{ "id": 4304171, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GERALD R. SNOW, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Snow", "decision_date": "2010-08-18", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201409\u20140924", "first_page": "734", "last_page": "744", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "403 Ill. App. 3d 734" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "582 F.2d 100", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 857779 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/582/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1116" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5538157 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 1078", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1084" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351271 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 U.S. 377", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170914 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" }, { "page": "1259" }, { "page": "976" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "1259" }, { "page": "976" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "1259" }, { "page": "976" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "1259" }, { "page": "976" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/390/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 70", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715156 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84-85", "parenthetical": "State could not compel architects to testify before grand jury with threat of canceling public contracts" }, { "page": "286", "parenthetical": "State could not compel architects to testify before grand jury with threat of canceling public contracts" }, { "page": "326", "parenthetical": "State could not compel architects to testify before grand jury with threat of canceling public contracts" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 801", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1676 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "2136" }, { "page": "806" }, { "page": "7-8" }, { "page": "2136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 U.S. 493", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340237 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "500" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "500" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "500" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "498" }, { "page": "566" }, { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047396 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027289 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" }, { "page": "377" }, { "page": "1182" }, { "page": "665" }, { "page": "384" }, { "page": "1188" }, { "page": "665" }, { "page": "384" }, { "page": "1188", "parenthetical": "taxpayer disclosed income on federal tax return, rather than asserting privilege, and such disclosure was properly used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/424/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "882 N.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88-89" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275124 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671-72" }, { "page": "671" }, { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11336129 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "1146" }, { "page": "427" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "1142" }, { "page": "429" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "1143" }, { "page": "437" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "1148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/465/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "771 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58925 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 759", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058501 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" }, { "page": "772" }, { "page": "1448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 183", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11733438 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" }, { "page": "729" }, { "page": "1470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 U.S. 424", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 304215 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "immunity statute prohibited the use of a subpoenaed grand-jury witness's incriminating statements even though the witness did not assert the privilege" }, { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "immunity statute prohibited the use of a subpoenaed grand-jury witness's incriminating statements even though the witness did not assert the privilege" }, { "page": "410-11", "parenthetical": "immunity statute prohibited the use of a subpoenaed grand-jury witness's incriminating statements even though the witness did not assert the privilege" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/317/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "850 N.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264438 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fifth amendment are authoritative in construing article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "415 Ill. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2683915 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107", "parenthetical": "United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fifth amendment are authoritative in construing article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/415/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "838 N.E.2d 1014", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1017" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260866 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "780 N.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 13, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837-38" }, { "page": "833-34" }, { "page": "834" }, { "page": "834" }, { "page": "833-34" }, { "page": "834" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "835-36" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637087 ], "weight": 13, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339-40" }, { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "337-38" }, { "page": "339" }, { "page": "339" }, { "page": "339" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0332-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1137, "char_count": 26152, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.446063651887353e-08, "percentile": 0.27875042135661193 }, "sha256": "cfc08c80381be42ed7168a4bc93aaefe4d01dda15bf645ba383962f51a1f3f5f", "simhash": "1:3941189abf4edc35", "word_count": 4296 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:11:09.619155+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GERALD R. SNOW, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Gerald R Snow, was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. He refused to submit to chemical testing and, as a result of his refusal, the State notified him that his driver\u2019s license would be suspended pursuant to the implied-consent statute (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1 (West 2008)) for a minimum of 12 months. Defendant filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension on the basis that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to conduct the traffic stop which led to defendant\u2019s arrest. After considering the evidence at the rescission hearing, which included testimony from defendant himself in support of his petition, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s requested relief.\nPrior to the start of defendant\u2019s criminal trial, the State notified the trial court that it would be presenting portions of defendant\u2019s testimony from the rescission hearing as part of its case in chief. Defendant objected. The court ultimately concluded that the State was prohibited from presenting defendant\u2019s testimony from the prior hearing as substantive evidence in the criminal trial. The State filed a certificate of impairment and a notice of appeal. After considering the issue within the applicable constitutional framework, we reverse the court\u2019s judgment.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn March 28, 2009, defendant was cited for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2) (West 2008)). He was notified that his one-year statutory summary suspension would begin on May 13, 2009.\nOn May 29, 2009, defendant filed a petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension, initially alleging four grounds but, after withdrawing three, he pursued rescission on the sole basis that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct the traffic stop. Defendant claimed he \u201cdid not improperly use his turn signal and his trailer ball and hitch did not obstruct his license plate\u201d so as to justify being stopped by the officer. Defendant withdrew the allegations relating to the propriety of his arrest.\nOn June 11, 2009, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s petition. Defendant testified on his own behalf and the State called the arresting officer, Illinois State Police Trooper Nathaniel Lunt. (We will reiterate only the testimony from this civil hearing that is relevant to the issues in this appeal, i.e., the testimony that the State sought to introduce in defendant\u2019s criminal trial, as designated for us by the State as highlighted testimony in the verbatim transcript.) Defendant testified that at approximately 9 p.m. on March 28, 2009, he left Scotty\u2019s tavern in Pontiac after having \u201ca beer or two.\u201d After driving a short distance, for approximately four minutes, he was stopped by Trooper Lunt.\nOn cross-examination, defendant testified he was at Scotty\u2019s for approximately 45 minutes to an hour with Alan Goetsch, Goetsch\u2019s wife, and Cheri and Dale Lambert. Before arriving at Scotty\u2019s, defendant had one beer at The Corner Junction, a nearby tavern. Before that, defendant had five to six beers at Chumps and Bones tavern over the course of five hours. There he had eaten peanuts and \u201cstuff on the bars.\u201d Defendant said he had not noticed the police officer\u2019s squad car behind him until the officer activated his overhead lights. Defendant answered each of the State\u2019s questions without asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant\u2019s counsel objected to several questions on relevancy, beyond-the-scope-of-direct-examination, and asked-and-answered grounds. The trial court overruled each.\nAfter considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s petition to rescind, finding the officer had probable cause to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle based upon an obstructed rear license plate, a violation of section 3 \u2014 413(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 413(b) (West 2008)). (The court was presented with photographic evidence of the alleged violation.)\nOn December 7, 2009, the trial court convened the parties for defendant\u2019s criminal jury trial. At the start of the trial, the prosecutor informed the court that he intended to introduce defendant\u2019s testimony from the rescission hearing. The testimony would be used as substantive evidence, not for impeachment purposes, during the State\u2019s case in chief. Defendant objected and moved to bar the State\u2019s use of the testimony. The court initially indicated it would allow the State to offer defendant\u2019s civil-proceeding testimony. However, after affording defendant\u2019s counsel time to research the issue, the court entertained the parties\u2019 respective arguments. Thereafter, the court reversed its initial ruling and barred the use of the testimony, stating as follows:\n\u201cAll right. I don\u2019t see as a distinguishing factor the fact that the defendant chose to take the stand in the rescission hearing, and then, over objection, was required to answer questions posed to him by the State. I see that as a nonfactor. However, I do believe that there is an element of compulsion here by way of the State taking an individual\u2019s life through the \u2014 or not life, but license through the summary suspension proceeding.\nIt basically puts him in a position where he is the best witness for his side, having been there, obviously and been arrested for the offense. Then he has to make that election of whether he is going to testify, subject himself to the possibility of the use of that testimony at the DUI proceeding, or simply let it go and suffer the loss of his privileges, or at least increase the chance for the loss of his privileges.\nAlthough there is no case on point, and certainly there is no Fourth District Appellate case that has been handed up, I believe that the better rules [sic] of law is that proposed in Tilden [(Village of Algonquin v. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d 332, 780 N.E.2d 832 (2002))]. And I will bar the use of the defendant\u2019s testimony from the summary suspension proceeding for substantive evidence in this proceeding. I will not, however, bar the use of it for impeachment purposes or if for some other reason, through some other rule of law, the testimony could be allowed in.\nSo I reverse my earlier ruling having been given the opportunity to review the case law on the subject.\u201d\nThe prosecutor asked for a recess to determine whether the State would be proceeding with the trial. When the parties reconvened, the prosecutor indicated the State would be filing a certificate of impairment and notice of appeal. On December 8, 2009, the State did so. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe State appeals, claiming the trial court erred by barring the use of defendant\u2019s testimony given at the rescission hearing as substantive evidence in the subsequent criminal proceeding. This appeal is, in effect, a review of the court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. Generally, we would review a court\u2019s suppression order under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. However, because there is no factual or credibility dispute, only a question of law, we review the issue de novo. See People v. Leighty, 362 Ill. App. 3d 258, 260-61, 838 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (2005). The issue before us is whether the constitution prohibits the State from introducing defendant\u2019s testimony, given in the civil statutory-summary-suspension hearing, in his subsequent criminal DUI prosecution. Or, more precisely, whether defendant\u2019s testimony in the rescission hearing was considered compelled in violation of his constitutional rights. For the following reasons, we answer both questions in the negative and reverse the court\u2019s judgment.\nThe primary focus of this case rests on the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides as follows: \u201cNo person *** shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. V. Similarly, our state constitution provides that \u201c[n]o person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a710; see Halpin v. Scotti, 415 Ill. 104, 107, 112 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1953) (United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fifth amendment are authoritative in construing article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution). \u201cThe privilege against self-incrimination may b[e] invoked in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in which the witness reasonably believes that the information sought, or discoverable as a result of the witness\u2019s testimony, could be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding against him or her.\u201d People v. Houar, 365 Ill. App. 3d 682, 688, 850 N.E.2d 327, 332 (2006).\nThe fifth amendment speaks only of compulsion. \u201cIt does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him. If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been \u2018compelled\u2019 within the meaning of the [ajmendment.\u201d United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427, 87 L. Ed. 376, 380, 63 S. Ct. 409, 410-11 (1943) (immunity statute prohibited the use of a subpoenaed grand-jury witness\u2019s incriminating statements even though the witness did not assert the privilege). The witness has a choice; he either testifies or he claims the privilege. \u201cThe criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring \u2018the making of difficult judgments\u2019 as to which course to follow.\u201d McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213, 28 L. Ed. 2d 711, 729, 91 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1971), quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 772, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (1970).\nHere, the trial court relied on the Second District\u2019s decision in Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 339-40, 780 N.E.2d at 837-38, in determining that defendant\u2019s suppression-hearing testimony should be precluded from admission in his criminal DUI proceeding. As we explain below, the court\u2019s reliance on Tilden was misplaced, as there is a key distinction between Tilden and the case sub judice.\nThe defendant, Joan Tilden, was sitting in the driver\u2019s seat of her car in the parking lot of a gas station with the engine running. Police officer Timothy Wilkin was directed to Tilden by an unidentified person, who had described Tilden as \u201cbombed.\u201d Wilkin approached Tilden and asked how she had arrived at the gas station. Wilkin was not allowed to testify at the rescission hearing as to what Tilden told him because he had not advised her of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 334-35, 780 N.E.2d at 833-34. He was also not allowed to testify that Tilden had admitted consuming four vodka drinks before leaving home. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 335, 780 N.E.2d at 834. Based on several other factors, Wilkin asked Tilden to submit to several field-sobriety tests. She failed, and Wilkin arrested her and charged her with DUI. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 335, 780 N.E.2d at 834.\nTilden filed a petition to rescind her statutory summary suspension, claiming the police officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect she had been driving under the influence of alcohol. At the rescission hearing, the Village of Algonquin (Village) called Tilden as an adverse witness. She objected, asserting her fifth-amendment privilege. The trial court sustained her objection and rescinded the statutory summary suspension. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 334-35, 780 N.E.2d at 833-34.\nThe Village appealed, claiming (1) the trial court erred in suppressing Tilden\u2019s statements to Wilkin, and (2) Tilden had waived her fifth-amendment privilege by filing a petition to rescind. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 335-36, 780 N.E.2d at 834. The Second District agreed with the Village, finding the court erred in suppressing Tilden\u2019s statements despite a lack of Miranda warnings because the proceeding was civil in nature and Miranda procedural safeguards do not apply to civil proceedings. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 338, 780 N.E.2d at 836. The court also found Tilden had waived her claim of privilege against self-incrimination by filing a petition to rescind her suspension. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 337-38, 780 N.E.2d at 835-36. The appellate court ultimately held that, although Tilden could not assert her fifth-amendment privilege during the rescission proceedings (the Village could compel her testimony), any incriminating statements made during the civil hearing were inadmissible in her contemporaneous criminal DUI action. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 339, 780 N.E.2d at 837. The court stated:\n\u201c[A] motorist\u2019s fifth[-]amendment right against self-incrimination is not violated when he is compelled to testify as an adverse witness in a hearing on his petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension of driving privileges, but any incriminating testimony from the civil proceeding is inadmissible in other criminal proceedings, such as a contemporaneous DUI action.\u201d Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 339, 780 N.E.2d at 837.\nThe Tilden court found support for its decision in People v. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 470, 771 N.E.2d 399, 407 (2002), wherein the supreme court held that a probationer could be compelled to testify at a probation-revocation hearing, a proceeding that was civil in nature. However, Lindsey specifically held that the State could compel the testimony because the defendant faced only the potential revocation of his probationary status if he testified that he had violated his probation by leaving the county jail at unauthorized times. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d at 470, 771 N.E.2d at 407. The defendant could not have realistically expected that his testimony would have exposed him to future criminal proceedings. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d at 470, 771 N.E.2d at 407.\nThe Tilden court recognized that Lindsey was factually distinguishable from the case before it because in Tilden, the defendant, in fact, faced a contemporaneous criminal action. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 339, 780 N.E.2d at 837. However, Tilden squared its opinion with Lindsey by relying on Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409, 424, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1146 (1984), wherein the United States Supreme Court noted that the government could compel a defendant to testify at a civil proceeding, such as a probation-revocation proceeding, when there existed no threat of future criminal actions arising from the testimony. However, the Court went further and found that when statements made by the defendant could incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution, the government may still compel his civil testimony, but must understand that those statements cannot be used in a pending or later criminal proceeding. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436 n.7, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 425 n.7, 104 S. Ct. at 1147 n.7. This result would eliminate, for the defendant, the threat of self-incrimination, while still allowing the government to administer its probation system. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436 n.7, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 425 n.7, 104 S. Ct. at 1147 n.7. Thus, Tilden concluded that the government may compel a motorist to testify at the rescission hearing as long as it was understood that any incriminating statements could not be used against the motorist in the contemporaneous DUI action. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 339, 780 N.E.2d at 837.\nRelying on Tilden, the Third District similarly held in People v. Hall, 378 Ill. App. 3d 666, 671-72, 882 N.E.2d 85, 88-89 (2007), that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to invoke his fifth-amendment privilege during his rescission hearing when called as a witness by the State. The court held that the defendant \u201cshould not enjoy immunity from answering the State\u2019s questions during his rescission proceedings.\u201d Hall, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 671, 882 N.E.2d at 89. \u201cWith the potential impact on Hall\u2019s criminal case eliminated through the policy articulated in Tilden, he is left with the fact that his rescission case is a civil proceeding where the fifth amendment simply does not apply.\u201d Hall, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 672, 882 N.E.2d at 89.\nIt appears the trial court here relied on those portions of the Til-den and Hall holdings that prohibited the government from using the defendant\u2019s rescission-hearing testimony in the underlying criminal DUI action. However, the key, to which we alluded previously, that distinguishes defendant\u2019s case from the factual scenarios in Tilden and Hall, is that defendant here was never compelled to testify within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Defendant voluntarily took the stand without attempting to assert his privilege against self-incrimination. Any objection asserted by counsel during defendant\u2019s cross-examination did not broach an assertion of defendant\u2019s privilege. He made general objections, which cannot be construed to assert defendant\u2019s privilege. Rather, defendant volunteered statements without assertion.\n\u201c \u2018[I]f a witness under compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not \u201ccompelled\u201d him to incriminate himself.\u2019 \u201d Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 419, 104 S. Ct. at 1142, quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654, 47 L. Ed. 2d 370, 377, 96 S. Ct. 1178, 1182 (1976). A witness\u2019s \u201cfailure at any time to assert the constitutional privilege leaves him in no position to complain now that he was compelled to give testimony against himself.\u201d United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10, 25 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9, 90 S. Ct. 763, 768 (1970). If a witness \u201cchooses to answer, his choice is considered to be voluntary since he was free to claim the privilege and would suffer no penalty as the result of his decision to do so.\u201d Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 420, 104 S. Ct. at 1143.\nDefendant argues he did not have a free choice whether to testify or remain silent, as the loss of his driving privileges was at stake. If he testified, he risked being convicted of DUI. If he remained silent, he risked the suspension of his driving privileges. He claims he was \u201ccompelled\u201d in the sense that he was forced to testify if he wanted to retain his driving privileges.\nIndeed, prior decisions have found indirect compulsion in the form of some extraneous force, such as duress. One such case is Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 17 L. Ed. 2d 562, 87 S. Ct. 616 (1967). There, police officers were questioned during an investigation into allegations of ticket fixing. Each officer questioned was informed that (1) his statements could be used against him, (2) he had the right to refuse to answer questions, but (3) if he did refuse, he would be removed from office. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 564, 87 S. Ct. at 617. The Supreme Court found the officers had been deprived of their free choice and were coerced, by the threat of firing, into testifying. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 567, 87 S. Ct. at 620. \u201cThere are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price.\u201d Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 567, 87 S. Ct. at 620. \u201c[T]he protection of the individual under the [fjourteenth [ajmendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of our body politic.\u201d Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 567, 87 S. Ct. at 620.\nDuress was also a factor in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7, 97 S. Ct. 2132, 2136 (1977), where a New York statute provided that if a political-party officer was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury regarding the conduct of his office, and the officer refused to testify, his term of office would be terminated and he would be disqualified from holding another public office for five years. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court said: \u201cThese cases settle that government cannot penalize assertion of the constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination by imposing sanctions to compel testimony which has not been immunized.\u201d Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 806, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 7-8, 97 S. Ct. at 2136. See also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85, 38 L. Ed. 2d 274, 286, 94 S. Ct. 316, 326 (1973) (State could not compel architects to testify before grand jury with threat of canceling public contracts).\nIn Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, 88 S. Ct. 967 (1968), duress was not the factor. Instead, the witness was forced to choose between the exercise of one constitutional right at the expense of another. The defendant testified in a hearing on his motion to suppress, and that testimony was used against him at trial. The Supreme Court held that such practice was unconstitutional and \u201cintolerable.\u201d Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 1259, 88 S. Ct. at 976. The defendant \u201cwas obliged either to give up what he believed *** to be a valid [fjourth [ajmendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his [fjifth [ajmendment privilege against self-incrimination.\u201d Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 1259, 88 S. Ct. at 976.\nThis case does not involve compelled testimony. The potential risk of losing driving privileges does not rise to the level of an \u201cimpermissible penalty\u201d imposed by the government (Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 426, 104 S. Ct. at 1148) or \u201can undeniable tension\u201d (Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 1259, 88 S. Ct. at 976) between the exercise of two fundamental rights should defendant choose to remain silent. This is especially true based on the nature of the allegation defendant relied upon as the sole basis for his petition to rescind. Defendant premised his petition on the claim that he had not violated any traffic law, and thus, the officer lacked any justification to conduct the traffic stop. In other words, he argued that his suspension should be rescinded because the officer lacked any justifiable reason to stop his vehicle. When a police officer observes a driver commit what he believes is a traffic violation, he is justified in briefly detaining the driver to investigate the violation. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433, 752 N.E.2d 1078, 1084 (2001). The officer may perform some initial inquiries, check the driver\u2019s license, and conduct a speedy warrant check. At that point, the motorist\u2019s constitutional rights have not been implicated. Thus, in this case, defendant was not confronted with the tension of exercising one constitutional right at the expense of surrendering another. Cf. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 1259, 88 S. Ct. at 976.\nTaken together, the above authority leads to the following conclusion. If a defendant chooses to testify at a hearing on his petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension, he must do so knowing that his testimony may be used against him in the underlying criminal action. If he does not choose to testify by asserting his fifth-amendment privilege, he risks the arguable inability to successfully prosecute his petition. The State may then call the defendant as an adverse witness in its defense of the petition, and, as explained above, the defendant could be forced to testify, as he would be unable to rely on his fifth-amendment privilege. Therefore, any incriminating statements could not be used against him in his underlying criminal action.\n\"The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination protects a witness from being forced to give testimony leading to the imposition of criminal penalties, but it does not insulate a witness from every possible detriment resulting from his testimony.\u201d Giampa v. Illinois Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 89 Ill. App. 3d 606, 613, 411 N.E.2d 1110, 1116 (1980). We conclude that since defendant chose to testify instead of claiming the privilege, his \u201cdisclosures were not compelled incriminations.\u201d Garner, 424 U.S. at 665, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 384, 96 S. Ct. at 1188. He, therefore, \u201cwas foreclosed from invoking the privilege when such information was later introduced as evidence against him in [his] criminal prosecution.\u201d Garner, 424 U.S. at 665, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 384, 96 S. Ct. at 1188 (taxpayer disclosed income on federal tax return, rather than asserting privilege, and such disclosure was properly used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings). Defendant\u2019s rescission-hearing testimony was entirely voluntary and subsequently admissible in the criminal proceedings.\nAlthough the possibility of losing one\u2019s driving privileges after an unsuccessful bid to rescind a statutory summary suspension may make participation in the hearing \u201ca wise choice,\u201d the companion procedures do not place a defendant \u201c \u2018between the rock and the whirlpool.\u2019 [Citation.] He can, if he wishes, stay out of the stream and watch the proceedings from dry land. But, if he does so, he forfeits any opportunity to control the direction of the current. [A defendant] must decide whether or not to testify at the hearing with the knowledge that, if he does, his statements may be used against him in the criminal case.\u201d Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1978), quoting Garrity, 385 U.S. at 498, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 566, 87 S. Ct. at 619.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and hold the State may introduce defendant\u2019s voluntary testimony from the rescission hearing in the subsequent criminal DUI trial.\nReversed.\nMYERSCOUGH, EJ., and STEIGMANN, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Jason B. Netzley (argued), of Addy, Bush & Associates, EC., of East Peoria, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GERALD R. SNOW, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201409\u20140924\nArgued July 14, 2010.\nOpinion filed August 18, 2010.\nThomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nJason B. Netzley (argued), of Addy, Bush & Associates, EC., of East Peoria, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0734-01", "first_page_order": 750, "last_page_order": 760 }