{ "id": 4303504, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN BOHANNON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bohannon", "decision_date": "2010-09-10", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201408\u20140370", "first_page": "1074", "last_page": "1079", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "403 Ill. App. 3d 1074" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "902 N.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796", "parenthetical": "roadside safety checks may not amount to criminal investigations" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283090 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350", "parenthetical": "roadside safety checks may not amount to criminal investigations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/388/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "851 N.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" }, { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1588345 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/115/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474382 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Supp.", "case_ids": [ 2782314 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/280/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2855718 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 1010", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1016" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2569177 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 32", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9505377 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37-38" }, { "page": "341" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "902 N.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436006 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225-28" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0223-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 689, "char_count": 13062, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14486211358268378 }, "sha256": "265ef9bd909198df39121b0954cbb74d2f66c21de3e7fce27c63fbb8c5cdb034", "simhash": "1:9ed4b9881d239aa4", "word_count": 2130 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:11:09.619155+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN BOHANNON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Steven Bohannon, was charged with obstructing a peace officer under the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1 (West 2006)) in the circuit court of Johnson County. The circuit court dismissed the charge. On appeal, the State contends that the dismissal was improper. We affirm.\nFACTS\nAccording to reports of the Vienna police department, defendant was driving his vehicle alone, when he was stopped at a random roadside safety checkpoint. Upon stopping, Vienna Police Chief Jim Miller asked defendant to produce a driver\u2019s license and proof of insurance. Defendant refused. Chief Miller and other officers asked again and defendant again refused. Defendant was arrested after telling the officers that he would not produce the documents and that they would have to arrest him.\nDefendant was placed under arrest and charged by information with obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1 (West 2006)). The amended information stated as follows:\n\u201cThat on or about the 3rd day of July, 2007, in Johnson County, Illinois, the [defendant, STEVEN S. BOHANNON, committed the offense of OBSTRUCTING A POLICE OFFICER, in violation of [section 31 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1 (West 2006))], in that said [defendant knowingly resisted the performance of [Vienna Police Chief] Jim Miller, a person known by the [defendant to be a peace officer, of an authorized act within [Vienna Police Chief] Jim Miller\u2019s capacity, namely the investigation of the [defendant's Illinois driver\u2019s license and liability insurance coverage status, in that the [defendant refused to provide [Vienna Police Chief] Jim Miller with a valid Illinois driver\u2019s license and proof of liability insurance after [Vienna Police Chief] Jim Miller repeatedly asked the [defendant to provide [Vienna Police Chief] Jim Miller with a valid Illinois driver\u2019s license and proof of liability insurance coverage.\u201d\nAlthough the narrative of the police reports indicates that defendant was issued traffic citations for the failure to display his driver\u2019s license and proof of insurance, the record before this court does not contain any such citations or order of disposition on any traffic offense.\nThe trial court dismissed the charge of obstruction on the motion of defendant. The court noted that the allegations did not involve issues of officer safety or refusal to exit a vehicle. The court found that the alleged conduct more closely resembled a refusal to answer questions of a police officer than a physical act. The court ruled that the mere refusal to provide a driver\u2019s license and proof of insurance did not constitute obstruction of a peace officer.\nThe trial court denied the State\u2019s motion to reconsider and the State appealed.\nANALYSIS\nThe legislature has vested law enforcement with the authority to request a driver\u2019s license and proof of insurance. The Illinois Vehicle Code provides that a driver must carry a license and exhibit it when requested by a law enforcement official. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 112 (West 2006). This section states that a driver \u201cshall display such license or permit if it is in his possession upon demand made, when in uniform or displaying a badge or other sign of authority, by a *** police officer.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 112 (West 2006). The Illinois Vehicle Code further provides, \u201cAny person who fails to comply with a request by a law enforcement officer for display of evidence of insurance *** shall be deemed to be operating an uninsured motor vehicle.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 707(b) (West 2006).\nThe fate of any citations under either of these provisions is unclear from the record before this court. At issue on appeal is a charge of obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1 (West 2006)). On the relevant date, the Criminal Code of 1961 provided as follows:\n\u201c\u00a731 \u2014 1. Resisting or obstructing a peace officer or correctional institution employee.\n(a) A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer or correctional institution employee of any authorized act within his official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1(a) (West 2006).\nA person violates this provision only if he engages in conduct that \u201cresists or obstructs\u201d (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1(a) (West 2006)). This phrase has been the subject of much discussion. In Raby, the Illinois Supreme Court defined the terms:\n\u201c \u2018 \u201cResisting\u201d or \u201cresistance\u201d means \u201cwithstanding the force or effect of\u201d or the \u201cexertion of oneself to counteract or defeat\u201d. \u201cObstruct\u201d means \u201cto be or come in the way of\u201d. These terms are alike in that they imply some physical act or exertion. Given a reasonable and natural construction, these terms do not proscribe mere argument with a policeman about the validity of an arrest or other police action, but proscribe only some physical act which imposes an obstacle which may impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent!,] or delay the performance of the officer\u2019s duties, such as going limp, forcefully resisting arrest!,] or physically aiding a third party to avoid arrest.\u2019 \u201d People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 399, 240 N.E.2d 595, 599 (1968), quoting Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 959 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev\u2019d on other grounds sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 27 L. Ed. 2d 696, 91 S. Ct. 758 (1971).\nSee People v. Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d 223, 225, 811 N.E.2d 236, 238 (2004); People v. Meister, 289 Ill. App. 3d 337, 341, 682 N.E.2d 306, 308 (1997); People v. Weathington, 82 Ill. 2d 183, 186, 411 N.E.2d 862, 863 (1980); People v. Gibbs, 115 Ill. App. 2d 113, 117, 253 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1969); see also City of Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill. 2d 1, 3, 253 N.E.2d 400, 401 (1969).\nThe emphasis on whether defendant\u2019s conduct was a physical act is misplaced. Raby and its progeny reveal a concern that the phrase \u201cresists or obstructs\u201d is not defined so broadly that it places citizens in jeopardy of an arrest for mere verbal disagreement. Whether seen as more verbal or more physical, defendant\u2019s conduct undoubtedly subjected him to arrest. The legislature resolved any ambiguity regarding the level of physicality necessary for an arrest under the Illinois Vehicle Code by providing a definition for the word \u201cdisplay.\u201d The Illinois Vehicle Code provides as follows:\n\u201cFor the purposes of this section, \u2018display\u2019 means the manual surrender of his license certificate into the hands of the demanding officer for his inspection thereof.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 112 (West 2006).\nSee also 625 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 707 (West 2006) (operation of uninsured motor vehicle).\nThe authority of law enforcement officers to request identification and defendant\u2019s duty to comply are set forth in the Illinois Vehicle Code. The question is whether, in light of these provisions, the failure to comply also constitutes obstructing a peace officer under the Criminal Code of 1961. This is a question of statutory construction.\nContext can clarify. This case is distinct from instances in which a lesser-included offense for the same conduct is proscribed by another statute. See People v. Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d 223, 228, 811 N.E.2d 236, 240 (2004). The broad mandate against obstructing a peace officer in the Criminal Code of 1961 addresses varied conduct encountered by officers performing their duty to keep the peace. In contrast, the narrower language of the Illinois Vehicle Code is limited to traffic stops. The specific and tailored provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code requiring the display of the driver\u2019s license and proof of insurance dictate their application to this vehicle stop. In the words of Justice Day: \u201cIt is a well-settled principle of construction that specific terms covering the given subject-matter will prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling.\u201d Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 125, 49 L. Ed. 114, 123, 24 S. Ct. 797, 803 (1904).\nFundamentally, the resolution of this appeal goes beyond deciding which statute should be given priority. Extending the Criminal Code of 1961 to the case at hand would not merely go beyond placing an additional level of culpability on defendant for the same conduct. Indeed, the charges of obstructing a peace officer would be inexplicable without the authority granted to law enforcement in the applicable provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code.\nIn other words, the State invites a circular definition. The phrase \u201cknowingly resists or obstructs\u201d makes no sense in a vacuum. Any charge of obstructing a peace officer is derivative. Defendant\u2019s conduct is given meaning only in light of the context of \u201cthe performance by *** a peace officer *** of any authorized act within his official capacity.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1(a) (West 2006). This, of course, begs the question \u2014 What is the \u201cauthorized act\u201d?\nIn the case at hand, the request for the display of a license and proof of insurance was the authorized act. Notably, the Illinois Vehicle Code criminalizes the failure to display proper documents. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 112 (West 2006); People v. Steele, 366 Ill. App. 3d 220, 223, 851 N.E.2d 920, 923 (2006). Assuming the facts presented in the police reports, we conclude that defendant was not obstructing or resisting an investigation into whether the laws of Illinois were violated; he was committing the actual offenses proscribed by the Illinois Vehicle Code. See People v. Steele, 366 Ill. App. 3d 220, 223, 851 N.E.2d 920, 923 (2006); see People v. Hacker, 388 Ill. App. 3d 346, 350, 902 N.E.2d 792, 796 (2009) (roadside safety checks may not amount to criminal investigations). The conduct prohibited by the Illinois Vehicle Code was the failure to display.\nA charge of obstructing a peace officer must be premised on the officer\u2019s performance of an authorized act. In this case, defendant\u2019s conduct is the exact same criminal act prohibited by the statutes from which the premise for imposing the Criminal Code of 1961 derived. The acts alleged to be resistance and obstruction were subsumed in the provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code. This pyramid is an unsound structure.\nThe police reports suggest that defendant was objecting to the requests of law enforcement as a matter of principle. The argument in the field continued through the halls of the circuit court and left a trail of paper to the appellate court. If defendant reads this court\u2019s decision as a vindication of his actions, he would be wrong. The officers were authorized to request a license and proof of insurance and, indeed, might have been derelict in their duties if they had failed to do so. The officers were authorized to arrest defendant for his failure to display the documents, and their authority continued to actions incident to the arrest, such as placing defendant in custody and towing his vehicle. Nonetheless, aside from the actual offenses of the failure to display the requested documents, defendant did not impede the performance of the duties of the officers. Defendant did not resist being taken into custody, obstruct the towing of his vehicle, or provide misleading information. He simply violated the Illinois Vehicle Code.\nCONCLUSION\nAccordingly, the order of the circuit court is hereby affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWELCH, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" }, { "text": "JUSTICE WEXSTTEN,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. I believe that the defendant\u2019s conduct sufficiently supported a charge of obstructing a peace officer (see People v. Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d 223, 225-28, 811 N.E.2d 236, 238-41 (2004)), and I note that, sections 6 \u2014 112 and 7 \u2014 602 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 112, 7 \u2014 602 (West 2006)) aside, police agencies are conditionally authorized to conduct roadside checkpoints such as the one conducted in the present case (see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 341, 121 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2000); People v. Hacker, 388 Ill. App. 3d 346, 350-51, 902 N.E.2d 792, 796 (2009)). I further note that \u201c[o]ur supreme court has repeatedly held that the State\u2019s Attorney has a responsibility for evaluating the evidence and other pertinent factors in determining what offense can and should properly be charged\u201d and that \u201cwhen a defendant\u2019s act has violated more than one statute, and each statute requires different proof for conviction, even though there may be some overlapping, the defendant may be prosecuted under the statute which provides the greater penalty.\u201d People v. Coleman, 205 Ill. App. 3d 567, 577, 563 N.E.2d 1010, 1016 (1990).", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE WEXSTTEN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Tricia Turner Shelton, State\u2019s Attorney, of Vienna (Patrick Delfino, Stephen E. Norris, and David Murrell, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, Johannah B. Weber, and John H. Gleason, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN BOHANNON, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201408\u20140370\nOpinion filed September 10, 2010.\nRehearing denied September 28, 2010.\nWEXSTTEN, J, dissenting.\nTricia Turner Shelton, State\u2019s Attorney, of Vienna (Patrick Delfino, Stephen E. Norris, and David Murrell, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Johannah B. Weber, and John H. Gleason, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1074-01", "first_page_order": 1090, "last_page_order": 1095 }