs without being required to acquire new property at premium prices. Lemke explained that the district solicited bids for the property in 2005 to ascertain its market value in order to determine what to do with it.\nDuring cross-examination, Lemke acknowledged that a 2004 survey indicated that a majority of the district\u2019s residents believed that the district should sell the property. Lemke stated that plans existed regarding the property in 2005; however, he added that the district had taken no action to \u201cmove on any one of those plans.\u201d He acknowledged that, after the district determined the value of the property by soliciting bids, selling it was \u201ccertainly one of the possible next steps.\u201d\nThe district next called Allyn Barnett, another member of the district\u2019s board. He had held that position since 2005 and had previously sat on the boards of two other school districts. He has been on a school board for 20 years. Barnett testified that the district never declared either formally or informally that the property is not needed or is unsuitable for school purposes. The subject had, however, been discussed frequently. Barnett voted for the resolution regarding the district\u2019s need for the property because he did not wish the village to take the property through an eminent domain action. He believed that there was an \u201capparent need\u201d for the land. He felt that the district\u2019s current facilities were inadequate. Barnett understood that the property was being held for either the construction of a third high school or athletic fields. Barnett opined that there was adequate substitute property within the district, and he identified a potential site. He added that attempts to acquire property around one of the district\u2019s high school campuses had proved \u201cextremely costly.\u201d\nBarnett was asked on cross-examination whether he was aware of the district\u2019s attempt to market the property. He replied that he was aware of the attempt to establish its value, but he could identify no specific question that would be answered solely by knowing the value of the property. Barnett acknowledged that he was unaware of any outdoor classes taking place on the property. Barnett agreed that there might be a price at which the district would sell the property (he later clarified that he was not aware what that price would be). While Barnett had been a board member, \u201cno specific use of the property had been decided upon.\u201d This was because the district \u201cdidn\u2019t have the money to do that.\u201d During redirect, he explained: \u201c[Ojbviously there are needs that could be addressed by the property but have there been any specifics that have been determined? That was what I was answering \u2018no\u2019 to.\u201d He also opined that \u201cacademic and athletic\u201d facilities \u201ccould be put on the property\u201d and that the loss of the property would result in an \u201cinability to use that property to meet those needs\u201d and thus would be detrimental to the public. However, no specific plans currently existed.\nThe district next called Megan Schroeder, a realtor who typically deals with residential property and is familiar with large tracts of land. She has also been a member of the district\u2019s hoard since 2003. The board has never determined that the property is not needed or is inconvenient for school purposes. Schroeder testified that the district\u2019s \u201cexisting use of the property\u201d was that it was \u201cbeing held to answer the needs of the schools, whether it be for athletic [use] or for building a third high school or for *** building [some] other *** kind of a facility.\u201d She added, \u201c[W]e\u2019re holding on to it, hoping that some day we [will] be able to financially use it.\u201d She voted for the resolution regarding the district\u2019s need for the property, because she believed that it would be detrimental for the village to take it. She explained that \u201cwe were finally poised in a position where we were able to look at what we really needed for the schools and to determine the value\u201d and \u201canswer the needs of the whole community.\u201d Schroeder testified that bids were solicited for the property because it was unique. An appraisal, on the other hand, would \u201cbe based on past sales and it wouldn\u2019t be reflective of what the market is today.\u201d Schroeder, being familiar with the area by virtue of her being a realtor, did not believe that suitable replacement property existed within the district. She stated that the district is \u201cwoefully low in property.\u201d\nDuring cross-examination, Schroeder acknowledged that the district had acquired some property adjacent to one of its campuses, but she pointed out that it was a much smaller area than that of the property. She stated that she had no \u201cdefinitive answers\u201d with regard to the district\u2019s needs. She agreed that \u201ca few hundred more students\u201d could \u201cfit in the building,\u201d but added that it would not be desirable. Outside of the band camp that was to use the property in the summer of 2007, Schroeder was not aware of any outdoor educational activity that took place on the property. During redirect examination, Schroeder noted the possibility that the population of the district would grow. She also pointed out that during one year, the Catholic schools raised their tuition, and, as a result, the district had an increase in enrollment of 160 students. A larger student body would increase the need for the property.\nThe last witness called by the village was Mark Staehlin, the district\u2019s comptroller. He testified that he is \u201cbasically the chief financial officer of the district.\u201d He has held this position since 1994. Staehlin testified that the property was purchased from private landowners in the late 1960s. Staehlin identified the \u201cDowners Grove north and south high school masters facility plan.\u201d The plan included a provision to build a third high school on the property. A referendum to issue bonds for this purpose failed in 1997. The district also contemplated using the property for soccer fields. A 2004 referendum concerning an operating rate increase also failed. In 2004, the district requested its architect to update plans for a sports complex. Staehlin considered various options concerning the property, including selling it in its entirety, developing the whole parcel, or breaking it up into smaller units that could be developed or sold off independently. Another potential use that was discussed was a transportation facility, which would reduce the cost of busing students. Staehlin testified that Newcastle solicited bids for the property in an effort to ascertain its value. Regarding the band camp that was to be held on the property, Staehlin stated that it was the idea of an associate principal from the district\u2019s southern campus. According to Staehlin, as of May 2005, the district\u2019s existing use of the property was holding it for future use.\nDuring cross-examination, Staehlin acknowledged that one possible outcome when Newcastle marketed the property was that it would be sold (he clarified on redirect that the district wanted to reserve the right not to sell the property). He agreed that from 1994 until 2005, the district had the financial resources to build athletic fields on the property. Staehlin also testified that no one had ever told him that the district could not continue to hold a band camp on the property after the taking.\nAfter the submission of certain documentary evidence, the district rested. The district called Perry in rebuttal, and he testified that a transportation center would ruin the prospect of using the property as the \u201chub of the town center.\u201d After argument by the parties, the trial court ruled. The trial court first noted that the statute it had to apply, section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code) (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004)), was not ambiguous and did not need to be construed. Thus, the inquiry before it was whether the taking would materially interfere with an existing use or would be detrimental to the public. The trial court noted that the public had rejected the referendums that would have allowed the construction of a third high school on the property. It also observed that the property had been leased to the park district for over 30 years, and it found that the district had never used it for an \u201cexisting educational purpose.\u201d The trial court stated that its role was not to determine the best use of the property; rather, it was limited to applying the statute. The court then found that there was \u201cno present use of that property.\u201d Accordingly, it ruled that the taking would not materially interfere with an existing use. It further determined that the taking would not be detrimental to the public.\nIn addition to disputing the trial court\u2019s ruling on the traverse, the district also contests two evidentiary rulings that the trial court made in the course of the hearing on just compensation. We will not set forth in detail the testimony presented at that hearing; instead, we will discuss the evidence only as it pertains to those two rulings. We now turn to the district\u2019s arguments.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, the district raises five main arguments. First, it contends that the trial court should not have intervened and resolved the competing legislative determinations made by the village and the district, asserting that this question is not justiciable. Second, it argues that the trial court erred in denying the district the same discovery that it allowed the village. Third, it contends that the taking was not authorized under section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004)). Fourth, it complains of the trial court\u2019s decision to limit cross-examination of the village\u2019s appraisers regarding an offer to buy the property that was made to the district after the village instituted this action. Fifth, it alleges error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to permit one of its appraisers to testify in the just-compensation hearing. We will address these arguments in turn.\nAs a threshold matter, we will accept the trial court\u2019s factual findings unless we determine that they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Chicago Investment Corp. v. Dolins, 107 Ill. 2d 120, 124 (1985). A decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only if an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Vino Fino Liquors, Inc. v. License Appeal Comm\u2019n, 394 Ill. App. 3d 516, 523 (2009). Questions of law, including matters of statutory construction, are reviewed de novo. LaSalle Bank National Ass\u2019n v. Cypress Creek 1, LP, 398 Ill. App. 3d 592, 597-98 (2010). Decisions lying within the discretion of the trial court, such as the admission of evidence, will be reversed only if the trial court abuses that discretion. U.S. Bank v. Lindsey, 397 Ill. App. 3d 437, 456 (2009). An abuse of discretion occurs only where no reasonable person would take the trial court\u2019s view. Bauer v. Memorial Hospital, 377 Ill. App. 3d 895, 912 (2007).\nA. Whether This Case Is Justiciable\nThe district first contends that this case is not justiciable because it requires the court to resolve two competing legislative determinations. The district first correctly points out that a municipality has no general authority to condemn public land and that a municipality may take public land only when a statute expressly authorizes it. City of East Peoria v. Group Five Development Co., 87 Ill. 2d 42, 45 (1981). As we discuss later, however, that express grant of power is found in section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004)). The district continues that, in a normal eminent domain action where the condemnee is not a governmental body, the condemnor\u2019s determination that the taking is necessary establishes a prima facie case of authority and need. Trustees of Schools of Township No. 37 v. First National Bank of Blue Island, 49 Ill. 2d 408, 414 (1971). It notes that such a legislative determination is presumed to be valid and that the party challenging the enactment bears the burden of rebutting the presumption. City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 390, 406 (2006); Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 533 (1950). The district further points out that, in addition to the village\u2019s ordinance initiating the condemnation, the district passed a presumptively valid and competing resolution.\nThe district then argues that the court system now faces a situation where it is required to choose between two competing legislative enactments and to choose which public need is greater. It contends that the trial court essentially sided with the village and determined that the village\u2019s needs were more compelling than those of the district. This issue, according to the district, is a political question beyond the power of the judiciary. Further, the district asserts, as there is no justiciable controversy, subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking. People v. Capitol News, Inc., 137 Ill. 2d 162, 169-70 (1990). We disagree.\nThe political-question doctrine is a recognition of the separation of powers between the various branches of our system of governance. Roti v. Washington, 148 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1009 (1986), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 682, 82 S. Ct. 691, 706 (1962). Questions that \u201c \u2018lack *** satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination\u2019 \u201d and for which it is appropriate to attribute \u201c \u2018finality to the action of the political departments\u2019 \u201d are beyond the jurisdiction of the judicial branch. (Emphasis omitted.) Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 28 (1996), quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 210, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 682, 82 S. Ct. at 706. Neither criterion applies in the instant case.\nThis case is governed by section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004)), which provides:\n\u201cThe corporate authorities of each municipality may vacate, lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, sidewalks, wharves, parks, and public grounds; and for these purposes or uses, to take real property or portions thereof belonging to the taking municipality, or to counties, school districts, boards of education, sanitary districts or sanitary district trustees, forest preserve districts or forest preserve district commissioners, and park districts or park commissioners, even though the property is already devoted to a public use, when the taking will not materially impair or interfere with the use already existing and will not be detrimental to the public.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004).\nThus, there are clear criteria for the court to utilize to resolve this case. Specifically, the court must determine whether the property is committed to a public use and whether the taking will materially impair an existing use or be detrimental to the public. See 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004).\nMoreover, the legislature enacted this statute, thereby creating these criteria. Since the legislature has directed us regarding how to resolve this issue, it is difficult to discern, so long as we follow the statute, how our resolving this dispute would impermissibly intrude into the realm of the legislature. In other words, since the legislature has set forth criteria for resolving future disputes, its actions are not of a final nature.\nFurther, contrary to the district\u2019s suggestion, there is no occasion for us to defer to the legislative enactments of the units of local government involved in this case. Units of local government are creatures of the legislature. See La Salle National Trust, N.A. v. Village of Mettawa, 249 Ill. App. 3d 550, 575 (1993) (\u201cIt is universally recognized that municipal corporations are creatures of the State and that, absent constitutional restraints, municipal corporations are subject to the will and discretion of the legislature\u201d). With the exception of home rule, the authority of units of local government is dependent \u201cupon the legislature, and, without a grant of power, the local government could not act.\u201d Groenings v. City of St. Charles, 215 Ill. App. 3d 295, 303 (1991). In fact, our state\u2019s constitution expressly provides that school districts \u201cshall have only powers granted by law.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a78; see also Best Bus Joint Venture v. Board of Education, 288 Ill. App. 3d 770, 778 (1997). The proper role of the court system is \u201cconstruing the constitution and determining whether its provisions have been disregarded by any of the branches of government [citation] and to interpret[ ] the laws of the state.\u201d Bigelow Group, Inc. v. Rickert, 377 Ill. App. 3d 165, 174 (2007); see also Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287, 302 (1997) (\u201cThe legislative function of enacting general laws and the executive function of enforcing those laws are complemented by the judicial function of interpreting and applying laws in specific cases\u201d). In section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Code, the legislature authorized a municipality to take land belonging to a school district. Given the judiciary\u2019s traditional role in interpreting and applying statutes, it is difficult for us to see how we would be intruding into matters properly committed to another branch of government by interpreting and applying section 11 \u2014 61\u20142. Moreover, as that section provides no role for the governing body of the condemnee in determining whether a taking should go forward, if we were to defer to the district\u2019s legislative findings, we would be abdicating our established role in our system of governance. Indeed, the district\u2019s resolution \u2014 if allowed to control this case \u2014 would strike us more as an encroachment upon judicial authority. See Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 570-71 (1978).\nThe district contends that the legislature has \u201cexpressly entrusted\u201d it to determine whether a taking will be detrimental to the public. In support of this assertion, it points to section 10 \u2014 22.13 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 22.13 (West 2004)), which empowers a school board to \u201cdecide when a site or building has become unnecessary, unsuitable or inconvenient for a school.\u201d Statutes, if possible, must be construed using their plain language, and a court must not read into a statute an exception, limitation, or condition that the legislature did not express. Gallagher v. Union Square Condominium Homeowner\u2019s Ass\u2019n, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1041 (2010). While this statute clearly vests a school board with the authority to make such a determination, nothing in its language suggests that it was intended to divest a court of authority over disputes arising under section 11\u2014 61 \u2014 2 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004)). Indeed, it would be odd for the legislature to vest one of the parties to a dispute with the power to determine its outcome. We do not find the district\u2019s position persuasive.\nThe district also points out that the legislature \u201chas established an alternate mechanism that allows the [vjillage to accomplish its goal of complete divestment without threatening the independent political authority of the [district].\u201d Here, the district refers to section 5 \u2014 24 of the School Code, which states:\n\u201cWhenever a petition is presented to the school board of a school district requesting the sale of school grounds and buildings to another school district or other municipality, which petition is signed by 10% of the voters of the district, the school board of the district shall adopt a resolution for the sale of such school grounds and buildings, and fix the price therefor, and shall thereupon order the secretary to certify to the proper election authorities the proposition for submission to the voters of the district in accordance with the general election law; and if a majority of the votes cast upon the proposition are in favor of the sale, then the school board, trustees of schools of the township in which the school district is located, or other school officials having legal title shall convey by its president and clerk or secretary, upon receipt of the purchase price, the property so to be sold; and the purchase price thereof shall be placed with the proper treasurer for the benefit of the school district so selling the property.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 24 (West 2004).\nWe agree with the district\u2019s characterization of this as an \u201calternate mechanism\u201d and see nothing in this statute intended to prevent the village from proceeding under section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004)) or to preclude the judiciary from entertaining such an action. Indeed, since section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 expressly authorizes a municipality to proceed with a condemnation of land already held for public use, section 5 \u2014 24 is clearly an alternative.\nIn sum, we conclude that the present case presents a justiciable matter. It does not call for the court system to resolve competing legislative determinations. Our role is limited to considering the issues that the legislature set forth in section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004)).\nB. Whether the Trial Court Improperly Limited Discovery by the District\nThe district next asserts that \u201c[o]nce the Circuit Court determined that it would choose between competing legislative determinations of public need, the [district] sought to discover the factual basis of the [village's determination that the public need required the taking of the [p]roperty for a park.\u201d It therefore sought to depose the village\u2019s mayor and members of the village board. It also requested certain documents. The district complains that the trial court denied it this discovery even though it granted similar discovery to the village. During the hearing on the district\u2019s motion to compel discovery, the district acknowledged that it was not contending that the village sought the property for an impermissible purpose; rather, it was questioning whether the statutory requirements had been met.\nWe conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the district\u2019s request. The trial court apparently determined that the evidence sought by the district was not relevant to anything properly provable at trial. The village points out that this court has previously held that it would be difficult to find an abuse of discretion regarding the denial of a discovery request where the requested material is not relevant. Estate of Heanue v. Edgcomb, 355 Ill. App. 3d 645, 651-52 (2005) (the district seeks to distinguish Heanue because the discovery request it addressed was not timely; however, that clearly was an alternative basis for our ruling in that case (see Heanue, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 651-52)).\nAs we explained above, it was not the trial court\u2019s role to \u201cchoose between competing legislative determinations of public need.\u201d Rather, this case required the trial court to apply section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004)). That section required the trial court to inquire into whether the taking would materially interfere with an existing use or be detrimental to the public. It does not require a court to assess the sufficiency of the ordinance with which the condemnor initiated the taking. As such, a reasonable person could agree with the trial court that the material sought by the district was not relevant and, therefore, no abuse of discretion occurred. Bauer, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 912.\nMoreover, even if the trial court\u2019s decision on this issue was erroneous, the district was not prejudiced by it. In the course of ruling on the district\u2019s traverse, the trial court expressly noted its role, taking into account separation-of-powers concerns, and stated that it had \u201cno opinion as to what the best use of the property is.\u201d Rather, it recognized that it was to apply section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 as written by the legislature. At no point in its ruling did it place any reliance on the village\u2019s ordinance authorizing the condemnation. As the trial court did not rely on the village\u2019s ordinance in making its ruling, any error limiting the district from investigating the basis for the ordinance was harmless. Cf. People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 288 (1988) (holding that the erroneous admission of a victim impact statement at a sentencing hearing was harmless where the trial court did not rely on the statement in sentencing the defendant).\nC. Whether Section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Code Authorizes the Taking\nThe district next contends that the condemnation was not authorized by section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004)). This statute has yet to be construed in a manner pertinent to this case. The district raises a number of subarguments in support of its position. We will address them in turn.\nThe district first contends that the use the village proposes to make of the property is not one of the uses set forth in the statute. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cThe corporate authorities of each municipality may vacate, lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, sidewalks, wharves, parks, and public grounds; and for these purposes or uses, to take real property or portions thereof belonging to *** school districts.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004).\nThe district contends that the evidence indicates that the village intends to use the property to expand its facilities, including its police and public-works facilities. Granting, arguendo, that this is the use the village intends to make of the property, this proposed use is not outside the scope of section 11 \u2014 61\u20142. We turn to the plain language of the statute for guidance, as it is the best indication of what the legislature intended when it enacted the statute. Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge, 231 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2008). The provision authorizes a municipality to take property to \u201cotherwise improve *** public grounds.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004). \u201cImprove\u201d is defined as \u201c[t]o develop (land), whether or not the development results in an increase or decrease in value.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 761 (7th ed. 1999). Further, we perceive of no reasonable construction of \u201cpublic ground\u201d that would exclude the property. As such, section 11 \u2014 61\u20142, by virtue of its plain language, authorizes a municipality to take land held by certain governmental entities in order to develop it. Hence, the village\u2019s intended use of the property is within the scope of section 11 \u2014 61\u20142.\nThe district reiterates its argument that the trial court failed to grant appropriate deference to its legislative findings encompassed in the resolution it adopted on August 15, 2005. As we explained above, the statutory scheme the legislature set forth to govern such takings provides no occasion for a court to defer to the legislative findings of a condemnee. The judiciary\u2019s role in this case is to apply section 11\u2014 61 \u2014 2, not to choose between two competing legislative enactments. In the course of making this argument, the district refers to three factual matters that were also encompassed in the district\u2019s resolution. Though the resolution itself is not entitled to any weight under section 11 \u2014 61\u20142, we will nevertheless comment on these underlying factual issues. First, the district charges that the trial court did not understand that the property could generate property tax revenue for the district even if it was not conveyed to a private entity. For example, the district points out that it could lease the property for a use that is subject to taxation. While there are certain scenarios where this would be true, we believe it too speculative to have any bearing on the outcome of this case. Second, the district complains that the trial court rejected its claim that it would not receive full compensation for the property in an eminent domain proceeding. In an eminent domain action, the jury is instructed to award the condemnee the fair market value of the property. See Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 196 Ill. App. 3d 5, 19 (1990). If the jury fails to do so, a condemnee\u2019s recourse is to appeal the verdict. As such, the trial court properly rejected the district\u2019s argument on this point. Third, the district complains of the trial court\u2019s reliance upon evidence indicating that it did not need and could not secure funding for a third high school. It claims that such matters are beyond the purview of the court system. See Committee for Educational Rights, 174 Ill. 2d at 24 (\u201cHistorically, this court has assumed only an exceedingly limited role in matters relating to public education, recognizing that educational policy is almost exclusively within the province of the legislative branch\u201d). While we would generally agree, the legislature has, in section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Code, enacted a statute committing to the courts the question of whether a taking would be detrimental to the public. Accordingly, the district\u2019s resolution notwithstanding, we find the district\u2019s assertions ill-founded.\nThe district next contends that the taking materially interferes with existing uses of the property. The trial court found that the district had not put the property to any existing use and that the property had been leased by the park district for over 30 years. The district posits two existing uses for the property. It contends that holding the property for a future use constitutes an existing use and that holding the property as an investment is also an existing use. Amici curiae join the district on these points. We find neither contention persuasive.\nThe notion that holding the property for a future use is an existing use conflicts with the plain language of the statute. Quite simply, section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 directs that a taking of publicly held property may take place only where it \u201cwill not materially impair or interfere with the use already existing\u201d of the property sought to be condemned. (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004). \u201cExisting\u201d is the present participle of \u201cexist.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 797 (2002). \u201cExist\u201d means \u201cto have actual or real being whether material or spiritual: [to] have being in space and time.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 796 (2002). Further, \u201calready\u201d is defined as \u201cprior to some specified or implied past, present, or future time\u201d and it is usually \u201cused to refer to time that is past with respect to the verb modified or to a condition that has been reached prior to the time of observation.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 62 (2002). Thus, the legislature used a word of the present \u2014 \u201cexist\u201d\u2014and added emphasis to it by modifying it with the term \u201calready.\u201d Accordingly, we cannot agree that holding for a future use constitutes a \u201cuse already existing\u201d within the meaning of the statute.\nMoreover, the district\u2019s interpretation would all but render section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 a nullity. After all, if one is holding something and not using it currently, it must be for a use in the future. Generally, \u201cTo determine the legislature\u2019s intent, we may also consider the reason, necessity, and purpose of the law, as well as the consequences that would result from construing it one way or another.\u201d In re Detention of Welsh, 393 Ill. App. 3d 431, 446 (2009). A construction that renders a statute meaningless should be avoided. In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 167 (2001). Construing \u201cuse already existing\u201d as encompassing holding for a future use would allow a condemnee to thwart a taking on the slenderest of grounds. In essence, a taking could go forward only where the condemnee could set forth no possible future use of a parcel. The legislature, however, presumably intended municipalities to be able to condemn publically held land or it would not have enacted section 11 \u2014 61\u20142. We will not eviscerate that intent by ignoring the connection to the present indicated by the phrase \u201calready existing\u201d and reading the language of the statute in an unnatural manner.\nThe amici curiae set forth substantial argument on this point. Their arguments are largely driven by matters of policy. For example, they contend that the trial court\u2019s decision \u201cdoes not factor in political realities of the deliberative process.\u201d They also assert that if the trial court\u2019s ruling is allowed to stand, \u201cno school board will be able to properly plan for the future needs of its students.\u201d This latter concern strikes us as overstated. We see little reason to suspect that municipalities will suddenly go on a condemnation spree, seizing vast amounts of property from school districts across the state. The fact that a municipality has to pay fair market value in a condemnation will surely act as a limit upon the amount of property that municipalities will condemn. In any event, such concerns are best directed to the legislature, which can amend the statute if it deems doing so appropriate.\nThe district also contends that holding the property for an investment constitutes an existing use. It begins by pointing out certain policy considerations, such as that real estate is the \u201conly practical form of long-term mid- to high-yield investment\u201d that a school district may make under Illinois law. See 30 ILCS 235/0.01 et seq. (West 2004). It asserts that the lack of liquidity of real estate is also beneficial to school districts, making it \u201cless vulnerable to claims for immediate or short-term use.\u201d An eminent domain proceeding, the amici curiae state, would force a school district to \u201cconvert a real estate investment into a highly liquid asset.\u201d The district further notes that it is expressly authorized to \u201cprovide revenue for schools.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/10\u2014 20.3 (West 2004).\nWhile there are certainly persuasive reasons for a school district to acquire and hold real estate, the question before us is whether holding real estate as an investment constitutes an existing use. We conclude that it is not. If we were to accept it as an \u201calready existing\u201d use within the meaning of section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004)), we would render the statute all but meaningless. We cannot conceive of a situation where any entity holding property could not state that it was holding it for investment purposes. In essence, a condemnation could proceed only with the consent of a condemnee who refrained from making this claim. Condemnation, by its very nature, does not require the consent of a condemnee. Thus, even if holding property for an investment is literally an existing use, we will not construe the statute as encompassing such a use, as that would defeat the intent of the legislature. See In re Estate of Castro, 289 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1075 (1997) (\u201c[WJhere the spirit and intent of the General Assembly in enacting a statutory provision are clearly expressed and its objects and purposes are clearly set forth, courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular clause which would defeat the obvious intent of the legislature\u201d). Clearly, the legislature intended a municipality to be able to condemn publically held land in some circumstances or it would not have enacted section 11 \u2014 61\u20142. The district\u2019s position on this point would make it virtually impossible for a municipality to do so. Moreover, \u201cinvest\u201d is defined, inter alia, as \u201cto make use of with particular thought of future benefits or advantages.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1189 (2002). Thus, investing implies a connection to the future whereas \u201calready existing\u201d (as explained above) plainly refers to the present. Accordingly, we determine that holding for investment purposes is not an existing use within the meaning of section 11 \u2014 61\u20142.\nNext, the district argues that the taking is detrimental to the public within the meaning of section 11 \u2014 61\u20142. It briefly contends that the trial court applied the wrong standard in making this assessment; however, it offers no sustained argument or authority on this point, and we will not consider it further. See Girard v. White, 356 Ill. App. 3d 11, 17 (2005). We reject the district\u2019s contention that we should consider that, since the district is geographically bigger than the village, the taking will be \u201con balance\u201d detrimental. Similarly, the district\u2019s assertion that residents of the district who are not residents of the village will not benefit from the taking \u201cbecause they cannot vote in local Woodridge elections\u201d strikes us as not well founded. We fail to see how the inability to participate in an election would preclude an individual from using and enjoying a park. There was testimony in this case that use of the property was not restricted to residents of the village or the park district. As such, there was evidence from which the trial court could conclude that the taking would not be detrimental to the public generally. Moreover, given the plain language of the statute, this is the appropriate standard. The statute states that the taking may occur if it \u201cwill not be detrimental to the public.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004). It does not refer to residents of some particular unit of local government. It is, of course, improper to read into a statute \u201cexceptions, limitations or conditions not expressed by the legislature\u201d Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Edmonson, 397 Ill. App. 3d 146, 152 (2009)), and we will not do so here.\nThe district argues that losing the property would \u201centirely thwart [its] efforts to fulfill current real estate and facility needs because adequate replacement property does not exist.\u201d It is undisputed that, as of the time of the hearing below, the district had not used the property for anything (save holding it for a future use or for investment purposes, which are not existing uses within the meaning of the statute). Moreover, there was evidence that student enrollment was at a peak and was expected to decline through 2020. The district had not used the property when enrollment was at its peak, so it does not follow that it needed it to meet its needs when enrollment started to decline. Moreover, notwithstanding the district\u2019s claim that no suitable replacement property exists within the district, Allyn Barnett, a member of the district\u2019s board, testified that such property did exist and he identified a specific parcel. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the taking is not detrimental.\nThe district also complains that it will be vulnerable to tax objections and that a \u201clarge cash verdict will require additional referenda to maintain existing tax levy limits.\u201d Regarding the first point, it is true that \u201c[i]t has long been the fixed policy in this State not to permit the unnecessary accumulation of monies in the public treasury. And while the taxing authorities have reasonable discretion in fixing the amount necessary to be raised, the courts will interfere to prevent a clear abuse of their discretionary powers.\u201d Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Miller, 42 Ill. 2d 542, 543 (1969); see also Geja\u2019s Caf\u00e9 v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 263-64 (1992) (\u201cWe reaffirm the principle that these cases expound, namely that it is unconstitutional to impose unnecessary taxes\u201d). Thus, the district\u2019s assertion regarding tax objectors, at its core, amounts to a claim that it would be detrimental to allow taxpaying citizens to behave in a manner consistent with the public policy of this state. We flatly cannot adopt such a position. Moreover, as the village points out, the district\u2019s operating budget for 2008-09 was about $74 million; the jury award in this case was $14.2 million; and much greater surpluses have been upheld. See In re Application of the People ex rel. Anderson, 279 Ill. App. 3d 593, 597 (1996); see also In re Application of County Collector, 41 Ill. App. 3d 106, 111 (1976) (\u201c[T]he courts have frequently upheld levies despite large cash balances on hand where no improper purpose was shown\u201d). Similarly, the district\u2019s second complaint involves the application of the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (35 ILCS 200/18 \u2014 185 et seq. (West 2008)). It is difficult for us to conceive of how the application of one legislative enactment could be detrimental to the public as contemplated by another legislative enactment. As such, we find the district\u2019s assertions on these two points unpersuasive.\nBefore closing this section, we note that amici curiae repeatedly attempt to draw a distinction between a municipality condemning an entire parcel and a municipality taking only a portion of a parcel. This distinction is not supported by the statute. Section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 allows a municipality \u201cto take real property or portions thereof.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 61\u20142 (West 2004). As such, these arguments are not well founded.\nIn short, we hold that section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 authorized the village to condemn the district\u2019s property in this case.\nD. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Limiting Cross-Examination of the Village\u2019s Appraisers\nThe district next argues that the trial court erred by barring it from cross-examining the village\u2019s appraisers regarding an offer to purchase the property by Dartmoor Homes. The trial court denied the district\u2019s request to use this offer for impeachment purposes. It first noted that the Dartmoor offer \u201cwas not an offer to purchase the property at a specific price,\u201d as the offer was comprised of a $10 million base price that increased on a per-unit basis depending on how many residential units were ultimately approved for development. Since no one could testify as to how many homes would ultimately be permitted on the property, the purchase price was speculative. The trial court also observed that Dartmoor could \u201cback out within 90 days,\u201d so the offer was contingent. The parties do not contest the trial court\u2019s factual findings here, and we will accept them for the purpose of resolving this appeal.\nGenerally, the best evidence of the value of a parcel consists of actual sales of similarly situated property in the vicinity of the condemned property. City of Chicago v. Lehmann, 262 Ill. 468, 474 (1914). Absent such evidence, offers to purchase the property provide some evidence of value, \u201cprovided such offers are bona fide and are made before the property is condemned.\u201d Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Dicke, 208 Ill. App. 3d 158, 168 (1991). The village suggests that the offer was not bona fide, but this does not appear to be the basis for the trial court\u2019s ruling. Similarly, the parties devote some attention to the timing of the offer relative to the initiation of the condemnation, another factor the trial court did not mention in its ruling. Instead, the trial court\u2019s ruling was based upon principles of relevance, noting that the price was speculative and the offer contingent. Evidence is relevant if it \u201chas \u2018any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u2019 \u201d Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer, 192 Ill. 2d 49, 57 (2000), quoting Fed. R Evid. 401.\nAs the trial court observed, the terms of the offer included Dartmoor\u2019s unconditional right to terminate the agreement within 90 days. Dartmoor\u2019s so-called offer, then, was not an offer at all. See McCarty v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 498, 508 (1980) (noting that \u201cwhere the so-called offer is not intended to give the so-called offeree the power to make a contract there is no offer\u201d). Further, that the purported offer did not contain a definite price, as it consisted of a base price plus a per-unit price increase, made the offer speculative and severely limited its probative value. As the trial court identified two valid reasons for its decision, we cannot say that a reasonable person could not agree with the trial court, so no abuse of discretion occurred. Bauer, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 912.\nThe district contends, nevertheless, that it should have been permitted to use the Dartmoor offer to impeach the village\u2019s appraisers. In Dicke, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 169, this court concluded that a trial court abused its discretion by admitting an offer to purchase property being condemned where the offer was not made until after the eminent domain proceeding was initiated. The proponent of this evidence argued that it should be allowed to show the basis for its expert\u2019s opinion \u2014 in essence, to bolster the expert\u2019s credibility. Dicke, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 168. This court found it to be reversible error to admit this evidence, even for the limited purpose of the expert\u2019s credibility. Dicke, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 169-70. We reasoned that, though an appraiser could consider such an offer in its proper perspective, laypeople on the jury likely could not do so. Dicke, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 170. That same reasoning applies here and provides an adequate basis for the trial court\u2019s exercise of its discretion. The district attempts to distinguish Dicke on the basis that it wished to use the Dartmoor offer for impeachment purposes while, in Dicke, the evidence was used by the proponent of the expert testimony. However, both uses pertain to credibility and both carry with them the same risk of misuse by the jury. We find the district\u2019s attempt to distinguish Dicke unpersuasive.\nAccordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the Dartmoor offer.\nE. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Barring One of the District\u2019s Appraisers From Testifying\nThe district also argues that the trial court should have permitted Gary DeClark, one of its appraisers, to testify. Even if we assume, arguendo, that it was error to bar DeClark from testifying, we are convinced that any such error was harmless. In Trustees of Schools of Township No. 36 v. LaSalle National Bank, 21 Ill. 2d 552, 557 (1961), our supreme court stated:\n\u201cWe have held in other eminent domain actions that where there are other witnesses and evidence as to value on both sides, even the improper admission [citation] or the improper exclusion [citation] of value evidence does not constitute reversible error where the jury has the opportunity of weighing the conflicting evidence admitted on behalf of both sides.\u201d\nThe court reiterated this proposition in Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 163 Ill. 2d 498, 505 (1994) (\u201cThe law of this State is well established that the improper admission or exclusion of value evidence does not constitute reversible error when there are other witnesses and evidence as to value on both sides and the jury has the opportunity of viewing the property and weighing the conflicting evidence\u201d). In this case, the district presented the opinion testimony of Dale Klezsynski, another appraiser, who valued the property at $21,500,000. DeClark valued the property at $19,690,000. As such, we fail to see how the district suffered any meaningful prejudice from the exclusion of DeClark\u2019s testimony.\nThe district asserts that it was prejudiced because the exclusion of DeClark left it with one witness to testify regarding value while the village had two such witnesses. It provides no authority to support this proposition, thus forfeiting the issue. Novakovic v. Samutin, 354 Ill. App. 3d 660, 667 (2004). We will therefore not consider this argument any further.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nIn light of the foregoing, we hold that the village possessed the authority pursuant to section 11 \u2014 61\u20142 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/11\u2014 61 \u2014 2 (West 2004)) to condemn the property held by the district. Furthermore, the trial court\u2019s evidentiary rulings of which the district complains were not erroneous or were harmless. Therefore, we find none of the district\u2019s contentions of error persuasive, and we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.\nAffirmed.\nMcLaren and HUTCHINSON, JJ, concur.\nA traverse and motion to dismiss is a procedural device that the target of an eminent domain proceeding may file to challenge the right of the condemnor to take the property at issue. Village of Cary v. Trout Valley Ass\u2019n, 282 Ill. App. 3d 165, 169 (1996).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HUDSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas F. Geselbracht and Mariah F. DiGrino, both of DLA Piper US LLI) of Chicago, for appellant.", "Phillip A. Luetkehans and Robert W Funk, both of Schirott, Luetkehans & Garner, EC., of Itasca, and Thomas W. Good, of Gorski & Good, of Wheaton, for appellee.", "Todd Faulkner and Brian E Crowley, both of Franczek Radelet, EC., of Chicago, for amici curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE VILLAGE OF WOODRIDGE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 99, Defendant-Appellant (The County Board of School Trustees of Du Page County et al., Defendants).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201408\u20140593\nOpinion filed July 26, 2010.\nThomas F. Geselbracht and Mariah F. DiGrino, both of DLA Piper US LLI) of Chicago, for appellant.\nPhillip A. Luetkehans and Robert W Funk, both of Schirott, Luetkehans & Garner, EC., of Itasca, and Thomas W. Good, of Gorski & Good, of Wheaton, for appellee.\nTodd Faulkner and Brian E Crowley, both of Franczek Radelet, EC., of Chicago, for amici curiae." }, "file_name": "0559-01", "first_page_order": 575, "last_page_order": 600 }