{ "id": 4305525, "name": "ELIZABETH ZDEB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Zdeb v. Allstate Insurance", "decision_date": "2010-09-17", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20142774", "first_page": "113", "last_page": "124", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "404 Ill. App. 3d 113" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994690 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 1052", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5366605 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1058" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/1052-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059981 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "\"point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore forfeited\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265503 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "by failing to offer supporting legal authority or \"any reasoned argument,\" plaintiffs waived consideration of their argument" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5186859 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385754 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 903", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5389005 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0903-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266334 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615", "parenthetical": "\"reliance on Hoglund is misplaced. *** In the present case, there is only one tortfeasor\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2930313 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" }, { "page": "483" }, { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405907 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "333-34" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2907350 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534792 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" }, { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3282947 ], "weight": 19, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274-75" }, { "page": "275" }, { "page": "274-75" }, { "page": "275" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "277" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279-80" }, { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. App. 3d 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2664828 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "721" }, { "page": "721" }, { "page": "721-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/187/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3277987 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "559" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075623 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603236 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621662 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "\"We review appeals from summary judgment rulings de novo\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5783354 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0582-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 818, "char_count": 28898, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.34714842448343514 }, "sha256": "83deb68b14f39abbe6fbc076326d2c6a80c8709471f00705ce2125d0df12663b", "simhash": "1:dded6ed641a954cd", "word_count": 4594 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:54.131587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ELIZABETH ZDEB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Elizabeth Zdeb, a policyholder, filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of Cook County seeking a determination that defendant, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), was not entitled to a setoff on underinsured motorist coverage with monies paid to her for automobile medical payments coverage. Allstate moved for summary judgment pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005 (West 2008)), claiming that the provisions of her automobile insurance policy permitted the setoff. Plaintiff filed a response to Allstate\u2019s motion, and a cross-motion for summary judgment, claiming that a setoff is allowed only when a policyholder obtains double recovery. The trial court found the policy unambiguously permitted the setoff, granted Allstate\u2019s motion for summary judgment, and denied plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals and we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nThe underlying facts are not in dispute. On October 19, 2006, plaintiff was a pedestrian on a public sidewalk in Chicago when she was struck by an automobile driven by Kamil A. Scislowicz (Scislowicz). As a result, plaintiff sustained serious injuries, claiming damages in excess of $200,000.\nScislowicz\u2019s vehicle was insured by State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) under an automobile insurance policy that provided liability coverage limits of $50,000 per person for bodily injury. Plaintiff settled with State Farm for the full policy limit of $50,000.\nPlaintiff\u2019s policy with Allstate provided underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage with a limit of $100,000 for bodily injury and automobile medical payments (MP) coverage with a limit of $50,000. Plaintiff paid separate premium amounts for the UIM and MP coverages, as is normally done in an automobile insurance policy. Part 2 of the policy declaration explains \u201cautomobile medical payments coverage\u201d as follows:\n\u201cAllstate will pay to *** an insured person all reasonable expenses actually incurred for necessary medical treatment, medical services or medical products actually provided to the insured person. Hospital, medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, orthopedic and prosthetic devices, pharmaceuticals, eyeglasses, hearing aids, and professional nursing services *** are covered.\nPayments will be made only when bodily injury is caused by an accident involving an auto or when [the insured] *** is struck as a pedestrian by a motor vehicle ***.\u201d\nPart 6 of the policy declaration contains provisions concerning UIM coverage. That part contained a \u201cLimits of Liability\u201d section that included the following applicable setoff provision:\n\u201cDamages payable will be reduced by:\n1. all amounts paid by or on behalf of the owner or operator of the uninsured auto or anyone else responsible. This includes all sums paid under the bodily injury or property damage liability coverage of this or any other auto insurance policy.\n2. all amounts payable under any workers\u2019 compensation law, disability benefits law, or any similar automobile medical payments coverage.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nPlaintiff submitted a UIM claim for her injuries to Allstate in the amount of $50,000, which equaled her UIM coverage limit minus the settlement amount she received from State Farm. Allstate had paid plaintiff $38,952.53 in MP coverage.\nAllstate calculated plaintiffs UIM claim as follows: $100,000 would be set off by the $50,000 settlement she received from State Farm and the $38,952.53 that Allstate had paid her in MP coverage, for a total setoff amount of $88,952.53. Allstate tendered the balance of $11,047.47 to plaintiff.\nOn April 23, 2009, plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action against Allstate seeking a declaration that she was entitled to $50,000, which represents the full UIM limit for bodily injury less the settlement amount she received from State Farm. On July 1, 2009, Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that it was entitled to set off the MP paid to plaintiff in the amount of $38,952.53.\nOn August 14, plaintiff filed a response to Allstate\u2019s motion for summary judgment and a cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff responded that summary judgment in favor of Allstate was improper because the MP coverage is a separate and distinct portion of plaintiffs insurance policy and claimed that a setoff is only allowed to prevent a double recovery.\nAfter hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court issued a written memorandum and order finding that the policy provisions unambiguously allowed Allstate to set off the UIM coverage by any settlement amount and payments made under the MP coverage.\nFurthermore, the trial court found that the purpose of UIM coverage is to place a policyholder in the same position had the underinsured motorist carried liability insurance in the same amount as the policyholder. The trial court concluded that in allowing Allstate to set off the UIM coverage by Scislowicz\u2019s settlement amount and the amount paid to plaintiff under her MP coverage placed plaintiff in the same position had she recovered $100,000 liability coverage from Scislowicz. As a result, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Allstate and denied plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment.\nThis appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Allstate and denying her cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that Allstate violated public policy when it reduced its underinsured motorist coverage by amounts paid for medical payments although the insurance policy unambiguously allowed for such a reduction.\nA trial court is permitted to grant summary judgment only \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2006). Construction of the terms of an insurance policy and whether the policy comports with statutory requirements are questions of law properly decided on a motion for summary judgment. See Librizzi v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 236 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587 (1992). The standard of review from the granting of summary judgment is de novo. Weather-Tite, Inc. v. University of St. Francis, 233 Ill. 2d 385, 389 (2009) (\u201cWe review appeals from summary judgment rulings de novo\u201d).\nWhen the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing court will give effect to those terms. Grevas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 152 Ill. 2d 407, 410 (1992); Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 78 Ill. 2d 420, 423-24 (1980). Here, the underinsured motorist coverage in the insurance policy provided, in pertinent part, that defendant\u2019s liability to plaintiff shall be reduced by the amount paid on behalf of the underinsured driver and \u201cany similar medical payments\u201d paid on behalf of defendant. The trial court found this language clear and unambiguous, and, on appeal, the parties do not contend that any ambiguity exists in the language of the insurance policy. \u201cParties to a contract may agree to any terms they choose unless their agreement is contrary to public policy.\u201d Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 559 (1992).\nUnderinsured motorist coverage is a statutory creation. Section 143a \u2014 2(4) of the Illinois Insurance Code (Code) requires automobile insurers to include underinsured-motorist coverage in policies that they issue. 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(4) (West 2004). Section 143a \u2014 2(4) of the Code defines an \u201cunderinsured motor vehicle\u201d as one which has resulted in bodily injury or death to the insured, and \u201cfor which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance policies or under bonds or other security\u201d be maintained by the person responsible for the vehicle is less than the limits of underinsured coverage provided the insured under his policy at the time of the accident. 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(4) (West 2004). Section 143a \u2014 2(4) further provides for the insurer\u2019s limits of liability as follows:\n\u201cThe limits of liability for an insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage shall be the limits of such coverage, less those amounts actually recovered under the applicable bodily injury insurance policies, bonds or other security maintained on the underinsured motor vehicle.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(4) (West 2004).\nIn Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548 (1992), our supreme court examined the public policy behind the underinsured motorist statute. In Sulser, plaintiff\u2019s husband was killed in a motor vehicle accident involving an underinsured motorist. Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 551. Defendant insurance company sought to reduce the plaintiff s UIM coverage by workers\u2019 compensations benefits plaintiff received on behalf of the husband. Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 553. The supreme court construed the legislative intent for providing underinsured motorist coverage was \u201cto place the insured in the same position he would have occupied if injured by a motorist who carried liability insurance in the same amount as [his underinsured motorists coverage].\u201d Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 558. The court further construed the public policy embodied in the underinsured motorist provision was \u201cdesigned to offer insurance to \u2018fill the gap\u2019 between the claim and the torfeasor\u2019s insurance\u201d and \u201cnot intended to allow the insured to recover amounts from the insurer over and above the coverage provided by the underinsured motorist policy.\u201d Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 556. The supreme court concluded that an automobile insurance policy provision allowing a setoff of workers\u2019 compensation benefits from underinsured motorist coverage was not contrary as to public policy and concluded that the insurance company was entitled to the setoff. Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 559.\nIn Adolphson v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 187 Ill. App. 3d 718 (1989), the Third District of the Illinois Appellate Court examined whether medical payments could be a setoff from underinsured motorist coverage. In Adolphson, as in the case at bar, the plaintiff-insured filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that her insurer, Country Mutual Insurance Company (Country Mutual), was not entitled to set off UIM coverage with MP coverage amounts paid to her. Adolphson, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 719. Plaintiffs automobile insurance policy included a provision that allowed a setoff of UIM coverage by any amounts paid by the underinsured driver and any MP amounts paid to her by Country Mutual. Adolphson, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 719.\nThe plaintiffs policy contained a $100,000 UIM coverage limit and an unspecified limit in MP coverage. Adolphson, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 719. The plaintiff suffered injuries in an automobile accident and claimed damages in the amount of $113,200. The tortfeasor\u2019s insurer settled with the plaintiff for $30,000. Country Mutual paid plaintiff $13,111.43 in MP coverage and paid the $56,888.57 balance in UIM coverage. In total, plaintiff received her $100,000 UIM coverage limit minus the amount recovered by the tortfeasor\u2019s insurer ($30,000) and minus the amount Country Mutual paid to plaintiff under its MP coverage ($13,111.43). Adolphson, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 719.\nIn interpreting the underinsured motorist statute, the Adolphson court found that the statute does not enumerate all deductions which may be claimed by an insurer, but rather sets a \u201cmaximum, or ceiling\u201d the insurer must pay. Adolphson, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 721. In addition, the court found that \u201c[njothing in the statute prevents the insurer from reducing its liability by amounts paid under other coverages in the same policy.\u201d Adolphson, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 721. The court found the insurance policy at issue unambiguously allowed such a reduction in UIM coverage by amounts paid under MP coverage, and thus, concluded that the insurer was entitled to the setoff. Adolphson, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 721-22.\nSimilarly, in the case at bar, plaintiff purchased an automobile insurance policy through Allstate which contained a $100,000 UIM coverage limit and $50,000 in MP coverage. The insurance policy also contained a provision under UIM coverage that allowed Allstate a setoff of any MP payments paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident, and sustained damages in excess of her UIM coverage limit. The driver\u2019s insurance company settled with the plaintiff for the driver\u2019s liability coverage limit of $50,000. Plaintiff recovered the remaining $50,000 difference when Allstate paid plaintiff $38,952.53 in MP coverage and the $11,047.47 balance.\nAs with the Adolphson court, we find nothing in the statute that prevents Allstate from reducing its liability by amounts paid under other coverages in the same policy since the policy authorizes the credits. In addition, under Sulser, Allstate\u2019s setoff provision is not contrary to any known public policy. The reduction did not prevent plaintiff from receiving the difference between the underinsured driver\u2019s insurance and the amount of UIM coverage provided in her policy. See Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 556. Accordingly, we find that the setoff provision in the Allstate policy was consistent with the underinsured motorist statute and the public policy behind the statute and, therefore, was valid.\nPlaintiff relies on Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 148 Ill. 2d 272 (1992), in support of her argument that allowing a setoff when there is no danger of double recovery violates public policy and that the payment of multiple premiums creates a reasonable expectation of multiple coverages in the insured.\nHoglund was consolidated with Greenawalt v. State Farm Insurance Co., 210 Ill. App. 3d 543 (1991), as both cases involved similar facts. In each consolidated case, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with a motorist who was insured while she was a passenger in a vehicle driven by a motorist who was not insured. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 274. Both drivers were at fault, and the plaintiff suffered injuries that exceeded the combined coverage limits of the insured driver and her uninsured motorist coverage. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 274-75. The plaintiff settled with the insured driver and received the insured driver\u2019s liability coverage limit of $100,000. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 275. The plaintiff then sought to obtain the limit of the uninsured motorist coverage under her own automobile insurance policy of $100,000. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 274-75. Plaintiff\u2019s policy also contained a setoff provision stating that any amounts paid or payable to the insured \u201cby or for any person or organization who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily injury to the insured.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 275. The defendant insurance company claimed that the setoff for the uninsured motorist coverage of $100,000 by the $100,000 paid by the insured motorist, left nothing available. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 276.\nThe supreme court in Hoglund first considered that the public policy behind the uninsured motorist provision was to place the insured in \u201csubstantially the same position as if the wrongful uninsured driver had been minimally insured.\u201d Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 277, citing Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance Co., 48 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (1970), and Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass\u2019n, 57 Ill. 2d 330, 335 (1974). The court found that the literal interpretation of each policy\u2019s setoff provision warranted the complete setoff. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 278. However, the court found that each setoff provision could not be read in isolation, but must be considered in conjunction with each plaintiff\u2019s reasonable expectation of receiving uninsured motorist coverage because she paid a premium for it, the public policy behind the uninsured motorist statute, the coverage intended by the insurance policy, and the facts of the case. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 279.\nIn viewing the setoff provisions in that way, the court found that each plaintiff reasonably expected to receive coverage for damages caused by an uninsured motorist, but the policies allowed the insurance company a setoff of monies paid by the insured motorist for that driver\u2019s fault in the accident, which was unrelated to the fault of the uninsured motorist. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 279. The court also found that a literal interpretation frustrated the public policy behind the uninsured motorist statute because the plaintiffs would not be placed in the same position if the uninsured driver had liability coverage. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 279-80. The court reasoned that if the uninsured driver had been insured, plaintiff would receive compensation from both drivers\u2019 liability coverage. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 280. However, the literal interpretation allowed the insurance company to set off the monies paid to plaintiff by the insured driver against the plaintiff\u2019s uninsured motorist coverage effectively nullified the uninsured motorist coverage. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 280. As a result, the court found that the setoff provision denied the plaintiff the \u201cvery insurance protection\u201d for which she had paid premiums and thus created a latent ambiguity. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 280. The court construed the policy in favor of coverage to the insured and concluded that the insurance company was entitled to a setoff against the uninsured motorist coverage only to the extent necessary to prevent double recovery. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 280.\nBased on the decision in Hoglund, plaintiff in the case at bar claims that Allstate is not entitled to a setoff because there is no danger of double recovery even if she received the limits of both her HIM coverage and MP coverage.\nWe agree with plaintiff that Hoglund is not limited to uninsured motorist cases. See Banes v. Western States Insurance Co., 247 Ill. App. 3d 480, 483 (1993). However, we find that plaintiffs reliance on Hoglund is misplaced.\nIn Hoglund, the concern for double recovery arose because there was more than one tortfeasor in each accident, as the monies paid by one tortfeasor acted to reduce the recoverable damages from the remaining tortfeasor. See Banes, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 483, citing Greenawalt, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 547, and Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 272. \u201cWithout such a reduction, a plaintiff could receive damages in excess of her injuries, resulting in double recovery.\u201d Greenawalt, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 547.\nPlaintiff has not provided us any case authority where Hoglund has been applied to situations involving only one tortfeasor. Yet, several Illinois Appellate Court cases have found that Hoglund does not apply in situations involving a single tortfeasor. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Coe, 367 Ill. App. 3d 604, 615 (2006) (\u201creliance on Hoglund is misplaced. *** In the present case, there is only one tortfeasor\u201d); Banes, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 484-85; Darwish v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 246 Ill. App. 3d 903, 907-08 (1993); Marroquin v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 245 Ill. App. 3d 406, 408 (1993); Obenland v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 234 Ill. App. 3d 99, 110-11 (1992). In the case at bar, there is only one tortfeasor. In addition, there is no latent ambiguity in the plaintiffs policy as applied that requires us to construe coverage in favor of plaintiff. Accordingly, we find that Hoglund does not apply.\nPlaintiff also has not provided us any case authority that would show a violation of public policy to allow a setoff where there is no double recovery by the plaintiff. Points raised but not argued or supported with authority in a party\u2019s brief are deemed waived. Roiser v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 367 Ill. App. 3d. 559, 568 (2006) (by failing to offer supporting legal authority or \u201cany reasoned argument,\u201d plaintiffs waived consideration of their argument); People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005) (\u201cpoint raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore forfeited\u201d); In re Marriage of Bates, 212 111. 2d 489, 517 (2004) (\u201cA reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with relevant authority cited\u201d); Ferguson v. Bill Berger Associates, Inc., 302 111. App. 3d 61, 78 (1998) (\u201cit is not necessary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue\u201d by failing to offer case citation or other support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires); 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7) (argument in appellate brief must be supported by citation to legal authority and factual record).\nPlaintiffs argument that allowing setoffs where there is no double recovery violates public policy is not persuasive. The public policy considerations the supreme court made in Hoglund, do not deviate from its determination of the public policy behind the underinsured motorist statute in Sulser. The supreme court in Sulser construed the public policy embodied in the underinsured motorist statute was not only to offer insurance between an insured\u2019s claim and the tortfeasor\u2019s insurance, but also to prevent the insured from recovering \u201camounts from the insurer over and above the coverage provided by the under-insured motorist policy.\u201d Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 556. The supreme court in Hoglund reflected that latter concern by allowing a setoff to the extent necessary to prevent double recovery. If the plaintiffs in Hoglund suffered damages that did not amount to the full liability limit of both tortfeasors\u2019 policies, then a setoff was necessary to prevent plaintiffs from recovering amounts from the insurer over and above the coverage provided by their underinsured motorist policies.\nHere, double recovery from two or more tortfeasors was not at issue. Moreover, the setoff provision in the Allstate policy is in accordance with the well-established public policy behind the underinsured motorist statute, which is to \u201cfill the gap\u201d between the amount recovered from the underinsured driver\u2019s insurance and the amount of coverage provided in the insured\u2019s policy. Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 556 (1992). Plaintiff contracted for $100,000 in UIM coverage and was entitled to a total recovery of that amount. Plaintiff received $50,000 from State Farm and recovered the remaining $50,000 when Allstate paid plaintiff $38,952.53 in MP coverage and the $11,047.47 balance. As applied, the setoff provision here does not conflict with the underinsured motorist statute or the public policy embodied in that statute and was, therefore, valid.\nPlaintiff also claims that she had a reasonable expectation of coverage under both UIM and MP coverages because she paid premiums on both. Again, plaintiff relies on Hoglund, where the supreme court considered in its analysis that each plaintiff paid a premium for the uninsured motorist coverage and found that a policyholder would be denied substantial economic value in return for the premiums that he or she paid if a setoff provision eliminated that coverage. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 279.\nWe find that argument not persuasive. In Hoglund, the supreme court found that the policyholder \u201cbelieved that he was purchasing uninsured motorist protection,\u201d but the setoff provision, as applied, nullified that coverage. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 278. As applied, the policyholders essentially paid for underinsured motorist coverage premiums without any benefit. In the case at a bar, however, the setoff provision did not nullify plaintiff\u2019s UIM coverage or MP coverage. Plaintiff received amounts from both coverages for which the total amount equaled the difference between the underinsured motorist\u2019s liability and her UIM coverage, which is the purpose of the UIM coverage that she purchased. See 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(4) (West 2004); Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 556.\nPlaintiff further argues that she should be entitled to recover separately under UIM and MP coverages because she paid separate premiums for those coverages. Plaintiff relies on Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass\u2019n, 57 Ill. 2d 330 (1974), for support.\nIn Glidden, the plaintiff was able to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of his three separate automobile insurance policies purchased from the same insurance company. Glidden, 57 Ill. 2d at 336. The policies contained the provision that if there is \u201cother insurance\u201d the insurance company was liable for only a pro rata portion of the damages from the total of all coverages available to the insured. Glidden, 57 Ill. 2d at 333-34.\nThe defendant insurance company argued that its obligation to the plaintiff under each of the three policies would be prorated to take into account monies paid to plaintiff under the other two policies. Glidden, 57 Ill. 2d at 334. Thus, the insurer argued that its obligation was $3,333.33 under each policy because each policy had a coverage limit of $10,000. Glidden, 57 Ill. 2d at 334. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that he should recover the full amount of uninsured motorist coverage under each policy for a total of $30,000. Glidden, 57 Ill. 2d at 332. The supreme court agreed and held that an ambiguity existed with respect to the \u201cother insurance\u201d clause as applied to the multiple policies and resolved that ambiguity in favor of the plaintiff. Glidden, 57 Ill. 2d at 336.\nIn the case at bar, plaintiff observes in her appellate brief that the Adolphson court considered the same argument. In Adolphson, the court distinguished Glidden for the following reasons: (1) Glidden involved the stacking of multiple policies with the same coverage; (2) there existed an ambiguity in the extent of coverage and exclusions in the policy; and (3) the plaintiff paid separate premiums in each of his three policies as opposed to one policy.\nThose same distinguishing factors in Adolphson are present in the case at a bar. This case does not involve the stacking of multiple policies; the policy is clear and unambiguous; and plaintiff paid for one policy. Plaintiff further argues that Adolphson is not applicable because it was decided before Hoglund. However, plaintiff does not explain how Hoglund prevents us from considering the same distinguishing factors that the third district considered in Adolphson.\nMoreover, separate premium payments for separate coverages in the same policy do not per se entitle an insured to recover under both coverages. Costello v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 263 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1058 (1993). An automobile insurance policy is a contract between the policyholder and the insurance company, and the policyholder is bound by the policy\u2019s terms so long as those terms do not violate public policy. Stryker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 74 Ill. 2d 507, 513 (1978).\nIn the case at bar, plaintiff contracted for $100,000 in UIM coverage, with a setoff provision that allowed Allstate to reduce that coverage by any amount received by the underinsured driver and any MP monies that Allstate paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff was injured by an underinsured driver and settled with the driver\u2019s insurance company for $50,000. The Illinois underinsured motorist statute required Allstate to \u201cfill the gap\u201d between the amount the plaintiff recovered from the underinsured driver and the amount of coverage provided in her insurance policy, i.e., $50,000. See 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(4) (West 2004); Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 556. Plaintiff recovered from Allstate $38,952.53 in MP coverage and $11,047.47 in UIM coverage for a total of $50,000. Under the terms of her insurance policy and statutory provisions, plaintiff received the full amount of UIM coverage to which she was entitled. Thus, we find no violation of public policy here. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate and denied plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court of Cook County in granting Allstate\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment.\nAffirmed.\nJ. GORDON and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.\nPlaintiff claims that the appellate court in Banes v. Western States Insurance Co., 247 Ill. App. 3d 480, 482 (1993), \u201cstated that \u2018it would be a violation of public policy to allow a setoff where there is no double recovery by the plaintiff.\u2019 \u201d This is incorrect. The Banes court made this statement only in the context of discussing what the trial court found.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ocasek, of Cooney & Conway, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Peter C. Morse and Daniel J. James, both of Morse Bolduc & Dinos, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ELIZABETH ZDEB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20142774\nOpinion filed September 17, 2010.\nJames E. Ocasek, of Cooney & Conway, of Chicago, for appellant.\nPeter C. Morse and Daniel J. James, both of Morse Bolduc & Dinos, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0113-01", "first_page_order": 129, "last_page_order": 140 }