{ "id": 4303873, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TERRY MASON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mason", "decision_date": "2010-08-31", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201409\u20140698", "first_page": "1048", "last_page": "1055", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "403 Ill. App. 3d 1048" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "577 N.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810-11" }, { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5284344 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" }, { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "914 N.E.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737-38", "parenthetical": "referencing Gant, but analyzing a search incident to the towing of a defendant's vehicle under different criteria" }, { "page": "737-38" }, { "page": "737-38" }, { "page": "737-38" }, { "page": "738" }, { "page": "738" }, { "page": "738-39", "parenthetical": "finding the State failed to show arresting officer was acting in accordance with a standard police procedure where officer offered no testimony regarding the requirement that defendant's vehicle be towed" }, { "page": "738-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4290854 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "referencing Gant, but analyzing a search incident to the towing of a defendant's vehicle under different criteria" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 615", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5878891 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "2137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "918 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625412 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "898 N.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" }, { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3617207 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" }, { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "910 N.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" }, { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 1045", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4285536 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1050" }, { "page": "1050" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/1045-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 U.S. 332", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3653882 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337-38" }, { "page": "493" }, { "page": "1716" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "1719" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "1719" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "1719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/556/0332-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 708, "char_count": 16828, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.116814631432179e-08, "percentile": 0.38115040683839096 }, "sha256": "2fe40ef0e2c9717de47e7cd5195569b31d372a037bdb787554632e9bba430029", "simhash": "1:03f7f34634ce8596", "word_count": 2824 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:11:09.619155+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TERRY MASON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a hearing, the trial court granted defendant Terry Mason\u2019s motion to suppress evidence, specifically, cocaine that was found by the police in the vehicle Mason was driving when he was stopped on probable cause for driving under the influence. The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment to proceed to trial on charges of aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol, aggravated driving while license revoked and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The trial court granted the State leave to file this appeal. We reverse the trial court and remand the cause for further proceedings.\nFACTS\nDefendant Terry Mason was charged with felony driving while under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(A) (West 2006)), aggravated driving while license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(d\u20142) (West 2006)), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2006)). The cause proceeded to a bench trial and the trial court heard Mason\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence of cocaine that led to the unlawful possession of a controlled substance charge.\nWith respect to the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, Mason presented the following evidence in support of his motion. Officer Jason O\u2019Hara of the Bolingbrook police department testified that on May 21, 2008, at approximately 2:10 a.m., after observing Mason commit a moving traffic violation, he activated the overhead lights on his police vehicle to conduct a stop of Mason. In response, Mason pulled the vehicle he was driving over to the side of the road known as Fernwood Drive. O\u2019Hara testified that Mason parked the vehicle properly. After determining that Mason\u2019s driver\u2019s license was revoked and after Mason was unable to provide proof of vehicle insurance, O\u2019Hara called for a backup unit to assist him. O\u2019Hara testified he observed that Mason had a noticeable odor of alcohol on his breath, that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, that his speech was slurred and that he was \u201cswaying\u201d after he exited the vehicle. These observations led O\u2019Hara to believe Mason was under the influence of alcohol and unable to safely operate a motor vehicle. Mason tacitly refused to perform any field sobriety tests. Mason told O\u2019Hara he had consumed two \u201cdrinks.\u201d After the backup arrived, O\u2019Hara placed Mason under arrest for driving while license revoked (DWR) and driving under the influence (DUI).\nAfter Mason was secured, O\u2019Hara joined the backup officers in a search of Mason\u2019s vehicle. O\u2019Hara went directly to the driver\u2019s side front door of the vehicle. Upon opening the door, O\u2019Hara \u201calmost\u201d immediately observed in the door handle area a clear, torn plastic bag containing a powdery, \u201crock-like\u201d substance and three \u201cchunks.\u201d O\u2019Hara took the substance into evidence. The vehicle Mason was driving was then towed. O\u2019Hara testified that based on the fact that no proof of insurance for the vehicle had been produced, it had to be towed from the scene. O\u2019Hara explained that when a vehicle is towed, the police conduct an inventory search of the vehicle, complete a tow report and stay with the vehicle until a tow driver arrives and receives the vehicle. O\u2019Hara acknowledged the vehicle Mason was driving did not belong to him.\nThe State moved for a directed finding on Mason\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. The trial court denied the State\u2019s motion. In doing so, the trial court stated, in part, that based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), \u201cthe search can no longer be considered incident to an arrest.\u201d The trial court observed that the videotape of the arrest clearly showed Mason was handcuffed and placed in the back of the police vehicle and had not left his driver\u2019s door open. For this reason, the trial court stated, \u201cso how the officers would have made a plain view sighting of the cocaine in the door without opening the door and going back into the vehicle is lost on the Court.\u201d The trial court also noted it was \u201chard pressed to understand what evidence of DUI would be found in the vehicle,\u201d as there was no indication Mason was drinking while he was driving the vehicle or that evidence he was driving while revoked could be found in the vehicle. With regard to the State\u2019s argument that the search of the vehicle was done pursuant to an inventory, the trial court stated, in part: \u201cI would think that if a simple inventory search would void out the ruling in Arizona versus Gant, the ruling in [that case] would be meaningless. However, that issue is not necessarily before me because the officer did not say that they searched for inventory purpose. That was hypothesized by the State.\u201d The trial court concluded the burden of proof had shifted to the State to prove the search of Mason\u2019s vehicle was lawful. The trial court stated its decision was based on the fact that Mason was in custody in the police car at the time the vehicle was searched and there was no indication the police were searching for evidence of the crimes for which Mason had been arrested. The trial court ordered the suppression hearing to continue.\nIn response to the trial court\u2019s ruling, the State recalled Officer O\u2019Hara and asked him, \u201cwhen searching a car when arresting someone for DUI, what are you looking for when you search the car?\u201d O\u2019Hara responded, \u201c[a]ny contraband, items of value that need to be secured, weapons.\u201d O\u2019Hara also testified that the Bolingbrook police department policy when a vehicle is towed is to conduct an inventory search to secure any items of value in the vehicle. To conduct the search, the vehicle and its compartments are searched and the doors, visors, and floors underneath the seats are examined. O\u2019Hara testified this was the procedure he followed with Mason\u2019s vehicle. O\u2019Hara also stated that when a driver\u2019s license is \u201csuspended or revoked and there is no insurance for the vehicle, [the police] are mandated to tow the vehicle.\u201d When asked to explain whether the mandate was a Boling-brook policy, O\u2019Hara answered, \u201c[n]o, it is by state law as far as I know.\u201d During closing argument, the State argued the police are authorized under their caretaking function to subject a vehicle to impoundment.\nIn ruling in favor of Mason, the trial court stated, in part, \u201cin the Court\u2019s opinion Arizona versus Gant *** is a bright line decision.\u201d The trial court opined that \u201cthe mere police policy to inventory a vehicle\u201d did not trump the ruling in Gant, lest the ruling be considered meaningless. The trial court made the following findings of fact with respect to the search: that there were at least four police officers at the scene; that Mason was handcuffed and inside a police vehicle; that at least two of the police officers entered Mason\u2019s vehicle to conduct what \u201ccould only be described as a random or ordinary search\u201d; that O\u2019Hara testified such searches are undertaken to look for contraband, weapons, and items of high value; that O\u2019Hara never stated he was looking for evidence of any further proof of the offenses of driving under the influence or driving while revoked; that there was no inference that open containers of alcohol were present in the vehicle; and that any policy of the Bolingbrook police department to inventory vehicles before turning them over to a tow driver did not overrule the requirement \u201cin this case\u201d to secure a search warrant to search the vehicle after Mason was placed into custody. The trial court suppressed the evidence of cocaine. The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment to proceed to trial on charges of aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol, aggravated driving while license revoked and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The trial court granted the State leave to file this appeal.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, the State asserts the trial court erred in granting Mason\u2019s motion to suppress the cocaine evidence because the police search of Mason\u2019s vehicle was both a search related to the crimes for which he was arrested and a search incident to an inventory. The State does not dispute that there was no basis for a search \u201cincident to arrest\u201d because Mason was restrained and in custody at the time of the search. The ruling of a trial court on a motion to suppress presents mixed questions of fact and of law. People v. James, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1050, 910 N.E.2d 168, 172 (2009). A trial court\u2019s factual findings are entitled to great deference and we will not disturb a trial court\u2019s findings of fact unless they are manifestly erroneous. People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 271, 898 N.E.2d 603, 609 (2008). A reviewing court remains free to undertake its own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues, however, and we may draw our own conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 271, 898 N.E.2d at 609. For this reason, we review a trial court\u2019s ultimate decision concerning whether to grant the motion to suppress de novo. James, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1050, 910 N.E.2d at 172.\nSubject to a few specific, well-defined exceptions, a search conducted without prior approval of a judge or magistrate is per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment. People v. Bridgewater, 235 Ill. 2d 85, 93, 918 N.E.2d 553, 557 (2009). As the trial court in this case noted, the United States Supreme Court, in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 337-38, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485, 493, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009), recently clarified the search-incident-to-arrest exception that applies to the warrantless search of a vehicle. In Gant, the Supreme Court emphasized that there are two circumstances under which a search of a vehicle incident to arrest is permissible. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 496, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. Under the first circumstance, law enforcement may search \u201ca vehicle incident to a recent occupant\u2019s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.\u201d Gant, 556 U.S. at 343, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 496, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. The second circumstance justifying the search of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest occurs \u201cwhen it is \u2018reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.\u2019 \u201d Gant, 556 U.S. at 343, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 496, 129 S. Ct. at 1719, quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905, 920, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 2137 (2004).\nIn the instant case, as noted above, the State does not dispute that the first Gant circumstance is not at issue here. Mason was handcuffed and secured in a police vehicle at the time of the search; therefore, he was not in reaching distance of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. The State argues, however, that the second Gant circumstance does apply in this case because the \u201ccontraband\u201d the police were searching for could include open alcohol containers, evidence that would support the charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The State\u2019s argument in this regard is undermined by the findings of the trial court, which did not believe the police acted under a reasonable belief that the vehicle contained evidence relevant to the crimes for which Mason had been placed under arrest. The trial court specifically described the search of Mason\u2019s vehicle as \u201ca random or ordinary search,\u201d noting that O\u2019Hara testified such searches are undertaken to look for contraband, weapons, and items of high value. The trial court further found that O\u2019Hara never stated he was looking for evidence of any further proof of the offenses of driving under the influence or driving while revoked and that there was no inference that open containers of alcohol were present in the vehicle. Giving the trial court\u2019s findings of fact their due deference, we conclude that the State cannot rest its \u201clawful search\u201d argument on the second Gant circumstance.\nWe also consider, however, that the trial court misinterpreted Gant in concluding the decision also stands for the proposition that the warrantless search of a vehicle pursuant to an impoundment inventory is prohibited. See People v. Clark, 394 Ill. App. 3d 344, 348, 914 N.E.2d 734, 737-38 (2009) (referencing Gant, but analyzing a search incident to the towing of a defendant\u2019s vehicle under different criteria). An inventory intrusion into a vehicle is tested for its constitutionality by the application of the fourth amendment standard of reasonableness. People v. Alewelt, 217 Ill. App. 3d 578, 579, 577 N.E.2d 809, 810-11 (1991). Where police inventory procedures are reasonable and administered in good faith, the inventory search will be deemed reasonable. Clark, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 348, 914 N.E.2d at 737-38. The purpose of the inventory search must be to protect the owner\u2019s property, to protect the police from claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger. Clark, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 348, 914 N.E.2d at 737-38. The inventory search must be conducted in good faith and not as a pretext for an investigatory stop. Clark, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 348, 914 N.E.2d at 737-38.\nThe threshold issue in considering whether the police have conducted a valid inventory search incident to a tow of defendant\u2019s vehicle is whether the impoundment of the vehicle is proper. Alewelt, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 579, 577 N.E.2d at 811. That a defendant\u2019s car would be left unattended is not a sufficient reason for impoundment unless the vehicle is illegally parked. Clark, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 348, 914 N.E.2d at 738. Law enforcement does have the authority, however, pursuant to its community caretaking function, to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience. Clark, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 348, 914 N.E.2d at 738. Where the police impound a vehicle based on a cognizable reason, an inventory search pursuant to the tow is justified. See Clark, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 349, 914 N.E.2d at 738-39 (finding the State failed to show arresting officer was acting in accordance with a standard police procedure where officer offered no testimony regarding the requirement that defendant\u2019s vehicle be towed). Although the State\u2019s evidence must support a finding that the decision to tow was based on a reasonable procedure, there is no requirement that the State present evidence of written procedures. Clark, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 349, 914 N.E.2d at 738-39.\nIn the instant case, O\u2019Hara testified that when a defendant is found to be driving with a suspended or revoked license and there is no insurance for the vehicle, he is mandated to tow the vehicle. Although O\u2019Hara was uncertain about the basis of the mandate, his decision to tow Mason\u2019s vehicle was based on a standardized procedure that was itself based on the cognizable reason that an uninsured vehicle operated by a driver with a revoked or suspended license must be towed. Because state law prohibits the operation on a public highway of a motor vehicle that is not covered by a liability insurance policy (625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 601 (West 2008)), we consider the procedure O\u2019Hara followed was a legitimate exercise of law enforcement\u2019s caretaking function. Furthermore, O\u2019Hara testified in detail regarding the procedure used to inventory a vehicle pursuant to an impoundment \u2014 a procedure we also find reasonable.\nIn conclusion, although we defer to the trial court\u2019s finding that the search of Mason\u2019s vehicle was not conducted pursuant to a reasonable belief that it contained evidence of the crimes for which he was arrested, we also conclude that the Gant decision did not expressly overrule those cases in which courts have sanctioned inventory searches pursuant to the proper impoundment of a vehicle. In the instant case, Mason\u2019s vehicle was properly subject to impoundment and the police conducted a reasonable inventory search before the vehicle was towed. For this reason, we reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling suppressing the cocaine evidence the police found and remand the cause for further proceedings.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nHOLDRIDGE, EJ., and WRIGHT, J., concur.\nMason also argued a motion to quash his arrest after which the trial court directed a verdict for the State.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Terry A. Mertel and Thomas D. Arado, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Melissa Maye, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appel-lee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TERRY MASON, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201409\u20140698\nOpinion filed August 31, 2010.\nJames Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Terry A. Mertel and Thomas D. Arado, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nMelissa Maye, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appel-lee." }, "file_name": "1048-01", "first_page_order": 1064, "last_page_order": 1071 }